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Summary		In	recent	years,	the	most	technologically	advanced	militaries	in	the	world	have	toiled	 against	 guerrilla	 forces.	 Counterinsurgent	 doctrine	 focuses	 on	 a	government’s	 lack	 of	 popular	 support	 to	 explain	 this.	 Academic	 literature,	however,	currently	treats	popular	mobilisation	as	a	dependent	variable,	rather	than	using	it	as	a	framework	for	understanding	the	dynamics	and	outcomes	of	civil	wars.			This	 thesis	 represents	 a	 first	 step	 to	 address	 this	 disparity	 and	 incorporate	popular	support	into	the	comparative	study	of	civil	war	outcomes.	I	explore	what	popular	support	provides	conflict	actors,	what	determines	population	behaviour	and	 how	 the	 ability	 of	 conflict	 actors	 to	 generate	 support	 determines	 the	dynamics	and	outcome	of	a	conflict.	I	conclude	that	popular	support,	or	the	battle	for	‘hearts	and	minds’,	is	crucial	to	the	power	of	conflict	actors,	but	only	when	it	is	understood	as	a	contribution,	not	shared	preferences.			Based	 on	 this	 analysis	 I	 propose	 a	 framework	 for	 studying	 civil	 conflict	 that	focuses	on	the	regenerative	capacity	of	the	two	belligerents.	The	key	battleground	in	 any	 civil	 war	 is	 rebel	 efforts	 to	 degrade	 the	 sovereign	 structures	 the	government	uses	to	generate	support	from	the	population.	If	rebels	can	achieve	this,	 the	government	collapses	and	the	rebels	can	win	the	war	even	if	 they	are	smaller	or	fail	to	score	any	battlefield	successes.		I	test	this	model	using	a	quantitative	analysis	of	65	civil	wars	and	four	in-depth	cases	studies.	Overall	there	is	strong	empirical	support	for	the	model	of	conflict	developed	 in	 this	 thesis,	 raising	 a	 number	 of	 theoretical	 and	 practical	implications.	 Most	 importantly,	 I	 find	 that	 strengthening	 institutions	 of	governance,	be	they	formal	or	informal,	 is	the	best	method	for	governments	to	defeat	rebel	groups,	while	rebels	win	by	undermining	socioeconomic	activity.	
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Introduction	
	The	 recent	Western	 interventions	 in	 Iraq	and	Afghanistan	have	 seen	 the	most	technologically	advanced	militaries	in	the	world	fail	to	eliminate	bands	of	poorly-trained,	 poorly-armed	 guerrillas.	 Perhaps	more	 vexingly,	 they	 failed	 to	 defeat	them	 despite	 inflicting	 enormous	 damage	 on	 these	 militant	 groups	 on	 the	battlefield.	According	to	some	sources,	the	Taliban	had	around	2,000	fighters	in	2001.	Somewhere	between	20,000	and	30,000	Taliban	were	killed	between	2001	and	 2014,	 not	 to	 mention	 the	 tens	 of	 thousands	 that	 were	 seriously	 injured,	captured	or	reintegrated.	Yet,	in	2014,	the	Taliban	reportedly	numbered	around	60,000	 (Dawl,	 2014).	 The	 Taliban’s	 growth	 did	 not	 come	 from	 some	 hidden	material	 power	 borne	 out	 of	 the	 use	 of	 asymmetric	 tactics	 (Thornton,	 2006).	Asymmetric	tactics	did	not	allow	it	to	stand	toe-to-toe	with	Western	forces.	It	lost	ten	to	 fifteen	times	 its	original	 fighting	force	and	one-third	to	a	half	of	 its	 final	force;	yet	it	grew	throughout	this	period.			To	explain	this	phenomenon	the	US	has	rewritten	its	counterinsurgency	doctrine,	focusing	on	securing	the	support	of	local	populations	(US	Army,	2007).	Billions	of	dollars	have	been	invested	in	conflict	zones	on	developing	governance	structures,	providing	 basic	 services,	 securing	 local	 populations	 and	 direct	 payments	 to	communities	 (Kilcullen,	 2012).	Western	governments	 are	not	 the	only	 conflict	actors	 that	 have	 expended	 resources	 on	 attempting	 to	 shape	 population	behaviour.	 Rebel	 groups	 build	 governance	 structures	 and	 provide	 services	(Mampilly,	2011).	Both	rebels	and	governments	attack	civilian	targets	(Eck	and	Hultman,	 2007).	 ISIL	 produces	 enormous	 amounts	 of	 propaganda	designed	 to	influence	populations.	All	of	these	resources	could	be	spent	on	projecting	military	strength,	 but	 belligerents	 choose	 to	 use	 them	 instead	 to	 influence	 population	behaviour.	 Clearly,	 conflict	 actors	 expect	 a	 return	 on	 this	 activity	 and	 must	calculate	 it	 to	 be	 larger	 than	 if	 those	 same	 resources	 were	 used	 for	 military	purposes.		Explaining	these	two	inter-linked	puzzles	represents	the	objective	of	this	thesis.	Why	do	belligerents	expend	resources	on	shaping	population	behaviour	that	they	
	
	
	
	
2	
could	 use	 on	military	 activity?	 And,	 how	 does	 this	 explain	 small	 rebel	 groups	defeating	strong	governments?	This	thesis	will	show	that	understanding	the	role	popular	support	plays	in	determining	civil	war	outcomes	also	offers	an	answer	as	to	why	small	rebel	groups	are	able	to	combat	better-trained	and	more	numerous	forces,	and	in	some	cases	defeat	them.			I	will	argue	that	civil	wars	are	best	described	as	competitions	to	mobilise	support	and	resources	from	the	population.	Through	the	course	of	the	war,	belligerents	both	seek	to	build	resilient	alliances	with	the	population	and	degrade	those	of	their	opponent.	After	creating	a	resilient	alliance	with	sections	of	the	population,	small	 rebel	 groups	 can	 use	 asymmetric	 tactics,	 such	 as	 guerrilla	 warfare	 or	terrorism,	 to	 focus	 on	 degrading	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 government	 to	 generate	support	 from	the	population.	As	government	authority	erodes,	rebels	generate	more	support	from	the	population,	which	allows	them	to	regenerate	in	the	face	of	 government	 efforts	 to	 wipe	 them	 out.	 Rebels	 select	 a	 military	 strategy	 –	asymmetric	or	conventional	–	based	on	balancing	expected	losses	against	their	regenerative	 capacity,	 and	 drag	 the	 government	 into	 a	 military	 stalemate.	Eventually	the	costs	of	the	war	overwhelm	the	government	and	the	rebels	win	without	having	to	defeat	the	government	directly.	Governments	can	only	prevent	rebels	from	achieving	this	if	they	can	break	rebel	capacity	to	mobilise	support	and	replace	resources	expended	on	the	battlefield.			Framing	war	 in	this	way	shows	why	belligerents	expend	resources	on	shaping	population	behaviour	rather	than	military	activity	and	why	small	rebel	groups	can	defeat	strong	governments	without	winning	on	the	battlefield.			The	 thesis	 also	 makes	 a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 both	 policy-making	 and	academic	 debates	 in	 a	 broader	 sense.	 Despite	 the	 continued	 propensity	 for	Western	governments	to	intervene	in	civil	wars	overseas,	comparative	studies	of	how	civil	wars	end	remain	limited,	especially	when	compared	to	studies	of	civil	war	onset.	Those	studies	there	have	been	do	not	fit	with	the	approach	taken	by	practitioners	of	conflict,	be	they	insurgent	or	government.		
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Western	interventions	in	civil	wars,	both	diplomatic	and	military,	are	taking	place	without	 political	 science	 comparatively	 testing	 the	 logic	 underpinning	 the	strategies	 employed	 in	 these	 conflict	 zones.	 Policymakers	 rely	 principally	 on	regional	 experts	 and	 qualitative	 doctrinal	 proscriptions	 when	 they	 do	 use	academia	 to	 guide	 conflict	 intervention	 strategies.	 These	 proscriptions	 often	come	from	those	that	failed	to	find	solutions	in	the	‘last’	war	(Mumford	and	Reis,	2013).	As	a	consequence,	analysts	in	Western	capitals	still	struggle	to	predict	and	influence	the	dynamics	and	outcomes	of	civil	wars.			This	 thesis	 will	 seek	 to	 redress	 this	 disconnect,	 bringing	 together	 existing	theoretical	 and	 empirical	 studies	 to	 enrich	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	 the	relationship	 between	 conflict	 actors	 and	 the	 population	 determines	 conflict	outcomes.	 It	will	 also	 create	 a	 framework	 for	 testing	doctrinal	 and	qualitative	propositions	 driving	 Western	 interventions	 in	 civil	 wars.	 Counterinsurgency	doctrine	suggests	that	improvements	in	economic	opportunities	and	the	delivery	of	services,	the	strength	of	governance	institutions	and	democratisation,	as	well	as	improving	local	security	will	correlate	with	governments	either	winning	wars	outright	or	at	least	surviving	into	the	post-war	period.	For	rebels,	the	opposite	holds;	 undermining	 economic	 opportunities	 and	 services,	 weakening	government	institutions	and	destabilising	society	will	correlate	with	insurgents	defeating	 governments.	 The	 theory	 developed	 in	 this	 thesis	 will	 argue	 that	changes	in	these	variables	determine	civil	war	outcomes	because	they	undermine	the	ability	of	the	opposing	belligerent	to	generate	resources	from	the	population,	either	leading	it	to	collapse	or	gradually	fade	away	as	it	uses	up	its	resources	on	the	battlefield.			The	 empirical	 section	 of	 the	 thesis	 offers	 strong	 support	 for	 these	 notions.	 A	comparative	 study	 of	 sixty-five	 insurgencies	 shows	 that	 changes	 in	 these	variables	correlate	with	governments	surviving	or	rebels	winning	as	we	would	expect.	 Improvements	 in	 governance	 means	 governments	 are	 more	 likely	 to	survive	 civil	 wars.	 In	 contrast,	 a	 decline	 in	 governance	 and	 socioeconomic	conditions	means	 rebels	 are	 likely	 to	 defeat	 governments.	 Four	 in-depth	 case	studies	reinforce	these	findings.	The	government	in	Burundi	agreed	to	a	range	of	
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democratic	 reforms,	 which	 undermined	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 rebels	 to	 generate	support	 from	 the	 population,	 forcing	 them	 to	 lay	 downs	 their	 weapons	 and	engage	with	 the	political	process.	Rebels	 in	Cambodia	and	Zimbabwe	defeated	incumbent	 governments	 by	 developing	 resilient	 relationships	 with	 the	population	 and	 undermining	 the	 government’s	 ability	 to	 provide	 economic	benefits	 to	 the	 population	 in	 exchange	 for	 active	 support.	 Rebels	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 and	 Zimbabwe	 created	 a	 climate	 of	 insecurity	 that	 led	 to	 the	governments’	 constituent	 populations	 leaving	 afflicted	 areas	 and	 refusing	 to	provide	support	to	the	government.			The	 theory	and	 the	cases	also	 imply	 that	alliances	between	conflict	actors	and	populations	 are	 based	 on	 a	 range	 of	 factors	 such	 as	 violence,	 population	displacement	 or	 informal	 patronage	 networks.	 While	 acknowledging	 this,	 the	thesis	 below	 will	 mainly	 focus	 on	 formal	 national-level	 state-building	 as	 a	mechanism	 for	 defeating	 rebels,	 and	 insurgent	 efforts	 to	 undermine	 these	processes,	as	this	still	forms	the	core	element	of	Western	theories	of	intervention	in	civil	wars	(Petersen,	2011).		Exploring	the	tenets	of	counterinsurgency	theory	shows	strong	support	for	the	importance	of	building	formal	institutions,	and	rebel	efforts	to	undermine	them,	in	 determining	 the	 outcome	 of	 civil	 wars.	 However,	 it	 also	 shows	 that	 how	delivering	services,	improving	governance	and	securing	the	population	work	to	defeat	rebels	needs	to	be	better	understood.	Current	Western	interventions	are	focused	on	population	acquiescence	and	 legitimacy	(JCS,	2013).	Exploring	how	governance,	development	and	security	actually	affect	the	outcome	of	civil	wars,	shows	 that	 their	 impact	 is	 better	 explained	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 behavioural	contribution	 they	 induce	 from	 the	 population.	 Moreover,	 this	 contribution	 is	driven	by	the	local,	individual	and	within-war	incentives	they	create,	not	shared	community	preferences	for	the	post-war	environment.			Before	laying	out	and	testing	this	process,	the	first	part	of	this	thesis	will	survey	the	current	literature	on	civil	war	outcomes	and	popular	mobilisation	in	order	to	form	a	baseline	for	the	rest	of	the	study.				
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Comparative	and	quantitative	literature		Comparative	academic	literature	on	civil	war	outcomes	has	historically	ignored	the	role	of	the	population.	Instead,	either	explicitly	or	implicitly,	it	has	adapted	models	drawn	from	the	study	of	interstate	conflict.	Formal	models	of	interstate	conflict	describe	a	 two-player	game	 in	which	differing	expectations	over	an	ex	
ante	balance	of	power	cause	both	players	to	believe	they	are	better	off	paying	the	costs	of	engaging	in	military	combat	to	achieve	their	goals,	rather	than	accept	the	peace	on	offer	(Blainey,	1988;	Reiter,	2009;	Slantchev,	2003).	It	assumes	unitary	actors	with	fixed	power	at	the	start	of	the	conflict.			Dan	Reiter	(2009),	building	on	Geoffrey	Blainey’s	On	the	Causes	of	War	(1988),	argues	that	once	war	breaks	out,	battles	reveal	information	that	alter	perceptions	about	 the	 likelihood	 of	 winning	 and	 the	 costs	 that	 need	 to	 be	 expended	 to	triumph.	Providing	the	belligerents	overcome	credible	commitment	problems,	as	the	 true	 balance	 of	 power	 is	 revealed,	 both	 actors	 identify	 a	 settlement	 that	divides	 the	object	 in	dispute	without	having	 to	pay	 the	costs	of	continuing	 the	conflict.	Both	actors	are	better	off	than	if	they	had	fought	the	war	to	its	conclusion.	If	they	continue	to	disagree	on	the	balance	of	power,	the	war	resumes	until	there	is	another	battle,	revealing	further	information.	Reiter’s	book	is	principally	about	interstate	wars	and	he	 supports	his	hypothesis	with	a	number	of	 cases.	Other	scholars	 have	 also	 found	 strong	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 support	 for	 this	approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	 interstate	 conflict	 (Fearon,	 1995;	 Ramsay,	 2008;	Slantchev,	2003).			
Comparative	literature	on	civil	war	endings	
	Reiter	states	this	model	can	be	applied	to	civil	conflict	as	well,	using	the	American	Civil	War	 as	 his	 example	 (2009).	Many	 other	 scholars	 also	 tried	 to	 apply	 this	model	of	conflict	to	explain	civil	war	dynamics	and	outcomes.			DeRouen	 and	 Sobek	 claim	 “(t)he	 interactions	 of	 rebels	 and	 governments	ultimately	determine	the	course	of	events	 in	a	civil	war”	(DeRouen	and	Sobek,	
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2004;	p304).	Cunningham,	Gleditsch	and	Salehyan	 reinforced	 this	notion;	 “the	outcome	 and	 duration	 …	 (being)	 a	 function	 of	 the	 balance	 of	 the	 military	capabilities	between	the	state	and	rebels”	(2009;	p572).		Using	 this	 logic,	 scholars	 first	 examined	 the	 role	 of	 state	 capacity	 in	 shaping	conflict	 dynamics	 and	 outcomes.	 Articles	 focusing	 on	 state	 capacity	 revealed	interesting	insights	(Collier	et	al.,	2004;	DeRouen	and	Sobek,	2004;	Fearon,	2004).	However,	by	applying	a	 static	balance	of	power	 framework	 they	 failed	 to	 fully	explain	some	of	their	empirical	findings.			Scholars	attempted	to	improve	these	models	by	adding	variables	measuring	rebel	strength.	 Cunningham,	Gleditsch	 and	 Salehyan	 argued	 that	many	 of	 the	 above	articles	 fail	 to	 fully	 capture	 civil	 war	 dynamics	 because	 they	 only	 look	 at	 the	government	(2009;	p571).	By	presenting	and	analysing	a	dataset	on	the	balance	of	power,	they	presented	a	number	of	interesting	findings.	Most	pertinent	for	this	thesis,	they	found	that	when	rebel	groups	are	larger	they	do	better	(p574).			Academics	have	tried	to	build	on	Cunningham	et	al.’s	work	by	using	year-on-year	data	 of	 rebel	 numbers1	 (Clayton,	 2013;	Hultquist,	 2013).	 Govinda	Clayton	 and	Philip	Hultquist	support	Cunningham	et	al.’s	observation	that	rebel	groups	being	larger	affects	the	outcome	of	civil	wars.	Tellingly,	however,	Hultquist	finds	that	rebel	 groups	 being	 smaller	 does	 not	 predict	 a	 government	 victory,	 suggesting	focusing	on	rebel	numbers	can	only	tell	us	so	much	(2013;	p624).		
	
Doctrinal	perspectives		This	is	supported	by	many	observations	from	practitioners	of	civil	war.	They	pay	scant	attention	to	the	relative	sizes	of	the	militaries	in	explaining	the	success	or	failure	 of	 rebel	 groups.	 Nor	 do	 they	 consider	 the	military	 battlefield	 a	 crucial	arena	for	determining	the	outcome	of	conflicts.		
																																																						1	Cunningham	et	al.	use	a	single	measure	of	the	balance	of	power	taken	at	an	arbitrary	point	in	the	conflict.	In	longer	conflicts	they	do	offer	more	than	one	measure.	
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Bard	E.	O’Neill,	in	Insurgency	and	Terrorism,	claims	the	success	of	an	insurgent	is	based	not	on	military	activity	but	rather	political	acumen.	He	argues	observers	see	prominent	revolutionaries	such	as	Mao	or	Ho	Chi	Minh	as	political	strategists	rather	than	skillful	on	the	battlefield	(1990;	p23).			The	Russian	military	claims	it	did	not	lose	one	battle	in	Afghanistan	in	the	1980s	(Braithwaite,	2011).	Nonetheless,	 it	 failed	to	subdue	the	Mujahedeen.	If	battles	work	 to	 reveal	 information	about	 the	 true	balance	of	power,	 it	 is	unclear	how	rebels	 can	win	without	winning	 a	 single	 battle.	 Timur	Kuran	 even	 shows	 that	rebel	 leaders	 do	 not	 engage	 in	 revolutionary	 activity	 with	 the	 expectation	 of	immediately	overthrowing	governments.	He	cites	Lenin	in	Russia	and	Khomenei	in	Iran	as	both	being	surprised	they	were	immediately	successful	(Kuran,	1989).			Relative	power	is	also	ignored	by	many	doctrinal	writers.	John	Nagl	(2005;	p30)	and	David	Galula	(1964;	p11)	both	point	out	how	state	capacity	can	be	misleading	as	a	predictor	of	counterinsurgent	success.	Rebel	doctrine	writers	actually	even	advise	against	maximising	 total	 force	numbers	 for	 insurgent	groups.	Mao	Tse-Tung	claims	that	if	groups	of	insurgents	make	themselves	too	large	they	expose	themselves	to	government	targeting	(2002).		Much	of	this	logic	has	been	borne	out	in	comparative	studies	of	conflict.					The	US	and	UK	governments	have	done	a	range	of	studies	and	conclude	that	the	ratio	of	 counterinsurgent	 to	 insurgent	 forces	 is	only	weakly	 related	 to	 conflict	outcomes	(Woodford,	2016).	Jeffery	A.	Friedman	found	no	correlation	between	relative	force	size	and	conflict	outcomes	(2011).	Hultquist	concedes	that	theories	of	relative	power	fail	to	explain	the	vast	majority	of	civil	wars;	when	there	is	a	preponderance	of	forces	in	favour	of	the	government	(2013;	p633).	In	the	dataset	Hultquist	uses	(from	R.M.	Wood,	2010),	the	mean	balance	of	power	favours	the	government	by	12	to	1,	and	rebels	only	enjoy	a	three	to	one	disadvantage	or	less	in	fewer	than	25	percent	of	conflict	years.			
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Moreover,	how	the	balance	of	power	shifts	within	a	 single	conflict	 remains	an	unexplored	area	of	study.	Most	comparative	studies	of	civil	war	outcomes	have	measured	power	at	an	arbitrary	point	in	the	conflict,	normally	at	the	beginning	(Collier,	 el	 al.,	 2004;	 DeRouen	 and	 Sobek,	 2004;	 Fearon,	 2004;	 Connable	 and	Libicki,	 2010).	 Many	 rebel	 groups	 start	 very	 small	 and	 grow	 throughout	 the	conflict,	but	often	maintain	a	significant	negative	ratio	compared	to	government	forces	up	to	the	point	of	victory.	For	example,	in	Zimbabwe,	the	rebels	numbered	in	 the	 hundreds	 in	 1965,	 rising	 to	 a	 few	 thousand	 in	 the	 mid-1970s,	 before	increasing	 to	 the	 tens	of	 thousands	 as	 the	 conflict	 came	 to	 an	 end.	Even	 then,	government	forces	still	outnumbered	insurgents	by	four	and	a	half	to	one	(Kriger,	1991).	The	international	community	needs	an	effective	way	of	measuring	when	this	is	likely	to	happen.	By	the	time	rebels	have	grown	large	in	size	it	is	often	too	late	to	implement	effective	intervention	strategies.			Similar	problems	arise	when	scholars	have	tried	to	look	at	how	activity	on	the	battlefield	affects	 the	outcome.	 J.	Michael	Greig	 (2015)	 finds	only	a	very	 small	correlation	 between	 battlefield	 outcomes	 in	 terms	 of	 who	 wins	 the	 overall	conflict.	Greig	shows	that	where	battles	are	fought	is	more	significant	than	who	wins	them	(ibid.).	Michael	Findley	(2013)	finds	that	while	military	stalemates	do	bring	 people	 to	 the	 negotiating	 table,	 they	 do	 not	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 a	settlement,	unlike	in	interstate	conflicts	(Ramsay,	2008).	The	difficulty	using	logic	for	interstate	wars	to	explain	civil	war	outcomes	may	offer	one	explanation	as	to	why	comparative	studies	of	intrastate	conflict	endings	remain	small	in	number.			In	order	resolve	some	of	these	problems	some	scholars	have	tried	to	break	wars	down	into	different	types	(Greig,	2015;	Hultquist,	2013).	Philip	Hultquist	calls	for	breaking	civil	wars	down	into	three	categories;	those	that	are	more	conventional,	which	behave	 like	 interstate	conflict,	and	asymmetric	and	 irregular	symmetric	conflicts,	that	do	not	fit	theories	of	interstate	war	(2013;	p625).			Taking	this	approach,	however,	causes	further	problems.	For	one,	what	balance	of	forces	need	to	exist	for	a	war	to	be	classified	as	conventional	or	asymmetric?			
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Moreover,	 Hultquist’s	 observation	 suggests	 a	 paradox	 for	 insurgent	 groups.	 It	suggests	some	rebel	groups	actually	fare	better	by	remaining	smaller	and	keeping	the	 war	 in	 the	 ‘asymmetric’	 category,	 rather	 than	 growing	 and	 creating	 an	unfavourable	 ‘conventional’	 balance	 of	 power.	 How	 do	 rebels	 benefit	 by	sustaining	a	force	that	is	actually	lower	than	its	full	potential?		Just	as	challenging	is	that	the	fact	that	doctrine	suggests	wars	transition	between	being	 more	 asymmetric	 in	 nature	 and	 more	 conventional	 and	 vice	 versa.	 US	Special	Operations	doctrine	(US	Army,	2010),	based	on	Mao’s	guide	to	building	a	revolutionary	 movement	 (2002),	 identifies	 three	 phases	 of	 successful	insurgencies;	 the	 latent	 incipient	phase,	 a	 guerrilla	warfare	 stage	and	 finally	 a	transition	 to	 a	 conventional	 force	 that	 overcomes	 the	 government	 militarily.	Broadly	 speaking	 the	 second	 and	 third	 phases	 correspond	 to	 asymmetric	 and	conventional	warfare,	with	the	first	representing	the	underground	stage	before	conflict	erupts.2	During	the	first	stage	a	rebel	group	will	be	focused	on	terrorism	and	building	a	political	network.	It	is	not	wrong,	therefore,	to	say	there	are	three	possible	stages	 in	a	civil	war;	 terrorism,	 insurgency	and	conventional	conflict.3	However,	doctrine	does	not	distinguish	between	 these	 types	of	 conflict.	As	US	Special	Operations	doctrine	points	out,	 single	wars	witness	a	number	of	 these	stages	both	through	time	and	space	(2010).	Insurgencies	may	be	strong	enough	in	 one	 area	 to	 compete	 with	 the	 government	 on	 a	 conventional	 basis,	 but	 in	another	may	only	carry	out	terrorist	or	guerrilla	activity.	This	makes	categorising	conflicts	along	these	lines	unhelpful.						Examining	contemporary	conflicts	confirms	this	problem.	ISIL	in	Syria,	conducted	a	low-intensity	insurgency	against	both	the	regime	and	other	opposition	groups	from	2012	to	the	beginning	of	2014.	It	then	transitioned	to	a	more	conventional	force	 and	 conquered	 territory	 across	 Iraq	 and	 Syria.	 Nevertheless,	 ISIL	 still	
																																																						2	I	am	not	ignoring	irregular	symmetric	conflict,	the	third	of	Hultquist’s	categories.	However,	this	is	a	function	of	government	strength	as	well	as	rebel	strength,	and,	therefore,	does	not	fit	into	current	explanations	of	rebel	strength	focused	on	the	three	stages	of	revolutionary	conflict.	I	will	discuss	this	in	more	detail	in	chapter	two.		3	Stathis	Kalyvas	(2009)	claims	terrorism	and	civil	war	are	different	phenomena.	Understanding	violence	as	a	function	of	the	strength	of	a	rebel	group	calls	this	into	question.	I	do	not,	however,	intend	to	engage	with	this	question	more	during	this	thesis.		
	
	
	
	
10	
augmented	conventional	operations	with	terrorist	and	guerrilla	activity	in	areas	it	was	weaker,	such	as	Baghdad	or	Damascus.	How	do	we	classify	civil	wars	that	bridge	 these	 categories	 through	 time	 and	 even	more	 problematically	 through	space?	If	rebels	simultaneously	carry	out	both	types	of	activity,	there	must	be	a	longer-term	objective	behind	this	activity,	most	obviously	creating	the	conditions	to	strengthen	the	group.			The	 current	 comparative	 literature	 of	 civil	 war	 endings	 leaves	 a	 number	 of	questions	unanswered:	Why	is	looking	at	the	balance	of	power	of	limited	value?	Why	do	rebel	groups	change	 in	size?	And,	why	do	conflicts	 transition	between	different	phases?	Understanding	war	as	a	competition	to	mobilise	resources,	in	which	rebels	create	opportunities	 to	grow	as	a	movement	by	undermining	the	government’s	ability	to	generate	support	offers	a	framework	for	answering	many	of	these	questions.			
Insurgent	alliances	
	Another,	more	 recent	 body	 of	work,	 has	 seen	 scholar	 focus	 on	why	 insurgent	alliances	form	and	break	apart	and	more	closely	mirrors	the	logic	of	civil	war	as	a	competition	to	mobilise	support.	This	challenges	the	framework	used	in	earlier	studies	on	civil	war	outcomes	because	it	assumes	that	power	is	not	fixed	at	the	beginning	 of	 the	 war.	 Instead,	 civil	 war	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 competition	 between	belligerents	for	the	loyalty	of	various	militia	factions.	As	such,	it	begins	to	offer	answers	to	some	of	the	questions	posed	above.	Stathis	Kalyvas	put	it	succinctly	when	he	said:		 “Many	 individuals	enter	 the	war	 long	after	 it	has	started,	driven	by	incentives	 and	 constraints	 that	 are	 by-products	 of	 the	war	 and	 the	result	of	innovative	and	adaptive	strategies	devised	by	rival	actors	in	the	 course	 of	 the	 war.	 Put	 otherwise,	 neither	 organisations	 nor	preferences	are	given	ex	ante	and	fixed	throughout	the	war.	Change	is	synonymous	with	war”	(2008;	p1063).			
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Michael	Findley	and	Peter	Rudloff	(2012)	show	that	insurgent	fragmentation	is	ubiquitous	 and	must	 be	 accepted	 as	 part	 of	 the	 structure	 that	 underpins	 civil	wars.	Macro-level	outcomes	are	decided	by	the	micro-level	decisions	of	conflict	participants,	which	 in	 turn	are	shaped	by	the	ability	of	national	 level	actors	 to	affect	those	decisions	as	the	war	drags	on.			According	to	Stephen	Biddle,	Jeffrey	A.	Friedman	and	Jacob	N.	Shapiro	in	Testing	
the	Surge	(2012),	the	progress	made	against	Al-Qaeda	in	Iraq	(AQI)	in	2007	was	based	on	tribes	shifting	allegiance	from	AQI	to	the	government.	The	media	have	often	framed	the	Anbar	Awakening	as	a	popular	uprising	against	AQI’s	extreme	form	 of	 governance.	 Biddle	 et	 al.	 show	 the	 majority	 of	 those	 involved	 in	 the	awakening	were,	in	fact,	‘turned’	insurgents	who	joined	government	and	coalition	militia	programs	for	a	variety	of	reasons.	The	key	to	the	increasing	power	of	the	government	was	 its	 ability	 to	make	 a	 better	 offer	 to	 those	 factions	previously	fighting	with	AQI	(2012).	The	relative	power	of	the	government	and	rebels	then	changed	in	favour	of	the	government,	allowing	it	to	make	gains	on	the	ground.			A	number	of	authors	have	analysed	various	factors	that	drive	the	formation	and	break	up	of	these	alliances.	Stathis	Kalyvas	(2008)	shows	that	ethnic	defection	is	common	 in	 civil	 war	 and	 ethnicity	 is	 not	 a	 good	 predictor	 for	 how	 civil	 war	factions	 will	 align.	 Fotini	 Christia	 (2012)	 demonstrates,	 based	 on	 research	 in	Afghanistan,	 that	 factions	 switch	 sides	 back	 and	 forth	 based	 on	 the	 overall	balance	of	power	and	to	maximise	their	own	power	within	their	chosen	faction.	Paul	Staniland	(2012)	argues	that	fratricidal	violence	predicts	defections	within	alliances.	 William	 Reno	 (2007)	 makes	 the	 case	 that	 the	 ability	 of	 patrons	 to	distribute	resources	dictates	 their	ability	 to	maintain	alliances,	and	when	 they	lose	 these	 resources	 armed	 factions	 seek	 alternative	 patrons.	 Many	 of	 these	studies	are	based	on	single	case	studies	and	it	is	likely	all	of	these	processes	are	at	work	in	different	times	and	places.	Kristian	Bakke,	Kathleen	Cunningham	and	Lee	Seymour	have	attempted	to	draw	these	studies	together	and	operationalise	rebel	fragmentation	in	order	to	create	a	framework	for	measuring	its	impact	on	civil	war	dynamics	(2012).			
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Both	Stathis	Kalyvas	 (2006)	 and	Lee	Seymour	 (2014)	 argue	 it	 is	 the	 ability	of	national-level	actors	to	manage	these	processes	and	build	alliances	that	dictates	the	 outcomes	 of	 civil	wars.	 Seymour	 (2014)	 looks	 at	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 that	affect	the	capacity	of	leaders	to	build	alliances	in	Sudan	and	shows	the	power	of	national	leaders	is	based	on	their	capacity	to	empower	local	armed	groups	to	do	their	 bidding.	When	 no	 single	 actor	 can	 control	 the	whole	 polity	 in	 this	 way,	multiple	 armed	 factions	 are	 able	 to	 operate.	 What	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 military	stalemate	is	actually	a	political	equilibrium.			
Limits	of	the	‘insurgent	alliance’	approach	
	This	 approach	 to	 studying	 civil	war	 has	 yielded	 interesting	 findings	 that	 have	enriched	our	understanding	of	the	processes	that	drive	civil	wars	of	all	types.	It	still,	 however,	 falls	 short	 of	 offering	 a	 complete	 picture.	 For	 one,	 when	 these	authors	 talk	 about	 micro-level	 decision-making	 what	 they	 mean	 is	 decisions	being	made	by	factional	leaders.	In	spite	of	Kalyvas’	assertion,	this	implies	there	is	 a	 fixed	 level	 of	 active	 participants	 in	 the	 conflict	 at	 its	 inception	 and	 how	belligerents	 incentivise	 these	 participants	 to	 fight	 for	 them	 determines	 the	outcome.	 There	 is	 still	 no	 explanation	 for	 why	 new	 participants	 from	 the	population	might	join	armed	groups	and	how,	therefore,	armed	groups	grow	in	size	without	stealing	fighters	from	their	rivals.	The	growth	of	the	Zimbabwean	rebels	 did	 not	 come	 from	 fighters	 that	 had	 previously	 been	 fighting	 for	 the	government.	The	rebels	in	Zimbabwe	exploited	conditions	to	bring	in	new	conflict	participants	from	within	the	broader	population.	Any	study	of	alliance	building	in	a	civil	war	has	to	include	the	population	more	generally	if	it	is	to	offer	a	complete	theory	of	civil	war	dynamics	and	outcomes.			Secondly,	 these	studies	 tend	 to	only	 focus	on	 irregular	militant	 factions	rather	than	governments	or	more	organised	rebel	forces.	While	most	rebel	groups	can	be	described	as	‘irregular’	in	nature,	government	forces	normally	take	on	a	more	outwardly	organised	 form.	Yet,	 individuals	 join	government	security	 forces	 for	
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the	exact	same	reasons	they	join	rebel	groups.4	Any	theory	of	alliance	building	that	 wants	 to	 link	 macro-level	 outcomes	 and	 dynamics	 with	 micro-level	population	decision-making	(and	vice-versa)	needs	to	explain	this	as	well	if	it	is	to	be	a	complete	explanation.			
Bringing	in	the	population	
	Authors	 that	 have	 looked	 at	 populations	 often	 assume	 it	 to	 be	 a	 passive	participant	 in	 civil	 war	 and	 focus	 on	 why	 rebels	 or	 governments	 carry	 out	population-focused	 violence.	 A	 number	 of	 studies	 have	 looked	 at	 factors	 that	affect	belligerent	interaction	with	the	population	(Beardsley	and	McQuinn,	2009;	Humphreys	and	Weinstein,	2006;	Weinstein,	2007).	These	works	generally	find	that	when	rebels	need	more	resources	from	the	population	they	are	more	likely	treat	them	well.	They	offer	insight	into	the	relationships	between	the	population	and	civil	war	belligerents,	but	do	not	explore	how	this	 relationship	affects	 the	final	outcome	of	conflicts.			There	is	also	an	extensive	body	of	literature	on	popular	mobilisation.	However,	these	works	normally	attempt	to	explain	mobilisation	as	the	dependent	variable,	rather	than	use	it	as	a	framework	for	understanding	the	civil	war	process	more	generally.	Ted	Gurr	focuses	on	grievances	and	relative	deprivation	(2012).	Others	have	examined	social	networks	and	the	structure	of	societies	to	understand	why	certain	communities	work	with	 rebel	groups	 (Migdal,	2015;	Scott,	1977;	Wolf,	1999).	Samuel	Popkin	found	that	many	peasants	in	South	Vietnam	worked	with	the	Vietcong	 based	 on	 the	 perceived	 economic	 benefit	 (Popkin,	 1979).	Norma	Kriger	argues	that	insurgents	offer	individuals	in	the	population	opportunities	to	address	 local	 social	 and	 political	 conflicts	 (Kriger,	 1991).	 Stathis	 Kalyvas	 and	Matthew	Kocher	(2007)	show	how	the	use	of	violence	can	constrain	the	choices	faced	 by	 civilians	 to	 not	 participate	 in	 conflicts.	 Elisabeth	 Wood	 shows	 how	grievances	 interact	 with	 moral	 drivers,	 emotions	 and	 process-related	
																																																						4	By	this,	I	mean	across	the	universe	of	cases.	Within	specific	conflicts,	members	of	the	population	may	have	very	different	reasons	for	joining	either	government	or	rebel	forces.		
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motivations	to	elicit	participation	in	the	insurgency	in	El	Salvador	(2010).	As	with	the	literature	on	insurgent	alliances,	it	is	likely	that	many	of	these	processes	are	taking	place	simultaneously.		Mark	 Lichbach,	 in	 The	 Rebel’s	 Dilemma,	 argues	 that	 revolution	 and	 counter-revolutionary	 activity	 are	 collective	 action	 problems,	 in	 that	 members	 of	 the	population	 benefit	 from	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 successful	 revolution	 (or	 its	 defeat)	whether	or	not	they	contribute	to	its	delivery.	As	such,	individuals	should	choose	not	to	support	rebellious	or	counterinsurgent	activity	regardless	of	their	broader	political	preferences	even	if	they	potentially	benefit	from	defeating	or	the	survival	of	 the	 incumbent	government.	The	Rebel’s	Dilemma	explores	the	huge	range	of	ways	macro-level	actors	overcome	this	paradox	(1998).			All	of	these	works	offer	extremely	interesting	insights	into	how	political	actors,	most	often	challengers	to	incumbent	regimes,	generate	participation	of	various	types	from	the	population.	Many	of	their	insights	will	be	explored	in	more	detail	below	 and	 added	 to	 findings	 from	 case	 studies	 to	 form	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	theoretical	model	underpinning	this	thesis.			As	 in	 the	 rebel	 alliance	 literature,	 however,	 studies	 examining	 popular	mobilisation	or	support	for	conflict	actors	tend	to	look	only	at	rebels.5	Moreover,	most	 of	 the	 popular	 mobilisation	 literature	 treats	 it	 as	 a	 dependent	 variable.	However,	 if	 these	aspects	of	 the	conflict	are	key	as	Findley	and	Rudloff	(2012)	argue	in	terms	of	rebel	fragmentation	and	Stathis	Kalyvas	shows	in	the	case	of	popular	 support	 (2006),	 then	 the	 structure	 determining	 popular	mobilisation	should	also	offer	a	template	for	understanding	civil	war	outcomes.			Most	 articles	 that	 have	 drawn	 inferences	 between	 belligerent	 and	 population	interaction	and	macro-level	dynamics,	or	vice	versa,	have	focused	on	the	use	of	violence	 against	 civilians.	 Lisa	 Hultman	 argues	 that	 rebel	 violence	 against	civilians	 imposes	 political	 costs	 on	 governments,	 which	 offers	 rebels	 an	
																																																						
5	The	Rebel’s	Dilemma	represents	an	exception	in	this	regard	(Lichbach,	1998).	
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alternative	 way	 of	 inflicting	 costs	 on	 the	 government	 when	 it	 is	 struggling	militarily	(2007	and	2009).	Reed	Wood	and	Jacob	Kathman	show	how	the	level	of	rebel	violence	has	a	curvilinear	effect	on	civil	war	outcomes,	with	medium	levels	being	the	best	predictor	of	a	negotiated	settlement	(2014).			This	exploration	of	how	the	use	of	violence	can	affect	belligerent	strength	and	civil	war	outcomes	adds	weight	to	the	idea	that	understanding	the	relationship	between	 belligerents	 and	 the	 population	 offers	 a	 fruitful	 avenue	 of	 research.	However,	 we	 should	 be	 looking	 beyond	 violence	 to	 understand	 how	 other	variables,	such	as	governance	or	the	economy,	shape	and	constrain	belligerents’	capacities	to	mobilise	support.			Stathis	 Kalyvas	 offers	 the	 most	 comprehensive	 framework	 for	 understanding	how	 the	 relationship	 between	 belligerents	 and	 the	 population	 explain	macro-level	dynamics	in	The	Logic	of	Violence	in	Civil	War	(2006).	Kalyvas’	main	thesis	is	that	local	participation	in	civil	war	is	borne	out	of	the	desire	of	locals	to	settle	and	protect	themselves	in	community-level	feuds.	The	war	itself	becomes	about	governments	 and	 rebels	 building	 alliances	 with	 local	 communities	 –	 “the	mechanism	 of	 alliance	 entails	 an	 exchange	 between	 the	 local	 and	 supra-local	actors,	whereby	the	latter	offer	the	former	military	muscle	so	that	it	can	prevail	in	 local	 conflicts;	 in	 return	 local	 actors	 supply	 central	 ones	 with	 essential	resources	 that	 can	 help	 them	 wage	 the	 war”	 (loc672).	 Kalyvas	 argues	 that	studying	this	 interaction	 is	 the	key	to	understanding	the	dynamics	of	civil	war	(loc584).			These	 alliances	 are	 not	 solely	 based	 on	 pre-existing	 relationships	 but	 are	endogenous	 to	 the	 conflict	 itself.	 Power	 comes	 from	 changes	 to	 the	 structural	context	within	which	the	population	makes	decisions	to	augment	the	strength	of	macro-level	 actors.	 It	 is	 important,	 therefore,	 to	 understand	 violence	 against	civilians	not	as	a	by-product	of	the	conflict.	Kalyvas	quotes	evidence	from	Africa	to	 show	 that	 organised	 and	 regular	 units	 under	 direct	 control	 of	 belligerent	leadership,	not	rogue	militias,	often	carry	out	violence	against	civilians.	Violence	is,	therefore,	used	to	motivate	a	specific	type	of	behaviour	(2006;	loc2131).	For	
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this	to	be	true,	it	implies	that	population	behaviour	is	a	strategic	component	of	civil	war.			One	 of	Kalyvas’	most	 important	 insights	 is	 to	move	 away	 from	understanding	support	as	a	preference	for	a	particular	belligerent	winning	the	conflict.	He	argues	that	support	must	be	described	in	behavioural	terms.	The	population	can	behave	in	a	way	that	strengthens	the	government	or	the	rebels	unintentionally	or	as	a	by-product	of	other	behaviour.	For	Kalyvas,	communities	are	motivated	to	provide	behavioural	 support	 to	 conflict	 actors	 to	 strengthen	 their	 local	 power,	 not	because	they	share	a	belligerent’s	national-level	preferences	(loc2670).			Kalyvas	 links	 this	 local	 micro-level	 decision-making	 to	 macro-level	 dynamics,	namely	 the	 distribution	 of	 violence	 against	 civilians.	 He	 argues	 that	 the	 key	variable	 for	which	 actor	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 best	 placed	 to	 draw	 support	 from	 the	population	 is	 the	 distribution	 of	 territorial	 control.	 There	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 less	civilian-focused	 violence	 in	 areas	 where	 one	 actor	 retains	 absolute	 territorial	control	and	more	in	contested	areas	as	actors	exploit	local	conflicts	to	suppress	potential	 opposition.	 Kalyvas	 supports	 his	 hypotheses	 with	 primary	 evidence	from	the	Greek	civil	war	 to	show	why	civilians	collaborated	with	communists,	nationalists	or	Nazi	occupiers	and	why	violence	erupted	in	specific	areas	(2006).			He	also	claims	this	framework	serves	as	a	baseline	for	understanding	civil	war	outcomes	 (loc672).	 However,	 this	 quickly	 becomes	 problematic.	 If	 Kalyvas	 is	correct,	territory	under	the	firm	control	of	one	actor	should	rarely	change	hands,	as	 the	 population	 will	 always	 collaborate	 with	 the	 strongest	 local	 force.	 The	conflict	should	become	solely	about	inducing	the	collaboration	of	the	population	in	contested	areas.	The	simple	fact,	however,	is	that	many	areas	can	be	peaceful	at	one	point	in	the	conflict,	then	become	subsumed	into	it	as	the	war	drags	on,	precisely	 because	 the	 population	 increasingly	 disengage	 from	 the	 controlling-power.	Moreover,	as	the	analysis	above	has	demonstrated,	some	conflicts	are	won	by	 rebel	 groups	 that	 hold	 very	 limited	 territory.	 Beyond	 tactical	 astuteness,	Kalyvas	offers	no	compelling	reasons	for	changes	in	the	dynamics	of	collaboration	between	the	population	and	conflict	actors	in	these	instances	(loc3689).	I	suggest	
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this	 shortcoming	 comes	 not	 from	 the	 actual	 study	 itself,	 but	 in	 how	 he	extrapolates	his	framework	for	understanding	population-directed	violence	to	a	means	for	determining	civil	war	outcomes.		In	order	to	do	this,	we	have	to	focus	on	 what	 governments	 and	 rebel	 forces	 do	 in	 the	 territory	 they	 control.	 How	macro-level	 behaviours	 and	 structures,	 beyond	 the	 use	 of	 violence,	 affect	belligerent	 mobilisation	 capacities	 remains	 an	 unexplored	 area	 of	 study	 and	should	offer	an	explanation	for	various	types	of	civil	war	outcomes.			Despite	the	limits	of	The	Logic	of	Violence	in	Civil	War,	Kalyvas’s	overall	thesis	that	“civil	war	is,	at	its	core,	a	process	of	integration	and	state	building”	(2006;	loc672)	makes	it	an	extremely	important	step	in	studying	civil	war.	The	rest	of	this	study	expands	on	this	logic	and	examines	how	governments	and	rebel	groups	integrate	population	 support.	 In	 this	 light	we	will	 reframe	 civil	war	 as	 a	 competition	 to	shape	the	behaviour	of	the	population,	not	just	a	military	conflict.			Roger	D.	Petersen’s	study	of	emotions	in	the	Balkans	already	partially	fills	this	literature	 gap	 in	 that	 he	 links	 his	 framework	 to	 the	 outcome	 of	 Western	interventions	in	the	Balkans	(2011).	Petersen	argues	it	is	the	presence	of	certain	emotions	that	allows	opponents	to	intervention	to	counter	stronger	actors’	ability	to	deliver	material	benefits	to	local	communities.	The	presence	of	these	emotions	is	based	on	historical	relationships	between	communities,	political	structures	and	inequalities	or	the	use	of	violence.	Petersen’s	book	is	mainly	focused	on	variations	in	the	success	of	Western	interventions	in	the	Balkans.	He	claims	it	 is	Western	doctrine’s	narrow	focus	on	rational	incentives	that	leaves	it	open	to	exploitation	by	political	entrepreneurs	able	to	exploit	the	presence	of	emotional	resources	for	generating	population	support.	It	is	not	clear	how	this	applies	in	other	cases	with	limited	external	 intervention	or	where	emotions	are	strong	(or	weak)	on	both	sides.	The	framework	developed	in	this	thesis	mainly	focuses	on	and	tests	state-building	activity	in	a	similar	manner	to	Peterson’s	focus	on	emotions.	However,	I	also	 acknowledge	 the	 role	 of	 intangible	 incentives	 in	 mobilising	 support	 for	conflict	actors,	making	it	complementary	to	Peterson’s	study.	The	case	study	of	Nagorno-Karabakh,	in	particular,	shows	how	emotions	and	entrenched	identities	interact	heavily	with	tangible	state-building	activity.		
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Plan	for	rest	of	study	
	The	rest	of	this	thesis	attempts	to	address	many	of	the	questions	raised	above.	It	will	be	divided	into	two	main	parts,	a	theory	and	an	empirical	section.	The	theory	section	will	first	discuss	the	concept	of	war	as	a	mobilisation	game,	answering	the	first	 puzzle	 -	 why	 do	 belligerents	 dedicate	 resources	 to	 shaping	 population	behaviour?	The	 second	chapter	will	 show	how	 this	 framework	 can	be	used	 to	explain	how	small	militant	groups	defeat	strong	governments.	I	will	argue	that	the	main	element	of	the	mobilisation	competition	is	rebel	efforts	to	degrade	the	structures	 governments	 use	 to	 generate	 support.	 Consequently,	 rebels	 do	 not	need	to	match	the	government	militarily	to	achieve	their	strategic	aims.					Having	established	my	theory,	 the	thesis	will	 test	 it	empirically	using	a	mixed-methods	approach.	The	empirical	sections	of	the	thesis	lend	strong	support	to	the	theory.	 The	 model	 of	 war	 developed	 in	 this	 thesis,	 therefore,	 provides	policymakers	and	strategic	decision-makers	a	template	for	understanding	wars	around	the	world	that	has	been	tested	with	academic	rigour	across	a	wide	variety	of	conflicts.			
	
Definitions	
	Before	 proceeding	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 define	 a	 number	 of	 terms	 that	 I	 use	throughout	the	thesis,	but	can	be	ambiguous	in	nature.			
Civil	war	
	As	pointed	out	by	other	scholars,	the	term	civil	war	can	be	contentious	(Kalyvas,	2009).	Moreover,	as	highlighted	above,	scholars	have	begun	trying	to	break	civil	wars	down	into	different	types	(Hultquist,	2013).	For	the	purpose	of	this	study,	however,	I	intend	to	use	one	definition	that	encompasses	these	different	types.	I	borrow	 the	definition	 from	Stathis	Kalyvas’	 chapter	on	civil	war	 in	The	Oxford	
Handbook	of	Comparative	Politics	(2009).		
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“Armed	 combat	 taking	place	within	 the	boundaries	of	 a	 recognized	(sic)	sovereign	entity	between	parties	subject	to	a	common	authority	at	the	outset	of	the	hostilities”	(p417).		As	Kalyvas	points	out,	this	definition	rests	upon	there	being	a	military	challenge	to	the	government	from	within	the	state	from	an	organised	force	“with	military	equipment	and	full-time	recruits”	(ibid.).			Most	of	this	thesis	also	assumes	that	the	government	remains	a	functioning	entity.	In	some	civil	wars,	such	as	Libya	after	the	fall	of	Colonel	Qadaffi,	even	the	nominal	government	is	represented	by	an	alliance	of	irregular	militias.	While	the	logic	of	chapter	one	can	be	applied	 to	all	 civil	wars,	many	of	 the	 caveats	developed	 in	chapter	two	require	there	to	be	a	functioning	government.	No	such	restriction	is	placed	on	the	type	of	rebel	force	the	government	faces.		
	
The	population	
	How	we	define	the	population	and	separate	it	from	conflict	actors	has	significant	theoretical	implications,	however,	this	will	be	treated	in	more	detail	in	the	next	section.	At	 this	 stage	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 emphasise	 that	 the	population	 is	 not	 a	unitary	actor.	Individuals	and	communities	respond	differently	to	the	same	set	of	macro-level	structures.	When	possible	I	try	to	clarify	when	referring	to	different	sections	of	the	population.	Even	then,	some	people	within	communities	will	lend	support	 to	 conflict	 actors	 while	 others	 avoid	 any	 active	 involvement.	Consequently,	the	term	‘the	population’	refers	not	to	the	whole	population,	but	to	individuals	 contained	 within	 it.	 Conflict	 actors	 draw	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	resources	from	the	population,	but	it	is	only	a	proportion	of	that	population	that	actually	provides	this	support.				
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Rationality	
	The	 model	 of	 civil	 war	 proposed	 in	 this	 thesis	 involves	 three	 main	 decision-making	groups;	the	two	belligerents	and	the	population.	Hundreds	of	thousands	of	people	make	decisions	 that	 affect	 the	war’s	 outcome.	To	 a	 large	 extent	 this	thesis	 is	 designed	 to	 propose	 a	 logic	 for	 studying	 the	 general	 environment	decision-makers	 respond	 to	 and	 the	 effect	 of	 those	 decisions.	 How	 decision-makers	actually	calculate	the	utility	of	particular	behaviours	does	not	change	the	main	arguments.	The	model	of	war	proposed	 in	this	 thesis,	however,	has	been	borne	out	of	an	impression	that	civil	war	actors	are	not	hyper-rational	as	is	often	assumed	(Powell,	2002).	I	assume,	instead,	that	decision-makers	are	boundedly-rational.	Michael	Laver	compares	hyper-	and	bounded-rationality:		 “Hyper-rational	agents	make	choices	by	looking	forward	strategically,	continuously	solving	and	resolving	 in	real	 time	(a)	dense	system	of	equations…	In	contrast,	adaptive	agents	look	backward	and	learn	from	the	past,	developing	simple	rules	of	thumb	that	condition	behaviour	on	the	recent	history	of	the	system”	(2005;	p264).		Boundedly-rational	 agents	 are	 also	 assumed	 to	 make	 decisions	 using	 more	localised	 information,	 rather	 than	 understanding	 the	 beliefs,	 behaviours	 and	consequences	of	actors	behaviours	within	the	whole	system	(Gigerenzer,	2002).	As	 the	 model	 proposed	 in	 this	 thesis	 means	 bringing	 in	 the	 population	 as	 a	rational	agent,	this	assumption	is	even	more	important.	Stathis	Kalyvas’	work,	for	example,	rests	on	the	principle	that	communities	determine	their	support	based	on	local	conflict	dynamics,	rather	than	the	national	picture.			Where	appropriate,	 footnotes	highlight	areas	where	 the	 logical	 implications	of	the	analysis	in	this	thesis	differs	if	the	assumption	of	rationality	is	altered.						
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State	vs	government	
	The	 terms	 government	 and	 state	 are	 often	 treated	 synonymously	 (Peters	 and	Pierre,	 2005).	 In	 this	 study,	 however,	 when	 referring	 to	 the	 state	 I	 mean	 the	territorial	area,	recognised	as	a	unit	within	the	international	system	(Mampilly,	2011),	within	which	a	conflict	is	taking	place.	The	government	is	one	of	the	parties	to	that	conflict.	
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Chapter	one	
War	and	the	population	
	The	first	puzzle	is	why	do	conflict	actors	expend	so	much	resources	on	shaping	population	 behaviour	 in	 civil	 wars?	 Practitioners	 almost	 universally	 claim	popular	 support	 is	 the	 key	 element	 in	 determining	 the	 outcome	 of	 intrastate	conflict.	(See,	for	example,	the	US	military’s	field	manual	on	counterinsurgency	(2007);	David	Galula	(1964);	Mao	Tse-Tung	(2002);	Bard	O’Neill	(1990);	Robert	Taber	 (2002);	 David	 Kilcullen	 (2009);	 John	 Nagl	 (2005)).	 Abraham	 Guillen	defines	revolutionary	conflict	as	a	battle	for	the	support	of	the	population	(Guillen	and	 Hodges,	 1973;	 p232).	 Robert	 Taber	 argues	 rebels	 have	 to	 gain	 the	cooperation	of	the	population	to	overcome	their	capacity	disadvantage	(Taber,	2002).	In	turn,	David	Galula	states	that	if	a	counterinsurgent	can	prevent	this	from	happening,	 they	 can	 isolate	 rebel	 groups,	making	 them	 easy	 to	 defeat	 (1964).	Western	counterinsurgency	strategy	rests	on	providing	the	population	security,	governance	and	development	to	create	this	isolation	(US	Army,	2007).			More	importantly,	qualitative	evidence	also	demonstrates	conflict	actors	putting	this	 logic	 into	 practice.	 Both	 rebels	 and	 governments	 spend	 resources	 on	governance,	 socioeconomic	activity,	 violence	against	 civilians	and	propaganda.	Conflict	actors	must	consider	it	more	productive	to	use	resources	in	this	manner,	than	expending	those	same	resources	on	military	activity.			This	 chapter	 examines	 the	 nature	 of	 alliances	 between	 conflict	 actors	 and	 the	population	in	an	attempt	to	elucidate	the	reasons	for	this	phenomenon.	It	will	be	broken	down	 into	 two	parts;	 firstly,	 examining	what	belligerents	 get	 from	 the	population,	before	creating	a	framework	for	understanding	how	conflicts	actors	elicit	 contributions	 –	 or	 mobilise	 support.	 I	 propose	 that	 examining	 this	relationship	reveals	a	key	variable	that	can	be	used	as	the	basis	for	understanding	the	 dynamics	 and	 likely	 outcomes	 of	 civil	 wars;	 a	 conflict	 actor’s	 ability	 to	mobilise	resources	through	the	course	of	the	conflict	-	its	regenerative	capacity.	By	focusing	on	this	variable	we	can	frame	civil	war	as	a	mobilisation	competition,	
	
	
	
	
23	
with	belligerents	attempting	to	build	sovereign	structures	that	mobilise	support	from	their	constituent	populations	and	degrade	the	capacity	of	their	opponents	to	do	the	same.							
Defining	popular	support	
	Observers	of	civil	war	divide	popular	support	for	conflict	actors	into	active	and	passive.	Bard	E.	O’Neill	(1990)	defines	active	supporters	as:		 “(T)hose	 who…	 make	 sacrifices	 and	 risk	 personal	 harm	 either	 by	joining	 the	movement	 or	 by	providing	 insurgents	with	 intelligence,	information,	 concealment,	 shelter,	 hiding	 places	 for	 arms	 and	equipment,	medical	assistance,	guides,	and	liaison	agents”	(p72).			He	defines	passive	supporters	as	those	“not	apt	to	betray	or	otherwise	impede	insurgents”	(p71).	This	amounts	to	not	providing	active	support	to	government	efforts	 at	 countering	 the	 rebellion.	 O’Neill	 quotes	 the	 Vietminh	 manual	 on	guerrilla	warfare	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 range	 of	ways	 population	 behaviour	 can	benefit	an	insurgency:		 “The	population	helps	us	 fight	 the	enemy	by	giving	us	 information,	suggesting	ruses	and	plans,	helping	us	to	overcome	difficulties	due	to	lack	 of	 arms,	 and	 providing	 us	with	 guides.	 It	 also	 supplies	 liaison	agents,	hides,	and	protects	us,	assists	our	actions	near	posts,	feeds	us	and	 looks	 after	 our	 wounded…	 Cooperating	 with	 guerrillas,	 it	 has	participated	in	sabotage	acts,	in	diversionary	actions,	in	encircling	the	enemy,	in	applying	the	scorched	earth	policy…	On	several	occasions	and	in	cooperation	with	guerrillas	it	has	taken	part	in	combat”	(p72)		This	 list	has	 two	notable	absentees,	one	of	which	O’Neill	addresses	 in	 the	 first	quote,	 the	other	which	he	does	not.	The	 first	 is	actively	 joining	the	movement.	People	do	not	stop	being	part	of	the	population	once	they	join	the	army	or	a	rebel	
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force.	They	retain	the	option	to	desist	from	fighting	or	switch	sides	as	outlined	in	the	literature	on	insurgent	alliances.			The	second	 is	 financial	support,	either	 through	direct	 funding	or	 the	paying	of	taxes.	Zacharian	Mampilly	shows	how	rebel	groups	of	different	strengths	across	the	world,	from	Sri	Lanka	to	Sudan,	collected	taxes	from	the	population	(2011).		Actively	fighting	for	an	insurgent	group	contributes	more	than	a	small	financial	contribution.	Nevertheless,	both	actively	strengthen	the	conflict	actor.		In	 reality,	 the	 division	 of	 popular	 support	 between	 active	 and	 passive	oversimplifies	 the	 situation.	 Two	 important	 nuances	 need	 to	 be	 added	 to	 this	dichotomy.	The	 first	 is	 to	see	support	as	a	continuum	of	activities	 that	conflict	actors	need	to	induce	from	the	population;	ranging	from	actively	fighting,	to	more	limited	 support	 such	 as	 paying	 a	 tax,	 to	 completely	 passive	 support	 by	 not	offering	active	support	to	the	opposing	conflict	actor.	Research	conducted	in	the	1960s	 on	 rebel	 groups	 in	 France,	 Yugoslavia,	 Algeria,	 Malaya,	 Greece,	 the	Philippines	 and	 Palestine	 concluded	 conflict	 actors	 need	 increasing	 levels	 of	support	as	its	movement	grows	in	size.	For	every	active	fighter	belligerents	need	an	 unspecified	 multiple	 of	 people	 providing	 financial,	 material	 and	 logistical	support.	 The	 authors	 showed	 that	 in	 some	 conflicts	 an	 insurgency’s	 support	network	outnumbered	fighters	by	as	much	as	27	to	1	(Molnar,	1966;	p64).6	Even	this	number	will	be	a	small	percentage	of	the	overall	population.	Thomas	Greene	suggests	the	average	participation	in	active	rebellions	is	around	seven	percent	of	the	population	(quoted	in	Lichbach,	1998;	p18).	This	almost	certainly	does	not	include	civilians	paying	taxes	or	other	benign	activities	that	do	not	appear	directly	related	to	the	war	effort,	such	as	working	in	education	or	healthcare	institutions	under	rebel	control.	Beyond	this,	rebels	need	an	even	larger	number	of	people	to	remain	passive	and	simply	let	the	rebels	function	without	assisting	government	efforts	to	target	them.	James	Coleman		argues	that	in	Vietnam,	guerrillas	did	not	only	 seek	 to	build	active	 support	 from	 the	population,	but	also	 to	 “immobilize	
																																																						
6	The	average	across	all	of	the	conflicts	examined	was	seven	to	one	(Molnar,	1966;	p64).		
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(sic)	it,	to	ensure	through	example	that	the	population	recognized	(sic)	that	aid	to	the	authorities	would	be	swiftly	and	certainly	punished”	(1990;	p481).			Mark	Lichbach	breaks	participation	down	into	five	types:		
• “Constituents.	 A	 rebel	 groups’	 social	 base	 or	 …	 the	 one	 it	 claims	 to	represent.	
• Sympathisers.	Those	within	the	constituent	group	that	agree	with	the	aims	of	the	rebel	group	but	stop	short	of	active	participation.	
• Members.	Those	that	join	formally	join	the	group	and	support	it	in	some	material	fashion.		
• Activists.	Members	of	the	population	that	actively	support	the	group	some	of	the	time.	
• Militants.	Those	with	a	full-time	commitment	to	the	group.”	(1998;	p17).		To	this	list,	we	should	add	non-constituents,	who	do	not	support	a	conflict	actor,	but	 do	 not	 support	 the	 other	 side	 either,	 creating	 freedom	 of	 activity.	 These	people	 would	 be	 considered	 as	 providing	 passive	 support.	 Each	 of	 these	categories	involves	an	increasing	contribution	to	the	group	and	more	demands	on	the	individual.	One	might	say	the	support	a	group	needs	follows	a	distribution	akin	 to	 figure	 one.	 Categorising	 support	 as	 just	 active	 or	 passive,	 therefore,	 is	insufficient	 for	 truly	 understanding	 the	 support	 conflict	 actors	 need.	 It	 is	necessary,	instead	to	work	out	what	types	of	support	different	segments	of	the	population	are	providing	to	belligerents.				
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	Figure	1:	Hypothetical	distribution	of	support	for	rebel	groups	
	The	second	nuance	involves	the	definition	of	support.	As	Stathis	Kalyvas	showed,	the	 amount	 of	 support	 a	 conflict	 actor	 draws	 from	 the	 population	 can	 be	unrelated	to	popular	association	with	its	broader	aims	(2006).	This	logic	applies	to	all	sorts	of	support,	including	actively	fighting.	Kristine	Eck	has	documented	forced	recruitment	in	a	number	of	conflicts,	including	Liberia	and	Uganda	(2014).			Using	Mark	Lichbach’s	typology,	therefore,	mischaracterises	many	participants	in	civil	war.	ISIL	uses	coercion	to	exploit	the	population	under	its	control,	forcing	people	to	fill	administrative	functions	or	keep	vital	infrastructure	running.	Others	carry	 out	 these	 roles	 simply	 to	 make	 a	 living	 rather	 than	 to	 support	 ISIL.	Nevertheless,	these	activities	still	generate	tax	revenue	for	ISIL	and	facilitate	vital	military	support	functions	such	as	transporting	oil	(Caris	and	Reynolds,	2014).	Using	Lichbach’s	categories,	one	could	argue	these	people	are	members	of	ISIL	in	terms	of	 their	 contribution	 to	 the	 strength	of	 the	group.	They	would	probably	deny	this	description.	As	such,	the	terms	used	in	the	graph	above	actually	reflect	the	amount	of	support	members	of	the	population	are	providing	to	conflict	actors	rather	than	a	commitment	to	the	group.	Popular	support	needs	to	be	defined	by	
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its	tangible	contribution	to	the	strength	of	a	group,	not	a	shared	preference	with	its	ultimate	aims.			Militants	might	be	considered	those	making	a	significant	to	contribution	to	the	strength	 of	 the	 group,	while	 constituents	might	 be	 those	 simply	 paying	 taxes.	Those	 filling	 administrative	 functions	would	 be	 somewhere	 in	 between.	 Non-constituent	 supporters,	 in	 turn,	 would	 be	 those	 providing	 passive	 support.	Nevertheless,	Lichbach’s	typology	represents	a	useful	delineation	of	the	types	of	support	belligerents	need.		One	final	thing	needs	to	be	said	about	the	nature	of	popular	support	if	it	is	to	be	used	as	a	basis	for	understanding	conflict	outcomes.	An	extensive	literature	has	appeared	 over	 the	 last	 fifty	 years	 documenting	 the	 need	 for	 rebels	 to	 build	popular	 support.	 Rarely,	 however,	 is	 the	 same	 logic	 applied	 to	 governments.	Discussion	 over	 popular	 support	 for	 the	 government	 is	 often	 limited	 to	undermining	rebels	(Galula,	1964;	Kilcullen,	2009;	O’Neill,	1990;	US	Army,	2007;	JCS,	 2013).	 While	 governments	 obviously	 benefit	 from	 achieving	 this,	 Mark	Lichbach	argues	 they	also	 require	 exactly	 the	 same	 types	of	 support	 as	 rebels	(1998).			The	government	needs	the	population	to	join	the	security	forces,	to	fill	roles	in	the	civilian	bureaucracy	that	sustains	the	military,	to	engage	in	economic	activity,	to	 pay	 and	 collect	 taxes	 on	 that	 money,	 to	 produce	 food,	 to	 operate	 vital	infrastructure,	and	all	the	other	things	that	keep	society	functioning.	Non-military	activities,	such	as	education	and	healthcare,	are	also	important	as	they	support	socioeconomic	activity.	As	far	as	I	am	aware	no	study	has	been	done	that	gives	an	indication	 of	 how	much	 support	 governments	 need	 in	 terms	 of	manpower	 to	sustain	 its	military	and	keep	vital	services	running.	Moreover,	 the	government	needs	to	sustain	a	whole	series	of	activities	that	rebels	do	not	need	to	consider.	It	needs	public	sector	workers	and	a	much	broader	percentage	of	the	population	to	pay	taxes.	It	is	likely	the	ratio	of	people	it	needs	to	provide	more	limited	support	to	keep	 the	 state	 functioning	 compared	 to	 actively	 join	 security	 forces	 is	 even	
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greater	than	the	27	to	one,	or	seven	percent	of	the	population,	rebels	have	needed	(Lichbach,	1998;	Molnar,	1966).			Belligerents	also	generate	support	from	external	sources	or	tapping	into	criminal	networks	 (Ross,	 2004).	 It	 is	 highly	 unlikely	 that	 belligerents	 will	 be	 able	 to	generate	 support	 from	 the	 population	 without	 access	 to	 resources	 from	elsewhere,	hence	the	focus	they	place	on	appealing	to	external	patrons	(Connable	and	Libicki,	2010).	External	support	also	affects	what	belligerents	need	to	elicit	from	 the	 population	 and	 how	 they	 go	 about	 realising	 it.	 For	 example,	 even	 a	hypothetical	conflict	actor	that	meets	all	of	its	manpower,	material	and	financial	needs	 from	 external	 sources	 still	 needs	 to	 pacify	 potential	 supporters	 of	 its	opponents.	In	reality,	no	such	actor	exists	and	belligerents	use	external	support	or	control	over	natural	resources	to	build	an	internal	movement	(Beardsley	and	McQuinn,	 2009;	 Collier	 and	 Hoeffler,	 2004;	 Mampilly,	 2011;	 Ross,	 2004;	Weinstein,	 2007).	 The	 quantity	 and	 type	 of	 support	 belligerents	 receive	 from	other	sources	may,	in	turn,	affect	how	they	choose	to	build	this	movement	(see	for	example	(Beardsley	and	McQuinn,	2009;	Mampilly,	2011;	Weinstein,	2007)).7			
The	role	of	the	population		The	population	provide	conflict	actors	manpower,	money,	shelter,	supplies	and	intelligence.	In	other	words,	the	critical	elements	belligerents	need	to	prosecute	a	war.	If	this	support	is	removed	entirely	then	a	conflict	actor	will	lose	the	war.	Bard	O’Neill	argues	that	successful	insurgencies,	such	as	the	Afghan	Mujahedeen	in	the	1980s,	elicited	this	support	from	the	population	on	a	long-term	basis,	while	unsuccessful	rebel	groups,	such	as	those	in	Bolivia	and	Guatemala	in	the	1960s,	failed	 precisely	 because	 they	 failed	 to	 establish	 relations	 with	 the	 population	(1990;	p73).	The	population’s	preference	for	belligerents’	respective	war	aims	is	probably	a	bell	curve,	with	those	actively	seeking	to	support	the	conflict	actors’	aims	at	the	extremes.	The	majority	of	the	population	remains	in	the	middle	and	is	influenced	by	a	plethora	of	factors.	In	this	light,	civil	war	becomes	a	process	of	
																																																						7	This	literature	will	be	revisited	in	chapter	three.		
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macro-actors	 shifting	 the	behaviour	of	 these	people	 in	 the	middle,	 in	order	 to	generate	support.			One	 important	 implication	 for	 accepting	 the	 breadth	 of	 support	 populations	provide	 conflict	 actors	 is	 it	 makes	 it	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 draw	 a	 clear	 line	between	 the	 population	 and	 belligerents.	 Often,	 fighters	 or	 other	 active	participants	are	judged	as	subsumed	into	a	unitary	decision-making	entity	(see,	for	 example,	DeRouen	 and	 Sobek	 (2004)	 and	Cunningham	et	 al.	 (2009)).	 This	approach	 may	 seem	 attractive	 in	 that	 it	 simplifies	 the	 analysis	 of	 intrastate	conflict.	 However,	 given	 how	 crucial	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 population	 is	 to	 the	strength	of	conflict	actors	this	assumes	away	a	key	variable.			Teresa	Barnes	puts	it	succinctly;	“civil	wars	are	not	determined	by	the	decisions	of	 individual	 leaders,	 but	 by	 the	 thousands	 of	 decisions	 being	 taken	 by	 foot	soldiers	to	participate	in	rebellions”	(Bhebe	and	Ranger,	1995).	Given	the	breadth	of	support	belligerents	get	from	the	population,	this	can	be	expanded	to	include	the	 tens	 of	 thousands	 providing	 support	 to	 belligerents	 through	 less-involved	means.	Barnes	obviously	oversimplifies	the	problem	the	other	direction,	in	that	she	ignores	how	macro-level	actors	influence	this	decision.	Nevertheless,	it	is	a	useful	 reminder	 that	 the	 role	 and	motivations	of	most	participants	 are	 absent	from	many	studies	of	intrastate	conflict.			Conceptually,	the	line	between	belligerents	and	the	population	is	relatively	clear;	conflict	actors	make	strategic	decisions	about	the	prosecution	of	the	war	and	the	population	constitutes	those	responding	to	these	decisions	and	choosing	to	assist	one,	both	or	neither	conflict	actor.	Applying	this	concept	in	practice	is	much	more	complicated	as	there	is	no	clear	line	in	any	organisation	between	those	making	decisions	over	its	direction	and	those	responding	to	them.	It	is	clear,	for	example,	that	foot	soldiers	remain	part	of	the	population	from	this	perspective,	but	it	is	not	clear	where	local	commanders	or	local	government	officials	lie.	For	the	purpose	of	this	study,	conflict	actors	constitute	elites	that	sit	at	the	top	of	this	command	hierarchy,	with	everyone	else	being	a	member	of	the	population.		
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To	provide	support	or	to	not	provide	support?	
	The	previous	 section	demonstrated	 the	breadth	and	 importance	of	population	involvement	in	civil	wars.	The	next	stage	in	incorporating	the	population	into	a	more	complete	model	of	intrastate	conflict	is	understanding	why	members	of	the	population	choose	to	provide	support	to	one,	both	or	neither	belligerent.	I	do	not	intend	 to	 list	 every	 possible	 reason	 an	 individual	 can	 have	 for	 supporting	 a	conflict	 actor.	 These	 reasons	 can	 be	 tangible	 or	 intangible,	 psychological	 or	material,	objective	or	subjective.	Humphreys	and	Weinstein	(2008)	use	evidence	from	Sierra	Leone	to	show	that	motivations	for	individual	participation	in	civil	war	 vary	 significantly.	 These	 motivations	 will	 vary	 even	 further	 between	conflicts.	Instead,	I	will	divide	the	population’s	incentives	to	provide	support	into	four	categories,	with	a	number	of	real-life	examples.				At	 an	 abstract	 level,	 every	 member	 of	 the	 population’s	 decision	 is	 relatively	simple.	 If	 the	 expected	 utility	 from	 providing	 a	 particular	 type	 of	 support	 is	greater	than	zero,	then	an	individual	will	provide	that	support.	If	it	is	less	than	zero,	then	it	will	not.			The	 population’s	 ability	 to	 contribute	 also	 determines	 how	 much	 support	 a	conflict	actor	can	generate.	As	an	obvious	example,	a	member	of	the	population	cannot	pay	a	tax	if	it	has	no	money	or	provide	food	if	it	cannot	grow	crops.	This	logic	applies	to	all	types	of	material	support	members	of	the	population	provide	to	conflict	actors.	 Individuals	can	even	only	provide	a	 finite	amount	of	 fighting	capacity.	The	case	studies	below	will	show	that	this	is	a	crucial	element	of	any	civil	war,	and	often	even	more	important	in	determining	the	final	outcome	than	the	proportion	of	the	population	that	support	each	belligerent.				Members	of	 the	population	respond	 to	 incentives,	both	positive	 (benefits)	and	negative	(costs),	and	decide	accordingly	whether	to	participate	and	at	what	level.	These	incentives	are	either	selective	for	individual	members	of	the	population	or	collective	and	apply	to	broader	communities.	They	will	also	be	divided	between	those	 delivered	 immediately	 during	 the	 conflict	 and	 promises	 to	 be	 delivered	
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after	 the	 conflict	 is	 won.	 This	 allows	 us	 to	 divide	 the	 types	 of	 incentives	 the	population	 respond	 to	 into	 four	 general	 types;	 selective	 and	 within-conflict,	selective	and	post-conflict,	collective	and	within-conflict,	and	collective	and	post-conflict	 (see	 table	one).	Each	of	 these	 four	 types	poses	a	different	challenge	to	belligerents	in	terms	of	motivating	the	support	they	need.		
Type	of	incentive	 Within-conflict	 Post-conflict	
	
Selective	
(Individual)	
	Financial	payment	Social	status	Military	targeting	(cost)	
	Political	power	Employment	Judicial	punishment	(cost)	
	
Collective	
(Community)	
	Support	in	local	conflicts	Security	Community-level	violence	(cost)	
	Political	change	Improved	services	Political	exclusion	(cost)	
Table	1:	Examples	of	the	four	types	of	incentives	that	affect	population	decision-making.	Those	with	cost	in	brackets	represent	negative	incentives.	
	
Selective	within-conflict	incentives		This	type	of	incentive	is	the	most	powerful	at	an	individual	level.	It	provides	an	immediate	benefit	or	cost	that	is	not	dependent	on	the	outcome	of	the	conflict.	As	such,	 it	 becomes	 easy	 for	 those	 responding	 to	 these	 incentives	 to	monitor	 its	delivery	 and	 alter	 their	 behaviour	 if	 the	 payoff	 is	 not	 realised.	 From	 the	individual’s	perspective	these	types	of	incentives	are	of	both	high	value	and	high	credibility.		The	main	drawback	of	this	type	of	 incentive	for	conflict	actors	is	that	it	can	be	extremely	difficult	to	provide	it	on	a	mass	scale,	especially	for	rebel	groups	that	have	limited	resources.	It	may,	therefore,	be	difficult	to	build	a	movement	using	selective	within-conflict	incentives	alone.			
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Examples	 of	 this	 type	 of	 incentive	 include	 direct	 economic	 incentives.	 Samuel	Popkin’s,	The	Rational	Peasant,	explains	peasant	support	for	the	Vietcong	on	the	basis	of	individuals	within	the	population	responding	to	the	economic	incentives	the	insurgency	offered	(1979).	Another	selective	within-conflict	benefit	may	be	the	 political	 or	 social	 standing	 that	 supporting	 a	 belligerent	 will	 provide	 the	individual.	 David	 Lan	 argues	 that	 spirit	 mediums	 cooperated	 with	 the	 ZANU	insurgency	 in	Zimbabwe	 in	order	 to	 reassert	 the	political	power	 they	had	 lost	during	the	period	of	white-rule	(Lan,	1985).		An	 example	 of	 a	 selective	 within-conflict	 cost	 is	 the	 probability	 of	 being	individually	 targeted	 for	 supporting	 a	 belligerent.	 In	 Afghanistan,	 the	 Taliban	attempted	to	kill	anyone	involved	in	local	government	institutions	as	a	means	to	prevent	people	from	occupying	these	roles	(Rashid,	2010).			
Selective	post-conflict	incentives	
	Selective	 post-conflict	 incentives	 are	 much	 less	 powerful	 than	 within-conflict	incentives	as	they	depend	upon	beliefs	over	how	the	war	will	end.	These	types	of	incentives	work	 best	when	 one	 actor	 appears	 close	 to	winning	 the	war.	Mark	Lichbach	(1998)	suggests	people	will	start	supporting	a	belligerent	that	appears	on	the	verge	of	victory	to	benefit	from	the	potential	spoils.			The	drawback	of	this	type	of	incentive	is,	therefore,	relatively	obvious;	during	the	early	stages	of	a	war	very	few	people	will	respond	to	it.	While	the	pay-off	may	be	high,	it	will	be	much	less	certain	as	the	belligerent	may	ultimately	be	unable	to	provide	 it,	as	 it	may	not	win	the	war.	Governments	and	rebels	may	also	break	promises	after	the	conflict,	lowering	the	credibility	of	any	offer	made	during	the	war	(Bueno	de	Mesquita,	Smith,	Siverson,	and	Morrow,	2005).			Despite	this,	there	is	evidence	of	this	type	of	incentive	having	some	effect	during	civil	 wars.	 Fotini	 Christia	 (2012)	 outlined	 how	 faction	 leaders	 changed	 sides	during	the	various	Afghan	wars	based	on	their	perceptions	of	the	political	power	they	would	hold	if	their	chosen	coalition	succeeded.	Fotini’s	work	also	suggested	
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that	the	more	people	this	offer	is	made	to,	the	less	credible	it	becomes.	She	found	that	 as	 coalitions	 grew	 in	 size,	 less	 powerful	members	 of	 the	 coalition	would	desert	and	offer	support	elsewhere.	
	
Collective	within-conflict	incentives	
	Collective	incentives	apply	to	a	whole	community	in	exchange	for	support	from	individuals	associated	with	 that	section	of	 the	population.	 If	belligerents	reach	whole	communities	through	collective	incentives,	they	can	expand	exponentially	the	amount	of	support	they	generate.				Shaping	population	behaviour	through	collective	incentives,	however,	represents	a	fundamental	challenge.	Individuals	within	communities	will	benefit	from	them	regardless	of	whether	or	not	 they	provide	support	 in	return.	The	paradox	 this	creates	 is	 that	 the	 provision	 of	 the	 collective	 incentive	 requires	 input	 from	 a	number	of	people.	Once	the	good	is	provided	it	is	enjoyed	by	the	whole	population	regardless	of	whether	or	not	an	individual	contributed.	While	individuals	benefit	from	the	provision	of	this	good,	their	input	involves	a	personal	cost	or	risk	and	their	individual	contribution	is	unlikely	to	be	decisive.	As	a	result,	the	individual	chooses	not	to	participate;	otherwise	referred	to	as	free-riding.	Consequently,	the	good	is	not	delivered,	even	though	everyone	would	benefit	from	it.	Economists	call	this	the	collective	action	problem	(Sandler,	2004).8		As	Mark	Lichbach	lays	out,	 in	spite	of	this	challenge,	armies	are	raised	by	both	revolutionary	 and	 counter-revolutionary	 forces	 and	 communities	 do	 support	these	 forces	 (1998).	 His	 book	 examines	 the	 plethora	 of	 ways	 belligerents	overcome	the	collective	action	problem	and	mobilise	support.9			
																																																						8	The	collective	action	is	not	as	acute	when	people	are	assumed	to	be	boundedly-rational,	as	they	are	likely	to	base	their	assessment	on	the	likelihood	of	attaining	the	pay-off	by	the	behaviour	of	those	around	them.	As	such,	if	political	elites	can	more	easily	induce	participation	by	creating	a	bandwagoning	effect.		
9	Chapter	three	will	examine	how	current	doctrinal	approaches	to	counterinsurgency	perform	against	Lichbach’s	solutions.	
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In	short,	the	collective	action	problem	suggests	that	individuals	are	less	likely	to	respond	 to	 community-based	 incentives	 than	 they	 are	 to	 selective	 incentives.	However,	 collective	 incentives	 can	 often	 reach	 far	more	 people	 than	 selective	incentives	and,	therefore,	do	not	have	to	be	as	successful	at	an	individual	level	to	generate	 more	 support	 in	 absolute	 terms,	 particularly	 less	 active	 types	 of	participation,	such	as	providing	intelligence.				As	with	selective	incentives,	collective	within-conflict	incentives	are	likely	to	be	more	powerful	than	collective	post-conflict	incentives.	Communities	can	accrue	benefits	 or	 avoid	 costs	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 providing	 support,	 allowing	individuals	to	withdraw	their	support	if	the	payoff	is	not	delivered.			The	 desire	 for	 community	 security	 is	 a	 collective	 within-conflict	 motivation.	Stathis	Kalyvas	argues	that	many	people	join	one	side	or	another	in	a	civil	war	based	on	their	desire	to	protect	their	community	(2006).	One	can	see	how	this	can	 be	 a	 collective	 action	 problem	 as	 security	 depends	 upon	 people	 joining	militias	or	security	forces	in	order	to	provide	this	security.			Belligerents	 also	 punish	 communities	 for	 the	 behaviour	 of	 individuals.	 Reed	Wood	and	Jacob	Kathman	show	how	rebel	groups	often	attack	communities	to	stop	them	engaging	in	economic	and	social	activity	that	benefits	the	government	(2014).10			
	
	
	
																																																						
10	Collective	costs	are	not	as	complicated	as	collective	benefits,	and	will	often	be	easier	to	deliver	to	the	population	than	selective	costs,	which	require	comprehensive	intelligence	to	identify	those	supporting	a	conflict	actor’s	opponent.	The	challenge	for	belligerents	is	that	those	involved	in	supporting	the	other	conflict	actor	may	be	well	protected	from	indiscriminate	violence,	or	consider	that	they	will	be	punished	regardless	(Kalyvas,	2006).	Consequently,	they	are	still	not	as	powerful	as	selective	costs.	As	this	thesis	focuses	mainly	on	positive	incentives,	it	will	not	feature	a	discussion	on	the	utility	of	choosing	between	various	violent	strategies	at	a	theoretical	level.	That	said,	the	case	studies	feature	the	use	of	violence	to	shape	population	behaviour	and	undermine	support	for	the	opposing	belligerent.	The	implications	of	these	specific	strategies	will,	therefore,	be	treated	in	more	detail	during	the	empirical	section	of	the	thesis.			
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Collective	post-conflict	incentives	
	Collective	 post-conflict	 incentives	 suffer	 the	 same	 problem	 as	 all	 collective	incentives.	They	are	also	highly	uncertain	for	the	same	reason	as	selective	post-conflict	incentives,	in	that	there	is	less	probability	that	the	incentive	will	actually	be	delivered.			Nevertheless,	a	number	of	scholars	have	proposed	that	some	conflict	actors	have	been	able	 to	 generate	 support	based	on	promises	 for	 the	post-war	order.	Ted	Gurr,	in	Why	Men	Rebel	(2012),	argues	that	relative	political,	social	or	economic	deprivation	 is	 a	 key	 variable	 in	 inspiring	 people	 to	 participate	 in	 rebellious	movements.	James	McPherson	(1998)	found	that	many	soldiers	in	the	American	Civil	War	participated	due	to	their	 ideological	affinity	with	the	goals	of	macro-level	 actors.	 One	 problem	 with	 this	 approach	 is	 that	 promises	 to	 address	grievances	or	implement	an	ideological	vision	are	collective	and	often	post-war	incentives.11			Consequently,	only	a	small	percentage	of	people	may	respond	to	these	types	of	incentives	with	active	support.	That	said,	conflict	actors	may	only	need	a	small	proportion	of	people	to	provide	the	most	active	types	of	support.	The	analysis	above	 showed	 that	 a	 small	 group	 of	 ideologically	 committed	 or	 extremely	aggrieved	individuals	may	be	enough	to	raise	an	armed	force	if	there	is	a	resilient	network	 of	 people	 providing	 less	 costly	 types	 of	 support.	 Collective	 post-war	incentives	may	also	be	sufficient	to	motivate	people	to	provide	less	risky	types	of	support,	 such	as	 small	 financial	 contributions.	Across	a	 large	population	 these	smaller	contributions	may	add	up	to	significantly	boost	a	conflict	actor’s	overall	
																																																						11	Despite	the	pervasive	nature	of	grievances	and	ideologies,	they	have	generally	failed	to	explain	conflict	dynamics	in	national-level	quantitative	analysis	of	civil	war.	Stephen	Brush	(see	Gurr,	2012;	px),	for	example,	examined	a	range	of	empirical	studies	and	found	there	was	no	support	for	Tedd	Gurr’s	theory	of	relative	deprivation.	Cederman,	Gleditsch	and	Buhaug	(2013)	suggest	this	is	because	studies	focus	on	the	wrong	level	of	analysis	and	present	a	new	dataset	that	focuses	on	local	dynamics,	which	they	claim	does	show	support	for	political	and	economic	grievances	as	a	driver	of	civil	war.	Mark	Lichbach	also	claims	that	subjective	grievances	are	much	more	important	than	objective	grievances	when	it	comes	to	motivating	participation	in	rebel	groups	(1998).	It	is	the	ability	of	political	entrepreneurs	to	exploit	grievances,	to	the	point	of	even	inventing	them,	that	matters,	not	the	objective	existence	of	a	grievance	in	the	first	place.		
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strength.	Nevertheless,	collective	post-war	incentives	will	be	the	weakest	driver	of	behaviour	at	an	individual	level.	For	a	conflict	actor	to	generate	the	support	it	needs	to	win	a	war,	collective	post-war	incentives	will	have	to	be	combined	with	credible	 within-war	 benefits	 or	 costs,	 which	 will	 more	 powerful	 in	 shaping	population	behaviour.				Collective	 post-conflict	 incentives	 can	 also	 take	 the	 form	 of	 costs.	 Ethnic	minorities	across	Syria	and	Iraq	have	fled	territory	rather	than	support	efforts	to	resist	ISIL’s	military	advances	(Smith,	2015).	These	civilians	undoubtedly	feared	that	ISIL	would	collectively	punish	non-Sunni	Muslim	communities	under	their	control	based	on	ISIL’s	activities	elsewhere.			
Type	of	incentive	 Within-conflict	 Post-conflict	
	
Selective	
(Individual)	
	High	payoff	Lower	uncertainty	Limited	reach		
	High	payoff	High	uncertainty	Limited	reach	
	
Collective	
(Community)	
	Low	payoff	Lower	uncertainty	Wider	reach		
	Low	payoff	High	uncertainty	Wider	reach		Table	2:	Features	of	the	four	types	of	incentives		
Supporting	both	sides		Table	 two	 summarises	 the	 different	 types	 of	 incentives.	 Based	 on	 a	 range	 of	incentives,	that	will	encompass	all	four	of	these	quadrants,	individuals	within	the	population	will	 provide	 the	 type	 of	 support	 to	 each	 belligerent	 that	 gives	 the	biggest	expected	payoff	to	the	individual.	It	may	be	that	this	equation	leads	some	individuals	to	provide	support	to	both	actors.	A	member	of	a	government	civil	service	may	be	strongly	motivated	by	 the	selective	 incentive	of	 their	wages	 to	continue	working	for	the	government.	However,	they	may	also	feel	the	political	
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aims	of	the	rebels	would	benefit	them	in	the	longer	term	and,	if	the	likelihood	of	punishment	for	doing	so	is	low,	may	provide	financial	assistance	to	rebels	or	turn	a	blind	eye	to	rebel	activity	within	their	community.	In	LTTE-held	Sri	Lanka,	civil	servants	 continued	 to	 work	 for	 the	 government,	 paying	 taxes	 to	 rebels	 and	delivering	 services	 to	 populations	 that	 actively	 supported	 rebel	 groups	(Mampilly,	 2011).	 According	 to	 Lichbach’s	 typology,	 this	 person	 could	 be	 a	member	of	both	the	government	and	the	rebels.			It	is	also	worth	noting	that	these	incentives	are	always	interacting.	An	individual	may	find	the	allure	of	democracy	in	the	post-war	environment	appealing.	They	may	also	recognise	that	there	is	a	low	probability	of	it	being	realised	and	their	individual	 contribution	 will	 make	 little	 difference.	 Nevertheless,	 they	 may	consider	joining	a	belligerent’s	military	force	for	less	money	if	they	believe	in	the	cause.	Without	both	the	selective	within-war	and	collective	post-war	 incentive	they	may	not	have	provided	support.				There	 is	 also	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 equation	 individuals	 face	 for	 providing	support	 to	 actors	 leads	 to	 them	 supporting	 neither	 side.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	perceived	utility	of	actively	contributing	to	both	sides	is	below	zero.	In	this	case,	the	population	passively	 support	 both	 sides	 and	 falls	 into	 the	non-constituent	category	 for	 both	 groups.	 As	 the	 analysis	 above	 shows	 though,	 even	 small	contributions,	such	as	paying	taxes,	constitute	active	support.	While	many	in	the	population	may	be	indifferent	to	the	outcome	and	support	the	strongest	actor,	as	per	 Kalyvas’s	 analysis	 (2006),	 their	 acquiescence	 should	 not	 be	 equated	 to	passivity.	These	contributions	may	seem	 insignificant	by	 themselves	but	when	spread	across	tens	of	thousands	of	people	may	determine	the	ability	of	a	conflict	actor	to	operate.		
	
Population	support	and	regenerative	capacity	
	The	preceding	analysis	has	described,	in	broad	terms,	the	nature	of	the	alliance	between	a	conflict	actor	and	the	population	during	a	civil	war.	The	alliance	has	two	main	parts;	the	contribution	of	the	population	to	the	strength	of	a	belligerent	
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and	 the	 ability	 to	 of	 a	 conflict	 actor	 to	 deliver	 incentives	 that	 elicit	 these	contributions.			The	 first	 element	 describes	 what	 the	 population	 provides	 belligerents;	 active	support	in	the	form	of	manpower,	finances,	supplies	or	intelligence,	and	passive	support	in	terms	of	not	providing	active	support	to	the	opposing	conflict	actor.	The	key	point	is	that	the	range	of	support	belligerents	need	to	function	is	more	complex	 than	 a	 simple	 active-passive	 dichotomy.	 Studies	 have	 shown	 that	 in	many	cases	conflict	actors	need	more	people	to	provide	the	less-active	types	of	support	 -	 providing	 a	 small	 financial	 contribution,	 for	 example	 -	 than	 actively	participate	 in	military	 options	 (Molnar,	 1966).	 The	 role	 of	 popular	 support	 in	determining	the	strength	of	a	conflict	actor,	therefore,	is	much	more	multifaceted	than	 whether	 the	 population	 considers	 a	 belligerent’s	 goals	 or	 behaviour	legitimate.		The	second	element	of	 the	alliance	describes	why	the	population	provides	 this	support.	 The	 literature	 on	 mobilisation	 suggests	 there	 is	 no	 silver	 bullet	 in	answering	 this	 question	 in	 practical	 terms.	 However,	 theoretically,	 we	 should	expect	that	an	individual	is	more	likely	to	provide	support	to	a	belligerent	if	the	pay-off	is	immediate	and	selective,	in	that	the	individual	can	only	realise	the	pay-off	 by	 actively	 providing	 support.	 Ultimately,	 the	 decision	 to	 support	 conflict	actors	is	a	strategic	one,	based	on	an	expected	return,	which	demonstrates	how	these	 two	 elements	 of	 the	 alliance	 between	 a	 belligerent	 and	 the	 population	interact.	 Governments	 and	 rebel	 groups	 have	 to	 alter	 the	 calculations	 of	 the	population	if	they	are	to	emerge	victorious.	The	aim	is	simple,	increase	the	range	of	incentives	to	potential	supporters	in	order	to	elicit	more	active	contributions,	moving	members	of	 the	population	across	the	continuum	from	constituents,	 to	members,	to	activists.	Belligerents	also	seek	to	maximise	the	amount	of	support	their	followers	can	provide.			They	also	attempt	to	decrease	the	utility	to	the	population	of	providing	support	to	 their	 opponents,	 essentially	 pacifying	 them	 and	 moving	 them	 across	 the	continuum	 from	 activists,	 to	 sympathisers,	 to	 non-constituents.	 Alternatively,	
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they	 will	 try	 to	 limit	 the	 amount	 of	 support	 their	 opponent’s	 constituent	population	can	generate.			The	 belligerent	 that	 achieves	 these	 objectives	 and	monopolises	 its	 capacity	 to	shape	population	behaviour	and	mobilise	resources	will	win	the	war.	This	mirrors	recent	practitioner	descriptions	of	civil	war.	David	Kilcullen	claims	that	“the	side	may	win	which	best	mobilizes	 (sic)	and	energizes	 (sic)	 its	global,	 regional	and	local	support	base	-	and	prevents	its	adversaries	doing	likewise”	(2012;	p140).	Figure	two	shows	this	process	visually.			
	Figure	2:	Framework	for	war	as	a	mobilisation	competition.	
	This	relationship	is	not	static	or	based	on	a	one-time	mobilisation	of	resources	at	the	beginning	of	 the	war.	Governments	and	rebels	are	continuously	mobilising	resources	and	their	capacity	to	do	this	shifts	as	the	war	goes	on.	In	any	given	time	period,	 conflict	 actors	 will	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 generate	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	resources	 by	 eliciting	 contributions	 from	 the	 population.	 This	 ability	 will	obviously	 also	 be	 augmented	 any	 external	 support	 governments	 or	 rebels	 are	receiving.	If	one	side	loses	the	ability	to	mobilise	support	completely,	then	it	will	lose	the	war.		
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The	ability	to	generate	resources	ultimately	determines	a	conflict	actors’	strength	and,	 as	 it	 is	 a	 dynamic	 process,	 I	 describe	 this	 ability	 as	 a	 belligerent’s	regenerative	capacity.	In	the	example	given	at	the	start	of	this	thesis,	the	Taliban	grew	 during	 the	 period	 of	 Western	 intervention	 in	 Afghanistan	 because	 its	regenerative	 capacity	 increased	 at	 a	 greater	 rate	 than	 it	 was	 losing	 fighters,	meaning	it	was	able	to	increase	its	strength	even	in	the	face	of	heavy	losses.		
	
War	as	a	state-building	competition	
	The	description	of	civil	war	as	a	process	of	alliance	building	offers	an	important	insight	into	the	basic	process	underpinning	the	dynamic	and	outcomes	intrastate	conflicts.	 It	 is	particularly	revealing	that	 this	description	mirrors	more	general	academic	literature	on	how	governments	maintain	control	over	the	state.					Bueno	 de	 Mesquita	 et	 al.	 present	 a	 model	 of	 society	 in	 The	 Logic	 of	 Political	
Survival	(2005),	which	illustrates	how	governments	retain	control.	The	authors	divide	 societies	 into	 a	 ‘winning	 coalition’,	 the	 ‘selectorate’	 and	 the	‘disenfranchised’.	The	‘winning	coalition’	consists	of	those	that	make	the	decision	on	who	leads	the	polity.	The	‘selectorate’	have	the	theoretical	capacity	to	choose	leaders	 or	 gain	 access	 to	 the	 ‘winning	 coalition’	 through	 the	 polity’s	 existing	institutional	 structures.	 The	 ‘disenfranchised’	 cover	 the	 remaining	 ‘residents’	(chap.	 2).	 These	 categories	 can	 be	 broadly	 mapped	 to	 the	 proposed	 types	 of	support	 conflict	 actors	 need.	 Governments	 create	 reciprocal	 relations	 across	these	 different	 sections	 of	 society	 to	 stay	 in	 power,	 raising	 taxes	 that	 it	 then	spends	 on	 providing	 public	 and	 private	 benefits,	 which	 further	 motivates	population	behaviour	that	generates	resources.	These	resources	also	allow	the	government	to	either	minimise	or	suppress	dissent	from	the	disenfranchised	or	non-constituents	 (chap.	10).	Based	on	 this	description,	 is	 easy	 to	 see	how	 this	reflects	the	alliance	between	conflict	actors	and	the	population	laid	out	above.			Governments	structure	their	relationships	with	the	population	in	a	wide	variety	of	ways.	Western	 liberal	models	of	 the	 state	 see	 the	government	as	mediating	conflict	between	various	social	groups	and	individuals	(Peters	and	Pierre,	2005).	
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Autocratic	governments	are	more	likely	to	rely	on	the	active	support	of	a	smaller	section	of	the	population,	which	it	provides	with	selective	incentives	in	exchange	for	assisting	the	government	in	suppressing	the	remainder	of	society	(Bueno	de	Mesquita	et	al.,	2005).	Weaker	governments	may	draw	strength	 from	building	patronage	 networks	 across	 the	 state.	 Lee	 Seymour	 shows	 that	 in	 Sudan	government	 power	 is	 enforced	 by	 local	 political	 elites,	 who	 incentivise	 their	constituent	population	to	participate	in	militias	that	provide	security	and	police	territory.	 In	 exchange,	 the	 government	 provides	 these	 elites	 with	 access	 to	resources	 or	 territorial	 control	 (2014).	 It	 is	 not	 even	 necessary	 that	 the	government	 exert	 complete	 control	 over	 its	 territory.	 In	many	 less-developed	states,	 the	 government	may	 only	 effectively	 control	 one	 portion	 of	 the	 polity.	Administration	in	the	rest	of	the	state	is	left	to	combinations	of	NGOs,	traditional	institutions	 such	 as	 tribes,	 religious	 groups	 or	 criminal	 networks	 (Mampilly,	2011).	No	group	that	has	designs	on	formally	controlling	the	state,	or	some	part	of	 it,	 is	 able	 to	 challenge	 these	non-state	 actors	 for	 supremacy	 in	 an	 area	 and	motivate	enough	support	to	confront	the	government.		Bueno	de	Mesquita	et	al.	argue	the	range	of	potential	polities	is	infinite	in	scope	in	terms	of	the	balance	between	the	size	of	the	‘winning	coalition’,	 ‘selectorate’	and	 ‘disenfranchised',	 and	 the	 types	 of	 incentives	 governments	 use	 to	 shape	population	 behaviour	 and	 hold	 on	 to	 power	 (2005).	 The	 reality	 is	 that	governments	 around	 the	 world	 control	 the	 state	 through	 a	 combination	 of	methods.	 Even	 many	 democratic	 states	 maintain	 strong	 security	 forces	 that	punish	participation	in	rebellious	activity.			Regardless	of	this	balance,	the	basic	description	of	the	state	as	a	system	in	which	governments	 distribute	 resources	 to	 their	 constituent	 population	 in	 order	 to	elicit	behaviour	that	generates	support	clearly	mirrors	the	mechanism	of	alliance	between	 belligerents	 and	 the	 population	 during	 civil	 wars.	 The	 equivalency	between	Bueno	de	Mesquita	et	al.’s	work	and	studies	of	rebel	networks	is	also	revealing.			
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Zacharian	Mampilly	 shows	 that	many	 scholars	 have	 drawn	 parallels	 between	insurgent	 efforts	 to	 build	 effective	 shadow	 governance	 structures	 and	 the	emergence	of	states	(Kasfir,	2002;	Kingston	and	Spears,	2004;	Mampilly,	2011;	Pegg,	1998).	These	scholars	liken	more	extensive	rebel	efforts	to	build	relations	with	 the	 population	 to	 Mancur	 Olson	 (1993)	 and	 Charles	 Tilly’s	 (1993)	description	 of	 modern-state	 formation,	 where	 roving	 bandits	 transition	 to	stationary	bandits	(Mampilly,	2011).	The	theory	explains	state	formation	as	the	result	of	bandits	needing	to	draw	support	from	the	population	to	sustain	military	activity	against	each	other.	These	bandits	“move	toward	consensual	accumulation	strategies	 because	 the	 rewards	 offered	 through	 effective	 taxation	 of	 the	population	 are	 much	 greater	 than	 the	 mere	 looting	 that	 the	 roving	 bandit	previously	relied	upon”	(Mampilly,	2011;	loc1059).			It	is	clear	that	rebels	face	this	calculation	during	civil	wars.	If	they	can	establish	permanent	structures,	that	mirror	Bueno	de	Mesquita	et	al’s	description	of	the	state,	 they	 can	 draw	 far	 more	 support	 from	 the	 population,	 organise	 the	population	 to	 maximise	 the	 amount	 of	 support	 each	 individual	 provides	 and	prevent	 the	 government	 from	 interacting	 with	 those	 communities.	 Building	shadow-governance	 structures	 becomes	 about	 more	 than	 demonstrating	 a	credible	alternative	or	seeking	legitimacy	(Podder,	2013).	These	structures	form	an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 process	 through	 which	 rebels	 organise	 and	 generate	support	from	the	population.			Rebels	 of	 all	 types	 seek	 to	build	networks	 that	provide	 them	with	manpower,	funding,	 supplies	 and	 intelligence.	 Since	 the	 interventions	 in	 Iraq	 and	Afghanistan,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 growing	 literature	 on	 how	 insurgencies	 create	networks	 from	which	 they	draw	 the	 support	 they	need	 to	build	 and	 sustain	 a	military	 force.	Chad	Serena	(2014)	 looked	at	 the	 Iraqi	Sunni	 insurgency	 in	 the	mid-2000s	 and	 shows	 its	 organisational	 network	 provided	 it	 with	 fighters,	funding,	 supplies,	 intelligence,	 the	 ability	 to	 train	 new	 members,	 and	 punish	government	 collaborators	 (2014).	 Paul	 Staniland	 provides	 a	 comparative	analysis	of	 insurgent	networks	across	south	Asia.	Once	 the	conflict	begins,	 the	insurgents	 need	 to	 broaden	 beyond	 their	 original	 social	 network	 and	 become	
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‘integrated’	to	draw	the	support	it	needs	to	function	and	combat	the	government.	They	 do	 this	 by	 developing	 links	 ‘horizontally’	 between	militant	 factions	 and	‘vertically’	into	the	population.	The	key	is	that	these	networks	function	to	create	a	two-way	flow	of	support	between	insurgents	and	the	population	(2014).		Staniland	and	Serena	focus	on	smaller	insurgent	groups	engaged	in	asymmetric-style	conflicts.	However,	understanding	these	networks	as	the	structures	through	which	 insurgencies	draw	support	makes	 it	clear	 they	are	the	equivalent	of	 the	more	 complex	 institutions	 built	 by	 governments	 and	many	 rebel	 groups	 that	control	territory,	such	as	the	LTTE	in	Sri	Lanka.	The	smaller	groups	Staniland	and	Serena	 studied,	 only	 needed	 support	 to	 sustain	 asymmetric	 activities	 against	vastly	superior	military	forces.	As	such,	they	created	clandestine	networks	out	of	the	reach	of	their	militarily	powerful	enemies.	The	LTTE	was	able	to	build	a	more	conventional	 army	 and	 administer	 a	 shadow-state.	 It	 built	 more	 complex	sovereign	structures	to	generate	the	additional	resources	required,	in	the	manner	articulated	by	Bueno	de	Mesquita	et	al.	(2005).	Governments	use	their	ministries,	local	 administrations	 or	 patronage	 networks	 to	 do	 the	 same.	 These	 sovereign	structures	both	deliver	incentives	to	the	population	and	generate	resources	back	out	 of	 the	 population	 that	 the	 belligerent	 can	 use	 for	 military	 activity	 and	delivering	further	incentives	to	the	population.		Academic	work	has	also	shown	that	both	governments	and	rebels	can	build	these	arrangements	 in	 parallel	 within	 a	 single	 state.	 Charles	 Tilly	 describes	 this	situation	as	“dual	sovereignty”	(1977).12	Multiple	scholars	have	since	drawn	on	
																																																						
12	Applying	Tilly’s	concept	to	the	study	of	civil	war,	while	extremely	useful,	does	require	a	departure	from	traditional	understandings	of	sovereignty.	Tilly’s	description	of	‘dual	sovereignty’	is	unrelated	to	the	concept	of	de	jure	sovereignty.	It	fits	much	better	when	viewed	through	the	prism	of	de	facto	sovereignty,	which	is	more	concerned	with	describing	the	actual	level	of	control	on	the	ground	(Mampilly,	2011).	Even	here,	the	level	of	control	rebel	groups	need	to	sustain	low-level	guerrilla	activity	may	not	meet	the	criteria	for	de	facto	sovereignty	as	it	is	described	by	some	scholars,	in	that	the	insurgency	does	not	control	or	actually	govern	territory	(Mampilly,	2011).	Zacharian	Mampilly,	for	example,	draws	attention	to	the	LRA	in	Uganda	and	the	RPF	in	Rwanda	who	preferred	to	sustain	only	minimal	contact	with	populations	they	could	not	control.	Nevertheless,	they	generated	enough	support	to	sustain	a	militant	movement	(2011;	loc	489).	When	drawing	on	Tilly’s	description	of	‘dual	sovereigns’	in	this	study,	therefore,	‘sovereignty’	is	simply	defined	as	a	reciprocal	relationship	between	a	macro-actor	and	some	portion	of	the	population	that	allows	that	macro-actor	to	sustain	a	military	force.	I	do	not	suggest	this	to	be	a	sensible	definition	of	sovereignty	in	other	contexts.	
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Tilly’s	work	to	show	how	two	or	more	actors	can	exercise	de	facto	sovereignty	within	 one	 internationally	 recognised	 state	 (Kingston	 and	 Spears,	 2004;	Mampilly,	 2011;	 Pegg,	 1998;	 E.	 Wood,	 2010).	 Belligerents	 compete	 to	 build	sovereign	structures	that	deliver	incentives	that	shape	population	behaviour,	and	extract	and	organise	the	resources	and	support	this	behaviour	grants	the	conflict	actor.	They	then	use	these	sovereign	structures	to	build	and	support	a	military	force.	 A	 state	 of	 ‘multiple	 sovereignty’	 exists	when	 two	 or	more	macro-actors	achieve	this,	regardless	of	the	relative	size	of	their	forces.	Civil	wars	then	become	a	competition	between	belligerents	to	extend	these	sovereign	structures	across	the	state	and	degrade	those	of	their	opponent.	The	side	that	is	able	to	do	this	will	be	in	a	position	to	‘mobilise	and	energise	its	support-base	and	demobilise	that	of	its	opponent’	(Kilcullen,	2012).				
Conclusion		
	This	chapter	has	developed	a	basic	model	for	understanding	the	way	belligerents	build	and	use	alliances	with	the	population	across	the	state.	The	conflict	actor	that	monopolises	its	alliances	across	the	polity	will	win	the	war.	DeRouen	and	Sobek’s	(2004)	statement	about	the	central	role	of	the	government	and	rebel	interaction	in	determining	the	outcome	of	civil	war	is,	in	fact,	incorrect.	Previous	comparative	studies	of	civil	war	outcomes,	such	as	DeRouen	and	Sobek	(2004),	Cunningham	et	al.	 (2009),	Fearon	 (2004)	and	Collier	et	 al.	 (2004),	 treat	 civil	war	as	a	 two-player	game	with	belligerents	interacting	strategically	with	each	other	based	on	their	 perceptions	 of	 the	 balance	 of	 power.13	 Instead,	 when	 considering	 likely	conflict	 outcomes,	 we	 should	 be	 applying	 a	 triadic	 model	 focusing	 on	 the	interactions	between	the	government,	the	rebel	group	and	the	population.			This	shows	why	governments	and	rebels	expend	so	much	resources	on	shaping	population	behaviour	rather	than	on	military	activity.	Monopolising	the	ability	to	shape	 population	 behaviour	 ultimately	 defines	 winning	 a	 civil	 war.	 Military	
																																																						13	These	theories	of	war	do	not	necessarily	limit	themselves	to	being	two-player	games	as	they	all	account	for	more	than	two	macro-level	actors.	However,	these	actors	still	interact	horizontally	with	each	other.		
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activity	will	obviously	play	a	role	in	determining	each	actor’s	ability	to	do	this,	but	it	is	not	the	only	means	belligerents	can	use.	The	framework	for	understanding	civil	war	developed	in	this	chapter	suggests	we	should	be	examining	the	strength	and	 resilience	 of	 each	 actors’	 structures	 for	 mobilising	 support	 from	 the	population.	If	they	are	strengthening,	we	can	assume	an	actor	is	gaining	ground	in	the	conflict,	if	they	are	weakening,	we	can	surmise	a	belligerent	is	losing.	When	only	one	belligerent’s	mobilisation	structures	remain	intact,	we	can	say	they	have	won	the	war.		This	framework,	however,	does	not	explain	the	second	main	puzzle	of	this	thesis;	why	small	rebel	groups	are	able	to	win	civil	wars	when	they	are	out-numbered	and	out-gunned?	If	a	belligerent’s	strength	is	determined	by	the	strength	of	the	sovereign	structures	it	uses	to	mobilise	support,	then	logic	implies	that	the	larger	actor	has	stronger	mobilisation	structures.	Strong	actors	should,	therefore,	still	be	more	likely	to	win	civil	wars.	The	next	chapter	will	focus	on	how	viewing	civil	war	as	a	mobilisation	competition	does	proffer	a	solution	to	this	question	as	well.	Governments	 and	 rebels	 are	 fundamentally	 different	 types	 of	 actors	 and,	therefore,	 need	 to	 generate	 different	 levels	 and	 types	 of	 support	 from	 the	population.	 Understanding	 this	 caveat	 to	 the	 logic	 of	 war	 as	 a	 mobilisation	competition	offers	a	more	complete	explanation	for	the	dynamics	and	outcomes	of	civil	wars.		
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Chapter	two	
The	art	of	insurgency		Chapter	one	laid	out	how	civil	wars	work	at	their	most	basic	level.	This	chapter	will	complete	the	theoretical	model	by	adding	two	important	caveats	that	make	it	possible	to	use	the	logic	of	civil	war	as	a	mobilisation	competition	to	actually	predict	the	likely	dynamics	and	outcomes	of	civil	wars.		I	will	argue	that	the	key	element	of	this	competition	is	rebel	efforts	to	degrade	the	mobilisation	capacity	of	governments	and	it	is	through	exploring	this	dynamic	we	can	explain	why	civil	wars	take	the	course	they	do.			
The	government’s	advantage	-	its	starting	position		As	demonstrated	in	the	previous	chapter,	once	a	war	begins	the	logic	driving	the	need	for	rebels	to	generate	popular	support	can	also	be	applied	to	governments.	This	also	implies	that	in	times	of	peace	the	government	has	solved	this	problem.			
	Figure	3:	Nature	of	state	before	war	starts.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Government 	 Rebels 
	 Population 
No	link	between	rebels	and	population	that	the	former	can	use	to	build	a	movement	capable	of	challenging	government 
	Functioning	relationship	between	population	and	government.	 
	
As	rebels	are	not	able	to	draw	any	support	from	population,	any	interaction	between	rebels	and	government	is	limited	and	government-dominated. 
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At	the	same	time,	no	potential	rebels	are	able	to	induce	enough	support	to	build	a	military	force.	Mark	Lichbach	argues	“social	order	in	a	state	results	from	social	disorder	in	dissident	groups.	Social	disorder	in	a	state	results	from	social	order	in	dissident	groups”	(1998;	pxii).	Rebel	groups	may	exist,	but	only	in	an	incipient	phase,	with	a	small	number	of	core	activists,	and	they	lack	the	capacity	to	inflict	meaningful	damage	on	the	government.	Pre-war,	the	government	has	a	monopoly	(or	near	enough)	on	generating	resources	from	the	population.			For	a	war	to	begin,	something	has	to	change	that	creates	an	incentive	for	a	portion	of	 the	population	 to	 begin	providing	 support	 to	 rebels.	 Empirical	 studies	 lend	support	to	this	notion.	Almost	all	studies	of	conflict	onset	describe	a	shift	in	the	cost-benefit	analysis	faced	by	the	population	over	whether	to	support	challengers	to	the	government.		Frances	 Stewart	 (2008)	 shows	 how	 the	 unequal	 distribution	 of	 resources	between	 various	 groups	 within	 society	 correlates	 to	 civil	 war	 beginning.	Cederman	et	al.	(2010)	argue	that	changes	in	the	political	status	of	ethnic	groups	will	often	precede	the	outbreak	of	conflict.	One	can	conclude	that	disenfranchised	groups	will	contain	more	individuals	that,	because	they	find	it	harder	to	secure	work	or	access	political	power,	will	be	more	susceptible	to	rebel	incentives.			Collier	and	Hoeffler	maintain	that	civil	wars	are	more	likely	in	countries	where	rebels	 have	 the	 opportunity	 capture	 the	 trade	 of	 natural	 resources,	 such	 as	diamonds,	oil	or	timber	(2004).	This	allows	them	to	deliver	selective	within-war	incentives	 to	 induce	support.	Fearon	and	Laitin	demonstrated	 that	 states	with	large	areas	where	government	presence	 is	weak	are	more	 likely	 to	experience	rebellion	 (2003).	 It	 is	 clearly	 not	 a	 cause	 of	 war	 by	 itself,	 but	 it	 creates	opportunities	 for	rebel	 leaders	with	political	acumen	or	access	 to	resources	 to	build	a	movement	to	challenge	the	government.	Zacharian	Mampilly	argues	this	is	exactly	what	happened	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	(then	Zaire)	in	1996.	The	east	of	the	country	had	long	been	ripe	for	an	insurgent	movement	as	it	lacked	 any	 significant	 government	 presence.	 Laurent-Desire	 Kabila,	 with	
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Rwandan	 support,	 exploited	 this	 to	 build	 a	 movement	 and	 capture	 the	 state	(2011).		This	short	overview	is	not	comprehensive,	but	it	does	show	that	many	empirical	studies	 of	 conflict	 onset	 offer	 strong	 support	 for	 the	 idea	 that	 civil	 war	 is	 a	mobilisation	game.	Wars	 can	only	begin	when	a	 challenger	 to	 the	government	develops	the	capacity	to	offer	a	range	of	incentives	to	the	population	in	exchange	for	active	types	of	support.	By	developing	the	capacity	to	draw	support	from	the	population,	rebels	transition	from	their	incipient	phase,	mobilise	a	military	force	and	a	state	of	dual	sovereignty	emerges.		The	distribution	of	sovereignty	depends	on	the	nature	of	the	change	in	the	state	that	allowed	rebels	to	build	a	movement	and	rebel	capacity	to	exploit	this	new	context.	 In	 the	 most	 extreme	 cases,	 government	 authority	 is	 stripped	 away	completely,	 no	 rebel	 group	 is	 strong	 enough	 to	 replace	 it	 and	 small	 militias	emerge	claiming	to	represent	local	communities.14	While	there	may	be	thousands	of	people	involved	in	the	conflict,	each	militia	is	only	able	to	incentivise	limited	support	 towards	 its	 specific	 goals.	As	an	example,	 after	NATO	bombing	 forced	Colonel	Qadaffi	from	power	in	Libya	there	was	no	organised	movement	capable	of	replacing	him	and	the	country	descended	into	factional	violence.			At	 the	other	end	of	 the	 scale,	 the	government	 loses	a	 significant	portion	of	 its	control	and	a	rebel	movement	with	strong	social	reach	into	society	or	access	to	external	resources	builds	a	conventional	army	(Staniland,	2014).	 In	Cambodia,	the	Khmer	Rouge	exploited	North	Vietnamese	support	 to	mobilise	a	 force	 that	was	capable	of	confronting	government	forces	directly.			The	division	of	sovereignty	does	not	have	to	be	territorial.	Conflict	actors	can	also	share	sovereignty	across	social	spaces,	exerting	varying	influences	over	different	
																																																						14	If	the	rebels	are	able	to	generate	enough	support	to	build	a	strong	movement,	then	the	rebels	quickly	replace	the	government	when	it	falls.	One	could	easily	argue	this	is	the	extreme	scenario	in	immediate	aftermath	of	the	erosion	of	government	authority.	This	is	probably	true.	However,	in	this	scenario	the	state	does	not	descend	into	a	civil	war,	as	it	immediately	returns	to	having	a	‘single	sovereign’	power.		
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ethnic,	class,	social	or	religious	groups	that	occupy	the	same	physical	territory.	In	Syria,	Alawites,	Christians	and	other	minorities	face	a	different	set	of	incentives	to	the	majority	Sunni	population	when	choosing	to	provide	active	support	to	the	regime	or	rebel	groups.	Many	minorities	fear	the	advance	of	ISIL	much	more	than	Sunnis,	 who	 are	 more	 prone	 to	 fear	 regime	 violence.	 Consequently,	 Sunni	communities	have	offered	support	to	a	range	of	opposition	groups	while	many	minority	groups	began	offering	increasing	support	to	the	regime	(Mousa,	2016).			As	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 individuals	 in	 the	 population	 can	 also	provide	support	 to	both	 the	government	and	rebels.	 In	 this	 case,	 two	or	more	sovereigns	are	exerting	authority	over	single	individuals.	This	latter	scenario	is	extremely	common,	with	rebels	drawing	support	 in	 the	 form	of	 food,	supplies,	finance	 from	 communities	 that	 still	 live	 and	 work	 in	 government-controlled	territory.	 Most	 insurgent	 strategists,	 including	Mao	 Tse-Tung	 (2002)	 and	 Che	Guevara	(2008),	speak	of	this	type	of	situation	early	in	conflicts.			As	 Philip	 Hultquist	 (2013)	 showed,	 in	 most	 cases,	 governments	 remain	significantly	 stronger	 than	 rebels	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	 conflict.	 The	 division	 of	sovereignty,	therefore,	normally	heavily	favours	the	governments.	The	solution	it	had	 to	 controlling	 the	 state	 before	 the	 conflict	 began,	 often	 remains	 partially	intact.	 Rebels,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 have	 to	 start	 building	 their	 mobilisation	structures	from	an	extremely	low-base.			This	 challenges	 the	 framework	 of	 war	 as	 a	 simple	 mobilisation	 competition.	Zacharian	Mampilly	brings	out	 the	contradiction.	He	points	out	 that	Olson	and	Tilly’s	theory	of	stationary	bandits	is	based	on	European	state	formation	in	the	seventeenth	 century.	 However,	 there	 is	 one	 major	 difference	 between	 the	strategic	 context	 faced	 by	 these	 early	 state-builders	 and	 modern	 insurgent	groups;	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 pre-existing	 government	 authority	 that	 already	 has	strong	reciprocal	relations	with	the	population	and	a	standing	army	(2011).15	
																																																						15	The	conflict	in	Libya	shows	this	is	not	always	the	case,	and	in	wars	where	government	power	is	stripped	away	almost	completely	then	the	logic	of	conflict	a	simple	state-building	exercise	will	hold.	I	come	back	to	this	briefly	below.		
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Insurgent	doctrine	strongly	reinforces	this	perspective.	It	basically	proposes	two	possible	 strategies;	 facilitate	 the	 complete	 fall	 of	 the	 government	 and	 assume	power,	or	eject	the	government	from	one	part	of	the	state,	fill	the	political	void	and	use	it	to	build	a	military	force	capable	of	capturing	the	remainder	of	the	polity	(Guevara,	2008;	Guillen	and	Hodges,	1973;	Mampilly,	2011;	Tse-Tung,	2002).			Either	way,	 the	 primary	 objective	 of	 rebels	 is	 to	 erode	 government	 sovereign	structures	 and	 this	 will	 form	 the	 key	 battleground	 of	 any	 civil	 war.	 For	governments,	 civil	war	 is	 about	 re-monopolising	 control	 by	 re-establishing	 its	sovereign	structures	that	manage	its	relationship	with	the	population	across	the	whole	 state.	 For	 rebels	 it	 is	 about	 further	weakening	 government	 institutions,	creating	the	space	for	the	rebels	to	extend	their	sovereign	structures	across	the	rest	of	the	polity.			
The	government’s	weakness	-	governments	have	to	govern		The	fact	that	governments	often	have	pre-existing	sovereign	structures	that	it	can	draw	on	to	prosecute	the	war,	means	it	will	often	start	conflicts	from	a	position	of	strength.	However,	 this	advantage	 is	balanced	against	 the	second	caveat	we	need	to	add	to	the	model	of	war	as	a	mobilisation	competition;	governments	have	to	generate	a	minimum	level	of	support	just	to	stay	active.	They	have	to	retain	control	over	key	population	 centres	 and	deliver	 a	basic	 level	of	 services	 to	be	considered	a	government	(Mampilly,	2011).	They	have	to	provide	services,	law	and	order,	and	governance	in	areas	not	involved	in	the	conflict.	They	have	to	raise	and	distribute	a	minimum	level	of	resources	to	achieve	this	and	stay	in	power,	and	 this	 will	 extend	 well	 beyond	 simply	 prosecuting	 the	 war.16	 If	 the	government’s	ability	to	raise	resources	falls	below	the	level	required	to	generate	the	incentives	that	keep	it	in	power,	then	it	is	liable	to	collapse	completely.			
																																																						
16	They	can	obviously	do	this	through	external	sources	rather	than	directly	from	the	population,	as	was	the	case	in	Afghanistan.	In	these	cases,	rebels	will	almost	certainly	seek	to	target	the	external	patron,	as	this	relationship	forms	the	basis	of	government	control.		
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Rebels,	in	contrast,	are	not	similarly	constrained.	Insurgent	groups	do	not	need	to	carry	out	governance	or	control	territory,	 they	will	only	do	it	 if	 it	 is	 in	their	interests	to	do	so.	In	other	words,	rebel	groups	can	dedicate	all	of	their	resources	to	supporting	their	war	effort,	opting	to	reduce	or	increase	activity	as	necessary.	Insurgents	 can	 be	 large	 shadow-state	 like	 organisations,	 like	 the	 LTTE	 in	 Sri	Lanka,	or	a	small	band	of	guerrillas	 looting	rural	communities,	 like	 the	LRA	 in	Uganda	(Mampilly,	2011).	Insurgencies	have	the	flexibility	to	ensure	that	the	level	and	 type	 of	 activity	 they	 carry	 out	 reflects	 their	 ability	 to	 generate	 resources.	Governments	do	not	have	this	flexibility	as	they	are	constrained	by	the	need	to	raise	 resources	 to	 carry	 out	 activity	 not	 directly	 related	 to	 the	 civil	 war	 it	 is	fighting.		This	 demonstrates	 the	 two	 important	 caveats	 that	 need	 adding	 to	 any	understanding	of	civil	war	as	a	competition	to	mobilise	support.	In	total,	there	are	three	main	components	of	civil	war	when	the	government	remains	functional:		
• Civil	 war	 is	 a	 mobilisation	 competition,	 in	 which	 belligerents	 seek	 to	generate	 resources	 from	 their	 constituent	 population	 and	 degrade	 the	capacity	of	their	opponents	to	do	the	same.		
• Governments	 start	 with	 the	 structures	 that	 manage	 this	 mobilisation	intact.	Rebels	have	to	degrade	these	structures	before	they	can	build	their	own.		
• Governments	have	 to	mobilise	a	 certain	amount	of	 support	 to	keep	 the	state	functioning	and	hold	onto	power.			The	rest	of	this	chapter	will	show	how	understanding	these	three	elements	of	civil	war	helps	to	explain	conflict	dynamics	and	outcomes.			
Military	interaction	
	By	 implication,	 during	 a	 civil	 war,	 rebels	 use	 military	 means	 to	 degrade	government	sovereign	structures.	Traditional	models	of	conflict	(eg	Reiter,	2009)	
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imply	that	rebels	are	best	served	projecting	as	much	military	power	as	possible.	Small	 rebel	 groups	 may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 win	 outright,	 but	 they	 can	 extract	concessions,	as	the	government	seeks	to	avoid	the	costs	of	having	to	defeat	them	militarily.	We	have	seen,	however,	that	this	does	not	stand	up	to	scrutiny.	Out-gunned	rebel	groups	do	win	outright	and	rebels	do	not	maximise	their	military	force	at	any	one	time	(Tse-Tung,	2002).	Something	else	must	be	driving	the	logic	of	rebel	military	activity.			Much	 has	 been	made	 of	 the	 asymmetric	warfare	 employed	 by	 rebel	 forces	 in	many	parts	of	the	world	and	how	it	enables	weak	rebel	groups	to	defeat	stronger	governments.	Explanations	for	why	it	works	have	focused	on	how	low-cost	and	easily	 accessible	 technologies,	 such	 as	 IEDs	 (improvised	 explosive	 devices)	 or	suicide	bombers,	redress	the	military	imbalance	(Thornton,	2006).	By	itself,	this	does	 not	 explain	 how	 rebels	 can	win	wars,	 only	 how	 they	 can	 inflict	 costs	 on	governments	while	facing	a	massive	material	disadvantage.	These	technologies	do	not	allow	rebels	to	capture	and	hold	territory	against	technologically	superior	foes,	as	would	be	required	to	win	a	war.			In	 How	 the	 Weak	 Win	 Wars,	 Ivan	 Arreguıń-Toft	 offers	 a	 more	 strategic	explanation	for	how	weaker	states	defeat	stronger	powers	in	interstate	conflicts.	His	 premise	 is	 that	 small	 states	 use	 indirect	 warfare	 –	 guerrilla	 tactics	 or	terrorism	–	to	wear	down	the	resolve	of	larger	states	(2005).	The	weaker	force	drags	 the	 larger	 power	 into	 a	 military	 stalemate,	 by	 selecting	 a	 strategy	 that	prevents	the	larger	force	from	scoring	an	outright	victory.	Ultimately,	the	cost	to	the	 larger	 state	 –	 both	 financial	 and	 psychological	 -	 of	 occupying	 the	 smaller	state’s	territory	becomes	more	than	the	value	of	the	territory	itself	and	the	larger	state	withdraws.	The	smaller	state	wins	the	war	despite	not	winning	any	direct	military	 confrontations.	 Arreguıń-Toft	 shows	 that	weaker	 states	 have	 become	increasingly	adept	at	using	this	strategy	to	defeat	stronger	nations	(2005).		Arreguıń-Toft’s	model	needs	adapting	before	it	can	be	applied	to	civil	wars.	For	one,	it	assumes	that	the	stronger	power	values	the	territory	in	dispute	less	than	the	smaller	power	(2005;	p25).	In	the	interstate	conflicts	Arreguıń-Toft	examines,	
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the	larger	state	is	occupying	the	homeland	of	the	weaker	power,	for	example,	the	Italians	in	Ethiopia	in	the	1930s	(2005;	pp109-143).	The	weaker	force	is	fighting	for	its	survival,	while	the	larger	power	is	not.	The	same	logic	does	not	work	in	a	civil	 war.	 The	 larger	 power	 in	 an	 intrastate	 conflict,	 the	 government,	 is	 also	fighting	 for	 its	 survival.17	 Arreguıń-Toft’s	 analysis	 might	 explain	 why	governments	 surrender	 peripheral	 territory,	 but	 not	 why	 they	 collapse	completely	when	holding	a	preponderance	of	military	power.			Guerrilla	warfare	has,	however,	worked	to	defeat	governments	in	a	range	of	civil	conflicts	 with	 limited	 external	 intervention,	 such	 as	 Cuba	 or	 Zimbabwe.	Asymmetric	warfare	must	 function	differently	 in	a	civil	war	context.	Rebels	do	not	use	guerrilla	warfare	to	make	the	costs	for	the	government	greater	than	the	benefit	it	accrues	from	controlling	the	state	as	per	Arreguıń-Toft’s	model.	Rebels	are	 actually	 trying	 to	drain	 the	 resources	 that	 the	 government	uses	 to	deliver	incentives	 to	 its	 constituent	population	and	suppress	 the	rebel’s	 support-base.	Rebels	are	aiming	to	undermine	the	government’s	regenerative	capacity	and	its	solution	for	controlling	the	polity.			Rebels	 do	 this	 through	 two	 interacting	 methods:	 firstly,	 they	 undermine	 the	government’s	ability	to	generate	the	resources	that	it	uses	to	distribute	benefits	to	its	constituent	population;	secondly,	they	force	the	government	to	spend	more	resources	on	military	activity	that	can	no	longer	be	spent	on	shaping	population	behaviour.	When	the	government	becomes	unable	to	distribute	the	incentives	–	both	positive	and	negative	-	that	hold	its	alliances	with	the	population	together,	the	population	withdraws	its	support,	pushing	the	government	past	the	point	that	it	can	raise	the	minimum	level	of	resources	to	keep	the	state	functioning.	As	the	two	main	 strands	 of	 insurgent	 doctrine	 argue,	 this	may	happen	 incrementally	across	the	state,	allowing	rebels	to	move	into	vacated	territory	(Tse-Tung,	2002),	or	the	government	may	fall	altogether,	giving	the	rebels	the	opportunity	to	assert	power	over	the	whole	polity	(Guillen	and	Hodges,	1973).		
																																																						17	Government	leaders	can	of	course	flee	abroad.	However,	they	would	then	no	longer	be	‘the	government’	and	would	essentially	be	admitting	defeat.		
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Rebel	strategy	selection		Rebels	select	a	strategy	in	the	same	way	as	Arreguıń-Toft’s	weaker	powers.	The	aim	is	to	drag	the	government	into	a	military	stalemate	(2005).	Rebels	calculate	their	ability	to	generate	support	from	the	population	based	on	the	strength	of	the	sovereign	structures	they	built	after	the	initial	erosion	of	government	authority.	They	add	this	to	any	support	they	are	receiving	from	external	sources,	links	into	illicit	networks	or	 the	 trade	of	natural	 resources.	This	 regenerative	capacity	 is	weighted	against	the	relative	military	power	of	the	government	and	its	ability	to	inflict	damage	on	rebel	forces.	Based	on	this,	rebels	identify	the	maximum	level	of	activity	they	can	carry	out,	but	continually	replace	expected	losses.	This	is	what	the	Taliban	managed	to	achieve	in	Afghanistan	between	2001	and	2014.		Should	the	rebels	immediately	develop	a	high	regenerative	capacity	then	they	will	challenge	 the	 government	 more	 conventionally	 in	 order	 to	 capture	 the	 state	militarily.	Rebels	are	likely	to	lose	more	personnel	and	expend	more	resources	employing	a	conventional	strategy,	but	they	are	also	likely	to	place	more	pressure	on	the	government.	If	rebel	sovereign	structures	are	resilient	enough	to	replace	these	losses,	then	they	can	sustain	an	army	even	in	the	face	of	significant	losses.			On	the	other	hand,	if	the	rebels	have	a	more	limited	regenerative	capacity	they	resort	 to	 an	 indirect	 strategy,	 such	 as	 guerrilla	 warfare.	 While	 engaging	 in	guerrilla	warfare,	rebels	are	not	trying	to	capture	territory	directly.	They	do	not	maximise	 the	 size	 of	 their	 force	 nor	 the	 amount	 of	 battlefield	 activity	 at	 any	particular	 point	 in	 time,	 so	 as	 not	 to	 expose	 themselves	 to	 losses	 they	 cannot	replace.			Mao	suggests	rebels	should	limit	their	force-size	in	order	to	minimise	losses	on	the	 battlefield,	 rather	 than	 inflict	 as	 much	 military	 damage	 as	 possible	 on	government	 forces	 (Tse-Tung,	 2002).	Hit	 and	 run	 tactics,	 a	 classic	 of	 guerrilla	warfare,	 ensure	 government	 forces	 are	 always	 under	 pressure	 and	 having	 to	defend	as	much	territory	as	possible	but	result	in	minimal	losses	to	rebel	forces:	
	
	
	
	
55	
“Select	the	tactic	of	seeming	to	come	from	the	east	and	attacking	from	the	west;	avoid	the	solid,	attack	the	hollow;	attack;	withdraw;	deliver	a	lightening	blow,	seek	a	lightening	decision.	When	guerrillas	engage	a	stronger	enemy,	they	withdraw	when	he	advances;	harass	him	when	he	 stops;	 strike	 him	 when	 he	 is	 weary;	 pursue	 him	 when	 he	withdraws.”	(Tse-Tung,	2002;	p46).		Rebels	attempt	to	chip	away	at	the	government’s	military,	continually	forcing	it	to	spread	its	forces	and	replace	losses	(Thornton,	2006).			Table	 three	 shows	 the	 likely	 dynamics	 of	 the	 conflict	 based	 on	 the	 relative	distribution	of	power.		
Strength	 Strong	government	 Weak	government	
	
	
	
Strong	rebels	
	
Quadrant	1	
	
Symmetric	conflict	–	
Conventional	war	Example	–	Cambodia	(post-1970)		
		
	
	
	
Weak	rebels	
	
Quadrant	3	
	
Asymmetric	conflict	–		
Guerrilla	warfare	Example	–	Zimbabwe		
	
Quadrant	4	
	
Irregular	conflict	-			Militias	Example	–	Nagorno-Karabakh	(1992)		Table	3:	Rebel	strategy	depending	on	balance	of	power.		If	the	initial	shock	weakens	the	government	sufficiently	and	the	rebels	are	strong,	then,	 in	all	 likelihood,	the	government	will	 fall	 immediately	and	the	rebels	will	
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assume	control,	hence	why	quadrant	two	remains	empty.18	If	the	government	is	significantly	 degraded,	 but	 the	 rebels	 remain	weak	 then	 the	war	will	 become	irregular	in	nature,	as	in	Somalia	or	Libya.	In	this	instance,	civil	war	will	become	a	 more	 symmetric	 mobilisation	 competition	 as	 belligerents	 seek	 to	 bring	 the	various	militias	into	one	force.			Assuming	the	government	survives	the	initial	emergence	of	the	rebels	then	the	war	will	settle	into	an	apparent	stalemate,	be	it	along	conventional	or	guerrilla	lines,	settling	into	quadrants	one	or	three.	Rebels	will	lose	personnel,	often	more	than	the	government,	but	as	rebels	select	a	strategy	that	continually	allows	them	to	regenerate	to	the	same	strength,	military	gains	for	either	side	are	likely	to	be	incremental.		Rebels	use	this	military	stalemate	to	drain	the	government’s	capacity	to	distribute	benefits	to	its	core	support-base.	Rebels	attack	soft	economic	and	political	targets	in	as	many	places	as	possible	(Thornton,	2006).	The	government	has	to	spread	its	forces	 across	 the	 state	 to	 keep	 vital	 infrastructure	 and	 local	 government	institutions	 running	 in	 order	 to	 generate	 the	 resources	 that	 keep	 it	 in	 power	(Bueno	de	Mesquita	et	al.,	2005;	Mampilly,	2011).	Military	defeats	for	rebels	still	represent	 a	 tactical	 victory	 if	 the	 government	 has	 to	 expend	 resources	 on	minimising	the	effect	of	rebel	activity,	which	can	then	no	longer	be	provided	to	its	constituency.		The	amount	and	types	of	support	the	government	needs	from	the	population	also	increases.	 Before	 the	 war,	 most	 government	 supporters	 may	 have	 just	 been	paying	taxes,	which	the	government	recycled	to	deliver	benefits	to	the	population.	Once	 rebels	 become	 active,	 the	 government	 will	 now	 be	 asking	 more	 of	 the	population;	 to	 join	 the	 security	 services,	 report	 on	 rebel	 activity,	 resist	 rebel	pressure	 to	provide	the	 insurgency	support	and	contribute	more	 financially	 to	
																																																						18	If	the	government	has	external	support	then	it	may	be	able	to	hold	on	to	power	even	if	it	is	massively	outnumbered.	In	this	case,	the	war	will	be	conventional	in	nature.	For	the	purpose	of	this	thesis,	that	scenario	is	essentially	one	form	the	war	can	take	in	quadrant	one,	with	the	external	support	the	government	receiving	creating	an	artificial	strength.			
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cover	the	increasing	cost	of	military	activity.	The	first	three	of	these	mean	there	is	now	a	risk	to	life	associated	with	supporting	the	government.	Greater	financial	contributions	 will	 be	 dependent	 on	 the	 government’s	 capacity	 to	 facilitate	 a	functioning	 economy,	 made	 all	 the	 harder	 by	 rebel	 activity.	 A	 conflict	 actors’	regenerative	capacity	is	defined	by	its	ability	to	mobilise	resources	by	delivering	incentives	 to	 the	 population	 and	 organise	 contributions	 in	 return.	 Civil	 wars	clearly	 undermine	 a	 government’s	 ability	 to	 do	 both	 of	 these	 things,	 thus	threatening	 its	 solution	 for	 controlling	 the	 state	 even	 in	 areas	 not	 affected	 by	rebel	activity.			Eventually	the	government	is	no	longer	generating	enough	support	from	an	area	of	 the	 country	 to	 make	 it	 worthwhile	 maintaining	 a	 presence	 there	 and	 it	withdraws,	allowing	rebels	to	move	in	and	create	their	own	sovereign	structures.	Rebels	then	have	greater	capacity	to	generate	support	and	replace	 losses	from	military	activity.	As	 such,	 they	 can	boost	 their	overall	 force	numbers,	 increase	activity	and	create	even	more	strain	on	the	government.			Rebels	 that	 capture	 territory	 can	 monopolise	 interaction	 with	 the	 local	population.	 Denying	 the	 government	 territory	 prevents	 it	 from	 drawing	resources	 from	 these	 areas	 such	 as	 agriculture	 for	 feeding	 the	 population	 or	revenue	 from	 natural	 resources.	 Rebels	 often	 target	 areas	 with	 limited	government	presence,	normally	in	the	periphery	of	the	state,	precisely	because	these	are	the	areas	the	government	has	least	interest	in	defending	(Cunningham	et	al.,	2009).	Numerous	rebel	groups,	from	the	LTTE	in	Sri	Lanka	to	the	LRA	in	Uganda,	have	followed	this	model	(Mampilly,	2011).			As	rebels	widen	the	reach	of	their	sovereign	structures	they	are	eventually	able	to	build	a	more	conventional-style	force.	The	rebel’s	conventional	force	can	then	capture	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 state.	 ISIL	 spent	 nearly	 two	 years	 of	 the	 Syrian	conflict	engaged	in	low-cost	guerrilla	activity.	At	the	same	time,	it	was	developing	structures	 across	 northwest	 Syria	 that	 created	 resilient	 relations	 with	 the	population.	 It	 then	 used	 these	 structures	 to	 create	 a	 conventional	 force	 that	captured	more	territory	across	Syria	and	Iraq.		
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There	is,	therefore,	a	feedback	loop	for	rebels	in	winning	a	war.	Rebels	use	their	initial	force	numbers	to	undermine	government	capacity	to	generate	resources	from	the	population	and	key	terrain.	Rebels	also	increase	the	amount	of	support	the	government	has	 to	generate	 to	stay	 in	power.	Eventually	 this	weakens	 the	government,	 forcing	 it	 to	withdraw	 further	 into	 the	 core	 of	 the	 state,	 creating	more	space	for	rebels	to	build	an	ever-stronger	force	and	create	more	strain	on	the	government.		Almost	 all	 insurgency	 doctrinal	 writings	 follow	 this	 logic,	 with	 particular	variations	depending	on	the	war	they	were	developed	in	(Guevara,	2008;	Guillen	and	Hodges,	1973;	O’Neill,	1990;	Taber,	2002;	Tse-Tung,	2002).	ISIL’s	doctrine,	as	 articulated	 in	 the	Management	 of	 Savagery,	 calls	 for	 its	 followers	 to	 sow	instability	and	build	support	from	communities	amongst	the	chaos	(Naji,	2004).			In	 essence,	 rebel	 doctrine	 suggests	 insurgencies	 need	 to	 push	 conflicts	 from	asymmetric	(quadrant	three	in	table	three)	to	conventional	(quadrant	one),	to	a	situation	where	 the	 rebels	 are	 strong	 and	 the	 government	weak,	 allowing	 the	rebels	take	over	the	state.		Many	commentators	that	examine	insurgent	doctrine,	describe	it	as	a	strategy	of	‘mobilisation’	 (Reed,	 2007;	 p22).	 This,	 however,	 misses	 its	 vital	 component.	Rebels	 actually	 employ	 a	 strategy	 of	 ‘demobilisation’.	 They	 demobilise	 the	government	institutions	that	build	and	maintain	its	military	force	by	draining	the	government’s	 capacity	 to	 raise	 funds	 for	 these	 activities.	 Rebels	 then	 need	 to	mobilise	to	a	much	smaller	extent	than	if	they	confronted	government	forces	in	a	more	conventional	manner	at	the	beginning	of	the	conflict.			The	model	 of	 conflict	 in	 which	 rebels	 win	 by	 pushing	 the	 war	 through	 these	phases	represents	an	ideal	type,	based	on	insurgent	and	US	counterinsurgency	doctrine	(US	Army,	2010).	As	governments	have	to	generate	a	minimum	level	of	resource,	however,	they	can	lose	at	any	point	along	this	continuum.			
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When	the	government	can	no	longer	service	those	alliances	that	keep	it	in	power,	its	 constituent	 population	 withdraws	 its	 support	 and	 the	 government	 falls,	regardless	of	how	far	the	rebels	have	succeeded	in	pushing	the	war	through	its	various	phases.	If	the	foundation	of	government	control	is	weak	then	even	low	levels	 of	 military	 activity	 may	 undermine	 the	 government’s	 solution	 for	controlling	the	polity	and	it	will	collapse,	allowing	the	rebels	to	take	control	of	the	whole	state	even	if	they	had	a	smaller	military	force	than	the	government.		
Government	counterstrategy		As	alluded	to	above,	rebels	do	not	have	to	raise	a	minimum	level	of	resources.	If	they	are	struggling	to	mobilise	support	then	they	can	reduce	activity	to	reflect	this	 new	 reality.	 Both	 Mao	 Tse-Tung	 (2002)	 and	 Che	 Guevara	 (2008)	 advise	reducing	conventional-type	activity	if	rebels	come	under	military	pressure.	Chad	Serena	argues	that	AQI’s	changing	strength	throughout	its	battle	with	coalition	and	Iraqi	government	forces	can	be	attributed	its	adaptability.	It	initially	adapted	quickly	to	structural	changes,	but	 failed	to	do	so	 in	2007,	which	led	to	 it	being	significantly	degraded	(2014).			If	rebel	strategy	is	judged	appropriately,	regardless,	of	its	force	size,	prosecuting	the	 war	 is	 always	 effectively	 cost-neutral,	 as	 expenditure	 is	 balanced	 against	activities	 that	generate	those	resources	 in	 the	 first	place.	Rebels	may	well	 lose	tactical	exchanges,	but	 this	 is	unlikely	 to	add	up	to	a	strategic	problem	if	 their	support-networks	 mean	 expended	 resources	 and	 lost	 personnel	 are	 always	replaced.				All	this	creates	a	significant	conundrum	for	governments.	Governments	have	to	defeat	rebels	on	the	battlefield	in	order	to	prevent	them	from	capturing	territory	and	undermining	government	ability	to	generate	resources	from	the	population.	Targeted	operations	against	rebel	leadership	or	interdiction	operations	against	insurgent	 supply	 routes	 may	 be	 necessary	 to	 prevent	 rebel	 gains	 (Staniland,	2014).	 Assuming	 rebels	 adapt	 their	 behaviour	 accordingly,	 however,	 military	activity	will	never	be	enough	to	defeat	an	insurgency	completely.	Governments	
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will	just	chase	rebels	around	the	country,	killing	them	or	pushing	them	out	of	one	place	only	for	them	to	regenerate	somewhere	else.	Eventually	the	cost	of	this	will	prove	prohibitive	and	the	government	will	fall.			Governments	have	to	push	the	conflict	the	opposite	direction	to	rebels.	Moving	it	from	 conventional	 to	 asymmetric,	 until	 eventually	 the	 rebels	 can	 no	 longer	sustain	any	activity.	Governments	are	seeking	to	move	the	conflict	the	opposite	way	through	table	three,	from	quadrant	one	to	quadrant	three,	before	eliminating	rebel	activity	altogether.			Governments	have	no	shortcut	that	can	push	the	conflict	through	these	phases	in	the	same	way	rebels	do.	As	rebels	can	alter	 their	activity	 to	reflect	any	 loss	 in	power,	they	will	not	simply	collapse.	Governments	must	slowly	eliminate	a	rebel	group’s	sovereign	structures	before	they	can	win.	The	government	can	only	do	this	by	affecting	the	choice	of	those	in	the	population	choosing	to	provide	support	to	 the	 rebels.	 Rebel	 leaders	 may	 only	 face	 costs	 that	 are	 offset	 against	 their	capacity	to	generate	resources	in	the	first	place.	Members	of	the	population,	in	contrast,	may	face	higher	costs	or	lose	additional	benefits	from	the	government	if	they	 continue	 to	 support	 rebels.	 Governments	 need	 to	 expand	 their	 existing	solution	 for	 controlling	 the	 state	 or	 identify	 a	 new	 arrangement.	 It	 can	 either	broaden	the	part	of	the	population	it	provides	direct	benefits	to	or	ramp	up	the	costs	 for	 those	people	 supporting	 its	 rebel	 challengers.	 If	 it	 succeeds,	 then	 the	polity	will	slowly	return	to	its	pre-war	state.			The	 major	 danger	 for	 governments	 is	 that	 even	 if	 they	 are	 succeeding	 in	degrading	the	rebel	group,	the	costs	of	running	the	state	may	become	prohibitive	and	the	government	could	still	collapse.			Defeating	rebels	on	the	battlefield	means,	at	best,	governments	do	not	lose.	For	rebels,	 just	 fighting	 may	 represent	 a	 victory	 if	 it	 creates	 a	 strain	 on	 the	government.	This	is	why	who	wins	and	loses	battles	tells	us	little	about	the	course	of	 civil	 wars,	 but	 where	 battles	 are	 fought	 does	 (Greig,	 2015).	 Rebels	 choose	where,	when	and	how	to	fight	based	on	the	effect	they	believe	military	activity	
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will	have	on	the	government’s	ability	to	generate	support.	Rebel	military	activity	that	stops	an	oil	pipeline	for	a	period	of	time,	deters	the	population	from	visiting	a	 market	 or	 terrorises	 the	 population	 in	 government	 territory	 will	 all	 be	considered	a	success	even	if	every	rebel	member	dies	in	the	attack.	The	closer	this	is	to	the	government’s	heartland	the	greater	the	effect	(Greig,	2015).	Che	Guevara	calls	this	‘paralysing	the	state’	(2008).			A	civil	war	has	a	military	battlefront,	but	it	also	has	social,	political	and	economic	ones.	A	government	can	appear	to	be	winning	on	the	military	battlefield,	but	still	lose	the	conflict	at	any	point	if	it	is	defeated	in	these	other	spheres	(Guillen	and	Hodges,	1973).		In	other	words,	governments	have	to	win	on	all	these	battlefields,	the	rebels	only	have	to	win	one	to	break	down	the	government’s	control	over	the	state.			Rebels	 seek	 to	 strike	 the	 perfect	 balance	 between	 generating	 resources	more	quickly	 than	 they	 expend	 them,	 and	 forcing	 the	 government	 to	 exhaust	 its	capacity	to	generate	support.	The	larger	the	rebel	force,	the	more	pressure	it	will	place	on	government	sovereign	structures,	but	smaller	rebel	forces	can	have	the	same	effect	over	a	longer	time-span.19	If	the	basis	of	government	control	is	weak,	insurgents	do	not	have	to	control	territory	to	have	this	effect,	nor	do	they	have	to	build	a	large	military	force.			There	 are	 multiple	 examples	 of	 rebel	 groups	 suffering	 significantly	 more	casualties	 than	the	governments	 they	are	 facing	and	failing	to	score	battlefield	victories,	but	eventually	inflicting	debilitating	costs	on	the	government.			The	Khmer	Rouge	in	Cambodia	and	ZANU/ZAPU	in	Zimbabwe	both	had	smaller	forces	and	lost	significantly	more	casualties	than	the	governments	they	faced,	yet	ended	up	winning	 the	war.	The	rebels	won	because	 their	ability	 to	 incentivise	participation	 in	 their	 forces	 was	 more	 resilient	 than	 the	 governments’.	 Rebel	
																																																						19	As	referenced	in	the	introduction,	Cunningham	et	al.	observe	that	asymmetric	conflicts	are	likely	to	be	longer	than	their	conventional	counterparts	(2009).		
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forces	 eventually	wore	 down	 and	 demobilised	 the	 government.20	 Importantly,	Cambodia	represents	a	more	conventional	civil	war,	while	Zimbabwe	saw	a	more	traditional	insurgency,	supporting	the	idea	that	rebels	can	win	regardless	of	the	phase	in	which	the	conflict	finds	itself.		This	is	what	Abraham	Guillen	meant	when	he	said	“in	a	revolutionary	war	that	side	wins	which	endures	the	longest:	morally,	politically	and	economically.”	(Guillen	and	Hodges,	1973;	p233).		
War	endings		The	 idea	 that	 governments	 and	 rebels	 seek	 to	push	 the	 conflict	 through	 these	phases	but	that	governments	can	collapse	at	any	stage	is	supported	in	how	wars	end.	Rebel	victories	normally	involve	a	political	or	economic	shock	that	pushes	the	 government	 past	 a	 ‘tipping	 point’,	 after	 which	 it	 can	 no	 longer	 raise	 the	support	it	needs.	McCormick,	Horton	and	Harrison	(2007)	show	the	end	phase	for	governments	is	normally	extremely	quick	and	follows	“an	indicator	that	the	final	period	of	the	struggle	has	begun”	(p327).	The	loss	of	a	core	piece	of	territory,	the	removal	of	a	political	leader,	the	defection	of	an	important	powerbroker	or	significant	 military	 desertions	 create	 a	 negative	 bandwagon	 that	 sees	government	control	quickly	unravel	(Connable	and	Libicki,	2010;	p15).	This	can	happen	 before	 rebels	 manage	 to	 build	 resilient	 structures	 across	 the	 whole	polity.21		
																																																						20	Commentators	often	put	this	type	of	phenomenon	down	to	the	ideological	commitment	of	rebels,	particularly	in	Vietnam.		After	the	war	a	US	negotiator	boasted	to	a	North	Vietnamese	representative	that	the	US	had	won	every	battle.	The	North	Vietnamese	representative	responded	that	this	was	irrelevant	(Salsman,	2011).	The	US	inflicted	over	a	million	casualties	on	North	Vietnamese	and	Vietcong	forces.	No	accurate	figure	exists	for	the	number	of	Vietcong	soldiers,	but	the	North	Vietnamese	Army	reportedly	numbered	around	290,000,	suggesting	one	million	casualties	should	have	eliminated	it	as	a	meaningful	force	(BACM	Research,	2009).	However,	it	still	eventually	defeated	southern	Vietnamese	forces	because	it	replenished	manpower,	supplies	and	finances	expended	on	the	battlefield,	absorbing	the	effect	of	the	million	casualties	it	suffered.	(Salsman,	2011).	I	find	ideological	commitment	an	unsatisfactory	explanation	in	that	the	amount	of	casualties	means	it	was	not	the	same	people	at	the	start	of	the	conflict	as	at	the	end.	The	North	Vietnamese	had	to	continually	bring	new	actors	into	the	conflict,	rather	than	rely	on	the	commitment	of	those	mobilised	at	the	beginning	of	the	war.	The	same	goes	for	the	enduring	strength	of	rebel	groups	in	Zimbabwe	and	Cambodia	as	well	as	the	recent	conflicts	in	Afghanistan	and	Iraq.	Rebels	endure	by	regenerating,	not	due	to	the	greater	commitment	of	their	members.		21	The	extent	of	a	rebel	group’s	shadow	governance	structures	will	almost	certainly	have	an	impact	on	the	post-war	environment.	Moreover,	as	described	above,	stronger	rebels	in	this	regard	will	probably	create	more	strain	on	the	government.	Rebel	sovereign	structures	are,	
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Governments	win	more	slowly.	According	to	McCormick,	Horton	and	Harrison,	most	government	victories	follow	a	period	in	which	violence	tapers	off	gradually	(2007).	Governments	need	to	strengthen	the	institutions	that	define	their	control	over	 the	 state.	 Only	 then	 will	 rebels	 be	 unable	 to	 replace	 lost	 personnel	 and	resources.22	That	said,	the	war	may	end	some	time	after	these	institutions	have	strengthened,	as	rebel	activity	slowly	fades	away.				Ultimately,	the	process	of	victory	is	reversed	for	governments	and	rebels.	Figures	four	and	five	lay	out	the	different	processes	governments	and	rebels	have	to	go	through	to	win	war,	linking	these	to	table	three.			 	
																																																						therefore,	extremely	important	in	determining	the	dynamics	of	the	conflict.	The	point	here	is	that	they	are	not	a	necessary	condition	for	a	government	defeat.		22	It	is	possible	for	the	state	to	return	to	a	context	where	the	government	does	not	control	large	parts	of	its	territory.	However,	rebel	groups	will	almost	always	seek	to	exploit	this	to	their	advantage	and	rebuild	their	movement,	meaning	the	war	is	actually	unlikely	to	end	completely.		
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	Figure	4:	Rebel	path	to	victory.		 	
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	Figure	5:	Government	path	to	victory.		This	asymmetry	between	how	rebels	and	governments	win	wars	demonstrates	why	 weak	 rebel	 groups	 can	 defeat	 strong	 governments,	 despite	 them	 both	fighting	for	their	survival.	It	also	shows	how	rebels	can	win	even	if	they	are	much	smaller,	solving	the	second	puzzle	this	thesis	is	seeking	to	answer.	That	is	not	say	military	 variables	 will	 not	 matter	 in	 determining	 the	 ability	 of	 rebels	 and	governments	to	push	the	conflict	through	these	phases.	Stronger	rebels	that	win	battles	 will	 impose	 more	 costs	 on	 the	 government.	 However,	 it	 shows	 why	military	elements	of	the	conflict	poorly	predict	outcomes	across	the	universe	of	
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cases	(Greig,	2015;	Hultquist,	2013).	 It	 is	also	 the	genesis	of	Henry	Kissinger’s	famous	saying:	"A	conventional	army	loses	if	it	does	not	win.	The	guerrilla	army	wins	if	he	does	not	lose."	(1969).		Significantly,	understanding	civil	wars	in	this	way	calls	into	question	categorising	civil	wars	 into	 symmetric,	 asymmetric	 and	 irregular	 (Hultquist,	 2013).	 Rather	than	 being	 distinct	 types	 of	 wars,	 they	 are	 part	 of	 one	 fluid	 process,	 with	belligerents	 attempting	 to	 move	 the	 conflict	 opposite	 directions	 along	 this	continuum.	Most	wars	do	not	follow	this	process	smoothly.	The	processes	laid	out	above	 represent	 the	 ideal	 type.	Most	wars	will	 jump	between	 these	phases	 as	economic	or	political	shocks	affect	the	power	of	 the	belligerents.	Nevertheless,	moving	 the	 war	 through	 these	 distinct	 phases	 is	 the	 conflict	 strategy	 of	 all	belligerents	and	governments	cannot	win	unless	they	push	rebels	back	through	these	phases.	Relative	power,	therefore,	is	not	revealed	through	the	course	of	the	conflict	as	maintained	in	traditional	models	of	war	(Reiter,	2009).	Civil	war	is	the	process	 through	 which	 rebels	 attempts	 to	 boost	 their	 power	 relative	 to	 the	government.	Before	the	war,	the	rebels	have	no	power,	they	develop	a	minimal	level	 of	 power,	 use	 this	 to	 build	 ever	 more	 power	 and	 degrade	 government	authority.			Rebels	use	their	new	ability	to	operate	to	further	weaken	government	capacity	to	generate	 support	 from	 the	 population	 and	 grow	 their	 movement	 further.	 If	political	or	economic	horizontal	inequalities	get	worse	or	government	reach	into	the	 periphery	 of	 its	 territory	 reduces	 further,	 rebels	 will	 have	 even	 greater	opportunities	 to	 build	 support.	 In	 contrast,	 if	 a	 government	 extends	 its	institutions	 to	 cover	areas	previously	outside	of	 its	purview,	 it	will	 limit	 rebel	opportunities	to	continue	generating	support.	Variations	during	the	course	of	the	war	in	the	very	same	macro-level	structures	that	academics	study	when	looking	at	conflict	onset	should	offer	an	indication	of	how	the	relative	strength	of	the	two	conflict	actors	is	changing	as	the	war	plays	out.	If	the	start	of	the	war	is	the	result	of	increased	opportunities	to	build	a	rebellious	movement	(Collier	and	Hoeffler,	2004)	or	increased	grievances	(Cederman,	Gleditsch,	and	Buhaug,	2013),	so	must	the	outcome	be	rooted	in	further	changes	to	these	features	of	the	state.		
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Belligerent	perceptions	
	Just	as	observers	can	assess	the	course	of	a	conflict	by	looking	at	the	changing	strength	of	government	sovereign	structures,	so	too	can	belligerents.			Rebels	measure	success	by	how	well	 the	government	 is	absorbing	 the	costs	of	continued	 conflict.	 If	 the	 conflict	 is	 weakening	 government	 institutions,	 then	rebels	will	believe	that	the	government	is	going	to	collapse	at	some	point	in	the	future.	The	costs	rebels	have	to	pay	to	achieve	this	will	play	only	a	minimal	role	in	their	perceptions	of	success	and	failure	as	they	adapt	their	strategy	to	reflect	the	amount	of	support	they	generate.	Rebels	will,	therefore,	base	their	decision	to	continue	fighting	solely	on	their	belief	over	the	 likelihood	the	government	will	eventually	collapse.			Governments,	in	contrast,	pay	significant	costs	even	if	they	win.	Resources	spent	on	military	operations	cannot	be	spent	on	delivering	incentives	to	the	population.	Dealing	with	a	 lengthy	 insurgent	campaign	may	 limit	 the	amount	of	benefits	a	government	can	distribute	to	its	core	constituency	more	than	negotiating	a	deal	at	an	earlier	point.	Governments	may	consider	making	concessions	to	rebels	to	end	 a	 conflict,	 either	 sharing	 political	 power	 with	 rebel	 leaders	 or	 providing	benefits	to	the	rebel’s	constituency,	even	if	they	feel	they	can	ultimately	win.	For	governments,	therefore,	both	beliefs	over	the	probability	of	winning	the	conflict	and	the	costs	that	will	be	required	to	win	determine	their	behaviour,	similar	to	actors	in	more	traditional	models	of	conflict	(Reiter,	2009).23			Analysis	of	how	a	conflict	 is	 likely	 to	proceed,	 therefore,	should	be	rooted	 in	a	closer	 examination	 of	 a	 government’s	 relations	 with	 the	 population.	 If	 the	institutions	that	describe	government	control	over	the	state	-	be	they	formal	or	informal	-	are	continuing	to	generate	support,	then	the	government	will	feel	it	is	
																																																						23	Arreguin-Toft	observes	that	many	stronger	governments	in	asymmetric	interstate	conflict	overestimate	their	chances	of	winning	as	they	put	too	much	stock	in	the	material	balance	of	power	(2005;	p35).	The	regime	in	Zimbabwe	did	the	same,	suggesting	this	may	also	hold	true	for	strong	governments	facing	weak	rebel	groups	in	civil	wars.	This,	however,	represents	a	case	of	miscalculation	rather	than	a	problem	with	the	model	of	conflict	proposed	in	this	thesis.		
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in	a	strong	position.	If	these	institutions	are	breaking	apart	this	will	signal	to	both	belligerents,	and	the	population,	that	the	government	is	struggling	to	absorb	the	costs	of	the	conflict	and	that	the	rebels	are	likely	to	win.	This	leads	to	the	main	hypothesis	of	this	thesis:			Hypothesis	 1:	Governments	 that	 are	 strengthening	 institutions	 that	manage	 its	
relations	with	the	population	are	more	likely	to	survive	civil	wars,	while	rebels	that	
are	degrading	these	institutions	are	more	likely	to	defeat	incumbent	governments.			Rebels	that	sustain	even	minor	levels	of	military	activity	against	the	backdrop	of	a	 government	 losing	 its	 ability	 to	 generate	 support	 from	 the	 population	 will	believe	 they	 are	 winning.	 In	 Afghanistan,	 the	 Taliban	 believed	 that	 the	 US	withdrawal	 in	 2014	 would	 significantly	 degrade	 the	 Afghan	 government’s	capacity	 to	 hold	 on	 to	 power.	 Therefore,	 despite	 suffering	 significant	military	losses,	it	refused	to	negotiate	(Dorronsoro,	2012).		If,	on	the	other	hand,	government	institutions	are	strengthening,	then	this	reflects	a	government	absorbing	the	costs	of	 the	conflict	and	 limiting	rebel	capacity	 to	generate	 support.	 Governments	 in	 this	 situation	 will	 feel	 they	 can	 defeat	 the	rebels	outright,	although	they	may	still	make	some	concessions	to	speed	up	the	war’s	end.	In	Malaya,	British	forces	built	stronger	relations	with	the	population	through	the	course	of	the	war	and	isolated	the	guerrillas	from	their	support-base.	Eventually,	the	rebels	lost	support	entirely	and	guerrilla	activity	died	away	(Nagl,	2005).		A	third	scenario	could	see	the	rebels	inflicting	costs	on	a	government,	but	not	to	the	point	that	the	state	will	collapse.	At	the	same	time,	rebels	are	facing	increasing	difficulties	mobilising	the	support.	In	this	case	the	conflict	is	‘ripe’	for	intervention	(Zartman,	 2001).24	 In	 Mozambique,	 the	 government,	 FRELIMO,	 could	 not	eliminate	 the	rebels,	RENAMO.	RENAMO	was	able	 to	maintain	activity	 in	rural	
																																																						
24	This	is	not	to	discount	any	problems	there	may	be	with	credible	commitment	issues	(Walter,	1997)	or	spoilers	within	both	camps	(Stedman,	2000).	However,	space	precludes	addressing	the	challenges	these	issues	create	using	the	framework	proposed	in	this	thesis.		
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areas,	but	was	losing	the	capacity	to	target	cities.	As	a	result,	both	parties	agreed	to	end	the	conflict	(Zartman,	2001).			The	 final	 plausible	 situation	 is	where	 rebels	 are	 too	weak	 to	 inflict	 significant	costs	on	 the	government,	but	 retain	 the	 capacity	 to	generate	 the	 support	 they	need	 to	 function.	 If	 neither	 actor	 has	 any	 reason	 to	 believe	 this	 situation	will	change	then	a	state	of	dual	sovereignty	may	be	a	political	equilibrium	and	the	war	can	continue	indefinitely.	Cunningham	et	al.	discuss	the	possibility	that	conflict	actors	have	two	features	that	determine	their	overall	power;	“the	power	to	target	(and)	the	power	to	resist”	(2009;	p574).	They	describe	a	situation	where	“rebels	are	 too	weak	 to	 extract	 concessions	 or	 obtain	 negotiated	 settlements,	 yet	 too	secure	to	be	easily	eradicated	by	governments”	(2009;	p575).			The	implication	from	Cunningham	et	al.’s	description	of	rebels	being	too	strong	to	be	easily	eradicated	is	that	rebels	can	avoid	government	efforts	to	target	them	militarily	(ibid.).	This	is	reflected	in	other	studies,	which	have	chosen	to	focus	on	external	support	(Beardsley	and	McQuinn,	2009),	external	sanctuary	(Salehyan,	2007),	control	over	peripheral	territory	(Cunningham	et	al.,	2009)	or	access	to	natural	resources	(Weinstein,	2007).	These	things	all	clearly	play	a	role	in	making	a	 rebel	 group	 more	 resilient,	 however,	 they	 cannot	 explain	 the	 situation	 in	Afghanistan	described	in	the	first	paragraph	of	this	thesis.	The	rebels	lost	huge	numbers	 of	 personnel	 and	 did	 not	 ‘avoid’	 targeting.	 These	 studies	miss	 a	 key	element	of	rebel	‘power	to	resist’;	its	regenerative	capacity.		The	‘power	to	resist’	in	 this	 sense	 comes	 not	 from	 avoiding	 military	 targeting,	 but	 the	 ability	regenerate	 the	 losses	sustained	 in	military	activity.	Afghanistan,	 Iraq,	Vietnam,	Cambodia,	and	Zimbabwe,	where	 the	rebels	 lost	huge	numbers	of	soldiers,	yet	remained	 resilient,	 suggests	 this	 element	 of	 a	 rebel	 group’s	 power	 to	 resist	 is	more	important.			If	both	conflict	actors’	ability	to	‘resist’	and	regenerate	resources	is	stronger	than	their	opponent’s	capacity	 to	degrade	 their	sovereign	structures	 then	a	state	of	‘dual	 sovereignty’,	 or	 a	 non-hurting	 stalemate,	 can	 continue	 indefinitely.	Benjamin	 Acosta	 uses	 this	 logic	 to	 show	 how	 militant	 organisations,	 such	 as	
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Hizbollah	or	Hamas	can	survive	for	such	long	periods	of	time,	with	neither	the	government	nor	the	rebels	having	any	realistic	possibility	of	winning	the	broader	conflict,	but	no	incentive	to	negotiate	(Acosta,	2014).25	
	
Conclusion		Many	observers	use	the	word	asymmetric	to	describe	civil	wars	in	terms	of	the	tactics	and	strategies	used	by	 the	belligerents	 (Thornton,	2006).	However,	 the	asymmetry	 runs	much	 deeper.	 Governments	 and	 rebels	 are	 trying	 to	 achieve	fundamentally	different	things	through	the	course	of	the	war.	Rebels	aim	to	bring	down	those	institutions	that	keep	the	state	functioning,	while	governments	try	to	strengthen	them.	Changes	in	macro-structures	that	determine	the	government’s	ability	to	draw	support	from	the	population	decide	the	outcome	of	the	conflict.	Rebel	success	or	failure	in	degrading	these	institutions	determines	relative	power	as	the	war	unfolds	by	pushing	the	war	through	guerrilla	and	conventional	phases.			Stathis	Kalyvas	stated	that	“change	was	synonymous	with	war”	(2008;	p1063).	The	preceding	analysis	has	articulated	the	change	that	rebels	are	attempting	to	induce;	the	weakening	and	eventual	elimination	of	the	government’s	sovereign	power.			Viewing	war	 in	 this	way	offers	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 second	question	posed	 in	 the	introduction.	Outnumbered	rebels	can	win	if	they	prise	apart	the	government’s	relationship	with	 the	population	by	degrading	 the	 institutions	 the	government	uses	 to	 manage	 these	 alliances.	 Rebels	 can	 achieve	 this	 even	 when	 being	outnumbered	militarily	because	control	over	territory	only	forms	one	element	of	
																																																						25	This	is	the	one	part	of	this	thesis	that	relies	on	the	assumption	that	belligerents	are	boundedly-rational.	If	belligerents	are	hyper-rational	then	they,	and	the	population,	can	anticipate	all	future	changes	to	government	capacity	to	absorb	the	costs	of	the	conflict	and	make	decisions	about	the	benefits	or	costs	of	continuing	the	war	or	supporting	belligerents	accordingly.	However,	many	changes	will	come	from	unpredictable	political	or	economic	shocks,	often	even	exogenous	to	the	conflict	itself.	The	unanticipated	fall	of	an	external	backer,	for	example,	may	lead	to	a	belligerent	losing	external	support,	diminishing	the	capacity	of	a	belligerent	to	generate	support	from	the	population.	It	is	much	more	plausible,	therefore,	to	assume	conflict	actors	make	decisions	based	on	local	and	short-term	dynamics.	This	offers	a	much	better	account	for	how	so	many	wars	end	up	in	a	non-hurting	stalemate,	which	is	impossible	if	war	is	the	result	information	asymmetry	or	credible	commitment	problems	(Powell,	2002).		
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the	government’s	sovereign	power.	Using	asymmetric	tactics,	rebels	can	weaken	the	 political	 or	 economic	 basis	 of	 government	 control	 instead,	 forcing	 the	government	to	collapse	even	if	it	remains	strong	militarily.	The	next	chapter	will	explore	specific	elements	of	the	alliance	between	belligerents	and	the	population.	This	will	allow	us	to	identify	empirical	variables	that	can	be	tested	to	measure	the	utility	of	the	model	of	civil	war	developed	in	the	last	two	chapters.	
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Chapter	three	
How	to	generate	support	
	Having	developed	a	framework	for	understanding	civil	war,	it	becomes	possible	to	explore	what	types	of	sovereign	relationships	enable	governments	to	fend	off	rebel	 challengers.	We	 can	 then	 generate	 sub-hypotheses	 to	 test	 alongside	 the	main	hypothesis	articulated	in	the	previous	chapter	and	measure	the	theoretical	model’s	 general	 utility.	 The	 previous	 chapter	 suggested	 that	 the	 power	 of	 a	variable	 should	 be	 determined	 primarily	 by	 the	 effect	 it	 has	 on	 government	capacity	 to	 generate	 support	 from	 the	 population.	 This	 will	 indicate	 whether	governments	are	losing	control	or	reducing	rebel	capacity	to	replace	losses	from	military	activity.		We	 can	 now	 also	 examine,	 both	 theoretically	 and	 empirically,	 the	 main	components	 of	 current	 counterinsurgency	 doctrine;	 development,	 governance	and	security	(US	Army,	2007).	Each	of	these	will	be	treated	in	turn,	and	examined	according	to	how	effectively	they	generate	resources	for	belligerents.			
Counterinsurgency	doctrine		If	 civil	war	 is	a	state-building	competition,	 it	 is	 instructive	 that	 the	 three	main	components	 of	 counterinsurgency	 doctrine	 reflect	what	 are	 “generally	 agreed	upon	as	the	three	core	functions	of	modern	government,	namely,	security,	welfare	and	 representation”	 (Mampilly,	 2011;	 loc1746).	 Population-centric	counterinsurgent	 doctrine	 advises	 providing	 the	 population	 security,	development	and	good	governance	to	undermine	rebel	capacity	to	draw	support	from	 the	 population	 (US	 Army,	 2007).	 Similarly,	 insurgent	 doctrine	 revolves	around	 undermining	 government	 capacity	 to	 provide	 these	 three	 functions	(O’Neill,	 1990;	 Taber,	 2002).	 Changes	 in	macro-level	measures	 of	 governance,	socioeconomic	and	security	conditions	should,	therefore,	serve	as	a	useful	test	of	the	overall	utility	of	the	theoretical	model	proposed	in	this	thesis.			
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In	 order	 to	 expand	 the	 discussion,	 development,	 governance	 and	 security	 are	treated	 more	 broadly	 to	 encapsulate	 three	 different	 types	 of	 incentives	belligerents	use	to	generate	support;	socioeconomic,	political	and	security.			
Socioeconomic	incentives	
	Socioeconomic	 incentives	 include	 paying	 individuals	 directly	 for	 support,	 but	they	 also	 include	 community-based	 financial	 inducements	 in	 the	 form	 of	development	and	public	services.	Public	services	in	this	sense	encompass	a	wide	range	 of	 activities,	 such	 as	 critical	 infrastructure,	 water	 sanitation,	 energy,	education,	hospitals	and	markets.	Current	counterinsurgency	doctrine	works	on	the	basis	 that	providing	 services	 lessens	 the	population’s	 incentive	 to	 support	rebel	groups	(US	Army,	2007).	The	population	calculates	the	provision	of	these	services	is	being	denied	them	by	rebel	activity	and,	therefore,	refuses	to	support	the	insurgency.	Emphasis	is	placed	on	providing	support	through	NGOs,	IGOs	and	host	nation	governments.	As	current	doctrine	acknowledges,	this	approach	had	limited	effect	on	the	conflicts	in	Afghanistan	and	Iraq	(JCS,	2013;	pVIII-20).	The	use	of	public	services	as	a	means	to	build	population	support	for	the	governments	of	 these	 nations	 failed	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons,	 some	 of	 which	 are	 well	documented,	such	as	systemic	corruption	(ibid.).			Nevertheless,	attacking	soft	economic	targets	remains	a	core	part	of	rebel	activity	across	a	variety	of	civil	wars,	suggesting	rebels	see	significant	utility	in	preventing	the	 government	 from	 providing	 these	 benefits	 to	 the	 population	 (Mampilly,	2011).	 As	 well	 as	 implementation	 problems	 in	 Iraq	 and	 Afghanistan,	 this	discrepancy	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	many	current	Western	practitioners	misdiagnosed	 how	 the	 provision	 of	 services	 help	 governments	 to	 defeat	rebellions.			In	 Iraq	 and	 Afghanistan,	 public	 services	 were	 provided	 as	 an	 end	 in	 and	 of	themselves.	 At	 a	 theoretical	 level,	 when	 services	 are	 funded	 and	 provided	 by	NGOs,	 IGOs	 or	 external	military	 forces	 they	 should	 have	 limited	 impact	 on	 an	individual’s	calculation	on	whether	to	support	the	government.	Hospitals,	schools	
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and	even	wells	and	markets	are	ultimately	collective	incentives,	and	often	post-war	 in	 that	 governments	may	 refuse	 to	 embark	 on	 these	 projects	 in	 insecure	environments	 (US	 Army,	 2007).	 Moreover,	 it	 can	 create	 a	 situation	 akin	 to	 a	development	 trap	 (Collier,	 2007).	 Governments	 have	 limited	 incentive	 to	stimulate	economic	growth,	because	finances,	supplies	and	even	manpower	for	its	security	forces	are	provided	externally.	As	a	consequence,	development	alone	will	not	serve	to	defeat	rebels	or	strengthen	governments.26			The	real	reason	public	services	work	to	curb	violence	is	that	they	form	part	of	a	functioning	 economy,	 which	 creates	 strong	 within-war	 incentives	 for	 the	population	 to	 generate	 resources	 for	 the	 actor	 facilitating	 this	 activity.	 More	importantly,	a	functioning	economy	maximises	how	much	support	the	population	can	 provide	 in	 return.	 Public	 services,	 providing	 critical	 infrastructure	 and	facilitating	economic	activity	creates	jobs.	This,	in	turn,	generates	tax	money	for	the	belligerent	facilitating	this	activity,	which	can	be	spent	on	paying	people	to	join	the	military.	It	is	an	obvious	way	for	a	government	to	hold	onto	power	within	Bueno	 de	 Mesquita	 et	 al.’s	 framework	 (2005).	 Understanding	 the	 effect	 of	development	 and	 a	 strong	 economy	 in	 this	 way	 also	 brings	 it	 in	 line	 with	 a	number	of	Mark	Lichbach’s	solutions	(1998),	such	as	 ‘providing	private	goods’	(p49)	and	‘providing	selective	incentives’	(p217).	A	strong	economy,	therefore,	creates	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 reciprocal	 relationship	 between	 the	 population	 and	 the	controlling-belligerent.	It	allows	a	belligerent	to	shape	population	behaviour	and	gives	the	population	the	capacity	to	deliver	resources	back	to	the	government.					Given	 the	 government’s	 starting	 position	 in	 most	 conflicts,	 it	 will	 be	 main	belligerent	 shaping	 population	 behaviour	 in	 this	 regard.	 That	 said,	 Zacharian	Mampilly	 documents	 a	 number	 of	 rebel	 groups	 providing	 various	 levels	 of	
																																																						26	There	are,	of	course,	extremely	important	moral	and	humanitarian	reasons	for	carrying	this	activity	out	regardless.	My	argument	here	is	that	it	is	unlikely	to	significantly	contribute	towards	defeating	insurgencies	by	itself.	It	also	important	to	note	that	I	do	not	meant	to	say	service	delivery	must	have	a	local	face,	as	is	often	assumed	(JCS,	2013).	Host-nation	governments	delivering	aid	granted	by	NGOs	or	external	patrons	will	suffer	from	the	same	problem.	For	it	to	assist	in	weakening	insurgencies,	the	services	must	be	a	function	of	resilient	and	reciprocal	sovereign	institutions	that	condition	the	population	to	behave	in	a	way	that	actually	supports	the	delivery	of	these	services	in	the	first	place.		
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services	to	the	population	(2011).	If	a	rebel	group	establishes	a	strong	economy	in	areas	under	its	control,	then	they	can	build	a	larger	military	force,	with	which	to	challenge	 the	government	more	conventionally.	 In	many	conflicts,	however,	rebels	will	devote	more	time	to	undermining	the	government’s	ability	to	keep	the	economy	functioning.	Rebels	bomb	critical	infrastructure,	markets,	roads,	schools	and	hospitals	precisely	for	this	reason.	Attacks	on	‘soft	targets’	often	make	up	a	significant	portion	of	a	rebel	group’s	military	activity,	as	evidenced	by	how	many	civilians	often	die	during	civil	wars.	Iraq	Body	Count,	an	organisation	dedicated	to	tracking	casualties	in	Iraq,	has	found	that,	as	of	May	2016,	158,559-177,219	of	242,000	 of	 those	 killed	 in	 Iraq	 since	 2003	 have	 been	 civilians	 (2016).	 Rebels	conduct	this	type	of	activity	because	they	believe	it	undermines	the	relationship	between	governments	and	the	population.			As	 the	 economy	 unwinds,	 the	 government	 becomes	 less	 able	 to	 provide	individuals	 with	 within-war	 incentives	 to	 induce	 participation	 in	 the	 security	forces,	 forcing	 it	 to	withdraw	 from	certain	areas	and	eventually	 leading	 to	 the	army	 collapsing	 completely;	 this	 essentially	 ‘pacifies’	 or	 demobilises	 the	population.	 It	moves	 the	population	 across	 from	militants,	 activists,	members,	sympathisers	and	constituents	to	being	non-constituents	in	terms	of	the	level	of	support	it	provides	to	the	government.	They	no	longer	join	the	security	forces,	civil	service	or	have	money	to	pay	taxes.	The	population	may	not	become	active	supporters	of	the	rebels,	but	this	still	increases	the	relative	power	of	the	rebels.	Government	military	strength	is	reduced,	allowing	the	rebels	to	transition	to	a	more	direct	strategy	to	capture	the	remainder	of	the	state.			The	ongoing	conflict	in	Syria	represents	an	example	of	this	process	at	work.	In	the	summer	of	2015,	Russia	 intervened	to	support	the	 flagging	Syrian	regime.	 Just	months	previously	commentators	had	assessed	that	Bashar	al-Assad	was	in	the	ascendency	 (Lucas,	 2015).	 During	 the	 period	 preceding	 Russia’s	 intervention,	however,	the	regime	had	begun	to	feel	more	strongly	the	economic	effects	of	the	conflict.	It	was	struggling	to	convince	people	to	join	the	army	and	pay	salaries.	In	total,	the	Syrian	army	declined	from	250,000	personnel	to	around	125,000	during	
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the	first	four	years	of	the	war	(Barnard	et	al.,	2015).	As	a	consequence,	it	could	no	longer	spread	its	forces	and	ceded	territory	to	rebel	groups.			We	can	contrast	this	with	ISIL’s	rise	in	the	same	period.	ISIL	captured	oil	fields,	engaged	in	looting	and	facilitated	economic	activity,	which	then	allowed	it	to	pay	potential	 recruits	 as	 well	 as	 workers	 in	 administrative	 functions	 and	 critical	infrastructure.	 Many	 individuals	 responded	 to	 ISIL’s	 financial	 inducements	(Doyle,	2015).	The	respective	 increase	and	decrease	 in	 ISIL’s	and	 the	regime’s	power	 can	 be	 directly	 traced	 to	 their	 ability	 to	 develop	 and	 sustain	 economic	relationships	with	local	communities.			Table	four	summarises	the	potential	 impact	a	particular	type	of	socioeconomic	activity	has	on	a	government’s	strength	and	the	regenerative	capacities	of	the	two	belligerents.				
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Table	4:	Summary	of	expected	effects	of	different	socioeconomic	incentives.		In	 summary,	 governments	 boosting	 economic	 activity	 and	 improving	 public	services	should	be	better	able	to	draw	the	support	they	need	from	the	population	to	defeat	rebellions.	Rebel	groups	undermining	government	capacity	to	deliver	these	 incentives	 to	 the	 population	 and,	 where	 possible,	 creating	 a	 shadow	economy	 are	more	 likely	 to	 grow	 in	 relative	 strength	 and	 emerge	 victorious.	However,	 just	 providing	 services	 through	 NGOs	 or	 humanitarian	 groups	 is	unlikely	to	be	effective,	as	it	does	not	lead	to	governments	mobilising	resources	
Type	of	activity	 Type	of	
incentive	
Resource	generation	 Expected	impact	on	
conflict		Facilitate	local	commercial	activity	and	trade		
	Selective	Within-war	Post-war	
	Taxes,	food	and	supplies.	 	Significant:	Effective	in	strengthening	governments	as	selective	and	within-war	incentive	and	generates	significant	support.			Deliver	public	services		
	Collective	Within-war	Post-war		
	Supports	commercial	activity.	
	Moderate:	Partially	effective	in	strengthening	governments.	Only	a	collective	incentive	but	facilitates	and	supports	broader	socioeconomic	activity.			Humanitarian	development		
	Collective	Within-war		
	None.	 	Limited:	Population	receive	aid	regardless	of	whether	they	support	government	or	not	and	does	not	generate	resources	for	governments.		
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in	the	same	way	as	wider	economic	activity.	These	notions	lead	to	the	first	sub-hypothesis:		Hypothesis	2:	Governments	increasing	economic	activity	and	providing	more	public	
services	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 survive	 civil	 wars.	 Those	 overseeing	 a	 decline	 in	
socioeconomic	activity	are	more	likely	to	be	defeated.		
Political	incentives	
	Conflict	actors	also	generate	popular	support	by	offering	political	 incentives	to	the	population,	such	as	democracy,	stronger	institutions	or	informal	power	for	local	communities.		Current	counterinsurgency	doctrine	emphasises	improving	governance	as	a	core	part	of	defeating	insurgencies.	It	defines	governance	as	“the	rules,	processes,	and	behaviour	by	which	interests	are	articulated,	resources	are	managed,	and	power	is	exercised	in	a	society”	(JCS,	2013;	pxvii).	Drawing	on	this	definition,	governance	functions	as	the	structures	through	which	a	conflict	actor	delivers	incentives	to	the	population.	Socioeconomic	 incentives	motivate	a	population	to	behave	in	a	particular	manner,	 effective	governance	 is	how	 these	 incentives	 are	delivered.	Civilians	 share	 this	 view.	 In	 general,	 they	 view	 political	 concepts,	 such	 as	democracy,	according	to	the	general	well-being	they	create	(Uvin,	2008).					As	with	development	aid,	coalition	forces	struggled	to	build	effective	institutions	in	 Iraq	 and	 Afghanistan.	 A	 large	 part	 of	 the	 problem	 was	 not	 theory,	 but	implementation,	 with	 Iraqi	 and	 Afghan	 governments	 mired	 in	 corruption,	nepotism	and	ethno-centric	politics	 (Coleman,	2011;	Whyte,	 2007).	 	However,	governance	 also	 failed	 to	 stymie	 the	 rebellions	 for	 the	 same	 reason	 as	development.	It	was	seen	as	a	way	to	undermine	the	legitimacy	of	the	rebels	and	address	grievances.	The	focus	slipped	from	actually	building	strong	institutions	with	national	reach	to	selling	the	benefits	if	democracy	was	allowed	to	flourish,	making	it	post-war	in	nature.			
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The	 real	 effect	 of	 functioning	 institution	 is	 that	 they	 both	 deliver	 within-war	incentives	to	the	population	in	a	regular	manner,	and	they	allow	conflict	actors	to	draw	more	popular	support	back	out	of	society.	Governance	manifests	 itself	 in	the	sovereign	structures	belligerents	create.	It	includes	the	very	basic	networks	sustained	by	 incipient	 insurgent	 organisations,	 through	 to	 huge	bureaucracies	controlled	by	some	governments	facing	down	violent	challengers.	Without	these	structures,	 conflict	 actors	 are	 unable	 to	 deliver	 incentives	 to	 their	 constituent	population.	 Nor	 can	 they	 continually	 draw	 the	 support	 they	 need	 from	 the	population	to	man	their	armed	forces	in	the	face	of	the	continual	strain	that	a	civil	war	places	on	them.			Many	of	Mark	Lichbach’s	solutions	for	solving	the	collective	mobilisation	problem	mirror	 the	 creation	 of	 formal	 or	 informal	 governance	 institutions.	 Most	importantly,	 he	 argues	 that	 developing	 a	 governing	 structure	 allows	 for	 the	delivery	 of	 many	 other	 solutions	 (1998;	 p132),	 including	 mutual	 exchange	agreements,	 increasing	 the	 selective	 incentives	 that	 can	 be	 delivered	 to	 the	population,	 and	 developing	 tit-for-tat	 arrangements	 (ibid.).	 It	 allows	 conflict	actors	to	reorganise	society	to	deliver	incentives	in	a	more	routine	manner,	thus	creating	more	trust	on	the	part	of	the	population	that	its	support	will	be	returned	(p195).	Governance	structures	form	the	very	basis	of	how	governments	organise	their	 solution	 for	 controlling	 the	 state	 in	 the	manner	 articulated	 by	Bueno	 de	Mesquita	et	al.	(2005).			These	 institutions	do	not	have	to	be	representative	 to	be	effective	(Fukuyama,	2013).	The	promise	of	democracy	in	a	post-war	deal	is	a	post-conflict	incentive.	Belligerents	should,	therefore,	struggle	to	elicit	mass	support	with	just	promises	of	increased	democracy	if	they	desist	from	supporting	the	other	side.	However,	if	belligerents	base	effective	within-war	governance	 structures	along	democratic	lines	then	this	should	increase	their	ability	to	motivate	popular	support.	For	one,	it	extends	the	segment	of	the	population	that	has	a	mutual	relationship	with	the	government.	Democracy	 creates	 a	monitoring	 and	punishment	mechanism	 for	the	population	 if	 a	 conflict	 actor	 is	 not	 fulfilling	 its	 promises	 (Lichbach,	 1998;	p210).	It	also	establishes	a	tit-for-tat	style	relationship	between	a	conflict	actor	
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and	a	population	as	it	grants	the	population	a	lower-cost	way	of	punishing	actors	(p133).	 Rather	 than	 having	 to	 actively	 support	 the	 opposing	 conflict	 actor	 in	order	to	pressure	change,	the	population	can	remove	elites	through	an	electoral	process	if	they	do	not	deliver	promised	benefits.			As	well	 as	 building	 formal	 or	 democratic	 institutions	 as	 a	means	 to	 structure	relations	 with	 the	 population,	 belligerents	 can	 also	 develop	 more	 informal	alliances	 with	 sections	 of	 society	 (Seymour,	 2014).	 In	many	 cases,	 this	 is	 the	default	 of	 counterinsurgency	 campaigns.	 David	 Kilcullen	 claims	 that,	 despite	overtures	 towards	 formal	 governance	 and	 democracy,	 building	 alliances	 with	local	groups	was	actually	the	logic	of	the	campaigns	in	both	Afghanistan	and	Iraq	(2012).	Conflict	actors	often	establish	local	defence	forces	that	hold	territory	but	are	only	nominally	controlled	by	the	macro-actor	(Peic,	2014).	Both	governments	and	rebels	offer	benefits	to	communities	across	the	state,	such	as	tribes,	religious	groups	or	local	villages.	In	Iraq,	ISIL	has	a	bureau	for	tribal	affairs,	which	reaches	out	 to	 tribal	 leaders	 and	 offers	 to	 empower	 them	 in	 exchange	 for	 providing	manpower	to	ISIL’s	forces	(Caris	and	Reynolds,	2014).	At	the	same	time,	the	Iraqi	government	 has	 been	 trying	 to	 raise	 a	 Sunni	 tribal	 force,	much	 like	 the	 Sunni	Awakening	 in	 2007,	 which	 significantly	 degraded	 ISIL’s	 forerunner,	 AQI	(Dettmer,	2015).			Establishing	alliances	through	social	groups	is	a	powerful	way	for	conflict	actors	to	draw	the	support	they	need	to	build	a	military	force.	Stathis	Kalyvas	observed	that	many	people	support	nationally-focused	conflict	actors	in	order	to	address	local	disputes	(2006).	Granting	groups	local	control	essentially	turns	a	post-war	promise	of	political	change	into	a	within-war	incentive	of	political,	economic	or	social	power.	It	also	turns	a	collective	benefit	into	a	selective	one.	Governments	and	 rebels	 will	 locate	 political	 entrepreneurs	 (Lichbach,	 1998;	 p168)	 within	communities	and	empower	 these	 leaders	 in	exchange	 for	drawing	 support	 for	their	patron.	These	 leaders,	 therefore,	 are	 individually	motivated	 to	 support	 a	conflict	actor	based	on	the	local	power	they	accrue	immediately.	They	face	their	own	 collective	mobilisation	 problem,	 but	 it	 is	 far	 less	 acute.	 Local	 leaders	 are	better	 placed	 to	 exploit	 Mark	 Lichbach’s	 ‘community	 incentives’.	 They	
	
	
	
	
81	
understand	 the	 way	 the	 local	 population	 perceives	 the	 incentives	 it	 is	 being	offered,	both	in	terms	of	the	expected	payoff	and	its	credibility.	Local	leaders	tap	into	communal	norms	of	behaviour	and	frame	the	ongoing	conflict	in	this	light.	They	can	place	the	conflict	into	a	social	and	local	context	that	creates	an	intangible	individual	payoff	to	those	actively	participating	(1998;	p121).	Individuals	within	communities	will,	therefore,	feel	social	pressure	to	participate	in	the	conflict.			Numerous	scholars	have	observed	 that	protest	movements	often	emerge	 from	social	networks	based	around	church,	political,	ethnic,	social,	geographic,	school	or	 university	 groups.	 James	 Scott	 (1977),	 Doug	McAdam	 (1999),	 Roger	 Gould	(1995)	and	Roger	D.	Peterson	(2001)	provide	evidence	of	social	networks	being	the	 basis	 for	 individual	 support	 for	 rebel	 groups	 and	 protest	 movements	 in	southeast	Asia,	the	USA,	France	and	eastern	Europe.	Paul	Staniland	shows	that	many	 insurgencies	 in	 south	 Asia	 emerged	 out	 pre-existing	 political	 networks	(2014).	Lichbach’s	observations	offer	an	appealing	explanation	as	to	why	this	is	the	case.			Belligerents	have	to	tap	 into	far	more	than	one	network	if	 they	are	to	create	a	sustainable	military	force.	However,	in	all	likelihood,	this	approach	represents	a	far	cheaper	and	less	complex	way	for	conflict	actors	to	build	an	effective	alliance	with	the	population.	It	minimises	organisational	costs	(Lichbach,	1998;	p47)	by	exploiting	already-organised	communities	(p141).			There	is	one	major	negative	to	this	approach.	Whereas	the	building	of	effective	formal	 institutions	decreases	 the	autonomy	of	 the	population	by	making	 them	more	reliant	on	their	relations	with	the	conflict	actor,	delivering	incentives	to	the	population	through	local	leaders	can	have	the	opposite	effect.				After	the	2007	Sunni	Awakening,	 the	Iraqi	government	tried	to	undermine	the	power	 it	 had	 given	 local	 tribal	 groups	 by	 arresting	 sheikhs	 and	 dismantling	militias.	By	2014,	those	excluded	from	the	Awakening	and	many	groups	that	had	fought	against	AQI	re-allied	themselves	with	ISIL,	helping	it	to	take	over	and	then	administer	 territory	 (Caris	 and	 Reynolds,	 2014).	Macro-conflict	 actors	 always	
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face	the	prospect	of	 the	political	benefits	 they	grant	 local	 leaders	being	turned	against	 them	 if	 the	 incentive	 structures	 change.	 Building	 effective	 local	administrations	can	offer	the	best	of	both	worlds.	Governments	can	exploit	the	authority	of	local	leaders,	but	keep	them	dependent	on	relations	with	the	central	government	for	the	resources	they	use	to	maintain	local	power	(Lichbach,	1998).			The	effort	rebel	groups	place	on	destroying	both	formal	and	informal	governance	institutions	 amply	 demonstrates	 their	 importance.	 Insurgents	 often	 employ	violence	 against	 these	 institutions	 rather	 than	 directly	 attacking	 government	forces.	 In	 Afghanistan,	 the	 Taliban	 attacked	 both	 the	 formal	 and	 informal	relationships	 the	 government	 was	 trying	 to	 develop.	 It	 kidnapped	 and	assassinated	 local	 government	 officials	 and	 tribal	 leaders	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	increase	 the	 cost	 for	 individuals	 choosing	 to	 support	 the	 government	 (Rashid,	2010).	This	was	designed	to	stop	the	government	building	effective	institutions	that,	in	turn,	could	have	been	used	to	draw	support	from	the	population.	Rebels	spend	 resources	 targeting	 governance	 structures	 because	 it	 degrades	government	capacity	 to	generate	resources	and	mobilise	support,	causing	 it	 to	collapse	and	the	rebels	to	take	control	of	the	state.				If	 a	 government	 strengthens	 its	 institutions	 and	 reaches	more	of	 society,	 then	challengers	will	be	unable	to	replace	losses	on	the	battlefield	and	rebel	activity	will	 reduce.	 In	 contrast,	when	 the	 strain	of	 civil	war	 is	 degrading	 government	institutions,	 it	 loses	 the	 ability	 to	manage	 relations	with	 society.	 	 Just	 as	with	socioeconomic	 incentives,	 if	 these	 networks	 are	 disintegrating	 then	 the	population	is	less	likely	to	actively	engage	with	the	government	and	will	become	increasingly	passive.	If	rebels	can	degrade	government	institutions	to	the	point	that	the	government	can	no	longer	organise	the	population,	then	it	can	push	the	conflict	 from	asymmetric	 to	 conventional	 or	 force	 the	 government	 to	 collapse	completely.			As	 well	 as	 its	 failing	 economy,	 the	 weakening	 of	 the	 Syrian	 regime	 has	undermined	its	ability	to	organise	support	from	minority	communities.		
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Table	5:	Summary	of	expected	effects	of	political	incentives.	
Type	of	
activity	
Type	of	
incentive	
Resource	generation	 Expected	impact	on	conflict	
	Build	formal	governance	institutions		
	Collective	Within-war	Post-war	
	Organises	the	collection	of	taxes,	raising	of	supplies,	recruitment	into	military	and	civil	service.	Crucial	for	delivering	socioeconomic	incentives	and	mobilising	resources	back	out	of	the	population.		
	Significant:	Effective	in	strengthening	governments	as	within-war	incentive	and	fundamental	for	generating	significant	support.		
	Informal	alliances		
	Selective	Collective	Within-war		
	Organises	support	direct	from	communities.	Resources	can	end	up	in	hands	of	intermediate	powerbroker	who	uses	them	for	own	goals.	
	Significant:	Efficient	way	of	drawing	support	from	population,	but	can	be	counterproductive	if	powerbroker	uses	resources	against	government	or	at	expense	of	other	communities.			Democratic	governance	institutions		
	Collective	Within-war	Post-war		
	Widens	sections	of	society	involved	in	state	activity.	Increases	incentives	of	communities	to	engage	with	governance	institutions	given	more	responsive	nature	of	government.		
	Moderate:	Amplifies	effect	of	building	effective	governance	institutions	(row	one)	as	increases	expectations	that	contribution	will	be	rewarded	and	interests	incorporated	into	government	activity.	Will	make	it	difficult	for	rebels	to	offer	alternative.	Democracy	alone,	however,	is	a	collective	incentive,	and	even	weaker	if	it	is	offered	as	reward	for	war	being	won.			
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Christians,	Druze	and	Alawites	 formed	a	significant	part	of	 the	Syrian	regime’s	army,	 but	 the	 degrading	 of	 government	 institutions	 led	 these	 communities	 to	question	 their	 alliance	with	Bashar	 al-Assad’s	 regime.	These	 communities	 still	desired	the	defeat	of	Sunni	rebels,	but	began	refusing	to	join	the	army	and	travel	to	other	parts	of	 the	country,	choosing	 instead	to	 form	their	own	local	militias	(Balanche,	2015).	The	population	in	this	case	was	not	supporting	the	rebels,	but	were	more	passive	in	their	support	for	the	government.		Table	five	breaks	down	the	discussion	the	potential	role	of	political	incentives	and	governance,	leading	to	the	next	hypothesis:		Hypothesis	 3:	 Governments	 strengthening	 institutions	 of	 governance	 are	 more	
likely	to	survive	civil	wars,	while	those	overseeing	a	weakening	of	these	institutions	
are	more	likely	to	be	defeated.			
Security	
	Counterinsurgency	doctrine	identifies	security	as	“the	top	consideration	for	the	population”	(JCS,	2013;	pVIII-20).	Stathis	Kalyvas	also	identifies	security	as	a	key	driver	 in	 securing	 cooperation	 between	 conflict	 actors	 and	 its	 constituent	population	 (2006).	Civil	wars	 lead	 to	 significant	disruption	 in	 local	 livelihoods	and	if	the	population	believes	a	belligerent	can	bring	an	end	to	the	war	then	this	represents	a	clear	incentive	to	provide	support.	On	the	surface,	however,	security	is	 a	 collective	 incentive,	 suggesting	 it	 cannot	 generate	 the	 breadth	 of	 support	needed	to	win	civil	wars.	Avoiding	death	would	appear	to	be	a	powerful	lure	but	the	 nature	 of	 the	 collective	 action	 problem	 suggests	 it	may	 not	 be	 enough	 to	critically	affect	the	progress	of	the	war.			A	belligerent’s	ability	to	provide	security	almost	certainly	has	three	other	effects	on	its	capacity	to	generate	support.	From	the	population’s	perspective	the	ability	of	a	belligerent	to	secure	a	local	area	increases	the	likelihood	that	it	will	prevail	(Lichbach,	1998;	p66).	Secondly,	it	decreases	the	potential	costs	of	supporting	a	conflict	actor	(p41).	If	a	belligerent	can	protect	its	supporters	from	retribution,	
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then	the	population	is	more	likely	to	actively	participate	in	economic	activity,	join	local	police	forces	and	work	in	administrative	roles.			Lastly,	 a	 conflict	 actor’s	 ability	 to	 deliver	 socioeconomic	 incentives	 to	 the	population	 and	 build	 governance	 institutions	 is	 greatly	 enhanced	 in	 a	 stable	environment.	 Local	 government	 structures	 cannot	 deliver	 services	 and	people	cannot	engage	 in	economic	activity	 if	 the	population	 fear	 leaving	 their	houses.	State	theorists	allude	to	the	interaction	between	these	three	pillars	of	the	state.	“Security	constitutes	a	precondition	for	welfare	and	political	participation,	while	welfare	 reduces	 conflict	 and	 political	 representation	 allows	 for	 non-violent	resolution	 of	 conflicts”	 (Stokke,	 2006;	 p5).	 	 This	 is	 why	 rebel	 forces	 seek	 to	destabilise	population	centres	as	 they	can	undermine	political	 institutions	and	economic	 activity.	 The	 government	 becomes	 unable	 to	 interact	 with	 the	population	and	draw	the	support	 it	needs,	which	creates	further	opportunities	for	rebels	to	operate.			Counterinsurgents	 in	 Afghanistan	 and	 Iraq	 applied	 these	 notions	 using	 the	‘inkspot’	strategy,	originally	conceived	by	David	Galula	based	on	his	experiences	in	 Algeria	 (1964).	 The	 idea	 was	 to	 build	 security	 in	 one	 area,	 develop	 local	government	 institutions	 and	 service	 delivery,	 before	 moving	 on	 to	 another	location.	 James	 Russell	 (2013)	 and	 Douglas	 Porch	 (2013)	 argue	 this	 strategy	failed	to	affect	the	course	of	those	conflicts	where	it	has	been	used,	be	it	Algeria,	Vietnam,	Afghanistan	 or	 Iraq.	 The	 problem	was,	 it	 put	 too	much	 emphasis	 on	security	in	motivating	population	behaviour.	While	security	is	the	most	pressing	concern	 for	 individuals,	 by	 itself	 it	 only	 incentivises	 passive	 support.	 If	 the	government	 lacks	 the	 ability	 to	 facilitate	 socio-political	 and	 economic	 activity,	then	security	will	not	be	converted	into	active	support.	If	services	are	delivered	by	NGOs	or	external	forces	rather	than	a	functioning	local	government	then	the	population	may	not	actively	resist	the	government,	but	nor	will	they	behave	in	a	manner	that	generates	resources.	Once	the	government	moves	onto	the	next	area,	insecurity	returns.	James	Russell	(2013)	shows	how	this	happened	repeatedly	in	Iraq	 and	Afghanistan.	Moreover,	 just	 providing	 security	 is	 a	 costly	 activity	 for	governments	and	limits	its	ability	to	divert	resources	elsewhere,	allowing	rebels	
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to	keep	fighting	in	other	places.	The	inkspot	strategy	only	works,	therefore,	if	the	government	already	has	the	national-level	structures	in	place	to	deliver	political	and	socioeconomic	 incentives	 locally	and	convert	 its	 control	over	an	area	 into	more	active	types	of	support.			Where	 governments	 have	 won	 wars,	 the	 end	 has	 been	 preceded	 not	 by	 the	provision	of	security,	but	rather	macro-political	changes	that	weakened	rebels.	Douglas	 Porch	 argues	 that	 all	 civil	 wars	 won	 by	 governments	 through	 softer	counterinsurgency	methods	fit	one	of	two	types;	either	the	conditions	were	not	conducive	in	the	first	place	for	rebels	to	seriously	degrade	government	power,	or	broader	 changes	 in	 macro-social,	 -economic	 and	 –political	 structures	undermined	the	mobilisation	capacity	of	the	rebels	(2013).	He	draws	reference	to	conflicts	in	Latin	America,	where	land	reforms	weakened	the	rebels	(p238)	and	Malaya,	where	the	British	made	political	concessions	to	weaken	the	insurgency	(p256).	 During	 a	 civil	 war	 the	 three	 tenets	 of	 counterinsurgency	 –	 security,	welfare	and	governance	–	are	much	more	interactive	than	their	current	emphasis	in	the	doctrine.			Despite	this,	the	theoretical	evidence	suggests	changes	in	a	government’s	capacity	to	provide	security	should	affect	its	capacity	to	draw	support	from	the	population,	which	is	laid	out	in	table	six.		
Type	of	
activity	
Type	of	
incentive	
Resource	generation	 Expected	impact	on	conflict	
	Provide	local	security		
	Collective	Within-war		
	By	itself,	security	creates	no	resources	and	is	costly	activity,	but	can	enhance	building	of	governance	institutions	and	socioeconomic	activity.		
	Moderate:	Provision	of	security	can	be	important	but	depends	on	national-level	political	and	economic	structures	being	in	place	to	elicit	active	support.		Table	6:	Summary	of	expected	effects	of	security	incentives.		
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This	leads	to	the	hypothesis	below.	However,	the	effect	of	changes	in	the	security	environment	may	be	more	 limited	 than	changes	 in	 the	strength	of	governance	structures	and	the	economy	in	determining	the	final	outcome	of	a	conflict.				Hypothesis	4:	Governments	that	are	increasingly	able	to	provide	security	are	more	
likely	to	survive	civil	wars,	while	governments	overseeing	increasing	instability	are	
likely	to	be	defeated.		
	
Counterinsurgency	doctrine	
	The	theoretical	evidence	suggests	all	three	tenets	of	counterinsurgency	doctrine	should	 help	 governments	 to	win	 civil	 wars.	 However,	 counterinsurgents	 have	poorly	 understood	 why	 this	 is	 the	 case.	 Practitioners	 have	 treated	 security,	governance	and	development	as	incentives	in	and	of	themselves.	This	has	led	to	the	 mistaken	 belief	 that	 populations	 will	 support	 governments	 if	 they	 show	themselves	to	be	legitimate	(US	Army,	2007).	The	preceding	analysis	suggests,	in	contrast,	that	security,	governance	and	development	as	ends	are	insufficient	to	generate	the	level	of	support	governments	need	to	defeat	insurgencies.			Governments	 that	 are	 providing	 an	 increasingly	 stable	 environment,	 an	improving	 economy	 and	 building	 effective	 institutions,	 however,	 will	 also	 be	creating	 strong	 and	 resilient	 structures	 that	 deliver	 incentives	 directly	 to	 the	population.	Credibility	is	more	important	than	legitimacy	in	shaping	population	behaviour.			More	importantly,	the	effectiveness	of	these	structures	increases	the	contribution	each	individual	in	society	can	provide	back	to	conflict	actors.	They	organise	and	generate	 recruits	 for	 the	 security	 forces,	 civil	 service	 and	 tax	 revenue.	 Strong	sovereign	structures	convert	passive	into	active	support,	pushing	the	population	across	the	spectrum	from	constituents	to	sympathisers	to	members	to	activists	in	terms	 of	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 support	 they	 generate	 for	 conflict	 actors.	 It	 is	 the	strength	of	these	structures	and	how	they	condition	population	behaviour	that	determines	 their	 resilience	 against	 the	 strains	 placed	 on	 them	by	 the	 costs	 of	
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fighting	a	civil	war.	The	strength	of	these	structures	determine	a	conflict	actor’s	ability	 to	 mobilise	 support	 through	 the	 course	 of	 the	 war	 and,	 therefore,	 its	regenerative	 capacity.	 Governments	 that	 extend	 their	 institutions	 across	 the	polity	will	eliminate	rebel	capacity	to	generate	support,	and	will	win	wars.	Rebels	that	undermine	these	institutions	will	defeat	incumbent	governments.	
	
Violence		Up	to	this	point,	this	chapter	has	analysed	the	positive	incentives	belligerents	use	to	 generate	 popular	 support.	 An	 extensive	 literature,	 however,	 shows	 that	belligerents	 attempt	 to	 punish	 communities	 for	 providing	 support	 to	 their	opponent,	most	 obviously	 through	 the	 use	 of	 discriminate	 and	 indiscriminate	violence.	 Violence,	 in	 this	 sense,	 differs	 from	 insecurity	 in	 that	 it	 specifically	targets	 the	 population.	 Direct	 violence	 constitutes	 one,	 often	 critical	 driver	 of	population	behaviour	within	conflict	zones	(Porch,	2013).			The	use	of	violence	has	been	extensively	studied	elsewhere	and	I	only	intend	to	cover	 it	very	briefly	(see	for	example	Downes,	2007;	Eck,	2014,	2014;	Eck	and	Hultman,	 2007;	 Kalyvas,	 2006;	 Kalyvas	 and	 Kocher,	 2007;	 R.M.	 Wood	 and	Kathman,	2014).				The	literature	shows	that	violence	works	as	a	powerful	selective	and	collective	within-war	 incentive.	 However,	 many	 scholars	 have	 maintained	 that	 violence	cannot	work	to	control	a	whole	population	and	has	a	number	of	negative	effects	for	the	actor	employing	it	(Mampilly,	2011).	Violence	drives	grievances	against	the	perpetrator.	If	another	belligerent	protects	civilians	from	the	violence	of	their	opponent	 then	 the	 population	 will	 have	 increased	 incentive	 to	 support	 them	(Kalyvas,	 2006).	 On	 this	 logic,	 violence	 only	 works	 strategically	 if	 the	 actor	employing	 it	 can	 sustain	 its	 oppression	 in	 the	 face	 of	 its	 opponent’s	 efforts	 to	protect	 civilians.	 Alexander	 Downes	 examined	 when	 government	 violence	 is	likely	to	work	in	defeating	rebel	groups	in	Draining	the	sea	by	filling	the	graves	(2007).	He	found	it	works	best	when	the	target	population	is	small	and	bounded	geographically,	as	it	is	easier	for	the	government	to	contain	any	potential	fallout.		
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I	suggest	that	violence	has	another	impact	on	the	likely	outcome	of	conflicts	that	has	not	been	previously	identified.	When	employing	violence,	a	conflict	actor	is	not	 creating	 mutually	 reinforcing	 behaviour.	 Creating	 a	 secure	 environment,	facilitating	 economic	 activity	 and	 developing	 effective	 governance	 structures	incentivises	the	population	to	generate	the	resources	–	manpower,	finances,	food	-	 that	 a	 belligerent	 can	 then	 use	 to	 sustain	 its	 military	 force.	 In	 contrast,	belligerents	often	use	violence	to	stifle	the	generation	of	these	resources	for	their	opponent.	This	explains	why	governments	can	win	through	repression	when	the	target	 population	 is	 small	 as	 it	 can	 draw	 the	 support	 it	 needs	 to	 sustain	 this	activity	from	elsewhere.	If	the	oppressed	population	is	large	then	a	government	may	bankrupt	itself	by	pursuing	this	strategy,	undermining	its	ability	to	distribute	benefits	to	its	constituent	population.			The	 case	 studies	 below	will	 offer	 an	 opportunity	 to	 explore	whether	 violence	interacts	with	 the	ability	of	belligerents	 to	mobilise	resources.	 In	other	words,	does	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 have	 secondary,	 as	 yet	 unexplored,	 effects	 on	 the	regenerative	capacity	of	belligerents.		
Information	operations		The	 above	 variables	 generally	 represent	 tangible	 elements	 of	 a	 conflict;	governance	 structures,	 economic	 opportunities,	 or	 the	 likelihood	 of	 being	afflicted	 by	 violence.	 Conflict	 actors	 also	 dedicate	 significant	 resources	 to	distorting	 the	 choices	 populations	 face.	 Mark	 Lichbach	 argues	 this	 can	significantly	 boost	 their	 ability	 to	 mobilise	 support	 (1998;	 p86).	 ISIL’s	propaganda	tries	to	convince	individuals	that	their	contribution	is	necessary	and	that	the	only	way	to	benefit	from	ISIL’s	success	is	to	travel	to	the	region.27	Other	groups,	 such	 as	 Peru’s	 Shining	 Path,	 force	 fighters	 and	 populations	 through	political	education	programs	(Weinstein,	2007).	These	programs	make	a	group’s	
																																																						27	A	summary	of	ISIL’s	English-speaking	magazine,	Dabiq,	can	be	found	at	The	Clarion	Project	(2016).	
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ideology	appear	more	coherent	and	desirable	(Lichbach,	1998;	p92),	especially	if	they	can	be	linked	to	local	concerns	(p231).			Conflict	actors	that	carry	out	extremely	effective	‘misinformation’	campaigns	will	have	to	provide	less	‘real’	incentives	to	influence	population	behaviour.	That	said,	information	operations	are	more	likely	to	be	successful	when	they	are	grounded	in	reality.	We	should,	therefore,	be	able	to	generate	a	general	assessment	on	the	choice	faced	by	the	population	by	looking	at	changes	in	objective	indicators	that	can	be	measured	and	tested	empirically.		
Strategic	choices	
	This	 chapter	 has	 explored	 a	 range	 of	 ways	 conflict	 actors	 shape	 population	behaviour.	It	has	not	broached	the	subject	of	why	conflict	actors	choose	between	different	strategies	for	shaping	population	behaviour.	The	following	section	will	briefly	look	at	some	of	these	factors.			The	 nature	 of	 the	 state	 will	 affect	 the	 behaviour	 of	 conflict	 actors.	 Jeremy	Weinstein	has	shown	how	rebels	that	capture	natural	resources	have	less	need	to	generate	active	support	(2007).	Their	ability	to	raise	funds	through	trade	enables	them	 to	 deliver	 selective	 incentives	 to	 potential	 supporters.	 Those	 without	natural	resources	have	to	draw	these	resources	from	the	population	and,	as	such,	need	to	develop	broader	relations	with	local	communities.	Weinstein,	compares	the	NRA	 in	Uganda	 and	RENAMO	 in	Mozambique,	 and	 shows	how	 the	 latter’s	control	over	natural	resources	meant	it	was	much	more	aggressive	in	its	relations	with	the	population	(2007).			Geography	also	plays	a	role.	If	a	state	has	peripheral	areas	that	are	difficult	for	governments	to	control,	then	it	pays	for	rebels	to	focus	their	efforts	in	building	support	 there.	 If	 not	 then	 they	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 prioritise	 weakening	government	control	in	the	centre	(Guillen	and	Hodges,	1973).		
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Any	support	conflict	actors	can	generate	externally	limits	the	resources	they	need	to	 raise	 internally.	 Consequently,	 belligerents	 will	 have	 greater	 regenerative	capacity	 even	 if	 they	 cannot	 raise	 resources	 from	 the	 population.	 External	support	can	significantly	affect	the	nature	of	the	alliance	between	a	belligerent	and	the	population.	Nevertheless,	the	broader	framework	developed	in	this	thesis	still	underpins	all	civil	wars.	Belligerents	still	need	to	distribute	benefits	to	their	constituents	 and	 impose	 costs	 on	 the	potential	 supporters	of	 their	 opponents.	What	will	change	is	that	they	have	less	need	to	generate	resources	from	society	to	 fund	 these	 incentives	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Kyle	 Beardsley	 and	 Brian	McQuinn	observed	 how	 rebels	with	 external	 support	 often	 focus	 on	 pacifying	 potential	resistance	 (2009).	 The	 same	 applies	 to	 governments,	 and	 offers	 one	 reason	coalition	efforts	in	Afghanistan	and	Iraq	failed	to	effectively	eliminate	insurgent	forces.			External	actors	can	also	provide	rebel	forces	with	a	sanctuary	(Salehyan,	2007).	Rebels	 with	 access	 to	 a	 sanctuary	 have	 less	 need	 to	 live	 amongst	 local	communities	 and	 can	 instead	 focus	 on	 mobilising	 fighters	 and	 attacking	government	 institutions.	 Rebels	 will	 then	 be	 harder	 for	 the	 government	 to	eliminate	completely,	meaning	the	insurgency	can	strain	government	resources	for	longer.			Zacharian	Mampilly	 also	 points	 out	 that	 international	 support	 can	 come	with	conditions,	or	even	advice,	which	affects	how	conflict	belligerents	deal	with	the	population	 (2011).	 He	 also	 reminds	 us	 not	 to	 forget	 the	 beliefs,	 ideology	 and	expectations	of	those	involved.	Rebel	and	government	leaders	hold	beliefs	about	the	best	way	to	build	movements,	which	can	affect	their	subsequent	decisions	to	use	violence	or	create	more	benign	structures	(2011;	loc656).			The	social	breakdown	of	belligerents	and	broader	society	will	also	play	a	role	in	determining	 the	 strategies	 conflict	 actors	 pursue	 to	 build	 support	 from	 the	population.	Paul	Staniland	shows	that	whether	an	insurgency	comes	from	a	pre-existing	social	or	political	organisation	will	affect	the	type	of	movement	it	tries	to	construct	 (2014).	 Mampilly	 shows	 that	 if	 tribes,	 religious	 groups	 or	 local	
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community	 networks	 are	 strong,	 then	 belligerents	 will	 have	 to	 build	 support	through	them,	rather	than	building	more	impersonal	institutions	(2011;	loc656).	Lastly,	Alexander	Downes	(2007)	showed	that	the	ethnic	breakdown	of	a	country	and	how	these	social	groups	reflect	the	make-up	of	the	government	and	the	rebels	can	also	affect	conflict	behaviour.			These	variables	affect	conflict	dynamics,	precisely	because	they	determine	rebel	capacity	 to	 undermine	 government	 relations	 with	 the	 population	 and	 build	 a	militant	force.		
	
Conclusion	
	This	chapter	has	explored	elements	of	the	government’s	sovereign	structures	that	it	uses	to	mobilise	support,	and	the	elements	rebels	target	to	‘paralyse	the	state’	(Guevara,	2008).	Socioeconomic-,	political-	and	security-based	incentives	appear	crucial	to	determining	the	outcome	of	civil	wars,	but	not	because	the	population	desire	these	benefits.	They	work	because	the	ability	to	deliver	these	incentives	depends	 on	 conflict	 actors	 building	 sovereign	 structures	 that	 convert	 these	constructs	 into	 within-war	 incentives.	 In	 turn,	 these	 structures	 organise	 the	population	and	maximise	the	amount	of	resources	conflict	actors	can	draw	from	communities.			When	 services	 and	 local	 governance	 are	 working,	 the	 population	 pays	 taxes,	produces	agriculture,	maintains	infrastructure,	innovates,	joins	the	security	force	for	employment,	fills	the	civil	service	amongst	many	other	things.	This	behaviour	generates	resources	for	the	government	that	it	uses	to	distribute	these	incentives	back	 to	 the	 population.	 This	 is	 the	 essence	 of	 Bueno	 de	 Mesquita	 et	 al.’s	description	of	government	control	over	the	state	(2005).		Rebels	that	undermine	the	government’s	capacity	to	deliver	these	incentives	will	weaken	 the	 government’s	 control	 over	 the	 state	 and	 eventually	 push	 the	government	 to	 collapse	 completely.	 Governments	 that	 can	 extend	 these	
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structures	 across	 the	 whole	 of	 society	 will	 win	 the	 war	 by	 eliminating	 the	political,	social	and	economic	opportunities	rebels	exploit	to	regenerate.		The	 rest	 of	 this	 thesis	 will	 look	 to	 test	 these	 assertions.	 Should	 they	 prove	effective	predictors	for	the	outcomes	of	civil	wars	that	have	actually	taken	place,	it	 will	 lend	 strong	 support	 to	 the	 general	 framework	 for	 studying	 civil	 wars	developed	in	this	thesis.	
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Chapter	four	
Methodological	approach:	mixed	methods	
	The	nature	of	this	study	lends	itself	to	testing	the	hypotheses	through	a	mixed	method	approach	that	combines	the	use	of	large-N	quantitative	analysis	and	in-depth	 case	 studies.	 Large-N	 analysis	 has	 the	 key	 advantage	 of	 ensuring	 a	representative	 and	broad	 sample.	We	 can	also	be	 certain	 that	 the	variables	of	interest	 objectively	 correlate	 across	 a	 variety	 of	 cases.	 However,	 the	 large-N	quantitative	approach	only	allows	us	to	look	at	correlations	between	variables,	not	 causal	 mechanisms.	 The	 main	 thrust	 of	 this	 thesis	 argues	 that	 civil	 war	outcomes	 are	 determined	 by	 changes	 in	 the	 government’s	 capacity	 to	 shape	population	 behaviour.	 It	 is	 especially	 important	 to	 be	 sure	 about	 the	 causal	mechanisms	as	that	forms	a	core	part	of	this	thesis.	Case	study	analysis	is	much	better	 suited	 to	 testing	 hypotheses	 around	 causal	mechanisms	 and,	 therefore,	represents	the	logical	choice	for	this	thesis.	Employing	process-tracing	allows	the	author	 to	 specifically	 focus	 on	 the	 causal	 path	 from	 changes	 in	 independent	variables	of	interest	to	the	observed	outcome.	In	other	words,	we	can	examine	how	 changes	 in	macro-level	 behaviours	 and	 structures	 actually	 condition	 the	ability	of	the	government	to	mobilise	resources	from	the	population	(Mampilly,	2011).			Case	 studies,	 however,	 also	 have	 a	 number	 of	 disadvantages.	 “Potential	limitations	 of	 case	 studies,	 though	 not	 inherent	 in	 every	 one,	 include	indeterminacy	 or	 inability	 to	 exclude	 all	 but	 one	 explanation,	 lack	 of	independence	 of	 cases,	 and	 the	 impossibility	 of	 perfectly	 controlling	 case	comparisons.”	(Bennett,	2004;	p20).	There	is	a	severe	danger	of	selection	bias,	with	scholars	choosing	case	studies	that	confirm	hypotheses.	It	is	also	impossible	to	know	whether	results	can	be	applied	to	cases	in	other	contexts,	as	one	cannot	keep	all	other	variables	constant	(Flyvbjerg,	2006).			Using	a	mixed	method	approach	addresses	these	issues.	The	case	studies	in	this	thesis	were	chosen	based	on	the	results	of	a	quantitative	analysis,	ensuring	the	
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selection	process	was	independent	of	any	previous	knowledge	I	had	of	particular	wars.	As	the	case	studies	follow	from	a	large-N	study,	we	also	know	whether	the	variables	of	interest	I	examine	in	the	case	studies	correlate	to	civil	war	outcomes	across	 a	 variety	 of	 contexts.	 A	 quantitative	model,	 therefore,	 allows	 us	 to	 test	whether	the	model	of	conflict	proposed	in	this	thesis	is	plausible	when	set	against	a	 wide	 variety	 of	 conflicts.	 Perhaps	 more	 importantly,	 it	 offers	 an	 objective	method	for	selecting	case	studies	to	explicitly	test	the	causal	processes	that	form	the	main	part	of	my	theory.			Consequently,	a	mixed	method	approach	offers	the	best	of	all	worlds,	drawing	on	the	advantages	of	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	analysis	and	allowing	me	to	test	 my	 main	 hypotheses,	 which	 revolve	 around	 how	 population	 support	determines	civil	war	outcomes.			
Quantitative	study	
	For	the	quantitative	analysis	I	use	a	dataset	adapted	from	the	RAND	study	How	
Insurgencies	 End	 by	 Ben	 Connable	 and	 Martin	 Libicki	 (2010).	 Their	 dataset	contains	89	completed	and	ongoing	insurgencies	that	started	between	1945	and	2006.	My	thesis	has	complete	data	for	65	of	these	conflicts,	across	51	countries,	all	starting	after	1960.	1960	represents	the	starting	point	of	this	study	due	to	data	availability	of	many	of	the	independent	variables	I	have	added	to	the	dataset.28		As	with	most	studies	that	look	at	the	dynamics	of	civil	war	(eg	Collier	et	al.,	2004;	DeRouen	 and	 Sobek,	 2004),	 Connable	 and	Libicki	 use	 time	 invariant	 variables	measured	at	the	beginning	of	the	conflict.	The	problems	this	creates	were	detailed	above.	Rebel	groups	attempt	to	alter	structural	conditions	in	order	to	demobilise	the	government.	As	such,	the	nature	of	the	state	at	the	beginning	of	the	conflict	will	only	tell	us	so	much.	To	overcome	this	problem,	I	have	expanded	the	dataset	to	create	959	conflict-year	observations,	which	means	we	can	study	changes	in	macro-level	indicators	through	the	course	of	the	conflict.		
																																																						28	Two	conflicts,	Laos	and	the	Indian	northwest	territories,	that	started	after	1960	had	to	be	dropped	due	to	a	lack	of	data	relating	to	either	the	state	or	the	conflict.	
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The	dependent	variable,	civil	war	outcomes,	comes	directly	from	Connable	and	Libicki’s	dataset.	Outcomes	are	broken	down	into	outright	government	victories,	rebel	victories	and	mixed	outcomes,	based	on	whether	insurgents	achieved	their	original	aims,	judged	by	experts	in	each	war	rather	than	the	authors.	This	does	result	in	some	outcomes	being	different	to	other	studies.	For	example,	DeRouen	and	Sobek	(2004)	code	South	Africa	as	a	negotiated	agreement,	while	Connable	and	Libicki	code	it	as	a	rebel	victory	given	the	political	change	the	ANC	effected.		Mixed	outcomes	are	characterised	by	the	government	surviving,	but	with	certain	political	changes	that	are	in	line	with	the	demands	of	the	rebel	group.	Whether	a	treaty	 formalises	 these	changes	 is	deemed	 irrelevant,	as	 is	a	settlement	 that	 is	simply	 a	 surrender.	 This	 gives	 the	 dataset	 a	 significant	 advantage	 in	 that	 the	outcomes	are	much	more	meaningful	and	widely	distributed.			The	major	downside	of	using	this	dataset	is	that	the	results	are	not	necessarily	directly	comparable	to	other	comparative	studies	of	civil	war	outcomes	nor	does	it	include	some	of	the	wars	used	in	these	studies.			The	first	issue,	I	believe	is	a	necessary	trade-off	for	enriching	our	understanding	of	conflicts.	Policymakers	need	to	not	only	understand	when	conflict	actors	are	most	likely	to	agree	to	a	negotiated	deal,	but	also	what	types	of	deals	are	most	likely	 to	 be	 concluded.	 Not	 all	 political	 deals	 that	 bring	 wars	 to	 an	 end	 are	equivalent,	 with	 participants	 making	 a	 wide	 variety	 and	 often	 unequal	 set	 of	concessions.	 It	 is	 important,	 therefore,	 to	 move	 beyond	 understanding	‘negotiated	 outcome’	 as	 a	 catch-all	 term.	 Instead	 we	 should	 categorise	 wars	according	to	a	more	objective	measure	of	whether	a	conflict	actor’s	war	aims	have	been	achieved.	This	dataset	allows	us	to	do	that	and,	therefore,	should	improve	the	usefulness	of	the	findings	for	policymakers	involved	in	trying	to	bring	civil	war	participants	to	the	negotiating	table.				The	 smaller	 dataset	 is	 more	 problematic	 and	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 make	 the	findings	 less	 robust.	 Connable	 and	 Libicki’s	 dataset	 was	 adapted	 from	 James	Fearon’s	and	David	Laitin’s	list	of	conflicts	in	Ethnicity,	Insurgency,	and	Civil	War	(2003).	Fearon	and	Laitin’s	dataset	covers	127	civil	wars	that	started	between	
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1945	and	1999.	Connable	and	Libicki	drop	some	cases,	which	they	categorise	as	“countercoups	and	insurrections”	rather	than	civil	wars	or	insurgencies	(2010;	p158).	They	then	added	wars	that	started	between	1999	and	2006,	which,	in	total,	led	to	the	figure	of	89	civil	wars.	However,	not	all	of	the	wars	that	Connable	and	Libicki	 dropped	 would	 have	 been	 included	 in	 the	 dataset	 used	 in	 this	 study	regardless.	 Many	 of	 the	 wars	 Connable	 and	 Libicki	 drop	 started	 before	 1960	meaning	there	would	not	have	been	data	available.	In	addition,	this	study	focuses	on	changes	 in	 levels	of	governance,	socioeconomic	drivers	and	security,	rather	than	 looking	 at	 these	 variables	 in	 absolute	 terms.	 Consequently,	 a	war	 has	 to	cover	at	 least	a	 three-year	period	 for	 these	changes	 to	become	measureable.29		Some	 of	 the	 conflicts	missing	 in	 Connable	 and	 Libicki’s	 dataset	 would	 not	 be	included	 in	 this	 thesis	 anyway	 due	 to	 lasting	 less	 than	 three	 years.	 In	 total,	Connable	and	Libicki	drop	only	fifteen	wars	from	Fearon	and	Laitin’s	dataset	that	would	have	met	the	criteria	for	inclusion	in	this	study.	30		While	it	would	be	ideal	to	include	these	wars	to	create	a	wider	dataset,	this	was	not	 realistic	 and	 would	 have	 violated	 the	 principles	 of	 independent	 data	collection.	Connable	and	Libicki	used	experts	to	determine	whether	governments	or	 rebels	achieved	 their	 conflict	aims.	To	add	 the	other	 fifteen	conflicts	would	have	required	either	contacting	a	similar	set	of	experts	to	get	assessments	on	how	the	 war	 ended	 according	 to	 Connable	 and	 Libicki’s	 criteria,	 or	 assessing	 the	outcomes	myself.	The	first	of	these	options	was	not	credible	as	I	could	not	ensure	the	experts	I	used	would	judge	conflicts	as	Connable	and	Libicki	 intended.	The	second	 was	 not	 realistic	 as	 I	 did	 not	 have	 the	 broad	 expertise	 to	 judge	 the	outcomes	of	these	conflicts	objectively.	While	the	independent	variables	for	this	thesis	incorporate	a	wide	variety	of	data	sources,	such	as	the	World	Bank	or	the	
																																																						
29	The	way	the	data	is	constructed	is	outlined	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter.	In	short,	a	war	has	to	have	taken	place	across	a	three-year	period	as	I	calculate	year-on-year	changes	from	the	beginning	of	the	conflict,	but	then	lag	these	changes	by	one	year	to	reduce	any	endogeneity	caused	by	changes	in	the	independent	variables	being	the	result	of	the	war	having	ended	during	that	year.		30	The	wars	not	included	are:	Haiti	(91-95),	Mali	(89-94),	Chad	(94-98),	Uganda	(81-87),	India	Sikh	(82-93),	Bangladesh	(76-97),	Indonesia	W	Papua	(65-ongoing),	Xinjiang	(91-ongoing),	Brazil	(65-72),	Ethiopia	(67-ongoing),	Angola	Cabinda	(92-ongoing),	Zimbabwe	(83-87),	Sudan	(63-72),	Iran	Kurdistan	(79-93),	Turkey	militias	(77-80).	
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Correlates	of	War	project,	I	also	borrow	two	variables	directly	from	Connable	and	Libicki’s	 data.	 Collecting	data	 for	 these	 independent	 variables	 on	 any	 conflicts	added	to	the	dataset	would	have	caused	exactly	the	same	problems	as	judging	the	dependent	 variable.	 On	 balance,	 therefore,	 I	 focus	 only	 on	 those	 conflicts	 that	were	included	in	Connable	and	Libicki’s	study.			The	trade-offs	for	using	this	smaller	dataset	are	also	more	than	negated	by	how	influential	Connable	and	Libicki’s	work	has	been	in	policy	circles.	Its	conclusions	and	recommendations	hold	huge	weight	as	RAND	retains	a	strong	relationship	with	 the	 US	 government	 (RAND	 Corporation,	 2014).	 Using	 RAND’s	 dataset	situates	my	conclusions	and	recommendation	within	their	findings,	which	have	helped	to	shape	Western	interventions	in	Afghanistan,	Iraq	and	Syria.			
Case	studies		I	have	chosen	four	case	studies	to	illuminate	how	changes	in	the	government’s	capacity	to	shape	population	behaviour	determines	civil	war	outcomes;	Burundi,	Cambodia,	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 in	 Azerbaijan,	 and	 Zimbabwe.	 The	 case	 studies	were	chosen	based	on	how	the	wars	performed	in	the	statistical	model.	I	selected	two	of	the	better-predicted	conflicts	–	‘typical’	cases	–	and	two	of	the	least	well	predicted	–	‘deviant’	cases.			Choosing	 ‘typical	 cases’	 ensures	 the	 conflicts	meet	 the	 criteria	 that	 the	 case	 is	representative	 of	 the	wider	 population	 (Seawright	 and	 Gerring,	 2008).	 As	 the	model	explains	these	cases	extremely	well,	the	analysis	focuses	on	whether	the	stipulated	 causal	mechanism	 is	 validated	by	 historical	 accounts	 of	 the	 conflict	(Seawright	and	Gerring,	2008).	Process-tracing	 identifies	whether	 the	paths	 to	the	respective	outcomes	were	dependent	on	changes	in	government	capacity	to	shape	population	behaviour.	The	factors	that	define	this	relationship	will	help	in	developing	a	more	 inclusive	 theory	of	 civil	war.	Burundi	 represents	 a	 ‘typical’	case	of	a	mixed	outcome,	while	Cambodia	constitutes	a	‘typical’	rebel	victory.			
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The	 typical	 cases	 represent	 an	 attempt	 at	 theory	 confirmation	 over	 theory	development.	The	best	means	to	do	the	latter	is	to	explore	deviant	cases	that	are	poorly	predicted	by	 the	quantitative	model.	These	 cases	 cannot	be	 considered	representative	at	the	point	of	selection	and	the	motivation	for	such	case	selection	is	exploratory	in	nature.	These	sorts	of	studies	offer	the	opportunity	to	identify	other	causal	factors	that	can	be	employed	to	produce	a	better	model	that	reduces	the	‘deviancy’	of	these	and	other	similar	cases	(Seawright	and	Gerring,	2008).	If	these	 additional	 factors	 work	 in	 a	 similar	 way	 to	 the	 hypothesised	 causal	mechanism	they	can	be	said	to	lend	support	to	the	theoretical	model.	However,	they	will	also	expand	our	ability	to	identify	macro-level	indicators	of	a	conflict’s	progress.	 It	 may,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 be	 that	 the	 ability	 of	 actors	 to	 generate	population	support	played	less	of	a	role	in	these	conflicts.	It	is	possible	that	these	conflicts	followed	a	different	path,	which	would	challenge	the	theories	presented	in	this	thesis.	The	deviant	cases	are	Nagorno-Karabakh,	which	ended	as	a	mixed	outcome,	and	Zimbabwe,	where	the	rebels	emerged	victorious.			I	 have	 chosen	 not	 to	 study	 outright	 government	 victories	 due	 to	 a	 number	 of	considerations.	Firstly,	time	and	space	constraints.	Obviously	the	more	cases	that	can	be	studied	 the	better	 for	generalising	causal	paths.	However,	adding	more	cases	would	 limit	 the	 space	dedicated	 to	 each	war	 and	 reduce	my	 capacity	 to	elucidate	the	precise	causal	mechanisms	at	work	in	these	conflicts.	The	second	reason	comes	from	the	theoretical	 implications	borne	out	of	previous	chapters	and	the	way	the	RAND	dataset	codes	civil	war	outcomes.	The	previous	sections	suggested	 governments	 have	 two	 options	 for	 generating	 support	 from	 the	population	 and	 undermining	 rebel	 strength;	 positive	 incentives	 -	 economic,	political	and	security	–	or	negative	incentives	–	violence.	If	the	government	uses	positive	incentives	it	may	do	this	through	macro-level	reform,	such	as	increasing	political	participation,	which	will	be	 factored	 into	how	the	outcome	 is	defined.	Certain	levels	of	political	reform,	which	is	a	key	variable	of	interest,	will	lead	to	a	conflict	being	classified	as	a	mixed	outcome,	rather	than	an	outright	government	victory.	Outright	government	victories	are	more	likely	to	reflect	instances	where	the	government	has	relied	on	negative	incentives	to	shape	population	behaviour.	The	use	of	repression	to	undermine	rebellions	has	already	been	analysed	in	detail	
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by	Alexander	Downes	(2007)	and	Stathis	Kalyvas	and	Matthew	Kocher	(2007).	It	is	unclear,	therefore,	what	more	we	could	add	to	our	understanding	of	these	types	of	conflicts.	In	contrast,	there	is	little	scholarly	analysis	of	how	governments	can	end	civil	wars	by	offering	positive	incentives	to	the	population	in	exchange	for	support.	Nor	has	academia	examined	the	idea	that	rebels	defeat	governments	by	demobilising	governments	and	undermining	the	sovereign	structures	they	use	to	shape	population	behaviour.	Elaborating	these	two	casual	mechanisms	should,	therefore,	produce	more	original	insights.		The	 other	major	 constraint	 I	 am	 under	 in	 applying	 case	 study	 analysis	 is	my	inability	 to	 do	 primary	 research.	 I	 require	 a	 conflict	 to	 be	 already	 sufficiently	researched	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	 case	 to	 the	 necessary	 depth.	 Ultimately,	however,	this	did	not	affect	my	choice	of	case	studies,	as	all	the	cases	I	wanted	to	look	 at	 were	 well	 covered.	 Moreover,	 as	 I	 have	 to	 rely	 on	 existing	 literature	covering	the	four	conflicts,	 I	cannot	be	accused	of	selectively	collecting	data	to	support	my	theories	and	hypotheses.			The	four	case	studies	also	signify	a	range	of	conflict-types.	We	will,	therefore,	be	able	to	assess	how	contextual	variables	interact	with	changes	in	our	variables	of	interest.	Of	the	four	cases,	three	have	an	ethnic	component,	while	Cambodia	does	not.	In	three	of	the	conflicts,	belligerents	are	seeking	to	capture	the	whole	state,	while	 in	Nagorno-Karabakh	 the	 rebels	have	more	 limited	 territorial	 aims.	The	civil	wars	are	spread	across	Africa,	southeast	and	central	Asia.	The	conflicts	also	have	 a	broad	 spread	 in	 terms	of	 overall	 length;	 three,	 nine,	 eleven	and	 fifteen	years.	Moreover,	 each	 of	 the	 conflicts	 also	 offers	 points	 of	 comparison	within	themselves.	While	 each	war	obviously	only	has	one	 ending,	 they	have	distinct	phases	in	which	the	belligerents’	ability	to	shape	behaviour	changes.	Employing	process-tracing	and	using	within-case	analysis	will	allow	me	to	assess	population	behaviour	before	and	after	changes	in	macro-level	behaviour	and	structures,	and	test	whether	it	responded	as	we	would	expect	and	for	the	reasons	predicted.			
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Conclusion	
	A	mixed	method	approach	offers	the	best	way	to	test	the	hypotheses	developed	in	this	thesis.	We	can	analyse	both	whether	macro-level	structures	correlate	to	civil	war	outcomes	in	the	manner	theorised	and	how	these	macro-variables	shape	population	behaviour.	 It	also	ensures	that	the	cases	studied	are	representative	and	that	the	results	can	be	generalised	to	shape	future	academic	work	and	policy	on	civil	war.				 	
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Chapter	five	
Statistical	analysis	
	This	chapter	will	test	the	validity	of	the	model	of	conflict	developed	in	this	thesis	by	exploring	correlations	between	changes	in	state-level	indicators	and	civil	war	outcomes.	A	number	of	statistical	models	will	be	presented,	which	will	test	for	correlations	between	changes	in	a	government’s	relationship	with	the	population	and	the	outcomes	of	civil	wars.	The	models	will	do	this	by	using	variables	that	proxy	for	governance,	socioeconomic	and	security	conditions.	 If	 improvements	along	these	three	lines	correlate	to	governments	faring	better	and	diminutions	correlate	with	governments	being	defeated,	then	we	will	be	able	to	surmise	that	the	theories	developed	in	this	thesis	has	validity	across	a	comparative	context.	We	will	 also	 be	 able	 to	 offer,	 for	 the	 first	 time	 using	 comparative	 techniques,	insight	 into	 whether	 the	 tenets	 of	 counterinsurgency	 doctrine	 do	 allow	governments	to	defeat	insurgent	challengers	as	proffered	by	its	proponents.			
Research	design		
	
Dependent	variable	
	The	dependent	variable	in	all	the	main	models	developed	below	is	the	civil	war’s	outcome	 as	 taken	 from	 the	 RAND	 dataset.	 Outcomes	 are	 coded	 as	 1	 for	 a	government	victory,	2	for	a	rebel	victory	or	3	for	a	mixed	outcome.	If	the	war	does	not	end	in	a	given	year	it	is	coded	as	0.	Table	seven	gives	the	basic	details	of	the	conflicts	included.			
Outcome	 Total	 Mean	duration	(yrs)	Government	victory	 18	 16.7	Rebel	victory	 14	 15.4	Mixed	outcome	 18	 10.8	Unfinished	 15	 -	Total		 65		 14.2*		*	excluding	unfinished	conflicts		Table	7:	Summary	of	conflict	outcomes.	
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It	 is	clear	that	there	 is	 limited	difference	 in	the	average	outcomes	of	rebel	and	government	victories.	Government	victories	do	appear	to	last	slightly	longer	than	rebel	triumphs,	but	this	difference	is	not	statistically	significant.	This	supports	the	notion	 that	 insurgent	 and	 counterinsurgent	 campaigns	 require	 a	 significant	commitment	of	time	and	resources	(Shinn,	2009).	What	it	also	suggests,	however,	is	that	neither	side	is	more	likely	to	win	long	wars.	Mixed	outcomes	are	clearly	shorter	that	outright	victories.31	This	would	be	expected	if	these	type	of	outcomes	reflect	 belligerents	 agreeing	 not	 to	 fight	 until	 one	 or	 other	 party	 collapses	completely.		
Method	
	Given	the	dependent	variable	is	nominal	rather	than	ordinal,	I	used	a	multinomial	logit	model	to	measure	the	correlation	between	the	independent	variables	and	the	various	outcomes.	The	dataset	contains	conflicts	across	51	countries	so	the	observations	 were	 clustered	 by	 country.	 I	 then	 used	 CLARIFY	 to	 simulate	 a	variety	 of	 scenarios,	 setting	 variables	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 interest.	 We	 can,	therefore,	 actually	understand	 the	 substantive	 correlation	between	 changes	 in	macro-structures	and	particular	conflict	outcomes.	CLARIFY	requires	a	positive	definite	matrix	to	run	the	simulation.	The	number	of	variables	must	be	less	than	the	number	of	clusters	divided	by	the	number	of	non-zero	outcomes,	which	in	this	case	results	in	a	maximum	of	sixteen	independent	variables.		
	
Independent	Variables	
	Most	studies	examining	civil	conflict	look	at	its	onset	and	the	choice	of	variables	is	 guided	 by	 comparing	 nations	 that	 witness	 war	 and	 those	 that	 do	 not.	Independent	variables	are	generally	coded	in	absolute	form	(for	example	Fearon	and	Laitin,	2003).	 In	 this	 study,	 every	nation,	 regardless	of	 its	 starting	macro-conditions,	 is	already	experiencing	a	war.	Regardless	of	 the	broader	context	 in	
																																																						31	A	two-sided	t-test	comparing	the	length	of	mixed	outcomes	compared	to	outright	victories	confirmed	that	the	two	datasets	were	different	(Pr	(T	>	t)	=	0.06)	and	that	outright	victories	were	longer	than	mixed	outcomes	((Pr	(T	>	t)	=	0.03).	
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absolute	terms,	it	enabled	‘multiple	sovereigns’	to	emerge.	The	question	is	how	further	changes	correlate	to	specific	outcomes.	The	best	way	to	capture	this	is	to	measure	changes	in	the	value	of	key	variables	from	one	year	to	the	next.	The	main	explanatory	time-varying	variables	are,	therefore,	presented	in	difference	format.	The	difference	measure	used	for	each	variable	is	based	on	how	long	it	is	judged	for	the	effect	to	be	felt	by	the	population.	Socioeconomic	and	governance	changes	are	likely	to	take	longer	to	filter	down	and	affect	population	behaviour;	as	such,	a	cumulated	 change	 over	 a	 three-year	 period	 is	 recorded.	 The	 security	environment	is	likely	to	be	felt	much	quicker,	so	two-year	changes	are	calculated.	During	the	early	years	of	the	war,	accumulated	change	is	taken	from	the	start	of	the	insurgency.			
Socioeconomic	variables	
	Life	expectancy	is	a	good	indicator	of	the	standard	of	living	within	a	nation	and	data	 is	 readily	 available	 from	 the	 World	 Bank	 (2011).	 If	 life	 expectancy	 is	increasing	it	is	a	sign	that	the	standard	of	living	is	improving	and	the	government	is	delivering	services	more	effectively.			The	 second	 variable	 I	 choose	 to	 capture	 the	 ability	 of	 a	 government	 to	 offer	economic	incentives	to	the	population	is	GDP	per	capita	in	real	terms	based	on	2004	prices.	Data	was	gathered	from	the	Penn	World	Table	(Heston	et	al.,	2009).	GDP	per	capita	 in	the	countries	examined	ranges	from	US$29336	per	capita	to	US$117,	with	a	mean	of	US$3462.	A	US$100	increase	or	decrease	is	likely	to	have	a	much	larger	impact	when	GDP	is	low	to	begin	with.	To	account	for	this,	GDP	is	logged	before	 recording	 changes	 so	 that	 changes	 from	a	 low	base	 carry	 equal	weight.32	 GDP	 tells	 us	 little	 about	 how	 the	 government	 is	 providing	 services.	However,	 it	 does	 proxy	 for	 overall	 economic	 activity,	 and,	 therefore,	 the	government’s	capacity	to	deliver	selective	economic	and	collective	incentives	to	the	population	during	the	war.	If	GDP	is	increasing,	this	suggests	the	government	
																																																						
32	The	range	for	life	expectancy	is	much	smaller	–	26	to	80.	As	such,	there	is	no	need	to	alter	the	variable.		
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has	more	capacity	to	deliver	economic	benefits	as	a	means	to	shape	population	behaviour.	 Any	 missing	 data	 was	 replaced	 by	 extrapolating	 changes	 in	 the	intervening	period.			
Political	Variables	
	Two	indicators	of	the	political	incentives	governments	are	offering	the	population	are	used,	one	looking	at	the	competitiveness	of	democracy	and	one	looking	at	the	political	status	of	the	rebel’s	constituent	population.	To	model	democratic	reform	I	 use	 the	 Polity	 IV	 dataset,	 which	 scores	 nations	 on	 their	 level	 of	 democratic	freedom;	 -10	 for	 the	 most	 autocratic	 through	 to	 10	 for	 the	 most	 democratic	(Marshall	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 The	 polity2	 variable	 in	 the	 dataset	 accounts	 for	 state	collapse	brought	on	by	conflict,	and	replaces	most	missing	data	points	from	the	main	polity	observation.	Any	remaining	missing	data	was	replaced	with	the	last	observed	value,	on	the	basis	that	the	population	would	judge	that	a	government	victory	would	see	a	return	to	this	level	of	democracy.			The	second	political	variable	 looks	specifically	at	the	status	of	the	social	group	associated	with	the	insurgency.	The	Ethnic	Power	Relations	(EPR)	dataset	lists	the	status	of	different	ethnic	groups	in	terms	of	their	access	to	executive	power	defined	 as	 “control	 over	 the	 presidency,	 the	 cabinet,	 and	 senior	 posts	 in	 the	administration,	including	top	army	posts”	(Cederman	et	al.,	2010;	p99).	Groups	are	 coded	 as;	 having	 a	 monopoly,	 being	 dominant,	 a	 senior	 partner,	 a	 junior	partner,	 having	 regional	 autonomy,	 having	 separatist	 autonomy,	 being	powerless,	 or	 being	 discriminated	 against	 (pp100-101).	 Changes	 in	 a	 group’s	status	are	recorded	based	on	how	far	up	or	down	it	has	moved	in	this	scale.	For	example,	 a	 group	 that	 goes	 from	 having	 regional	 autonomy	 to	 being	 a	 senior	partner	will	score	a	two.	This	serves	as	a	basis	for	describing	the	magnitude	of	the	political	 incentives	being	offered	to	 the	population.	Separatist	autonomy	is	always	coded	zero	as	this	does	not	reflect	a	choice	by	the	government.	Conflicts	not	covered	in	the	EPR	dataset	are	recorded	as	zero	throughout	the	conflict.	While	this	 variable	 does	 not	 cover	 all	 conflicts,	 governments	 and	 insurgencies	 will	normally	have	identifiably	different	core	constituencies,	be	they	ethnic,	religious,	
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regional	or	urban-rural.	The	EPR	dataset	only	accounts	for	the	first	of	these,	but	it	proxies	for	political	concessions	more	generally.		These	political	variables	address	two	factors	of	interest;	governance	and	violence.	Increasing	democracy	will	reflect	political	reform	and	the	use	of	political	benefits	to	 influence	 the	 population.	 In	 contrast,	 declining	 democracy	 may	 signify	 a	government	 taking	more	 repressive	measures	 to	undermine	 support	 for	 rebel	groups,	possibly	to	include	the	use	of	violence.			These	variables	focus	on	the	inclusiveness	of	government	institutions	rather	than	describing	actual	government	effectiveness.	The	latter	would	better	fit	parts	of	the	theory	developed	in	earlier	chapters.	However,	data	that	covers	government	effectiveness	more	explicitly	does	not	exist	for	all	of	the	conflicts	in	the	dataset.	Nevertheless,	against	the	smaller	set	of	conflicts	it	corresponds	to,	I	have	run	two	regressions	 including	changes	 in	 the	government’s	political	reach,	 from	Kugler	and	Tamman’s	relative	political	performance	dataset	(2012).		We	would	expect	changes	in	this	variable	to	have	a	more	significant	impact	than	variables	that	measure	democracy	as	it	better	captures	the	ability	of	governments	to	both	deliver	incentives	to	and	generate	resources	from	the	population.	In	some	ways,	however,	the	role	of	democracy	is	more	interesting	theoretically	in	that	it	tests	the	central	policy	of	Western	interventions	in	many	civil	wars.			
Security	Variables	
	Two	variables	measure	the	security	environment.	The	first	is	changes	in	the	size	of	 the	 military	 relative	 to	 the	 population,	 which	 counterinsurgency	 doctrine	suggests	should	affect	 the	ability	of	 the	government	 to	provide	security	(Jones	and	 Johnston,	 2013).	 Governments	 could	 also	 use	 a	 larger	 military	 force	 to	suppress	 the	 population	 (DeRouen	 and	 Sobek,	 2004).	 Either	way,	 an	 increase	should	represent	a	government	better	able	to	mobilise	support	and	if	it	proves	to	be	a	key	variable	then	how	it	works	to	end	rebel	activity	can	form	the	basis	for	investigation	 in	 the	 case	 studies.	 Military	 personnel	 per	 1000	 people	 in	 the	
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population	was	taken	from	the	Correlates	of	War	National	Military	Capabilities	dataset	 (Singer,	 1988),	 with	 cumulated	 changes	 calculated.	 Where	 there	 is	missing	data	based	on	a	collapse	of	state	capacity	this	was	coded	as	zero	military	personnel.	This	is	obviously	not	ideal	as	governments	will	clearly	still	have	people	fighting	on	their	behalf	or	 the	war	will	have	ended.	However,	 these	 forces	will	probably	be	irregular	in	nature	and,	therefore,	are	less	likely	to	be	perceived	by	the	population	as	representing	a	government	in	control.	Consequently,	a	value	of	zero	military	personnel	does	tell	us	something	about	the	relationship	between	a	government	and	its	population.		I	 also	 look	 at	 changes	 in	 the	 intensity	 of	 the	 conflict.	 If	 combat	 deaths	 are	decreasing,	 we	 can	 assume	 the	 population	 feels	 more	 secure.	 Should	 combat	deaths	 increase	 then	 this	 would	 suggest	 the	 rebels	 are	 destabilising	 society.	Changes	 in	 battle	 deaths,	 therefore,	 should	 demonstrate	 how	 changes	 in	 the	populations	 perception	 of	 security	 affect	 the	 government’s	 ability	 to	mobilise	support.			Changes	 in	 battlefield	 deaths	 were	 taken	 from	 the	 UCDP	 battle	 deaths	 data	(Lacina	 and	 Gleditsch,	 2006).	 These	 figures	 include	 civilians,	 as	 well	 as	combatants,	but	only	those	killed	during	battles	between	government	and	rebel	forces.	 They	 do	 not	 include	 direct	 violence	 against	 the	 population,	 which	 we	theorised	would	have	a	different	effect.	Given	the	way	the	dataset	from	this	study	has	been	put	together	some	of	the	conflict-years	do	not	have	casualty	figures	in	the	UCDP	data.	A	zero	was	entered	for	these	conflict-years;	this	still	has	value	as	it	demonstrates	an	extremely	low-intensity	insurgency.			Increasing	deaths	before	a	mixed	outcome	could	also	indicate	that	the	emergence	of	a	costly	hurting	stalemate	predicts	the	end	of	a	civil	war.	While	the	strength	of	government	 forces	 could	 also	 be	 indicator	 of	 increasing	 government	 power	relative	 to	 rebel	 strength,	 as	 we	 are	 only	 looking	 at	 government	 forces	 it	 is	
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impossible	to	make	this	judgement.	To	do	this,	we	would	have	to	include	data	on	the	size	of	rebel	forces	as	well.33			A	summary	of	the	main	independent	variables	can	be	found	below.			
Variable	 Absolute	values	 Changes		 mean/	median	 std	dev	 min/max	 mean/	median	 std	dev	 min/max		Democracy		 0.02/0	 6.33	 -9/10	 0.35/0	 3.13	 -15/15		Group	status*		 n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 0.33/0	 0.31	 -2/3		Life	expectancy		 55.99/	56.69	 10.6	 26.4/	80.15	 0.99/0.98	 1.22	 -6.33/	10.36		GDP	per	capita**		 3491/	2021	 4604	 117/		28451	 0.02/0.04	 0.17	 -1.45/0.92		Battle	deaths		 5014/		700	 17577	 0/		240287	 318/0	 8615	 -62000/	106662	Government	military	size		 180/76	 298	 0/1900	 4.09/0	 32.53	 -400/209	*	Absolute	values	for	group	status	are	qualitative	and	do	not	have	summary	statistical	values.	**	The	change	values	for	GDP	per	capita	refer	to	changes	in	the	logged	value	of	the	absolute	values	presented	here.		Table	8:	Summary	statistics	of	key	independent	variables.		Of	 interest,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 is	 a	 general	 improvement	 in	 governance	 and	socioeconomic	conditions	in	the	countries	covered	in	the	dataset,	despite	the	fact	that	 they	are	experiencing	conflict.	This	suggests	 that	 the	baseline	 for	changes	
																																																						33	Reed	Wood	(2010)	presents	a	dataset	that	includes	relative	power	of	rebel	and	government	forces.	However,	it	only	includes	data	from	1989	onwards,	which	means	it	does	not	correspond	to	most	of	the	conflicts	examined	in	this	thesis.		
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socioeconomic	development	and	changes	in	governance	is	a	slight	improvement,	rather	than	no	change.	
	
Additional	Variables	
	Aside	 from	 the	 independent	 variables	 of	 primary	 interest,	 a	 number	 of	 other	contextual	 factors	may	impact	conflict	actors’	ability	to	draw	support	 from	the	population.	The	final	section	of	chapter	three	went	over	some	of	the	key	variables	discussed	in	literature	on	civil	war.	The	list	below	represents	those	that	can	be	easily	coded	for	use	in	the	statistical	model.	Any	of	these	variables	having	a	strong	effect	on	conflict	outcomes	does	not	challenge	the	overall	theories	of	this	thesis	if	this	effect	is	in	conjunction	with	the	expected	role	of	the	independent	variables	already	outlined.	However,	if	the	model	shows	no	correlation	between	the	above	population-focused	variables	and	civil	war	outcomes,	then	this	would	represent	a	serious	challenge	to	the	main	hypothesis	of	this	thesis.		
	
Insurgency	use	of	Terror	
	The	main	variables	of	interest	in	this	study	proxy	for	changes	in	the	relationship	between	 the	 government	 and	 population.	 This	 tells	 us	 very	 little	 about	 the	structures	 used	 by	 insurgents	 to	 generate	 support.	 Jeremy	Weinstein	 (2007)	argued	the	decision	of	how	much	rebel	groups	rely	on	the	population	for	support	often	affects	their	propensity	for	violence.	Rebels	using	terrorism	are	less	likely	to	build	shadow	governance	structures	and	provide	rudimentary	services	to	the	population.	 If	 this	 behaviour	 effects	 the	 likelihood	 of	 a	 rebel	 victory	 then	 a	dichotomous	variable	to	account	for	rebel	use	of	terror	may	correlate	with	one	or	more	outcomes.	Data	on	rebel	use	of	terror	is	taken	directly	from	Connable	and	Libicki’s	dataset.	Twenty	insurgencies	used	terrorism,	while	45	did	not.			
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Sanctuary	and	internal	safe-havens	
	Both	 quantitative	 studies	 (Connable	 and	 Libicki,	 2010;	 Salehyan,	 2007)	 and	doctrine	 writers	 (Galula,	 1964)	 discuss	 the	 value	 of	 internal	 and	 external	sanctuary	to	insurgents.			Access	 to	 an	 external	 sanctuary	 lessens	 the	 support	 rebels	 need	 to	 generate	support	 from	 the	 population	 as	 they	 do	 not	 have	 to	 live	 amongst	 local	communities	 to	 evade	 government	 forces.	 They	 can	 focus	 their	 efforts	 on	degrading	government	capacity	to	hold	its	alliances	with	the	population	together.	The	data	on	external	sanctuaries	comes	from	the	Connable	and	Libicki	dataset	and	is	a	dichotomous	variable	coded	as	one	if	the	rebels	have	access	to	an	external	sanctuary	and	zero	if	they	do	not.	Rebel	groups	had	access	to	external	sanctuaries	in	 44	 of	 the	 conflicts	 covered	 in	 the	 dataset,	 showing	 how	 common	 it	 is	 for	insurgencies	to	use	foreign	soil	to	stay	out	of	reach	of	government	forces.		
	To	proxy	for	access	to	an	internal	safe-haven	I	use	Fearon	and	Laitin’s	measure	for	 ‘rough	 terrain’,	 which	 is	 the	 logged	 percentage	 of	 the	 country	 covered	 by	mountains	(2003;	p81).	They	acknowledge	this	does	not	cover	all	types	of	terrain	that	insurgents	might	use,	such	as	jungles	or	swamps,	but	in	the	absence	of	an	all-encompassing	measure	 of	 rough	 terrain	 they	 conclude	 this	 single	 measure	 is	sufficient	(ibid.).		
Territorial	conflict	
	Alexander	Downes	showed	that	the	size	of	the	rebel	constituent	population	could	affect	 whether	 harsher	 or	 softer	 counterinsurgency	 approaches	 were	 more	appropriate	(2007).	To	account	for	this	I	input	a	variable	that	indicates	whether	the	aims	of	the	rebels	are	limited	to	controlling	a	specific	territorial	area	or	the	whole	state.	The	data	is	coded	one	if	the	rebels	have	limited	territorial	aims	and	zero	if	they	are	trying	to	capture	the	central	government.	Twenty-six	of	the	65	conflicts	covered	in	this	study	had	insurgencies	fighting	with	limited	territorial	aims.		
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External	Intervention	
	Military	support	for	either	side	should	affect	the	outcome	and	how	conflict	actors	seek	to	mobilise	support	from	the	population.	I	use	a	dichotomous	variable	of	one	if	a	belligerent	is	receiving	direct	external	support	in	a	given	year,	and	zero	if	they	do	not.	The	data	 is	 taken	 from	the	merged	 ‘International	Military	 Intervention	Data	1945-2005’	(Pearson	and	Baumann,	1993;	Pickering	and	Kisangani,	2009).	It	lists	all	state	military	interventions	in	other	countries,	their	duration	and	who	was	 being	 supported	 between	 1945	 and	 2005.	 The	 variable	 does	 not	 include	intervention	not	sanctioned	by	the	state	or	economic	support.			Overall,	governments	received	support	in	29	conflicts,	spread	across	131	conflict-year	observations.	Twelve	of	these	interventions	lasted	for	more	than	three	years,	while	four	lasted	the	entire	duration	of	the	conflict.	Rebels	received	support	in	20	civil	wars,	spread	across	75	conflict-years.	Of	these,	nine	interventions	lasted	for	over	three	years	and	five	were	permanent	for	the	entire	war.			
Time	
	In	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 relative	 impact	 of	 certain	 variables	 are	 not	 being	effected	by	any	underlying	time	dependency	I	put	time,	time	squared,	and	time	cubed	into	the	model	as	recommended	by	Carter	and	Signorino	(2010).	 	Of	the	wars	that	ended,	the	longest	war	was	37	years,	while	the	minimum	length	was	three	years.	The	mean	time	of	conflicts	was	fourteen	years	while	the	median	was	twelve.			All	 variables	 are	 lagged	 by	 one	 year	 to	 remove	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 change	 in	macro-level	indicators	being	the	result	of	a	peace	settlement.34	The	outcome	of	a	conflict	in	2000,	for	example,	will	be	tested	against	macro-level	changes	between	
																																																						34	Lagging	variables	and	using	difference	measures	means	two	observations	are	dropped	for	each	conflict,	which	accounts	for	the	disparity	between	the	number	of	observations	stated	in	the	previous	chapter	and	the	observations	in	most	of	the	models.		
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1996-1999	 for	 socioeconomic	 and	 governance	 variables	 and	 1997-1999	 for	security	variables.					
Results	
	To	 begin	with,	 I	 examine	 each	 of	 the	 tenets	 of	 counterinsurgency	 doctrine	 in	isolation,	before	bringing	them	together	and	adding	the	control	variables.			
Socioeconomic	variables		
	 	 Model	1	-	Changes	in	socioeconomic	conditions		 Government	victory	 Rebel	victory	 Mixed	outcome	Change	in	life	expectancy		 0.0209	(0.146)	 -0.637***	(0.126)	 0.075	(0.149)	Change	in	GDP		 0.979	(1.190)	 -3.167***	(1.227)	 -2.644**	(1.164)	Time	 0.0639	(0.0827)	 -0.0144	(0.153)	 -0.467	(0.323)	Time	squared		 -0.00152	(0.00466)	 0.00562	(0.00770)	 0.0392*	(0.0232)	Time	cubed	 2.53e-05	(8.17e-05)	 -9.80e-05	(0.000113)	 -0.000918*	(0.000499)	Constant	 -4.517***	(0.635)	 -4.552***	(0.915)	 -2.398*	(1.284)	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	Number	of	obs				 829	Wald	chi2(15)	 54.60	Prob	>	chi2	 0.0000	Pseudo	R2	 0.08	Table	9:	Model	one	-	changes	in	socioeconomic	conditions.	
	Figure	6:	Changing	socioeconomic	conditions	and	government	victories.	
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	Figure	7:	Changing	socioeconomic	conditions	and	rebel	victories.	
	Figure	8:	Changing	socioeconomic	conditions	and	mixed	outcomes.	
	Model	one	does	not	support	the	notion	that	governments	do	better	by	improving	socioeconomic	 conditions,	 challenging	 hypothesis	 two.	 There	 is,	 however,	 a	strong,	 statistically	 significant	 correlation	 between	 declining	 socioeconomic	conditions	 and	 rebel	 victories	 as	 shown	 in	 figure	 seven.	 There	 is	 also	 some	evidence	that	governments	facing	economic	difficulties	are	more	inclined	to	make	concessions	to	end	the	war	in	a	mixed	outcome	(figure	eight).	We	would	expect	this	result	if	socioeconomic	conditions	are	an	indication	of	a	government	more	likely	to	be	defeated,	as	per	the	second	part	of	hypothesis	two.					Overall	the	effect	of	a	decline	in	life	expectancy	is	much	more	pronounced	than	a	drop	in	GDP	per	capita.	Using	CLARIFY,	the	model	suggests	that	a	five-year	drop35	in	 life	expectancy	correlates	with	a	27.5	percent	 increase	 in	the	 likelihood	of	a	rebel	victory	in	the	following	year.36	A	50	percent	drop	in	GDP	per	capita	in	the	
																																																						35	All	reported	changes	are	over	a	three-year	period	unless	otherwise	stated.		
36	All	reported	changes	are	significant	at	p>0.05	unless	otherwise	stated.		
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same	period	increases	the	likelihood	of	a	rebel	victory	by	twelve	percent	and	a	mixed	outcome	by	nine.	 Interestingly,	 the	 two	variables	 interact	quite	heavily.	The	same	drop	in	GDP	per	capita	when	life	expectancy	has	also	declined	by	five	years	increases	the	likelihood	of	a	rebel	victory	by	43.6	percent.	This	is	on	top	of	the	27.5	percent	impact	that	the	drop	in	life	expectancy	has	by	itself.	At	this	stage	it	is	not	possible	to	say	why	this	should	be	the	case,	but	we	may	be	able	to	explore	this	in	more	detail	in	the	case	studies	below.				The	 preceding	 chapters	 suggested	 that	 governments	 need	 to	 maintain	socioeconomic	activity	in	order	to	raise	the	revenue	it	uses	to	mobilise	support	from	the	population.	These	resources	are	vital	for	recruiting	into	its	military	and	civil	service,	as	well	as	tax	revenue	for	the	more	general	services	governments	provide	to	their	people.	If	rebels	undermine	socioeconomic	activity,	then	it	limits	a	 governments	 capacity	 to	 fund	 the	 institutions	 it	 uses	 to	 mobilise	 support,	potentially	leading	to	its	collapse	and	allowing	insurgents	to	take	control	of	the	state.	The	performance	of	socioeconomic	variables	 in	model	one	demonstrates	support	for	this	notion	in	a	comparative	setting.		
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Governance		
	 	 Model	2			 Government	victory	 Rebel	victory	 Mixed	outcome	Change	in	democracy		 -0.183***	(0.0501)	 0.0702	(0.0588)	 0.135**	(0.0607)	Change	in	ethnic	relations		 0.389	(0.532)	 -0.587	(0.394)	 0.880**	(0.446)	Time	 0.0830	(0.0895)	 -0.143	(0.162)	 -0.532	(0.330)	Time	squared		 -0.00144	(0.00503)	 0.00802	(0.00836)	 0.0430*	(0.0245)	Time	cubed	 1.67e-05	(8.90e-05)	 -0.000101	(0.000120)	 -0.00101*	(0.000540)	Constant	 1.67e-05	(8.90e-05)	 -0.000101	(0.000120)	 -0.00101*	(0.000540)	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	Number	of	obs				 829	Wald	chi2(15)	 42.40	Prob	>	chi2	 0.002	Pseudo	R2	 0.0516	Table	10:	Model	two	-	changes	in	governance	conditions	
	Figure	9:	Changing	democracy	and	government	victories.	
	Figure	10:	Changing	democracy	and	rebel	victories.	
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	Figure	11:	Changing	democracy	and	mixed	outcomes.		Where	 the	effect	of	 changes	 in	 socioeconomic	 conditions	appeared	 to	be	most	significant	on	the	probability	of	governments	being	defeated,	changes	in	levels	of	democracy	tell	us	more	about	when	governments	do	better.	Model	two	suggests	governments	dragged	into	a	civil	war	have	two	choices;	 increase	repression	or	enact	political	reform.	Figure	nine	shows	that	governments	do	better	when	they	decrease	levels	of	political	participation.	A	decrease	in	a	state’s	polity	score	by	ten,	 correlates	 with	 a	 nine	 percent	 increase	 in	 the	 probability	 of	 an	 outright	government	victory.	However,	an	increase	in	the	polity	score	by	ten	improves	the	likelihood	of	a	mixed	outcome	by	five	percent	(figure	11).	This	second	result	is	reinforced	by	changes	in	the	ethnic	status	of	groups	associated	with	insurgencies,	with	an	improvement	by	two	positions	in	the	scale	proposed	by	Cederman	et	al.	(2010)	increasing	the	likelihood	of	a	mixed	outcome	by	ten	percent.			Governments	that	offer	political	incentives,	such	as	democracy,	do	appear	to	be	able	 to	 stave	 off	 insurgent	 groups.	 Linking	 this	 back	 to	 the	 model	 of	 conflict	developed	 in	 chapters	 one	 and	 two,	 model	 two	 supports	 the	 notion	 that	democratisation	widens	the	scope	of	those	in	the	population	receiving	benefits	from	the	government,	reducing	rebel	capacity	to	generate	support	and	replace	resources	expended	on	military	activity.	Model	two	shows	that	this	idea	can	be	replicated	 across	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 conflicts.	We	 can,	 therefore,	 conclude	 that	model	 two	supports	hypothesis	 three,	at	 least	 the	 first	part	of	 it;	governments	strengthening	 governance	 structures,	 albeit	 either	 through	democratisation	or	increasing	repression,	are	more	likely	to	survive	civil	wars.		
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Chapter	three	also	discussed	governance	in	terms	of	institutional	strength.	Model	three	incorporates	a	variable	that	accounts	for	changes	in	the	political	reach	of	the	government	across	the	polity.	This	variable	should	give	a	further	indication	of	the	role	of	governance	in	determining	conflict	outcomes,	irrespective	of	whether	this	governance	is	democratic	or	not.	Unfortunately,	data	for	this	variable	does	not	exist	for	all	of	the	conflicts	in	the	dataset.		 	 Model	3		 Government	victory	 Rebel	victory	 Mixed	outcome	Change	in	democracy		 -0.200***	(0.0480)	 0.125	(0.0821)	 0.176**	(0.0694)	Change	in	ethnic	relations		 0.412	(0.523)	 -0.638	(0.439)	 1.054**	(0.438)	Change	in	political	reach	 3.159	(2.533)	 -10.34***	(3.800)	 -0.128	(5.230)	Time	 0.0738	(0.0888)	 -0.133	(0.169)	 -0.481	(0.381)	Time	squared		 -0.00103	(0.00486)	 0.00514	(0.00977)	 0.0443	(0.0270)	Time	cubed	 9.86e-06	(8.43e-05)	 -3.23e-05	(0.000147)	 -0.00111*	(0.000582)	Constant	 -4.705***	(0.712)	 -3.913***	(0.757)	 -3.070*	(1.595)	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	Number	of	obs				 766	Wald	chi2(18)	 68.50	Prob	>	chi2	 0.0000	Pseudo	R2	 0.0831	Table	11:	Model	three	-	changes	in	governance	with	political	reach	added.		As	 with	 socioeconomic	 conditions,	 the	 key	 impact	 of	 changes	 in	 government	reach	is	on	rebel	victories.	A	25	percent	decline	in	a	government’s	reach	across	its	state	correlates	with	an	11	percent	increase	in	the	likelihood	of	a	rebel	victory.	This	 supports	 the	 notion	 that	 rebels	win	 by	 undermining	 government	 control	over	 the	 state,	 both	 economically	 as	 in	model	 one,	 and	politically	 as	 in	model	three.	Rebels	use	 the	 socioeconomic	and	political	opportunities	 this	 creates	 to	build	their	own	sovereign	structures	and	create	further	strain	on	the	government.			
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Model	 three	 lends	 support	 to	 the	 second	 part	 of	 hypothesis	 three.	 It	 also	reinforces	the	results	from	model	two,	in	that	the	effect	of	changes	in	the	polity	score	and	ethnic	relations	are	robust	to	the	addition	of	the	additional	variable.	Models	 two	 and	 three,	 therefore,	 support	 hypothesis	 three	 in	 its	 totality;	governments	do	better	when	they	strengthen	their	institutions	of	governments,	while	they	are	more	likely	to	lose	if	these	institutions	are	weakening.			
Security	conditions	
	 	 Model	4		 Government	victory	 Rebel	victory	 Mixed	outcome	Change	in	battle	deaths		 -2.98e-05	(2.16e-05)	 -6.89e-05**	(2.84e-05)	 -5.37e-05**	(2.73e-05)	Change	in	government	military	size	 0.0111	(0.00790)	 -0.00968*	(0.00516)	 -0.0138***	(0.00352)	Time	 0.0693	(0.0873)	 -0.125	(0.157)	 -0.374	(0.271)	Time	squared		 -0.00159	(0.00497)	 0.00696	(0.00826)	 0.0308	(0.0192)	Time	cubed	 2.53e-05	(8.52e-05)	 -8.42e-05	(0.000123)	 -0.000723*	(0.000410)	Constant	 -4.624***	(0.592)	 -3.753***	(0.853)	 -2.579**	(1.065)	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	Number	of	obs				 829	Wald	chi2(15)	 46.81	Prob	>	chi2	 0.0000	Pseudo	R2	 0.0581	Table	12:	Model	four	-	changes	in	security	conditions.	
	Figure	12:	Changing	security	conditions	and	government	victories.	
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	Figure	13:	Changing	security	conditions	and	rebel	victories.	
	Figure	14:	Changing	security	conditions	and	mixed	outcomes.		Overall,	the	impact	of	changes	in	the	number	of	battle	deaths	and	the	size	of	the	government	military	 are	minimal	 compared	 to	 changes	 in	 socioeconomic	 and	governance	variables.	Decreasing	battle	deaths	statistically	correlates	with	rebels	doing	better,	 contrary	 to	what	we	would	expect	 to	 see	 if	 increasing	 insecurity	contributes	to	rebel	victories.	Even	then,	the	effect	is	substantively	small.	There	has	to	be	a	drop	of	25,000	battle	deaths	in	a	two-year	period	for	there	to	be	an	increase	in	the	likelihood	of	a	rebel	victory	of	five	percent.			A	drop	in	the	size	of	the	government’s	military	also	correlates	to	a	rebel	victory	and	 a	 mixed	 outcome.	 This	 lends	 some	 support	 to	 hypothesis	 four,	 but	 the	substantive	effect	is	also	extremely	small.	A	decrease	in	75	military	personnel	per	100,000	in	the	population	correlates	with	a	four	percent	increase	in	the	likelihood	of	a	mixed	outcome.	Even	at	this	level	of	change,	there	is	no	statistically	significant	correlation	with	a	rebel	victory.	The	model,	therefore,	supports	other	studies	that	
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show	the	size	of	government	forces	does	matter,	but	only	to	a	very	limited	extent	in	substantive	terms	(Friedman,	2011).								There	is	no	meaningful	correlation	between	any	of	the	outcomes	and	increases	in	either	 the	 number	 of	 battle	 deaths	 or	 the	 size	 of	 the	 government’s	 military.	Overall	 model	 four	 only	 offers	 limited	 support	 for	 hypothesis	 four.	 Taken	together,	 therefore,	 models	 one	 to	 four	 do	 support	 the	 caveat	 appended	 to	hypothesis	four,	that	we	would	expect	changes	in	socioeconomic	and	governance	conditions	to	be	more	important	in	shaping	conflict	outcomes.			The	distribution	of	the	battle	deaths	data	offers	an	interesting	additional	insight	into	how	civil	wars	play	out	more	generally.	Declining	levels	of	battlefield	deaths	increased	the	likelihood	of	wars	ending	across	the	board,	albeit	to	a	very	limited	extent	substantively.	This	is	in	complete	contrast	to	what	we	would	expect	to	see	if	 civil	war	agreements	were	preceded	by	a	painful	 stalemate	 (Mooradian	and	Druckman,	 1999).	 Instead,	 the	way	 changes	 in	 the	 amount	 of	 deaths	 perform	suggests	that	the	ending	of	a	war	follows	a	decline	in	the	ability	of	belligerents	to	carry	out	military	activity.	A	decline	in	military	activity	almost	certainly	reflects	a	drop	in	capacity	to	replace	losses	on	the	battlefield,	brought	about	by	an	inability	to	 generate	 support.	 That	 said,	 the	 substantive	 and	 statistical	 effect	 of	 this	variable	is	limited,	meaning	it	is	difficult	to	assert	this	with	any	great	confidence.	However,	when	put	alongside	the	way	socioeconomic	and	governance	variables	perform	in	models	one	to	three,	it	lends	further	support	for	the	idea	that	wars	end	following	 the	 demobilisation	 of	 fighting	 forces,	 rather	 than	 a	 crescendo	 of	violence.		
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Interactive	models	
	 	 Model	5		 Government	victory	 Rebel	victory	 Mixed	outcome	Change	in	life	expectancy		 0.0239	(0.160)	 -0.703***	(0.124)	 0.0921	(0.159)	Change	in	GDP		 0.837	(1.533)	 -3.028**	(1.340)	 -2.429*	(1.430)	Change	in	democracy	 -0.183***	(0.0531)	 0.0224	(0.0709)	 0.127**	(0.0621)	Change	in	ethnic	relations		 0.463	(0.548)	 -0.624	(0.494)	 0.973**	(0.435)	Change	in	battle	deaths	 -3.16e-05	(2.43e-05)	 -7.13e-05*	(3.98e-05)	 -4.96e-05	(3.11e-05)	Change	in	government	military	 0.0108	(0.00873)	 -0.0100**	(0.00495)	 -0.0168***	(0.00478)	Time	 0.0778	(0.100)	 -0.00137	(0.161)	 -0.457	(0.291)	Time	squared		 -0.00121	(0.00542)	 0.00545	(0.00811)	 0.0411*	(0.0210)	Time	cubed	 1.45e-05	(9.14e-05)	 -9.79e-05	(0.000124)	 -0.00102**	(0.000467)	Constant	 -4.958***	(0.761)	 -4.788***	(1.093)	 -2.863**	(1.260)	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	Number	of	obs				 829	Wald	chi2(27)	 128.19	Prob	>	chi2	 0.0000	Pseudo	R2	 0.1516	Table	13:	Model	five	-	Counterinsurgency	variables	combined.	
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	 Model	6		 Government	victory	 Rebel	victory	 Mixed	outcome	Change	in	life	expectancy		 0.0681	(0.183)	 -0.717***	(0.125)	 0.278	(0.243)	Change	in	GDP		 0.637	(1.272)	 -2.547**	(1.050)	 -2.464*	(1.404)	Change	in	democracy	 -0.278***	(0.0740)	 0.00694	(0.0669)	 0.183**	(0.0717)	Change	in	ethnic	relations		 -0.0902	(0.749)	 -0.839	(0.780)	 1.119***	(0.361)	Change	in	battle	deaths	 -3.38e-05**	(1.52e-05)	 -5.22e-05*	(2.96e-05)	 -4.18e-05	(2.87e-05)	Change	in	government	military	 0.0107	(0.0103)	 -0.0145**	(0.00625)	 -0.0217***	(0.00610)	Rebels	have	external	sanctuary	 0.0565	(0.717)	 2.356	(2.111)	 1.362*	(0.817)	Rough	terrain		 -0.414	(0.286)	 0.0287	(0.321)	 0.345	(0.246)	Rebels	use	terrorism	against	population	 0.762	(0.664)	 0.259	(0.730)	 -1.285	(0.953)	Territorial	aims	 1.058	(0.718)	 -1.050	(1.111)	 1.135*	(0.608)	External	support	for	government	 1.957**	(0.967)	 -0.589	(0.898)	 1.477**	(0.678)	External	support	for	rebels	 0.129	(1.185)	 1.553***	(0.450)	 0.875	(0.566)	Time		 0.129	(0.119)	 0.149	(0.362)	 -0.469**	(0.215)	Time	squared		 -0.00382	(0.00598)	 -0.00155	(0.0174)	 0.0457***	(0.0167)	Time	cubed		 7.97e-05	(9.35e-05)	 2.33e-05	(0.000263)	 -0.00115***	(0.000377)	Constant	 -5.667***	(1.349)	 -7.690*	(4.501)	 -6.137***	(1.205)	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	Number	of	obs				 829	Wald	chi2(45)	 5316.63	Prob	>	chi2	 0.0000	Pseudo	R2	 0.2391	Table	14:	Model	six	-	Full	model	with	counterinsurgency	and	control	variables.		Models	 five	and	six	 shows	 the	 results	above	are	 robust	 to	both	combining	 the	independent	 variables	 of	 interest	 into	 a	 single	 model	 and	 adding	 the	 control	variables.	The	robustness	of	these	results	offers	strong	support	for	the	notion	that	civil	 wars	 are	 determined	 by	 changes	 in	 sovereign	 structures	 that	 shape	 the	
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government’s	 capacity	 to	 generate	 support	 from	 the	 population.	 That	 the	 key	variables	 continue	 to	 perform	 exactly	 as	 expected	 shows	 the	 utility	 of	 this	approach	 for	 examining	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 main	 tenets	 of	 counterinsurgency	doctrine	and	how	they	 interact	with	the	broader	geopolitical	and	geographical	context.	 It	 also	 demonstrates	 the	 model’s	 utility	 for	 selecting	 case	 studies	 to	examine	 whether	 the	 hypothesised	 causal	 mechanisms	 lead	 to	 the	 various	outcomes.				Using	model	six,	we	can	now	simulate	a	number	of	situations	to	see	how	the	key	explanatory	variables	of	principle	interest	interact	with	the	broader	contextual	variables.			
	
Socioeconomic	conditions	
	If	rebels	have	external	support	and	access	to	a	sanctuary,	then	even	a	relatively	minor	 decline	 in	 socioeconomic	 conditions	 has	 a	 dramatic	 effect	 on	 their	likelihood	 of	 victory.	 A	 three-year	 drop	 in	 life	 expectancy	 and	 twenty	 percent	drop	 in	GDP	increases	the	chance	of	a	rebel	victory	by	49	percent,	 from	an	11	percent	baseline.37	These	numbers	are	well	within	the	normal	range	of	values	and	seem	very	 small	when	set	 against	 the	 conditions	we	often	 see	 in	 conflicts	 like	Syria	(Butter,	2015).			Model	six	also	allows	for	further	examination	of	the	potential	impact	of	improving	socioeconomic	conditions.	If	other	variables	are	artificially	set	in	favour	of	a	rebel	victory,38	then	a	relatively	moderate	improvement	in	socioeconomic	conditions	(three	years	for	life	expectancy	and	ten	percent	for	GDP)	can	reduce	the	chance	of	a	rebel	victory	from	28	to	four	percent.	We	can	conclude	that	governments	are	less	 likely	 to	 lose	 wars	 if	 they	 are	 facilitating	 more	 economic	 activity	 and	providing	better	public	services.	Boosting	 the	economy	and	providing	services	does,	therefore,	serve	a	purpose	for	governments.		
																																																						37	All	reported	simulation	changes	are	significant	to	95%	confidence	unless	otherwise	stated.		38	Rebels	have	external	support	and	sanctuary.	The	government’s	military	has	declined	by	50	personnel	per	1000	in	the	population	and	battlefield	deaths	have	declined	by	10000.		
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Political	conditions	
	Simulating	potential	outcomes	of	interest	lends	further	support	to	the	power	of	political	reform	in	bringing	conflicts	to	an	end.	An	improvement	in	the	societal	position	of	social	groups	associated	with	the	rebels	and	a	rise	in	the	polity	score	by	 five	 increase	 the	probability	of	a	mixed	outcome	by	as	much	as	42	percent	depending	on	how	we	set	other	variables.39	While	changes	in	the	polity	score	have	a	relatively	small	substantive	effect	by	themselves,	they	do	interact	heavily	with	other	variables,	suggesting	political	reform	needs	to	be	made	at	the	right	time	in	the	conflict.			The	 power	 of	 democratisation	 as	 a	 means	 to	 bring	 civil	 war	 to	 an	 end	 is	demonstrated	by	the	fact	that	there	does	not	appear	to	be	a	simulation	in	which	the	probability	of	a	mixed	outcome	climbs	above	approximately	nineteen	percent	without	any	political	reform.40	Moreover,	political	reform	also	seems	to	correlate	with	 governments	 getting	 themselves	 out	 of	 trouble.	 If	 variables,	 including	 a	decline	in	GDP	and	life	expectancy,	are	set	in	favour	of	rebels	then	political	reform	significantly	 reduces	 the	 probability	 of	 a	 rebel	 victory	 and	 increases	 the	likelihood	of	a	mixed	outcome.	This	suggests	that	the	economy	acts	as	an	early	warning	system	for	governments.	If	it	is	declining,	then	governments	can	react	by	increasing	political	incentives	to	undercut	rebel	capacity	to	operate.			
Security			As	discussed	above,	a	drop	in	the	size	of	the	government	military	correlates	with	both	a	rebel	victory	and	a	mixed	outcome.	Setting	the	independent	variables	at	levels	of	 interest	provides	 insight	 into	which	path	 is	more	 likely.	 If	we	 set	 the	
																																																						39	I	explored	a	range	of	scenarios,	altering	changes	in	the	size	of	government	forces,	rebel	and	government	external	support,	rebel	access	to	an	external	sanctuary,	and	drops	in	GDP,	with	time	always	set	at	twelve	years.	Depending	how	these	variables	were	set,	improving	governance	increased	the	chance	of	a	mixed	outcome	from	as	little	as	five	percent,	to	the	41	percent	quoted	above.			40	This	represents	an	extreme	scenario	in	which	GDP	has	halved,	deaths	have	declined	by	10,000,	the	government’s	military	has	decreased	by	50	personnel	per	1000	in	the	population,	the	rebels	have	external	sanctuary	and	external	support,	and	the	rebels	have	limited	territorial	aims.		
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independent	 variables	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 rebel	 victory	 then	 a	 drop	 in	 the	 size	 of	government	forces	by	50	per	1000	people	in	the	population	increases	the	chance	of	 a	 rebel	 victory	 by	 14	 percent.41	 Setting	 the	 variables	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 mixed	outcome	 and	 simulating	 a	 decline	 in	 government	 forces	 by	 the	 same	 amount	increases	a	mixed	outcome	by	12	percent,42	but	has	no	effect	on	a	rebel	victory.	Governments	 that	 are	 struggling	 to	mobilise	 their	 army	 and	 provide	 security	appear,	therefore,	to	have	two	choices;	slide	into	defeat	or	broaden	the	segment	of	the	population	it	offers	benefits	to,	undermining	rebel	capacity	to	regenerate.		
	
External	intervention		External	intervention	for	both	governments	and	rebels	increases	their	chances	of	victory.	 It	 is	clear	that	belligerents	with	external	support	are	going	to	be	more	resilient,	allowing	rebels	to	stay	in	the	fight	and	undermine	government	power	or	 giving	 governments	 greater	 capacity	 to	 absorb	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 conflict.	Simulations	 show	 that	 external	 interventions	 also	 amplify	 the	 effect	 of	socioeconomic	and	political	change.	The	effect	of	decreasing	democracy	can	be	three	times	as	much	for	governments	that	are	receiving	external	support.	One	can	easily	surmise	that	external	support	grants	governments	the	capacity	to	sacrifice	its	ability	to	generate	resources	from	the	section	of	the	population	on	which	it	is	focusing	its	repression.			Declining	socioeconomic	conditions	can	have	two	and	half	times	the	effect	on	a	rebel	victory	if	rebels	have	external	support.	Rebels	receiving	external	support	have	less	need	to	build	their	own	mobilisation	structures	to	create	resilience	and	will	be	better	placed	to	focus	its	efforts	on	demobilising	the	government.	It	is	also	likely	that	foreign	forces	are	better	trained	and	put	more	strain	on	government	forces,	 meaning	 the	 government	 needs	 more	 support	 from	 the	 population	 to	replenish	manpower	and	supplies.		
																																																						41	Variables	in	favour	of	rebels:	Life	expectancy	decline	of	3	years,	GDP	decline	of	20%,	rebels	have	access	to	external	sanctuary	and	external	support,	time	set	to	twelve	years.		42	Variables	in	favour	of	mixed	outcome:	Polity	change	of	+5,	status	upgraded,	GDP	decline	of	20%,	rebels	have	access	to	an	external	sanctuary,	rebels	have	territorial	aims	and	government	has	external	support.		
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What	is	clear,	is	the	importance	of	external	interventions,	explaining	why	rebels	and	governments	spend	so	much	time	seeking	 international	support	alongside	their	efforts	to	build	internal	mobilisation	networks	(Connable	and	Libicki,	2010).		
	
Sanctuary	and	safe-havens	
	External	sanctuary	plays	an	interesting	role	in	the	model.	By	itself	it	has	limited	effect,	correlating	statistically	only	with	a	mixed	outcome,	and	having	almost	no	substantive	effect.	It	does,	however,	interact	with	other	variables	that	correlate	with	a	rebel	victory.	Socioeconomic	decline	can	have	two	and	half	times	the	effect	if	a	rebel	group	has	external	sanctuary.	It	is	possible	that	sanctuary	allows	rebels	to	 build	 mobilisation	 structures	 beyond	 the	 purview	 of	 government	 activity.	Rebels	 can	 stay	 in	 the	 fight	 longer,	 and	 when	 governments	 get	 into	 trouble,	insurgents	are	better	positioned	to	convert	this	into	an	outright	victory.			Internal	safe-havens	do	not	appear	to	have	any	impact.	It	 is	possible	model	six	fails	to	capture	the	effect	of	rough	terrain	on	a	conflict.		On	the	other	hand,	rough	terrain	may	actually	decrease	the	likelihood	of	a	conflict	ending	in	any	outcome.	Academics	(Cunningham	et	al.,	2009)	and	doctrine	writers	(Galula,	1964)	point	to	inaccessible	terrain	being	a	key	element	of	most	insurgencies.	It	boosts	rebel	capacity	to	carve	out	a	sovereign	space	and	build	structures	to	draw	support	from	the	 population	 without	 being	 targeted	 by	 government	 forces.	 Rough	 terrain,	however,	does	not	 tell	us	 anything	about	a	 government’s	 ability	 to	 absorb	 the	costs	of	a	counterinsurgency	campaign.	In	other	words,	safe-havens	may	increase	a	 rebel	 group’s	 ‘power	 to	 resist’	 but	 not	 its	 ‘power	 to	 target’	 and	 defeat	 the	government,	precipitating	a	non-hurting	stalemate.	Ultimately,	all	rough	terrain	may	do	is	increase	the	likelihood	that	two	sovereign	powers	can	co-exist	in	the	same	state.			
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
127	
Overall	performance	of	the	model	
	Figure	15:	ROC	curves	of	independent	variables	and	each	outcome.		Figure	15	shows	the	reported	operator	characteristic	(ROC)	curves	for	each	of	the	outcomes.43	 The	 ROC	 curves	 are	 based	 on	 the	 ratio	 of	 correctly	 predicted	outcomes	compared	to	the	number	of	false	positives	for	every	correctly	predicted	outcome.	While	a	probability	of	over	50	percent	represents	an	intuitive	cutpoint,	Ward	et	al.	argue	that	models	that	predict	outcomes	with	low	probabilities	are	still	 powerful	 if	 they	 clearly	 differentiate	 between	 outcomes	 that	 actually	occurred	and	those	that	did	not	(2010).	At	a	cutpoint	of	ten	percent,	changes	in	these	 independent	 variables	 correctly	 predict	 eight	 out	 of	 14	 rebel	 victories	(0.57)	but	falsely	predict	only	15	out	of	814	(0.02).	The	model,	therefore,	gives	a	useful	indication	of	governments	that	are	struggling	against	insurgencies	even	at	this	low	threshold.	It	also	better	allows	us	to	put	the	simulated	outcomes	above	
																																																						43	These	were	calculated	by	using	three	separate	logit	models	with	each	of	the	outcomes	as	the	dependent	variables.	
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into	context,	as	a	change	 in	 five	percent	becomes	 far	more	meaningful	 if	a	 ten	percent	threshold	is	considered	a	significant	predictor	of	a	likely	outcome.44			The	ROC	curve	is	based	on	calculating	the	ratio	between	true	and	false	positives	at	all	possible	cutpoints.	The	larger	the	area	under	this	curve	(known	as	the		AUC)	the	more	accurate	the	model	is	considered	for	predicting	that	particular	outcome,	as	it	strongly	differentiates	between	true	and	false	positives.	The	AUC	score	can	range	from	0.5	-	models	that	have	no	predictive	power	and	cannot	differentiate	between	 true	 and	 false	 positives	 -	 to	 1,	 where	 all	 of	 the	 true	 outcomes	 are	predicted	with	higher	probability	than	any	non-outcomes.	Ward	et	al.	claim	that	this	AUC	measure	is	now	the	best	measure	for	determining	the	empirical	utility	of	logistic	regressions	(2010).	It	is	especially	important	to	explore	this	aspect	of	the	model,	given	the	difficulties	of	building	logistic	regressions	when	the	quantity	of	 positive	 outcomes	 is	 low,	 which	 often	 leads	 to	 an	 underestimation	 of	 the	substantive	impact	of	variables	of	interest	(King	and	Zeng,	2001).			The	AUC	scores	for	all	three	outcomes	are	high;	0.79	for	government	victories,	0.87	for	rebel	victories	and	0.88	for	mixed	outcomes.	Based	on	these	scores,	the	variables	used	in	the	models	above	are	slightly	more	useful	for	predicting	rebel	victories	and	mixed	outcomes.	This	is	further	reinforced	in	table	15,	which	shows	how	the	model	fares	at	correctly	predicting	outcomes	at	different	cutpoints.										
																																																						44	At	this	stage	I	am	not	proposing	a	sensible	threshold	for	predicting	the	outcome	of	civil	wars.	That	would	depend	on	a	range	of	factors	and	comparisons	with	other	models.	The	fact	that	the	ROC	curve	scores	are	relatively	high,	however,	does	suggest	that	this	model	can	be	used	at	a	level	below	50	percent	as	a	useful	guide	on	the	course	of	civil	wars.		
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Cutpoint	 Ratio	 Government	
victory	
Rebel	
victory	
Mixed	
outcome	
50%	 True	positive	 0	(0)	 0.07	(1)	 0.17	(3)	False	positive	 0	(0)	 0.00	(1)	 0	(0)	40%	 True	positive	 0	(0)	 0.14	(2)	 0.17	(3)	False	positive	 0	(0)	 0.00	(2)	 0	(0)	30%	 True	positive	 0	(0)	 0.36	(5)	 0.17	(3)	False	positive	 0	(0)	 0.00	(2)	 0.00	(1)	20%	 True	positive	 0	(0)	 0.5	(7)	 0.28	(5)	False	positive	 0.00	(2)	 0.00	(7)	 0.01	(5)	10%	 True	positive	 0.39	(7)	 0.57	(8)	 0.39	(7)	False	positive	 0.03	(26)	 0.02	(15)	 0.03	(22)	Table	15:	Number	of	true	and	false	positives	at	different	thresholds.	
	Table	15	even	underemphasises	model	six’s	capacity	to	predict	rebel	victories.	Both	the	false	positives	over	30	percent	actually	ended	as	rebel	victories	within	two	years.	The	model	predicted	there	was	a	59	percent	probability	of	the	war	in	Cambodia	ending	in	a	rebel	victory	in	1974.	The	war	ended	a	year	later.	The	other	false	positive	was	the	anti-Soviet	insurgency	in	1990,	which	the	model	suggested	would	end	in	a	rebel	victory	with	a	43	percent	probability.		That	war	did	end	two	years	later	with	the	collapse	of	the	communist	regime.			Table	16	shows	all	of	the	predicted	probabilities	in	the	year	the	wars	ended.	It	further	 reinforces	 that	 the	 model	 shows	 significant	 utility	 in	 predicting	 rebel	victories	 and	mixed	 outcomes,	 but	 is	 less	 powerful	with	 outright	 government	victories.	This	is	unsurprising,	however.	The	analysis	in	chapter	three	suggested	that	 rebels	 win	 by	 undermining	 government	 ability	 to	 deliver	 and	 generate	resources	from	the	state,	which	was	well	captured	in	the	models	by	GDP	and	life	expectancy	levels.	It	was	also	posited	that	governments	will	generally	win	in	two	ways;	they	can	either	expand	their	sovereign	structures	to	deliver	resources	and	generate	resources	from	a	broader	cross-section	of	the	population,	or	they	can	increase	repression	and	limit	the	ability	of	the	population	to	provide	support	to	the	insurgency.	The	former	was	captured	in	model	six	with	variables	looking	at	changes	 in	 democracy	 and	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 mixed	 outcomes.	 	 The	 latter,	
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however,	 was	 less	 well	 incorporated.	 The	 performance	 of	 the	 polity	 variable,	supported	the	idea	that	governments	can	defeat	insurgencies	through	increased	repression.	 However,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 repression	 will	 often	 include	 the	 use	 of	violence	and	the	most	violent,	autocratic	regimes	have	no	need	to	become	more	exclusionary	 in	 institutional	 terms.	 Violence	 is	 not	 included	 in	 the	model	 and,	therefore,	 it	 is	probable	that	a	key	explanatory	variable	 for	predicting	outright	government	 victories	 is	 missing.	 Its	 incorporation	 would	 also	 be	 useful	 for	analysing	when	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 against	 civilians	 favours	 governments	 and	when	it	is	likely	to	be	self-defeating.			Despite	this,	the	AUC	scores	and	the	predicted	probabilities	in	table	16,	show	that	the	broader	theoretical	model	developed	in	chapters	one	and	two	is	an	extremely	useful	framework	for	studying	civil	war	dynamics	and	outcomes.	Hypothesis	one,	therefore,	 is	 well	 supported	 -	 governments	 fend	 off	 rebels	 by	 strengthening	institutions	that	define	their	relationship	with	the	population,	while	rebels	win	by	undermining	these	institutions.	It	also	underlines	the	statistical	model’s	utility	for	selecting	case	studies	to	explore	how	changes	in	the	strength	of	government	institutions	that	define	its	relationship	with	the	population	determine	civil	war	outcomes.																		
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Government	
victories	
Pred.	 Rebel	victories	 Pred.	 Mixed	
outcomes	
Pred.	Uruguay	 0.179	 Cambodia	 0.717	 Burundi	 0.776	Angola	(UNITA)	 0.175	 Rwanda	 0.481	 Chechnya	I	 0.77	Argentina	 0.161	 South	Africa	 0.343	 Georgia/	Abkhazia	 0.661	Congo/Katanga	 0.129	 Eritrea	 0.322	 Mozambique	(RENAMO)	 0.284	Iraq	Kurdistan	 0.108	 South	Vietnam	 0.258	 Bosnia	 0.216	Northern	Ireland	 0.103	 Afghanistan	(anti-Soviet)	 0.224	 Nicaragua	(Contras)	 0.113	Sierra	Leone	 0.1	 Afghanistan	(post-Soviet)	 0.151	 Lebanese	Civil	War	 0.106	Biafran	Secession	 0.093	 Sudan	(SPLA)	 0.095	 Congo	(anti-Kabila)	 0.086	Philippines	 0.083	 Namibia	 0.072	 East	Timor	 0.082	Guatemala	 0.055	 Somalia	 0.048	 Senegal	 0.068	Balochistan	 0.038	 Liberia	 0.023	 Papua	New	Guinea	 0.042	Indonesia	(Aceh)	 0.032	 Afghanistan	(Taliban)	 0.017	 Yemen	 0.038	Turkey	(PKK)	 0.019	 Zimbabwe	 0.008	 Tajikistan	 0.035	Croatia	 0.016	 Moldova	 0.000	 Nagorno-
Karabakh	
0.028	Morocco	 0.01	 	 	 El	Salvador	 0.023	Algeria	(GIA)	 0.009	 	 	 Nepal	 0.017	Uganda	(ADF)	 0.006	 	 	 Kosovo	 0.017	Peru	 0.004	 	 	 Kampuchea	 0.002	Table	16:	Predicted	probabilities	at	time	of	war	ending.	
	
Limitations	
	The	 lack	 of	 an	 accurate	 description	 on	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 against	 civilians	probably	represents	the	main	shortcoming	of	the	models	above,	but	there	are	also	a	number	of	other	limitations.	The	model	fails	to	capture	rebel	relations	with	the	population.	The	variable	used	to	proxy	for	rebel	behaviour,	the	use	of	terrorism,	shows	no	statistical	effect	on	any	of	 the	outcomes.	The	statistical	model	 is	still	useful,	largely	because	the	theory	underpinning	this	thesis	suggests	that	the	likely	dynamics	 and	 outcomes	 of	 civil	wars	 are	 embedded	 in	 changes	 to	 the	macro-structures	 that	 define	 a	 government’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 population.	Nevertheless,	 the	model	could	be	 improved	by	developing	a	better	measure	of	rebel	mobilisation	structures.		
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A	 further	 limitation	 comes	 from	 the	 use	 of	 national	 political	 and	 economic	indicators.	 It	 is	 feasible	there	were	significant	 local	changes	in	the	relationship	between	the	government	and	the	population	that	were	not	reflected	in	national-level	indicators.	I	do	not	consider	this	a	major	weakness	as	changes	in	national	level	indicators	reflect	the	government’s	ability	to	prosecute	war	anywhere	in	its	territory,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 the	 conflict	 itself	 causes	 those	 changes.	 For	example,	 the	 first	 Chechen	 conflict	 between	 1992	 and	 1994	 is	 well	 predicted	because	the	Russian	army	demobilised	on	such	a	large	scale	after	the	fall	of	the	Soviet	Union.	The	Chechen	rebels	did	not	cause	this	demobilisation,	yet	it	almost	certainly	played	a	role	in	the	conflict’s	outcome	along	with	other	broader	political	changes	across	the	whole	of	Russia.	That	said,	the	inclusion	of	local	data	alongside	national-level	 variables,	 such	 as	 those	 explored	 by	 Cederman,	 Gleditsch	 and	Buhaug	 in	 Inequality,	 Grievances	 and	 Civil	War	 (2013),	 may	 better	 reflect	 the	capacity	of	belligerents	to	mobilise	support	in	some	conflicts.			Finally,	as	acknowledged	in	the	theory	section	of	the	paper,	this	model	of	conflict	assumes	the	state	remains	somewhat	functional	as	the	war	begins.	It	is	entirely	possible	that	government	sovereign	structures	are	wiped	away	by	the	shock	that	starts	the	war	and	there	is	no	rebel	group	organised	enough	to	assume	control	of	the	state.	In	this	instance,	the	war	is	more	likely	to	be	irregular	in	nature.	This	type	of	war	is	more	likely	to	represent	a	simple	state-building	competition	from	a	very	low-base,	which	means	different	dynamics	will	probably	be	pertinent.	The	model	tested	in	this	chapter	works	on	the	basis	that	the	state	is	functional	and	rebels	are	trying	to	undermine	the	institutions	that	keep	it	that	way.	Moreover,	the	model	only	tests	government	efforts	to	build	and	sustain	alliances	with	the	population	through	formal	mechanisms	of	governance	and	economic	activity.	As	multiple	scholars	have	shown,	governments	often	retain	power	through	a	system	of	 informal	or	patronage-based	alliances	with	different	groups	across	the	state	(Reno,	2007;	Seymour,	2014).	The	statistical	model	could	be	improved	as	a	more	general	 predictor	 of	 civil	 war	 outcomes	 if	 these	 two	 scenarios	 were	 better	incorporated.			
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Robustness	tests		To	test	the	robustness	of	the	findings	I	used	different	measures	of	variables,	such	as	 changes	 over	 less	 and	more	 years.	 None	 of	 the	 findings	 change	 the	 results	articulated	above.	I	also	created	alternative	models	to	check	whether	they	altered	the	effect	of	the	key	variables.	The	key	variables	of	interest	are,	in	fact,	much	more	robust	than	the	other	variables	to	changes	in	the	parameters	of	the	model.			The	first	major	check	for	testing	the	robustness	of	the	findings	above	was	to	add	in	the	variable	looking	at	government	effectiveness	into	the	full	model.	First	and	foremost,	 it	 changes	 none	 of	 the	 conclusions	 above,	 with	 all	 of	 the	 main	socioeconomic	 and	 governance	 variables	 being	 robust	 to	 the	 addition	 of	 this	variable.	 That	 said,	 an	 increase	 in	 life	 expectancy	 now	 correlates	 to	 a	 mixed	outcome,	 offering	 tentative	 support	 for	 the	 idea	 that	 governments	 can	 induce	rebels	to	sign	political	deals	if	socioeconomic	conditions	are	improving.																				
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	 Model	7		 Government	victory	 Rebel	victory	 Mixed	outcome	Change	in	life	expectancy		 0.359*	(0.213)	 -0.878***	(0.175)	 1.009***	(0.360)	Change	in	GDP		 0.927	(1.407)	 -2.563**	(1.021)	 -2.325	(1.713)	Change	in	democracy	 -0.323***	(0.0737)	 -0.0306	(0.0668)	 0.254***	(0.0977)	Change	in	ethnic	relations		 0.122	(0.743)	 -1.793	(1.224)	 1.430***	(0.486)	Change	in	political	reach	 5.274**	(2.320)	 -11.37***	(3.284)	 0.527	(4.363)	Change	in	battle	deaths	 -2.29e-05	(3.53e-05)	 8.68e-06	(1.91e-05)	 -5.78e-05	(4.22e-05)	Change	in	government	military	 0.0166	(0.0116)	 -0.0249***	(0.00546)	 -0.0299***	(0.00719)	Rebels	have	external	sanctuary	 0.358	(0.677)	 30.79***	(7.745)	 1.563	(1.343)	Rough	terrain		 -0.579**	(0.277)	 0.468	(0.347)	 0.220	(0.331)	Rebels	use	terrorism	against	population	 1.102*	(0.588)	 0.884	(0.989)	 -0.791	(1.123)	Territorial	aims	 0.708	(0.647)	 -2.257***	(0.853)	 1.067	(0.823)	External	support	for	government	 1.911**	(0.937)	 0.216	(1.297)	 1.924**	(0.902)	External	support	for	rebels	 1.015	(0.831)	 1.804***	(0.471)	 1.779*	(0.978)	Time		 0.150	(0.149)	 1.251***	(0.449)	 -0.761	(0.747)	Time	squared		 -0.00430	(0.00748)	 -0.0738***	(0.0284)	 0.0731	(0.0535)	Time	cubed		 8.29e-05	(0.000114)	 0.00138**	(0.000539)	 -0.00179	(0.00110)	Constant	 -5.959***	(1.401)	 -42.83***	(9.422)	 -7.298***	(2.230)	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	Number	of	obs				 766	Wald	chi2(39)	 -	Prob	>	chi2	 -	Pseudo	R2	 0.3354		Table	17:	Model	seven	-	Full	model	with	changes	in	political	reach	added.	45	
																																																						
45	Models	seven	and	eight	do	not	report	Wald	Chi2	calculations	as	these	require	a	positive	definite	matrix,	as	with	the	use	of	CLARIFY	(explained	above).	Model	seven	does	not	have	a	
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Increasing	 political	 reach	 also	 now	 correlates	 with	 an	 outright	 government	victory,	 while	 declining	 reach	 still	 strongly	 correlates	 with	 a	 rebel	 victory.	Changes	in	political	reach	do	not	correlate	with	mixed	outcomes,	but	increasing	democracy	continues	to	do	so.	I	have	to	drop	a	number	of	wars	from	the	model	due	to	a	lack	of	data,	which	means	it	is	not	possible	to	simulate	outcomes	and	test	how	 these	variables	 interact.	However,	 including	a	 variable	 capturing	political	reach	strongly	supports	the	overall	model	of	conflict	proposed	in	this	thesis	and	hypothesis	 three	 in	 particular.	 Even	with	 a	 large	 number	 of	 control	 variables	added	to	the	model,	when	the	government	loses	the	ability	to	reach	across	the	polity	it	fails	to	generate	the	resources	it	needs	to	hold	onto	power	and	retracts,	signalling	rebel	growth	and	eventually	victory.	Alternatively,	if	it	can	reassert	its	sovereignty,	 then	 it	 can	 cut	 away	 at	 the	 rebel’s	 capacity	 to	 generate	 support,	eventually	eliminating	its	ability	to	operate.			The	 second	 alternative	 model	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 table	 18.	 It	 involved	 swapping	outcomes	with	those	from	the	UCDP	conflict	termination	data,	coding	anything	classified	 as	 ending	 in	 a	 peace	 settlement	 or	 a	 ceasefire	 as	 a	 mixed	 outcome	(Kreutz,	2010).46	The	overall	utility	of	the	model	was	reduced,	almost	certainly	because	 the	range	of	outcomes	was	much	more	 limited.	That	said,	most	of	 the	variables	correlated	with	the	same	outcomes	in	the	same	way.	There	were	two	slight	changes	to	the	variables	of	interest	in	this	study.47	Increases	in	the	polity	score	no	longer	correlate	with	mixed	outcomes,	although	changes	in	the	status	of	ethnic	groups	continues	to	do	so,	meaning	the	model	still	supports	the	idea	that	governments	do	better	when	 they	broaden	 their	 relationships	across	different	sections	of	 the	population.	A	decline	 in	 the	polity	score	still	correlates	with	an	outright	government	victory.	However,	it	now	also	correlates	with	a	rebel	victory,																
	 	
																																																						positive	definite	matrix	as	the	number	of	independent	variables	has	increased,	while	model	eight	fails	to	build	a	positive	definite	matrix	as	there	are	less	non-zero	outcomes.		46	There	were	nine	government	victories,	eight	rebel	victories	and	24	mixed	outcomes.		47	There	was	one	other	change	that	is	slightly	outside	the	purview	of	this	thesis.	External	support	for	the	rebels	now	correlates	to	government	victories,	instead	of	rebel	triumphs.	It	is	possible	this	is	because	the	rebellion	only	got	started	because	the	rebels	had	external	support,	and	the	conditions	did	not	favour	a	successful	insurgency.	This	represents	an	interesting	avenue	for	future	research.		
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	 Model	8		 Government	victory	 Rebel	victory	 Mixed	outcome	Change	in	life	expectancy		 -0.217	(0.187)	 -0.900***	(0.175)	 0.251*	(0.145)	Change	in	GDP		 -0.00404	(1.875)	 -4.287***	(1.266)	 -3.220*	(1.654)	Change	in	democracy	 -0.223**	(0.109)	 -0.229**	(0.0908)	 0.0353	(0.0648)	Change	in	ethnic	relations		 -0.560	(0.393)	 -0.0149	(0.710)	 0.825**	(0.384)	Change	in	battle	deaths	 -1.86e-05	(2.59e-05)	 8.24e-07	(3.39e-05)	 -2.48e-05**	(1.21e-05)	Change	in	government	military	 0.0151	(0.0102)	 0.00277	(0.0113)	 -0.0151***	(0.00454)	Rebels	have	external	sanctuary	 0.345	(0.835)	 -1.389	(1.601)	 1.017	(0.635)	Rough	terrain		 -0.429	(0.460)	 0.353	(0.289)	 -0.0808	(0.209)	Rebels	use	terrorism	against	population	 -0.270	(0.737)	 -1.232	(0.789)	 -1.091	(0.786)	Territorial	aims	 1.396*	(0.815)	 0.640	(0.831)	 0.686	(0.495)	External	support	for	government	 -0.308	(0.941)	 1.743	(1.547)	 1.446**	(0.621)	External	support	for	rebels	 1.990***	(0.662)	 1.227	(1.611)	 0.132	(0.863)	Time		 -0.329	(0.338)	 -0.143	(0.222)	 -0.253	(0.181)	Time	squared		 0.0166	(0.0189)	 0.0111	(0.0108)	 0.0145	(0.00930)	Time	cubed		 -0.000225	(0.000275)	 -0.000182	(0.000151)	 -0.000183	(0.000147)	Constant	 -3.100	(2.027)	 -5.071***	(1.810)	 -4.051***	(1.350)	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	Number	of	obs				 751	Wald	chi2(45)	 -	Prob	>	chi2	 -	Pseudo	R2	 0.2064	Table	18:	Model	eight	-	Full	model	using	UCDP	outcomes.		suggesting	governments	may	face	a	backlash	from	the	population	if	they	seek	to	control	the	population	through	increased	repression.	The	second	change	is	that	an	increase	in	life	expectancy	now	correlates	to	a	mixed	outcome,	just	as	it	does	when	 the	 variable	 for	 government	 effectiveness	 is	 added.	 A	 decline	 in	 GDP,	
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however,	still	correlates	to	a	mixed	outcome	as	well,	making	it	difficult	to	explain	the	 correlation	 between	 changes	 in	 socioeconomic	 conditions	 and	 mixed	outcomes	in	this	particular	model.			Another	obvious	next	step	would	be	to	incorporate	changes	in	rebel	numbers	into	this	quantitative	model.	Unfortunately	data	for	rebel	numbers	and	the	balance	of	power	 only	 exists	 since	 1989	 (R.M.	 Wood,	 2010).	 As	 such,	 introducing	 these	variables	 into	 the	 current	 model	 negates	 the	 possibility	 of	 doing	 statistical	analysis	as	it	reduces	the	number	of	observations	significantly.	We	can,	however,	use	 this	 data	 to	 test	whether	 any	 of	 the	 independent	 variables	 correlate	with	changes	 in	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 or	 in	 the	 size	 of	 rebel	 forces.	 No	 variables	correlate	to	the	balance	of	power	(model	10).	Very	few	variables	correlate	with	changes	in	rebel	numbers	and	an	improvement	in	the	status	of	the	ethnic	group	associated	 with	 conflict	 actually	 correlates	 an	 increase	 in	 rebel	 numbers.	However,	a	drop	in	GDP,	does	correlate	with	an	increase	in	rebel	numbers.	The	model	must	be	interpreted	tentatively,	as	the	sample	is	extremely	small,	with	only	260	observations,	but	it	may	suggest	there	would	be	a	feedback	loop	in	model	six	if	rebel	numbers	were	introduced,	exactly	as	predicted.	Conducive	socioeconomic	conditions	increase	rebel	numbers,	which,	in	turn,	induces	further	macro-change	that	enables	the	rebels	to	build	more	support.	The	theory	of	conflict	developed	in	the	previous	 chapters	 suggested	 this	 should	be	 the	 case.	This	means	 adding	 a	variable	capturing	rebel	numbers	could	cause	problems	drawing	firm	statistical	conclusions.	 Of	 course,	 leaving	 rebel	 numbers	 out	 altogether	 could	 lead	 to	omitted	variable	bias.	Until	there	is	more	comprehensive	data	on	rebel	numbers	that	corresponds	with	a	proper	range	of	outcomes,	it	will	be	impossible	to	know	how	the	omission	of	rebel	numbers	affects	the	inferences	made	here.			The	fact	that	changes	in	rebel	numbers	offers	some	insights,	while	the	balance	of	power	 does	 not	 is	 also	 instructive.	 Rebels	 can	 select	 tactics	 that	 mitigate	 an	unfavourable	balance	of	power,	meaning	it	should	tell	us	little	about	how	a	war	is	likely	to	proceed.	However,	 increases	 in	rebel	numbers	almost	certainly	create	more	economic,	social	and	political	pressure	on	governments,	regardless	of	the	size	 of	 government	 forces.	 It	 is	 also	 likely	 to	 reflect	 a	 rebel	 group	with	 better	
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mobilisation	 structures	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 generate	 more	 support	 from	 the	population.	 This	 suggests	 we	 need	 to	 collect	 data	 on	 rebel	 mobilisation	 and	shadow	governance	structures	that	we	can	test	comparatively.			 	 Model	9		 Changes	in	rebel	numbers	 Changes	in	balance	of	power	Change	in	democracy	 -0.0912	(0.139)	 -0.250	(0.349)	Change	in	ethnic	relations		 4.611***	(1.599)	 -1.847	(1.752)	Change	in	life	expectancy		 0.0840	(0.269)	 1.774	(1.890)	Change	in	GDP		 -3.384**	(1.491)	 52.50	(55.54)	Change	in	battle	deaths	 0.000158	(9.72e-05)	 5.42e-05	(0.000356)	Change	in	government	military	 -0.0124	(0.0102)	 -0.102	(0.109)	Rebels	have	external	sanctuary	 1.587	(1.057)	 -9.420	(9.855)	Rough	terrain		 0.745	(0.477)	 -3.619	(3.590)	Rebels	use	terrorism	against	population	 -0.760	(0.717)	 2.284	(3.325)	Territorial	aims	 1.984**	(0.945)	 -8.575	(8.930)	External	support	for	government	 -2.888*	(1.479)	 17.05	(18.03)	External	support	for	rebels	 0.403	(3.069)	 -2.129	(7.272)	Time		 -0.167	(0.141)	 2.825	(2.927)	Time	squared		 0.00435	(0.0103)	 -0.227	(0.226)	Time	cubed		 2.48e-05	(0.000188)	 0.00385	(0.00381)	Constant	 -2.179	(2.154)	 13.50	(14.72)	Observations	 260	 261	R-squared	 0.161	 0.012	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses											***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	Table	19:	Model	nine	-	OLS	regression	of	changes	in	rebel	numbers	and	balance	of	power.		
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Conclusion		
	The	 statistical	 models	 presented	 in	 this	 chapter	 represent	 a	 significant	 step	forward	in	the	study	of	civil	war.	We	shifted	the	focus	to	variables	that	proxy	for	the	relationship	between	the	government	and	the	population.	The	second	major	change	 was	 the	 use	 of	 difference	 variables,	 measuring	 how	macro-political,	 -socioeconomic	 and	 –security	 conditions	 changed,	 rather	 than	 looking	 at	 their	absolute	 values.	 The	model	 supported	 Stathis	 Kalyvas’s	 notion	 that	 change	 is	fundamental	part	of	the	civil	war	process	(2008).			The	statistical	analysis	presented	in	this	chapter,	therefore,	offers	strong	support	for	 the	model	of	civil	war	developed	 in	chapters	one	and	two.	A	decline	 in	 the	institutions	that	define	a	government’s	relationship	with	the	population	suggest	rebels	are	more	likely	to	win.	On	the	other	hand,	governments	fare	better	when	they	 are	 eliminating	 rebel	 capacity	 to	 regenerate	 support,	 either	 by	 offering	positive	 incentives	to	a	broader	range	of	the	population	or	 increasing	negative	incentives	for	those	that	may	be	considering	supporting	rebels.	The	models	show	that	focusing	on	the	relationship	between	the	government	and	the	population	is	an	effective	way	of	predicting	the	course	of	civil	wars.	The	relationship	between	governments	and	the	population	defines	the	regenerative	capacity	of	both	rebels	and	governments,	which	is	why	it	is	so	key	to	the	outcome	of	conflicts	and	why	it	is	the	focus	of	rebel	military	activity.			The	statistical	models	also	showed	how	this	works	in	more	specific	terms.	The	most	 powerful	 predictor	 of	 rebel	 victories	 was	 a	 decline	 in	 socioeconomic	conditions.	Insurgents	win	when	they	are	able	to	undermine	the	economy	and	the	ability	 of	 the	 government	 to	 deliver	 basic	 services	 to	 the	 population.	 The	government’s	socioeconomic	relationship	with	the	population	clearly	defines	its	capacity	to	raise	resources	that	it	then	spends	on	its	military	and	redistributing	incentives	 back	 to	 the	 population.	 By	 degrading	 this	 relationship,	 insurgents	reduce	government	capacity	 shape	population	behaviour,	and	 further	 increase	their	own	opportunities	 to	mobilise	 resources.	When	governments	are	able	 to	prevent	this	from	happening,	the	model	shows	governments	are	much	less	likely	
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to	lose	to	insurgent	challengers.	The	statistical	models	presented	in	this	chapter	show	this	happening	across	a	range	of	conflicts,	strongly	supporting	hypothesis	two.			The	 results	 above	 also	 show	 that	 governments	 tend	 to	 fare	 better	 when	strengthening	their	institutions	of	governance	and	worse	when	these	institutions	are	degraded,	supporting	hypothesis	three.	Models	three	and	seven	incorporated	a	measure	of	changes	in	government	institutional	reach.	As	a	government’s	reach	declines,	rebels	become	more	likely	to	win.	Governments	in	this	position	have	less	capacity	to	distribute	as	a	means	to	mobilise	resources	from	the	population,	and	leave	space	for	rebels	to	create	their	own	mobilisation	structures.	Models	two,	three	and	seven	also	showed	that	governments	widening	their	reach	are	more	likely	to	defeat	rebel	challengers.			The	final	element	of	counterinsurgency	doctrine	and	hypothesis	four,	the	role	of	security,	 finds	 less	 support.	 A	 drop	 in	 size	 of	 the	 government’s	 military	 does	suggest	 insurgencies	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 win,	 but	 the	 substantive	 effect	 is	extremely	 small,	 suggesting	 it	 is	 a	 less	 useful	 indicator	 of	 a	 war’s	 progress.	Governments	 facing	 insurgencies	 almost	 certainly	 prioritise	 spending	 on	 their	military	and	withdraw	resources	from	other	state	activities	first.	The	unravelling	of	a	government’s	military,	therefore,	is	more	likely	to	be	quick,	as	observed	by	McCormick	et	al.	(2007).	Declines	in	governance	and	socioeconomic	conditions	are	likely	to	be	slower,	showing	why	they	are	more	reliable	long-term	predictors	of	civil	outcomes.	The	models	support	the	observation	in	chapter	three	that	the	effect	of	changes	in	security	is	likely	to	be	smaller	than	variations	in	governance	and	socioeconomic	conditions.			The	remaining	chapters	will	examine	four	cases	in	more	detail	and	show	how	to	apply	the	model	of	war	developed	in	this	thesis	for	examining	individual	conflicts.	How	does	the	economic	strain	of	fighting	an	insurgency	undermine	government	ability	 to	 mobilise	 resources	 from	 its	 population,	 pushing	 it	 to	 collapse	 and	allowing	 small	 rebel	 groups	 to	 defeat	 large	 government	militaries?	 How	 does	
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political	 reform	 undermine	 insurgent	 regenerative	 capacity,	 weakening	 its	capacity	to	replace	resources	expended	on	military	activity?		The	rationale	for	selecting	these	case	studies	is	in	table	16.	Burundi	and	Cambodia	were	the	best-predicted	mixed	outcome	and	rebel	victory	respectively.	We	know	that	 changes	 in	 the	 variables	 of	 interest	 did	 occur	 in	 these	 conflicts	 and	 can	examine	 whether	 it	 led	 to	 the	 outcomes	 for	 the	 reasons	 predicted.	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 and	 Zimbabwe	 were	 poorly	 predicted,	 offering	 an	 opportunity	 for	exploring	other	variables	that	may	lead	to	mixed	outcomes	or	rebel	victories.		
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Chapter	six	
A	‘typical’	mixed	outcome:	Burundi	1993-2003	
	
Introduction	
	The	statistical	model	in	the	previous	chapter	predicted	a	78	percent	chance	of	a	mixed	outcome	in	the	Burundian	civil	war	in	2003.	The	polity	score	had	increased	by	three	and	the	status	of	the	Hutu	ethnic	group	associated	with	the	rebels	had	improved	 from	 powerless	 to	 senior	 partner.	 The	 government	 had	 external	support	and	the	rebels	had	access	to	external	sanctuary.	This	explains	the	high	probability	 of	 a	 mixed	 outcome.	 Only	 one	 variable	 performs	 contrary	 to	expectations	 for	 the	 eventual	 outcome,	 with	 the	 size	 of	 government	 forces	increasing	slightly.			The	changes	in	the	political	variables	captured	in	the	model	reflects	the	Arusha	Accords,	 signed	 in	 August	 2000.	 The	 Accords	 overhauled	 Burundi’s	 political	system	to	bring	the	two	ethnic	groups,	the	Tutsis	and	the	Hutus	onto	a	more	equal	footing	 (Lemarchand,	 2006).	 The	 Accords	were	 in	 response	 to	 seven	 years	 of	conflict,	in	which	Hutu-centric	rebel	groups	had	fought	with	the	Tutsi-dominant	military	for	control	over	the	state.48	The	Accords,	therefore,	allow	us	to	divide	the	conflict	 into	 two	 distinct	 phases.	 The	 first,	 1993-2000,	 saw	 the	 Tutsi	military	attempt	 to	 defeat	 the	 Hutu	 rebels	 by	 separating	 them	 from	 the	 population	through	 the	 punishment	 of	 Hutu	 civilians.	 The	 second	 period,	 from	 2001	onwards,	saw	an	attempt	to	end	the	conflict	through	a	political	settlement,	which	invited	insurgent	groups	to	participate	in	popular	elections.	Eventually,	the	main	rebel	group,	the	CNDD-FDD,	took	advantage	of	this	in	2003.	At	the	same	time,	the	military	situation	changed	very	little	through	the	course	of	the	conflict.	As	such,	comparing	population	behaviour	before	and	after	2001	allows	us	to	examine	how	
																																																						48	As	always	in	ethnic-based	civil	wars,	the	reality	was	more	complex	than	a	simple	Hutu	rebellion	against	their	Tutsi	masters.	Some	Tutsis	fought	with	the	rebels	and	the	military	government	was	able	to	secure	support	from	some	Hutu	communities.	However,	the	two	ethnic	groupings	represented	the	core	elements	of	the	two	belligerents	and,	for	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	I	assume	that	the	Hutus	were	the	rebel’s	constituent	population,	while	the	Tutsis	were	the	government’s.		
	
	
	
	
143	
a	 changing	 political	 context	 affects	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 population	 to	 provide	support	to	belligerents,	while	the	military	situation	holds	relatively	constant.	Of	particular	 interest	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	CNDD-FDD	played	no	role	 in	 the	Arusha	Accords.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 ultimately	 adhered	 to	 the	 Accords’	 principle	components	 because	 it	 affected	 the	 behaviour	 of	 its	 support-base.	 We	 can,	therefore,	directly	trace	how	this	happened,	without	concerns	that	the	political	deal	was	shaped	by	the	rebels	to	strengthen	their	own	power.	It	also	serves	as	an	important	lesson	to	policymakers	working	on	civil	wars;	political	solutions	can	be	 effective	 at	 undermining	 rebel	 support	 even	 if	 rebels	 are	 not	 involved	 in	drawing	them	up.			
Key	actors	
	As	in	many	civil	wars	there	were	a	number	of	rebel	factions.	The	rebel	group	in	focus	for	this	chapter	will	be	‘The	National	Council	for	the	Defense	of	Democracy	–	Forces	for	the	Defense	of	Democracy’	or	the	CNDD-FDD.	The	CNDD-FDD	was	the	largest	 and	most	 active	 rebel	 group	 and	 its	 agreement	 to	 follow	 the	 political	process	 corresponds	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 conflict	 according	 to	 the	RAND	dataset	(Connable	 and	 Libicki,	 2010).	 While	 the	 National	 Forces	 of	 Liberation	 (FNL)	continued	to	fight	after	2003,	it	never	had	widespread	support	and	was	much	less	active	(Watt,	2008).			Burundi	represents	an	interesting	challenge	in	that	 it	 is	not	straightforward	to	demarcate	who	represented	the	government	during	the	civil	war.	For	the	purpose	of	this	study,	I	define	the	Burundian	Armed	Forces	(FAB)	as	the	government.	The	FAB	 was	 only	 officially	 in	 power	 between	 1996	 and	 2000,	 but	 it	 controlled	government	policy	throughout	the	conflict,	in	particular,	the	prosecution	of	the	war.	The	bi-ethnic	government	in	power	between	1993	and	1996	was	just	a	front	for	the	military	and	formed	part	of	a	decades-long	effort	to	control	the	state.	The	relinquishing	of	power	 in	2001,	back	to	a	bi-ethnic	government	to	oversee	the	transition	to	democracy,	represented	part	of	this	strategy.			
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Plan	for	chapter	
	The	 rest	 of	 the	 chapter	 will	 look	 at	 how	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 and	 FAB	 sought	 to	generate	support	from	the	two	different	segments	of	the	population.	The	rebels	drew	almost	all	of	their	support	from	the	Hutus,	who	made	up	85	percent	of	the	population.	The	government	generated	most	of	its	support	from	the	Tutsis	who	made	up	 the	remainder.49	 	 I	examine	 the	conflict	actors’	behaviour	before	and	after	2001	and	how	this	shaped	population	behaviour	during	these	two	phases.	I	will	then	look	at	the	nature	of	military	interaction	between	the	government	and	the	rebels.	Finally,	I	take	the	opportunity	to	look	at	how	external	factors	shaped	the	behaviour	of	the	conflict	actors	and	their	ability	to	generate	support	from	the	population.			As	expected,	this	chapter	offers	strong	support	for	the	theories	underpinning	this	thesis.	The	Arusha	Accords	did	threaten	to	demobilise	the	CNDD-FDD	exactly	as	predicted,	pushing	it	to	engage	in	the	fledgling	political	process.	Moreover,	there	is	strong	evidence	that	economic	difficulties	nearly	caused	the	complete	downfall	of	the	government,	forcing	it	into	the	political	reforms	that	ended	the	war,	exactly	as	we	would	expect	based	on	the	analysis	in	the	previous	chapters.			
The	state	before	1993			
A	history	of	violence	
	After	a	Hutu	prime	minister	was	assassinated	in	1965,	Hutus	violently	punished	the	Tutsi	population.	This	repression	was	facilitated,	in	no	small	part,	by	Hutus	in	the	police	 and	 the	 army	 (Watt,	 2008).	 The	Tutsis	 in	 the	 government,	many	of	whom	had	fled	Hutu	repression	in	Rwanda,	were	determined	to	ensure	this	could	not	happen	again	and	 filled	 the	security	 forces	with	 loyal	Tutsis	 (Lemarchand,	2006).	The	Tutsi	monarchy	ignored	the	results	of	the	1965	election,	where	the	
																																																						49	There	was	another	smaller	ethnic	group,	the	Twa,	constituting	one	percent	of	the	total	population.	However,	their	role	in	the	conflict,	while	of	human-interest	value,	was	minimal	in	determining	the	ultimate	outcome.	Therefore,	they	will	not	be	discussed	at	length	in	this	thesis.	
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Hutus	 once	 again	 secured	 a	majority.	 A	Hutu-led	 coup	 in	 response,	 led	 to	 the	killing	of	scores	of	Hutu	intellectuals	and	politicians	(Krueger	and	Krueger,	2007).	The	Tutsi	military	then	deposed	the	monarchy	in	1966,	effectively	extinguishing	any	hope	Hutus	had	of	accessing	political	power.	In	1972,	an	outbreak	of	violence,	instigated	by	Hutus	in	the	south	of	the	country,	led	to	the	harshest	crackdown	yet.	The	 Tutsi	 military	 murdered	 over	 200,000	 Hutus	 and	 forced	 300,000	 to	 flee	Burundi,	focusing	particularly	on	educated	Hutus	(Krueger	and	Krueger,	2007).			During	this	period,	 the	Tutsi-led	government	used	violence	to	 impose	costs	on	anyone	 seeking	 to	 resist	 its	 control	 over	 the	 state.	 Moreover,	 by	 targeting	intellectuals	and	Hutu	elites,	the	government	eliminated	those	people	that	were	politically	aware	and	able	to	convince	the	population	to	support	activity	against	the	 government.	While	 the	 subsequent	 sixteen	 years	 saw	 a	 number	 of	 coups,	these	 all	 emerged	 out	 of	 infighting	within	 the	 Tutsi-controlled	military	 (Watt,	2008).		In	1988,	violence	began	to	erupt	again	between	the	military,	the	Hutu	population	and	 Tutsi	 hardliners.	 This	 time	 over	 150,000	 people	 were	 reported	 killed.	 In	response,	 the	 military	 dictator	 Major	 Pierre	 Buyoya	 formed	 a	 commission	 to	investigate	the	causes	and	develop	a	plan	for	a	democratic	transition.		In	1991	a	new	constitution,	‘the	Charter	of	Unity’,	was	approved	and	democratic	elections	were	held	in	1993.	Melchior	Ndadaye,	the	leader	of	the	Front	for	Democracy	in	Burundi	(Frodebu),	became	the	first	Hutu	president	(Lemarchand,	2009).			The	 FAB’s	 main	 priority	 was	 not	 control	 over	 the	 state	 per	 se,	 but	 rather	dominance	of	 the	 security	organs.	 It	 calculated	 this	would	protect	Tutsis	 from	Hutu	efforts	to	wipe	them	out	(Watt,	2008).	After	the	1988	outbreak	of	violence	it	appears	Buyoya	decided	that	political	reform	was	the	best	way	to	ensure	Tutsi	control	over	the	security	institutions.	It	is	not	clear	from	the	historical	literature	what	 exactly	 led	 the	 Tutsi	 military	 to	 move	 away	 from	 trying	 to	 control	 the	population	 through	 violence	 to	 offering	 political	 reform.	 It	 is	 possible	 it	 was	simply	a	case	of	a	different	man	at	the	helm	compared	to	previous	outbreaks	of	violence.	However,	the	nature	of	Burundian	society	had	also	changed.		
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After	1972,	the	Hutu	political	opposition	organised	itself	abroad.	Paliphetu	(who	would	later	become	the	FNL)	spent	twenty	years	in	exile	organising	politically,	spreading	their	message	both	domestically	and	internationally	(Watt,	2008).	At	the	same	time	a	Hutu	middle	class	began	to	re-emerge	(Watt,	2008).	Frodebu	had	also	grown	in	strength,	as	evidenced	by	its	victory	in	the	1993	elections.	The	Tutsi	military,	therefore,	clearly	faced	a	much	more	organised	threat	than	in	1972	and	it	 possibly	 recognised	 that	 controlling	 the	 population	 through	 violence	 may	empower	this	opposition	even	further.		
The	outbreak	of	war	
	In	the	event,	 it	quickly	viewed	this	calculation	as	a	mistake.	Major	Buyoya	had	originally	 believed	 he	would	win	 the	 election	 (Lemarchand,	 2009).	Moreover,	once	Frodebu	took	power	they	quickly	set	about	security	reform	to	create	a	more	favourable	ethnic	balance	in	the	police	(Watt,	2008).	The	army	feared	the	same	thing	was	going	to	happen	to	the	military	and	took	the	decision	to	reverse	the	democratic	transition	just	three	months	after	elections.	President	Ndadaye	was	assassinated,	 leading	 to	nationwide	violence	 from	Hutu	militias,	who	allegedly	began	 to	 attack	 and	 kill	 Tutsis.	 The	Tutsi	 Army	 cracked	down	on	 the	militias,	rounding	 up	 civilians	 and	 killing	 anyone	 suspected	 of	 being	 involved	 in	 the	violence.	 In	 total	 150,000	 people	 are	 believed	 to	 have	 been	 killed	 following	Ndadaye's	 assassination	 (Krueger	 and	 Krueger,	 2007).	 According	 to	 Willy	Nindonera,	 the	 Hutus	 organised	 themselves	 into	 community-based	militias	 to	protect	themselves	and	fight	back	against	Tutsi	armed	groups	(2012).	Nindonera	goes	onto	to	document	how	the	external	Hutu	political	networks	and	a	splinter	group	from	the	deposed	Frodebu,	the	CNDD-FDD,	took	control	of	these	militias	and	created	a	more	cohesive	challenge	to	the	Tutsi	military.	The	CNDD-FDD,	led	by	Leonard	Nyangoma,	also	absorbed	university	groups,	promising	to	pursue	the	political	change	they	craved.	In	addition,	it	used	its	own	patronage	networks	to	exploit	 the	 power	 of	 local	 community	 leaders	 to	 identify	 potential	 supporters	(Nindonera,	2012).			
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Both	the	rebels	and	the	government	now	had	the	sovereign	power	to	generate	the	support	they	needed	to	sustain	military	activity;	Burundi	transitioned	into	a	state	of	war.		
Rebel	strategy	before	2000	
	
Relations	with	the	Hutu	population		Having	 taken	 up	 arms	 against	 the	 state,	 the	 theory	 developed	 in	 this	 thesis	suggests	the	CNDD-FDD	should	have	dedicated	most	of	its	efforts	to	undermining	government	power	and	building	its	own	sovereign	networks	rather	than	directly	confronting	the	FAB.			It	only	takes	a	cursory	glance	at	reports	of	rebel	activities	in	Burundi	to	see	this	was	the	case.	Direct	interaction	between	the	FAB	and	the	CNDD-FDD	was	minimal	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1998).	Instead,	the	CNDD-FDD	invested	heavily	in	building	strong	relations	with	the	population.	An	interview	with	Jean-Maries	Ngendhayo,	a	member	of	the	CNDD-FDD,	after	the	conflict	shows	the	extent	to	which	the	rebel	group	valued	political	support	for	their	cause;	“the	rebellion	owed	its	existence,	organisation	and	growing	military	and	political	effectiveness	to	the	material	and	moral	support	from	the	country’s	largely	Hutu	peasant	population”	(Nindonera,	2012;	p18).	Nindonera	claims	this	was	the	core	part	of	Nyangoma’s	strategy	for	defeating	the	FAB	(ibid.).			According	to	documentary	studies	of	 the	CNDD-FDD,	 the	 first	 thing	Nyangoma	did,	was	mobilise	the	rising	number	of	Hutu	intellectuals	and	get	them	to	spread	the	 political	 message	 at	 home	 and	 abroad.	 These	 political	 representatives	engaged	 with	 communities	 across	 Burundi,	 explaining	 the	 importance	 of	supporting	the	rebellion	(Nindonera,	2012).	The	military	justified	its	control	over	the	 state	 by	 claiming	 it	 was	 maintaining	 national	 unity	 and	 preventing	 the	institutions	 of	 the	 state	 becoming	 ‘ethnicised’	 (Uvin,	 2008).	 Given	 the	government’s	use	of	violence,	political	entrepreneurs	had	a	relatively	simple	task	undermining	this	narrative.		
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It	 is	 particularly	 interesting	 that	many	 fighters	 received	no	payment	 at	 all	 for	joining	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 (Uvin,	 2008;	 p173).	 This	 suggests	 selective	 economic	incentives	were	not	 the	prime	 factor	 in	 the	CNDD-FDD’s	ability	 to	build	active	support.		Willy	Nindonera	argues	that	the	political	structures	they	created	were	almost	certainly	more	important	in	incentivising	popular	support	(2012).	They	delivered	 within-war	 benefits	 to	 the	 population	 and	 made	 post-war	 benefits	appear	more	credible	and	desirable.	The	CNDD-FDD	faced	the	same	challenge	as	many	rebel	groups.	The	strength	of	the	government	meant	they	could	not	develop	their	 own	 governance	 structures	 in	 the	majority	 of	 the	 country.	Nevertheless,	even	 where	 government	 institutions	 continued	 to	 operate,	 the	 CNDD-FDD	created	shadow	structures	across	 the	country	(Nindonera,	2012).	There	was	a	provincial	governor	and	an	economic	administrator	in	every	area,	charged	with	overseeing	relations	with	the	population	and	meeting	needs	that	the	rebels	could	service.	Policy	directors	identified	local	concerns	and	showed	how	the	CNDD-FDD	planned	to	redress	grievances	if	and	when	they	took	control.	It	set	up	a	parallel	police	 force	 across	 the	 country,	 even	 in	 areas	where	 it	 had	minimal	 presence,	which	 it	 used	 to	build	 support	by	protecting	 the	population	 from	government	violence	 (Nindonera,	 2012).	 The	 rebels	 also	 created	 networks	 of	 support	 in	refugee	camps	(Southall	and	Bentley,	2005).	The	CNDD-FDD	also	tried	to	impose	an	 internal	discipline	on	 its	own	troops,	 in	order	 to	ensure	 the	benefits	 it	was	providing	were	not	undermined	by	its	own	behaviour	(Nindonera,	2012).	Human	Rights	Watch	reports	conducted	at	various	stages	of	the	conflict	call	into	question	how	successful	they	were	(2004,	2003,	1998).	However,	the	fact	that	it	was	part	of	 its	 strategic	 dialogue	 shows	 the	 importance	 it	 placed	 on	 retaining	 positive	relations	with	the	population.		In	 areas	 where	 it	 had	 more	 control,	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 established	 multi-service	administrations,	including	a	police	force	and	health	services.	They	also	provided	education	on	how	to	mass-produce	crops,	such	as	watermelons,	forcing	civilians	where	necessary	to	farm	land	under	their	control	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1998).	The	 rebels	 then	 facilitated	 the	 trade	 of	 these	 crops,	 ensuring	 the	 population	received	financial	benefits	for	working	with	them	(Nindonera,	2012).	The	actions	
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of	the	CNDD-FDD	show	how	effective	governance	can	be	turned	into	a	within-war	incentive	if	it	provides	the	population	with	direct	benefits.			The	 rebels	 were	 also	 not	 averse	 to	 using	 violence	 against	 Hutus	 when	 they	considered	it	expedient.	For	example,	they	tried	to	leverage	traditional	structures	of	Burundian	society,	such	as	the	bashingantahe.	These	were	men,	“selected	on	the	basis	of	their	wisdom,	impartiality	and	wealth”	(Uvin,	2008;	p4),	who	advised	communities	 and	 mediated	 local	 disputes.	 Peter	 Uvin	 argues	 they	 remain	extremely	influential	in	shaping	popular	perceptions	of	national	political	actors	(2008).	The	CNDD-FDD,	however,	could	not	co-opt	the	bashingantahe	and	killed	those	that	refused	to	offer	support	(Huyse	and	Salter,	2008).	Reports	examining	the	 strength	 of	 the	 bashingantahe	 suggest	 CNDD-FDD	 violence	 significantly	weakened	 the	 institution,	 eliminating	 a	 potential	 barrier	 the	 rebels	 faced	 in	shaping	population	behaviour	(ibid.).			
Popular	support	for	the	CNDD-FDD	
	The	CNDD-FDD	shaped	Hutu	behaviour	through	a	variety	of	political,	economic,	security	and	violence	based	incentives.	The	population,	 in	return,	provided	the	CNDD-FDD	with	a	range	of	support.	The	political	administrators	of	the	CNDD-FDD	identified	those	most	likely	to	actively	participate	in	the	conflict.	This	ensured	a	steady	supply	of	recruits,	even	in	the	face	of	FAB	activities	to	undermine	these	efforts	 (Human	 Rights	Watch,	 2001a).	 Equally	 as	 important,	 the	 CNDD-FDD’s	political	structures	led	to	the	supply	of	finances,	food	and	other	materials.			Every	Hutu	family	in	areas	of	rebel	influence	had	to	“contribute	a	fixed	amount	of	food”	(Nindonera,	2012;	p18).	The	rebels	also	sold	goods	to	the	population,	the	latter	 using	 the	money	 they	 earned	 through	 crop	production	 and	 the	 trade	 of	goods.	The	CNDD-FDD	also	taxed	the	trade	they	facilitated,	generating	significant	financial	revenue	to	fund	military	activity	(ibid.).	The	political	networks	they	set	up	in	refugee	camps	in	neighbouring	countries	allowed	them	to	use	these	camps	to	 regroup	 and	 launch	 attacks	 across	 the	 border	 (Watt,	 2008).	 Refugees	 also	proved	a	valuable	boon	materially,	with	each	refugee	family	having	to	provide	“a	
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kilo	of	beans	or	maize	–	or	cattle”,	often	out	of	their	aid	allotment	(Nindonera,	2012;	p18).			It	is	difficult	to	verify	whether	the	population	provided	this	support	voluntarily	or	because	they	felt	under	pressure,	as	most	of	the	evidence	of	civilian	sentiment	comes	 from	 CNDD-FDD	 fighters	 rather	 than	 the	 population.	 However,	 large	numbers	 of	 the	 population	 chose	 to	 stay	 in	 areas	 of	 rebel	 control	 during	 this	period	 and	 provide	 the	 rebels	 the	 support	 they	 needed.	 It	 is	 not	 clearly	documented	how	much	territory	the	CNDD-FDD	controlled	during	the	conflict,	or	how	this	changed	during	the	conflict.	Figure	16	shows	a	heat	map	of	CNDD-FDD	demobilisation	numbers	 after	 the	war.	 It	 seems	 sensible	 to	 suggest	 that	 areas	under	rebel	control	were	focused	in	areas	with	the	highest	 insurgent	numbers	after	the	war.	Rebel	strongholds	represented	a	small	proportion	of	the	country	overall.		
	Figure	16:	CNDD-FDD	demobilisation.	
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Regardless	of	all	these	caveats,	the	rebels	shaped	population	behaviour	to	such	an	extent	that	they	were	able	to	continually	regenerate	resources	expended	on	military	activity	against	the	government.	Tanzania	and	the	Democratic	Republic	of	 Congo	 provided	 assistance	 and	 sanctuary	 to	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 (International	Crisis	 Group,	 2006).	 However,	 according	 to	 some	 commentators,	 the	 Hutu	population	provided	the	CNDD-FDD	with	a	level	of	support	that	made	it	almost	self-sufficient	(Nindonera,	2012).	The	effectiveness	of	the	CNDD-FDD’s	sovereign	structures	 shows	 the	 tangible	 value	 rebels	 can	 accrue	 from	 building	 relations	with	the	population,	and	reinforces	why	conflict	actors	divert	so	much	attention	to	these	types	of	activities.		
Targeting	non-constituents	
	While	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 had	 some	 Tutsi	members	 (Nindonera,	 2012),	 it	 did	 not	make	wholesale	efforts	to	incorporate	Tutsi	communities.	The	CNDD-FDD	made	very	little	effort	to	capture	land	held	by	the	Tutsi	military	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1998).	 Instead	 it	 used	 its	 forces	 to	 exacerbate	 ethnic	 tension	 as	 a	 means	 of	increasing	 the	Hutu	population’s	 incentive	 to	support	efforts	 to	overthrow	the	FAB.	Hutu	forces	targeted	Tutsi	civilians,	knowing	that	the	FAB	and	Tutsi	militias	would	take	revenge	on	the	Hutu	population	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2003).	It	also	targeted	local	politicians,	regardless	of	ethnicity.	The	rebels	did	this	to	prevent	the	 government	 from	 establishing	 ‘bi-ethnic’	 local	 institutions,	which	 the	 FAB	created	as	a	means	to	undermine	rebel	support	(ibid.;	p138).	When	the	FAB	could	no	 longer	 staff	 local	 government	 institutions	 it	 controlled	 areas	 centrally.	 The	FAB	 dealt	 with	 the	 population	much	more	 harshly	 when	 administering	 areas	directly,	creating	propaganda	opportunities	for	the	CNDD-FDD	to	build	support	(ibid.).			Human	Rights	Watch	also	documented	the	CNDD-FDD	punishing	Hutus	it	accused	of	 supporting	 the	 FAB	 (2001b).	 The	 FAB	 armed	 Hutu	 communities	 under	 a	program	 called	 the	 ‘Guardians	 of	 the	 Peace.’	 The	 CNDD-FDD	 would	 attack	individuals	and	communities	that	participated	in	a	bid	to	stop	the	program	from	working	and	reinforce	its	narrative	that	the	government	only	represented	Tutsis.		
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All	told,	CNDD-FDD	used	its	military	to	target	Tutsi	civilians	as	a	means	to	boost	its	mobilisation	capacity.	 It	drove	 increased	violence	 from	 the	military	against	Hutu	 communities,	 including,	 its	 wholesale	 relocation	 into	 internment	 camps.	This	 made	 it	 much	 easier	 for	 the	 CNDD-FDD’s	 political	 officer	 to	 portray	 the	rebellion	as	the	only	way	for	Hutus	to	gain	security	and	political	representation,	which	 could	 only	 be	 achieved	 if	 Hutus	 supported	 rebel	 activity.	 When	 put	together,	the	combination	of	rebel	governance	structures,	facilitation	of	economic	activity,	support	networks	in	refugee	camps	and	the	use	of	violence	succeeded	in	creating	a	resilient	regenerative	capacity.	As	the	war	dragged	on	it	also	began	to	have	a	demobilising	effect	on	the	government.						
Government	strategy	before	Arusha	
	Ultimately	it	was	the	government	response	to	the	rebellion	that	almost	cost	it	the	war.	Before	2000,	the	FAB	employed	a	dual	strategy	to	undermine	rebel	capacity	to	mobilise	support;	political	promises	and	violence.		
	
A	bi-ethnic	government?		The	FAB	claimed	it	represented	both	Hutus	and	Tutsis	and	that	the	CNDD-FDD’s	war	aims	were	meaningless.	To	support	this	claim	it	made	attempts	to	make	it	appear	 as	 if	Hutus	 and	Tutsis	 shared	power.	 In	1993,	 it	 reinstated	 a	 bi-ethnic	front-government,	with	a	Hutu	president	and	a	Tutsi	prime	minister.	According	the	Stef	Vandeginste,	deposing	and	reinstating	the	bi-ethnic	government	had	two	aims.	The	first	was	to	undermine	the	insurgency’s	narrative	that	the	government	represented	Tutsi	repression	of	Hutus.	If	believed	by	the	population	this	would	have	made	 it	 harder	 for	 the	 rebels	 to	 sell	 the	 potential	 benefits	 of	 supporting	them.	 The	 second	 aim	 was	 to	 signal	 that	 the	 military	 remaining	 under	 Tutsi	control	was	a	redline	 for	 the	FAB.	This	would	decrease	 the	credibility	of	 rebel	claims	that	it	could	deliver	the	political	incentives	it	was	promising,	again	making	it	harder	to	generate	population	support	(Vandeginste,	2010).	Nevertheless,	the	FAB	 also	 set	 up	 a	National	 Security	 Council	 to	 deal	with	 the	Hutu	 insurgency,	which	 the	 military	 fully	 controlled.	 As	 the	 FAB	 now	 faced	 a	 more	 organised	
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rebellion	 than	at	 any	 stage	 in	 the	 last	 thirty	years,	 the	CNDD-FDD	was	able	 to	demonstrate	this	disparity	to	the	population	through	its	political	networks.	The	Hutu	 population	 simply	 did	 not	 believe	 that	 Hutu	 politicians	 had	 any	 power	(Nindonera,	2012).	The	front-government	installed	by	the	FAB,	therefore,	had	a	negligible	impact	on	rebel	strength.	By	1996,	the	FAB	feared	the	weakness	of	the	government	would	prompt	an	international	intervention	(Southall	and	Bentley,	2005).	As	it	had	also	failed	as	a	strategy	for	demobilising	support	for	the	CNDD-FDD,	the	FAB	reinstalled	Pierre	Buyoya	as	president.		Some	Hutus	were	brought	into	the	army,	due	to	the	need	to	quickly	expand	its	size	 (Nindonera,	 2012).	 However,	 Hutus	 remained	 subordinate	 to	 Tutsi	commanders	 and	 their	 overall	 role	was	 limited.	Hutu	 communities,	 under	 the	Guardians	of	the	Peace	program,	were	given	light	weapons,	a	little	training	and	then	used	on	the	 front	 lines	 to	 fight	rebels	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2001a).	The	government	claimed	that	the	population	engaged	with	the	process	as	a	means	to	gain	 security	 (Human	Rights	Watch,	2001b).	However,	 a	Human	Rights	Watch	report	 (2001b)	 suggests	 that	 the	 FAB	 forced	 many	 people	 to	 participate.	Communities	that	refused	to	join	were	treated	as	if	they	supported	the	insurgents	and	given	 fines	and	 imprisoned	(p6).	Former	rebels	were	also	recruited,	often	facing	being	tortured	if	they	refused.	As	many	as	75	percent	of	these	militias	in	some	areas	were	reported	 to	be	 former	rebels	 (p8).	The	government	did	offer	some	direct	incentives	to	those	that	joined	these	militias.	It	did	not	pay	them,	but	it	provided	medical	care	for	both	fighters	and	their	families	(p9).	The	FAB	also	allowed	 recruits	 to	 loot	 and	 enrich	 themselves	 when	 they	 operated	 in	 areas	accused	of	supporting	the	rebels	(p10).	Reports	documenting	the	activities	of	the	Guardians	 of	 the	 Peace,	 however,	 suggest	 the	 primary	 motivation	 most	individuals	had	 for	 joining	 the	program	was	 to	avoid	government	punishment	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2001a,	2001b).		
The	same	old	violence	
	Aside	 from	 the	 transparent	 overtures	 in	 restoring	 a	 Hutu	 president	 and	developing	 Hutu	 militias,	 the	 FAB	 largely	 continued	 with	 the	 violence	 it	 had	
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employed	 to	 squash	 Hutu	 resistance	 since	 the	 1960s	 (Lemarchand,	 1996).	 It	almost	 always	 chose	 to	direct	 its	military	 force	 against	 the	population,	 clearly	with	the	intention	of	choking	potential	support	for	insurgency.	Targeted	killings	focused	 on	 prominent	 Hutu	 civilians	 rather	 than	 rebel	 leaders,	 similar	 to	 the	strategy	followed	in	1972	(International	Crisis	Group,	2000;	p15).			NGO	reports	documenting	the	conflict	highlight	how	even	when	presented	with	an	 opportunity	 to	 confront	 CNDD-FDD	 forces	 the	 FAB	 deliberately	 delayed	arriving	at	a	location,	giving	rebels	time	to	flee	the	area.	It	would	then	carry	out	retribution	 on	 the	 civilian	 population	 (Human	 Rights	 Watch,	 1998;	 p152).	 It	intentionally	 drove	 the	 population	 from	 a	 town	 if	 there	 were	 any	 reports	 of	violence	(ibid.;	p25).			By	 targeting	 segments	 of	 the	 population	 believed	 to	 be	 sympathetic	 to	 the	insurgent	 cause	 it	 limited	 the	 opportunities	 for	 rebel	 groups	 to	 exploit	 the	‘material	and	moral	support’	offered	by	the	population.	It	also	likely	altered	the	cost-benefit	calculus	of	civilians	providing	this	support	in	the	first	place,	knowing	that	it	would	result	in	violent	retribution.			The	final	step	in	this	strategy	was	the	use	of	regroupment	camps.	The	government	rounded	 up	Hutu	 communities	 it	 accused	 of	 supporting	 the	 rebels	 and	 forced	them	into	camps.	The	government	claimed	these	were	simply	internally	displaced	person	(IDP)	camps,	no	different	from	those	used	to	provide	shelter	to	Tutsis	who	had	fled	rebel-dominated	areas.	However,	NGO	reports	showed	this	to	be	patently	false;	the	key	difference	being	that	IDPs	were	free	to	come	and	go	while	those	in	regroupment	 camps	were	 forced	 to	 assemble	 there	 and	were	 unable	 to	 leave	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1998).			The	aim	of	the	camps	was	to	isolate	the	CNDD-FDD	from	the	population.	Anyone	not	 in	 the	 camps,	 including	 women	 and	 children,	 was	 assumed	 to	 be	 a	 rebel	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1998).	After	assembling	in	the	camps,	 local	towns	were	searched,	then	ransacked	and	destroyed	to	prevent	them	being	used	by	insurgent	groups.	One	military	guard	at	a	camp	 in	Kayanza	stated	that	before	 the	camps	
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were	set	up,	insurgents	would	simply	blend	into	the	population	as	soon	as	any	FAB	 troops	arrived.	Once	 they	used	 the	 camps	 they	eliminated	 this	option	 for	rebel	soldiers	(p40).	In	addition,	the	population	could	not	provide	the	material,	financial	and	manpower	support	outlined	above.	If	there	was	no	population	the	rebels	could	not	create	the	sovereign	structures	they	used	to	generate	the	support	that	 allowed	 them	 to	 replace	 personnel	 and	 resources	 expended	 on	 the	battlefield.	Statements	by	some	members	of	the	FAB	affirm	that	the	aim	of	the	camps	was	to	"isolate	the	FDD,	to	limit	the	ability	of	the	Hutu	population	in	rural	areas	 to	 offer	 support	 to	 the	FDD	and	other	Hutu	 rebel	 groups,	 and	bring	 the	population	under	the	strict	scrutiny	and	control	of	the	military"	(p42).			
Success	or	failure?		There	are	no	exact	numbers	for	those	forced	into	regroupment	camps	across	the	whole	 country,	 but	 350,000	people	were	 forced	 to	 live	 in	 fifty-three	 camps	 in	Bujumbura	province	alone.	This	represented	80	percent	of	the	local	population	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2000).			These	 camps	 clearly	 represented	 the	 core	 part	 of	 government	 strategy	 to	demobilise	 CNDD-FDD	 support	 structures.	 Secured	 in	 internment	 camps	 the	population	 could	not	 generate	 resources	 -	 in	 the	 form	of	manpower,	 finances,	supplies	–	for	the	rebels,	undermining	its	capacity	to	operate.	While	there	is	no	data	to	test	the	success	of	this	strategy,	anecdotal	evidence	shows	that	in	areas	where	 the	 government	 set	 up	 regroupment	 camps	 rebel	 violence	 reduced	dramatically	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1998;	p71).	There	is	little	evidence	to	suggest	the	 CNDD-FDD	 was	 on	 the	 brink	 of	 collapse	 or	 seeking	 an	 end	 to	 the	 war,	however,	 it	 had	 certainly	 stopped	making	 progress	 (Lemarchand,	 2006).	 This	shows	how	a	government	can	contain	an	aggrieved	population	through	the	use	of	violence,	particularly	if	it	can	essentially	‘imprison’	the	population	and	physically	prevent	it	from	providing	support	to	rebel	groups.			However,	the	FAB’s	strategy	of	choking	support	for	the	insurgency	through	the	use	 of	 violence	 began	 to	 undermine	 government	 ability	 to	 continue	 drawing	
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support	from	the	Tutsi	population.	Tutsi	support	for	the	FAB	was	predicated	on	two	 things;	 protection	 from	 rebel	 violence	 (Human	Rights	Watch,	 2001b),	 but	also	 direct	 payments	 for	 joining	 the	 military	 and	 civil	 service	 (Southall	 and	Bentley,	2005).	The	side	effect	of	moving	the	population	into	camps	as	a	means	to	provide	 security	 was	 that	 rural	 production	 virtually	 came	 to	 a	 standstill.	Burundi’s	economy	went	into	serious	decline	and	the	government	began	to	have	difficulties	paying	the	military	and	civil	service	(Krueger	and	Krueger,	2007).	The	FAB	 was	 also	 under	 international	 sanctions	 given	 its	 treatment	 of	 the	 Hutu	population,	 which	 meant	 it	 could	 not	 replenish	 its	 coffers	 through	 external	support	(Southall	and	Bentley,	2005).			This	 highlights	 the	 choice	 governments	 face	 when	 employing	 violence	 to	demobilise	their	opponents.	In	Burundi,	Hutus	represented	a	significant	majority,	suggesting	violence	as	a	strategy	should	be	unsustainable	(Downes,	2007),	and	so	it	proved	to	be	the	case.	The	FAB	was	in	danger	of	no	longer	being	able	to	provide	selective	within-war	incentives	to	the	Tutsi	population	to	staff	the	military	and	the	civil	service.	Losing	the	ability	to	do	this	would	almost	certainly	 lead	to	 its	collapse	and	a	rebel	victory,	even	though	the	rebels	were	failing	to	make	military	gains.	The	government	needed	international	sanctions	lifted,	but	this	came	with	conditions;	the	FAB	had	to	pursue	political	reform.			
The	Arusha	Accords	–	shifting	the	game	
	In	an	effort	to	get	sanctions	lifted	the	FAB	engaged	more	heavily	in	negotiations	with	 other	 political	 factions	 and	 the	 international	 community	 (Southall	 and	Bentley,	2005).	In	August	2000,	the	government	and	an	array	of	political	factions	in	Burundi,	but	not	the	CNDD-FDD,	signed	the	‘Arusha	Accords’	in	the	presence	of	25	heads	of	state.	The	deal	included	a	three-year	transition	to	democracy,	to	begin	on	1st	November	2001,	a	fifty-fifty	split	between	Tutsis	and	Hutus	in	the	army,	the	division	of	key	ministries	and	the	closure	of	the	regroupment	camps	(Southall	and	Bentley,	2005).	The	international	community	agreed	to	resume	international	aid,	which	meant	the	government	could	continue	paying	its	supporters	and	hold	onto	power.	Buyoya	was	 to	 continue	 leading	 the	 country	 for	 eighteen	months	
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until	1st	May	2003,	with	the	Hutu	FRODEBU	leader	Domitien	Ndayizeye	as	his	deputy.	Ndayizeye	was	to	take	over	the	presidency	on	that	date	until	elections	in	November	2004.	A	monitoring	group	was	also	set	up,	constituting	the	signatories	to	the	agreement,	members	of	the	international	community	and	leaders	of	civil	society	(Southall	and	Bentley,	2005).		
A	more	representative	government		The	Arusha	Accords	were	agreed	after	Nelson	Mandela	took	over	the	mediation	process,	 following	 the	 death	 of	 Julius	 Nyerere	 in	 1999.	 According	 to	 Roger	Southall	and	Kristina	Bentley,	Mandela’s	contribution	was	key	because	he	forced	the	 FAB	 to	 confront	 the	 main	 element	 of	 rebel	 mobilisation	 capacity;	 Tutsi	repression	 of	 Hutus	 (2005).	 However,	 he	 did	 this	 by	 also	 limiting	 the	 FAB’s	capacity	to	demobilise	rebel	support	through	organised	violence.	Mandela	visited	the	 population	 directly	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	 process.	 There	 is	 no	 documentary	evidence	of	what	he	discussed.	Southall	and	Bentley,	however,	claim	that	he	did	this	to	demonstrate	to	both	the	government	and	the	rebels	that	he	understood	how	 the	 population	 viewed	 the	 conflict	 and	 that	 he	 had	 popular	 support	 in	pursuing	his	path	to	peace	(2005;	p81).		Mandela	 forced	 the	 FAB	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 role	 of	 ethnicity	 in	 fuelling	 the	conflict	(Southall	and	Bentley,	2005).	Mandela	also	created	pressure	on	the	FAB	to	 adhere	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 the	Accords.	He	 got	 the	 international	 community	 to	agree	to	provide	the	government	financial	and	material	support	on	the	condition	the	 FAB	 stuck	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 deal	 and	 closed	 regroupment	 camps	(International	 Crisis	 Group,	 2002a).	 Up	 until	 this	 point,	 the	 camps	 had	represented	the	core	part	of	the	FAB’s	counterinsurgency	strategy.	That	the	FAB	sacrificed	the	main	component	of	its	strategy	for	demobilising	rebel	supporters	in	 exchange	 for	 the	 money	 it	 needed	 to	 pay	 its	 own	 supporters	 shows	 the	tightrope	governments	walk	when	expending	resources	to	put	down	rebellions.				The	FAB	 sacrificed	 its	 ability	 to	use	 its	 default	 strategy	 for	demobilising	 rebel	forces.	It	was	under	less	economic	strain	but	it	now	faced	a	rebel	group	that	had	
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external	sanctuary	in	Tanzania	and	control	over	peripheral	parts	of	the	country.	The	government	had	to	adhere	to	the	political	strategy	outlined	in	the	Accords	if	it	was	to	pursue	alternative	means	to	demobilise	the	CNDD-FDD.			The	 Arusha	 Accords	 also	 addressed	 the	 concerns	 of	 the	 Tutsi	 population,	ensuring	spoilers	did	not	scupper	the	deal.	Multiple	scholars	agree	that	this	was	one	 of	 the	 keys	 to	 the	 success	 of	 the	 Arusha	 Accords	 (Cheeseman,	 2011;	Reyntjens,	 2006;	 Sullivan,	 2005).	 David	 Sullivan	 (2005)	 shows	 that	 when	 the	Hutu	government	tried	to	reform	the	security	sector	in	1993	it	could	not	credibly	convince	Tutsis	that	it	did	not	intend	to	use	the	military	to	persecute	the	Tutsi	population.	 The	 FAB	 then	 came	 under	 pressure	 to	 depose	 the	 Hutu-led	government.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 Arusha	 Accords	 guaranteed	 the	 Tutsis	 retained	representation	 in	 state	 structures,	 including	 security	 organs	 (ibid.).	 Nic	Cheeseman	 argues	 this	 made	 the	 Tutsis	 more	 cohesive	 as	 a	 political-bloc,	undermining	the	voice	of	hardliners	that	had	deposed	the	government	in	1993	(2011).	Credible	security	guarantees	and	the	offer	of	political	representation	was	enough	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 Tutsi	 elites	 and	 population	 supported	 the	 political	reforms.			
Demobilising	the	rebels	
	The	Arusha	Accords	were	signed	in	2001,	but	it	was	a	further	two	years	before	the	CNDD-FDD	officially	signed	the	Pretoria	Protocol	that	marked	the	end	of	the	conflict.	The	protocol	provided	the	CNDD-FDD	with	positions	in	the	transitional	administration,	including	its	then	leader,	Pierre	Nkurunziza,	as	Minister	of	State	for	Good	Governance.	He	would	be	 consulted	on	all	matters	and	was	officially	third	in	rank	in	the	government	(Watt,	2008;	p80).	The	protocol	reiterated	a	fifty-fifty	 ethnic	 split	 in	 the	 army	 and	 police	 force,	 guaranteeing	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 a	percentage	of	those	positions.	Elections	would	be	held	in	2005,	with	quotas	for	Tutsis	 far	 above	 the	 proportion	 of	 the	 population	 and	 many	 FAB	 leaders	guaranteed	to	keep	their	positions	in	the	government	and	military	(Watt,	2008;	p82).	The	CNDD-FDD	essentially	agreed	to	participate	in	elections,	which	it	could	
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not	be	sure	it	would	win,	and	would	then	have	to	share	power	with	those	it	had	been	fighting.				In	2001	 the	rebels’	position	was	 that	 they	would	only	come	to	 the	negotiating	table	if	the	military	agreed	to	revert	to	the	1992	Constitution.	They	rejected	the	Arusha	Accords,	which	they	accused	of	institutionalising	ethnicity	(Watt,	2008;	p76).	 The	 election	 results	 of	 1993	 showed	 that	 they	 expected,	 under	 this	arrangement,	to	gain	absolute	control	of	the	instruments	of	the	state.	In	2001,	the	CNDD-FDD	 clearly	 felt	 they	 could	 achieve	 this	 by	 continuing	 the	 conflict.	Commentators	at	the	time	suggested	this	would	mean	the	Arusha	Accords	could	not	succeed	in	ending	the	war	(International	Crisis	Group,	2000).	However,	just	two	years	later	the	CNDD-FDD	agreed	to	participate	in	an	electoral	process,	which	it	originally	rejected	and	forced	it	to	share	power	with	those	it	had	been	fighting.	It	is	possible	this	reflected	battlefield	developments.	However,	there	is	very	little	that	one	can	point	to	that	suggests	this	was	the	case.	There	was	no	real	change	in	the	military	 stalemate	 that	 characterised	 the	 previous	 seven	 years	 of	 conflict;	offensives	 and	 counter	 offensives	 continued	 to	 cancel	 each	 other	 out	(International	Crisis	Group,	2002b).		If	anything,	we	might	have	expected	Arusha	to	strengthen	the	CNDD-FDD.	The	FAB’s	closure	of	many	regroupment	camps	meant	Hutus	communities	returning	to	 their	 towns,	 which	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 should	 have	 been	 able	 to	 exploit	 and	strengthen	 their	 organisation.	 It	 should	 have	 boosted	 rebel	 access	 to	 the	population	and	increased	the	material	and	financial	support	it	could	draw	from	these	 communities.	 	 The	 closing	 of	 the	 camps	 also	 disseminated	 thousands	 of	young	 Hutus	 across	 the	 country,	 aggrieved	 at	 the	 Tutsi	 military	 for	 unjustly	incarcerating	 them,	 all	 potential	 recruits	 for	 rebel	 forces	 (Lemarchand,	 2009;	p164).			Moreover,	the	military	government	was	constrained	in	its	capacity	to	ever	reopen	the	regroupment	camps	due	to	its	need	to	maintain	international	support.	Viewed	in	this	way	the	CNDD-FDD	was	in	its	strongest	position	of	the	war,	reflected	in	their	initial	rejection	of	the	Accords.	By	2003,	however,	they	did	little	more	than	
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secure	 increased	 oversight	 over	 the	 Arusha	 process	 in	 the	 Pretoria	 Protocol,	suggesting	they	were	weaker	in	2003	than	in	2001.			We	can	trace	why	this	happened	by	looking	at	the	sources	that	examined	popular	responses	to	the	Accords	(Nindonera,	2012;	Schraml,	2010;	Southall	and	Bentley,	2005;	 Uvin,	 2008;	 Vervisch	 and	 Titeca,	 2010).	 The	 FAB’s	 previous	 behaviour	created	scepticism	amongst	Hutus	that	it	would	adhere	to	the	terms	of	Arusha.	However,	Mandela	built	in	a	number	of	mechanisms	to	ensure	its	progress	could	be	effectively	monitored.	By	insisting	on	a	firm	timeline	for	the	political	transition	and	creating	the	Implementation	Monitoring	Committee,	Mandela	gave	both	the	rebels	and	the	population	a	clear	means	of	assessing	the	FAB’s	commitment	to	honouring	the	Accords	(International	Crisis	Group,	2002b).	Most	importantly	the	1st	May	date	for	transition	of	the	presidency	to	a	Hutu	gave	both	the	population	and	 the	 rebel	 groups	 a	 clear	 trip	 wire	 against	 which	 to	 measure	 the	 Tutsi	military’s	 commitment	 to	 extending	 governance	 to	 disenfranchised	 Hutus	(International	 Crisis	 Group,	 2002b).	 This	made	 it	much	 harder	 for	 the	 FAB	 to	cheat,	which	undermined	the	CNDD-FDD’s	message	that	force	was	the	only	means	for	Hutus	to	secure	the	political	benefits	the	rebels	were	promising.			Mandela’s	aim	of	putting	bottom-up	pressure	on	the	CNDD-FDD	began,	therefore,	to	bear	fruit.	Peter	Uvin,	 in	Life	after	Violence,	conducted	numerous	 interviews	with	civilians	and	showed	that	the	population	believed	political	elites	had	come	up	with	a	deal	 that	addressed	ethnic	relations,	meaning	support	 for	 the	rebels	began	 to	 wane	 (2008).	 Carla	 Schraml	 documents	 a	 bashingantahe,	 in	 2008,	explaining	 his	 confusion	 as	 to	why	 the	 FNL	 continued	 to	 fight	 after	 2004.	 He	describes	 it	 as	 a	 "Hutu	 rebellion	 against	 a	Hutu	 government"	 (2010;	 p264),	 a	rebellion	that	ultimately	achieved	few	of	its	aims.			Willy	Nindonera’s	interviews	with	former	foot	soldiers	of	the	CNDD-FDD	is	even	more	illuminating	in	that	it	shows	this	having	a	direct	effect	on	rebel	strength.	In	many	places,	fighters	actually	began	to	lay	down	their	arms	and	return	to	their	communities.	These	fighters	felt	the	political	transition	outlined	in	Arusha	meant	there	 was	 no	 longer	 any	 meaningful	 reason	 to	 fight	 (Nindonera,	 2012).	 An	
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eagerness	to	engage	in	the	new	political	system,	combined	with	pressure	from	Tanzania,	 also	 led	 significant	 numbers	 of	 refugees	 to	 return	 home.	 Interviews	with	refugees	at	the	time	shows	that	they	wanted	to	return,	but	only	if	the	peace	process	 showed	 signs	 of	 success	 (Southall	 and	 Bentley,	 2005;	 p130).	 This	weakened	the	CNDD-FDD’s	capacity	to	draw	support	from	outside	of	the	country	and	 meant	 this	 part	 of	 the	 population	 now	 supported	 the	 government	 by	endorsing	the	political	process.	Having	developed	extensive	political	links	within	the	 population,	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 assimilated	 the	 changing	 mood	 quickly	 and	recognised	that,	in	order	to	continue	receiving	the	support	of	the	population,	they	had	to	engage	with	the	peace	process	(Nindonera,	2012).	Actual	rebel	numbers	seem	 to	 be	 less	well	 documented	 than	 any	 of	 the	 other	 three	 conflicts	 in	 this	thesis.	 However,	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 Arusha	 Accords	 had	 on	 rebel	 strength	 is	backed	up	by	the	data	on	rebel	numbers	 from	Reed	Wood’s	dataset	(2010).	 In	2001,	the	rebels	had	23,000	members,	in	2002	this	was	cut	to	13,000,	as	shown	in	figure	17.			
	Figure	17:	Balance	of	power	and	force	strengths	from	1998.	Data	taken	from	Reed	Wood’s	dataset	(2010).50	Numbers	in	bars	represent	thousands	of	troops.		
																																																						
50	Wood’s	dataset	only	has	data	on	CNDD-FDD	numbers	from	1998.	
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This	pressure	explains	why	the	CNDD-FDD	made	significant	concessions	in	2003,	when	in	2001	it	had	been	determined	to	keep	fighting.	Political	reform	had	the	exact	effect	predicted	by	the	theories	underpinning	this	thesis.	It	undermined	the	ability	 of	 the	CNDD-FDD	 to	 generate	 the	 support	 it	 needed	 to	 sustain	military	activity.	As	it	was	losing	the	ability	to	generate	population	support	and	recognised	the	government	was	now	secure,	having	had	economic	sanctions	removed,	 the	CNDD-FDD	 clearly	 felt	 it	 had	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 take	 the	 political	 deal	 it	 had	previously	rejected.	The	civil	war	came	to	an	end.				
Battlefield	dynamics	
	The	 analysis	 above	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 key	 dynamics	 of	 the	 conflict	 –	 the	beginning,	the	decision	of	the	FAB	to	implement	political	reform	and	the	outcome	–	 can	 all	 be	 explained	by	 examining	 how	key	 events	 affected	 the	mobilisation	capacities	of	the	FAB	and	the	CNDD-FDD.	Equally,	military	interaction	between	the	CNDD-FDD	and	the	FAB	fails	to	explain	the	outcome.	Data	on	rebel	numbers	shows	the	CNDD-FDD	was	outnumbered	throughout	the	conflict-years	that	data	on	rebel	numbers	is	available	(see	figure	17),	although	they	did	reach	an	almost	two-to-one	disadvantage	in	2001	(R.M.	Wood,	2010).	Direct	CNDD-FDD	attacks	on	the	military	were	largely	guerrilla	in	nature,	and	tended	to	focus	on	securing	key	 facilitation	routes	rather	 than	 furthering	territorial	control	 (Human	Rights	Watch,	1998).			The	CNDD-FDD	chose	its	level	of	military	activity	not	to	directly	defeat	the	FAB.	Instead	it	chose	a	military	strategy	that	exacerbated	Hutu	grievances	against	the	Tutsi-dominated	government,	improving	its	capacity	to	generate	support.	There	was	no	need	to	defeat	the	Tutsi-military	directly	to	achieve	this	effect.	The	war	drifted	into	a	stalemate,	with	the	rebels	attempting	to	weaken	the	government	economically	and	politically	(International	Crisis	Group,	2002b).	The	economic	strain	and	the	political	networks	the	CNDD-FDD	created	showed	it	was	having	the	desired	effect.	Once	its	military	activity	ceased	to	have	this	effect,	due	to	the	shift	in	FAB	strategy,	it	was	forced	to	engage	with	the	political	process.		
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Similarly,	 the	 government	 almost	 exclusively	 used	 its	military	 forces	 to	 shape	population	behaviour,	rather	than	demobilise	the	CNDD-FDD	directly.	When	this	tactic	 led	 to	 the	 economic	 pressure	 that	 meant	 it	 was	 struggling	 to	 mobilise	support	 from	 its	 constituent	 population,	 it	was	 forced	 into	 political	 reform	 in	exchange	for	the	ending	of	international	sanctions.			It	is	clear	that	in	Burundi,	belligerent	perceptions	about	the	progress	of	the	war	were	 shaped	 by	 changes	 in	 their	 capacity	 to	 generate	 population	 support	 as	predicted	in	chapter	two.			
	
Post-2003	
	While	 this	 thesis	 is	 primarily	 concerned	with	 how	 the	war	 in	 Burundi	 ended,	rather	than	how	peace	was	maintained,	the	issues	that	threatened	to	derail	the	political	transition	are	also	illuminating.		
	
Preparing	for	elections	
	Unlike	 in	 so	 many	 conflicts	 worldwide,	 the	 promised	 level	 of	 CNDD-FDD	demobilisation	caused	few	problems51	(Reyntjens,	2006).	As	many	rebel	fighters	did	not	receive	a	wage,	and	perceived	their	work	to	have	been	done,	they	simply	returned	 to	 their	 communities	 (Uvin,	 2008;	 p173).	 Overall,	 security	considerations	seem	to	have	played	only	a	limited	role	in	potentially	derailing	the	process.	One	would	think	that	the	rebels	would	be	keen	to	neutralise	the	FAB’s	military	 force	 as	quickly	 as	possible,	 and	vice	versa.	However,	 accounts	of	 the	transition	do	not	suggest	that	subsequent	delays	in	balancing	the	security	forces	threatened	the	process	(International	Crisis	Group,	2004).	The	CNDD-FDD	would	have	known	that	the	international	community	was	constraining	the	FAB’s	ability	to	violate	agreements	and	re-pursue	a	policy	of	Hutu	persecution.	It	is	reasonable	
																																																						51	That	is	not	to	say	there	were	no	problems.	The	CNDD-FDD,	for	example,	deliberately	swelled	its	ranks	before	demobilising	in	order	to	over-represent	its	strength	(Nindonera,	2012).	However,	no	accounts	of	the	conflict	seem	to	suggest	that	it	was	a	major	impediment	to	political	transition.	
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to	have	expected	some	mistrust	after	years	of	the	Tutsi	military	backtracking	on	promises	of	political	reform	(Nindonera,	2012).	This	mistrust	manifested	itself	first	 and	 foremost	 in	 a	 reluctance	 by	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 to	 disband	 its	 political	structures	rather	than	its	military	forces	(Uvin,	2008).			Most	commentators	have	pointed	out	 that	 the	CNDD-FDD’s	political	structures	allowed	it	to	mobilise	electoral	support	(Lemarchand,	2009;	Southall	and	Bentley,	2005;	Uvin,	2008).	It	would	also	clearly	give	them	the	option	of	relaunching	the	insurgency	 if	 the	FAB	did	exploit	 the	political	process	 to	 eliminate	CNDD-FDD	political	 leaders.	 To	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 these	 political	 networks	 allowed	 them	 to	mobilise	support	as	necessary,	be	it	for	elections	or	military	activity,	and	this	was	the	basis	of	the	CNDD-FDD’s	power.			The	CNDD-FDD	was	so	successful	on	this	front	that	interim	President	Ndayizeze	considered	 delaying	 the	 elections	 (Reyntjens,	 2006).	He	 tried	 to	 speed	 up	 the	demobilisation	process	and	slowed	the	appointment	of	regional	political	officials	(Southall	and	Bentley,	2005).	He	also	tried	to	prevent	refugees	from	returning	in	time	to	vote	(ibid.).	The	CNDD-FDD	threatened	to	quit	the	process	at	this	point,	but	 even	 went	 so	 far	 as	 to	 cite	 that	 security	 considerations	 were	 proceeding	smoothly,	 to	 include	military	 integration.	 However,	 they	 considered	 delays	 in	appointing	regional	officials	a	threat	to	transition	as	it	limited	their	links	to	the	population	(Southall	and	Bentley,	2005).	Ultimately	Ndayizeze	was	not	powerful	enough	to	make	a	play	for	power	by	himself	and	ceded	to	CNDD-FDD	demands.	Even	during	the	political	transition,	the	conflict	continued	to	be	fought	through	the	population.	Both	sides	recognised	that	the	key	to	their	power	was	the	political	structures	they	used	to	generate	support	from	the	population.		
	
Democracy…	or	not?	
	One	 important	 lesson	 to	 take	 from	 Burundi	 is	 that	 it	 cannot	 be	 said	 to	 have	transitioned	to	full	democracy.	Commentators	have	been	extremely	critical	of	the	Burundian	 peace	 process	 for	 excluding	 civil	 society	 and	 institutionalising	ethnicity	(Daley,	2006a,	2006b;	Vervisch	and	Titeca,	2010).	The	Tutsis	retained	
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significantly	 more	 power	 proportionally	 compared	 to	 their	 numbers	 in	 the	broader	population.	However,	interviews	with	Burundians	after	the	conflict	show	that	their	explicit	demands	were	for	improved	societal	cohesion,	security	and	fair	access	 to	 economic	 opportunities.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	 population	 is	unconcerned	with	 specific	 details	 of	 the	 political	 processes,	 but	 reflect	 on	 the	opportunities	they	think	political	deals	are	likely	to	offer.	In	Burundi,	the	Arusha	Accords	 addressed	 ethnic	 access	 to	 instruments	 of	 the	 state	 and,	 therefore,	convinced	 the	 population	 that	 their	 needs	 would	 be	 met	 (Uvin,	 2008;	 p52).	Addressing	 these	 concerns	 built	 support	 for	 the	 process,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 put	pressure	on	both	the	FAB	and	the	CNDD-FDD	to	work	within	its	confines,	ending	the	conflict.	Whether	 this	gives	political	elites	 in	Burundi	an	 incentive	 to	build	support	by	appealing	to	ethnicity,	as	suggested	by	Patricia	Daley	(2006a;	p314),	is	another	question.		
	
Shaping	strategy	
	The	conflict	in	Burundi	is	also	interesting	in	that	it	shows	how	a	number	of	factors	shape	belligerents’	strategies	for	shaping	popular	support.			
External	actors	
	The	most	obvious	way	external	support	altered	the	behaviour	of	the	belligerents	was	the	pressure	the	FAB	came	under	in	order	to	secure	international	aid	to	pay	its	 military	 and	 civil	 service.	 International	 sanctions	 also	 contributed	 to	 the	economic	strain	that	forced	the	government	to	move	away	from	containing	the	rebels	by	violently	punishing	its	support-base	(Krueger	and	Krueger,	2007).	The	FAB’s	 external	 support	 was	 predicated	 on	 it	 attempting	 to	 shape	 population	behaviour	by	offering	it	political	benefits.				In	contrast,	the	rebel’s	access	to	external	support	did	not	have	the	expected	effect.	The	 CNDD-FDD	 undoubtedly	 received	 crucial	 funding	 and	 supplies	 from	 their	diaspora,	 Tanzania,	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Congo	 and	 Rwandan	 armed	groups.	This	also	allowed	them	to	establish	bases	across	borders	from	which	they	
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could	launch	attacks	(Dilworth,	2006).	It	is	difficult	to	measure	the	value	of	this	support,	but	it	almost	certainly	acted	as	a	significant	force	multiplier.	What	it	did	not	do,	however,	was	shift	 their	 focus	away	 from	generating	support	 from	the	population	 through	 creating	 sovereign	 structures	 that	 provided	 economic	 and	political	incentives	to	the	population.	Beardsley	and	McQuinn’s	finding	that	rebels	with	 significant	 external	 support	 are	 more	 prone	 to	 violence	 as	 a	 means	 of	drawing	support	from	the	population	(2009)	does	not	appear	to	find	support	in	Burundi.	 Nor	 does	 it	 appear	 that	 external	 pressure	 pushed	 the	 rebels	 into	agreeing	 to	 a	 ceasefire	 and	participating	 in	 the	political	 process.	 Tanzania	 did	withdraw	 its	 support	 for	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 shortly	 before	 it	 chose	 to	 negotiate	(Watt,	 2008).	 However,	 this	 external	 support	was	 replaced	 following	 regional	tension	involving	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	and	Rwanda,	which	meant	rebel	groups	across	the	region	could	still	access	arms	and	supplies	as	required	(International	Crisis	Group,	2006).		
	
Personalities	
	A	 number	 of	 personalities	 also	 played	 a	 role	 in	 shaping	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	belligerents.	Clearly	Nelson	Mandela’s	influence	was	crucial	in	creating	bottom-up	 pressure	 on	 both	 belligerents	 to	 lay	 down	 their	 arms.	 Without	 Mandela’s	insights	it	is	not	clear	that	international	pressure	would	have	forced	the	FAB	to	behave	in	a	way	that	simultaneously	strengthened	it	and	undermined	support	for	the	rebels.	Mandela’s	role	in	the	Burundi	shows	the	importance	of	both	exploiting	ripe	moments	(Zartman,	2001)	and	astute	mediation	(Maresca,	1996).				Changes	 in	 leadership	 of	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 also	 altered	 its	 strategy	 through	 the	conflict.	According	to	Willy	Nindonera,	the	CNDD-FDD	became	much	more	unified	as	 a	movement	when	Pierre	Nkurunziza	 took	over	 the	 leadership	 in	2001.	He	maintained	 much	 closer	 relations	 than	 his	 predecessor,	 Jean-Bosco	Ndayikengurukiye,	with	his	foot	soldiers,	political	networks	and	the	population.	Willy	 Nindonera	 believes	 this	 made	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 more	 likely	 to	 pursue	negotiations	 because	 Nkurunziza	 was	 more	 responsive	 to	 the	 wishes	 of	 his	
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supporters	and	better	able	to	bring	the	whole	movement	with	him	(2012;	pp17-18).			
Conclusion		The	conflict	in	Burundi	lends	strong	support	to	the	main	hypotheses	of	this	thesis	and	the	theoretical	implications	of	the	model	developed	in	chapter	two.	Table	20	summarises	 the	 key	 findings	 along	 with	 the	 conflict	 dynamics.	 Both	 the	government	and	rebels	generated	support	by	developing	political	networks	that	facilitated	 the	 delivery	 of	 direct	 within-war	 incentives,	 lending	 support	 to	hypotheses	three.	The	rebels	built	support	in	the	first	place	by	building	networks	that	created	reciprocal	relations	with	the	population.	 In	return,	 the	population	provided	 the	 rebels	 manpower,	 food	 and	 finances.	 The	 FAB,	 however,	undermined	 this	 support	 by	 delivering	 democratic	 reform,	 undermining	 the	CNDD-FDD’s	capacity	to	generate	support.	This	brought	the	conflict	to	an	end	in	a	mixed	outcome,	as	both	the	rebels	and	the	leaders	of	the	FAB	took	positions	in	the	government	and	control	over	security	organs	was	shared.	Changes	in	macro-political	structures	conditioned	population	behaviour	exactly	as	expected,	which,	in	turn,	shaped	the	decisions	of	conflict	actors	exactly	as	predicted.			It	is	perhaps	unsurprising	that	Burundi’s	civil	war	shows	strong	support	for	the	role	of	democratic	reform	in	ending	civil	wars,	given	it	was	selected	as	a	‘typical	case’	in	this	regard.	Burundi	also,	however,	supports	other	insights	implied	by	the	theoretical	model;	albeit	the	effect	of	these	variables	was	not	enough	to	end	the	war.	 The	 FAB’s	 use	 of	 violence	 and	 displacing	 the	 population	 into	 camps	weakened	the	economy,	creating	such	pressure	on	the	FAB	government	that	 it	came	close	to	collapse.	The	population	also	supported	the	respective	belligerents	and	engaged	in	the	political	process	in	order	to	secure	protection.			In	summary,	the	conflict	in	Burundi	supports	the	model	of	war	proposed	in	thesis	extremely	well.	Rebel	strength	came	from	undermining	government	power,	and	their	ability	build	support	from	the	population.	The	costs	of	the	conflict	pushed	the	 government	 close	 to	 collapse,	 forcing	 it	 to	 engage	 in	political	 reform	even	
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though	it	appeared	comfortable	on	the	battlefield.	The	reform	brought	economic	relief,	ending	any	chance	of	the	government	collapsing.	 It	also	undermined	the	CNDD-FDD’s	capacity	 to	regenerate	resources	spent	on	the	conflict.	The	rebels	were	forced	to	engage	in	a	process	they	originally	rejected,	or	face	slowly	fading	away.								
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Table	20:	Summary	of	Burundi	conflict	dynamics	and	key	findings.		 	
Date	 Events	 Conflict	dynamics	
(table	3)	 Key	drivers	of	change	 Rebel	regenerative	capacity	 Government	control	over	the	state	 Sub-hypotheses	
supported	1993-2001	 Onset	 Asymmetric	warfare	(Q3).		No	change	in	conflict	dynamics.		
Assassination	of	Hutu	prime	minister,	Melchior	Ndadaye,	leads	to	ethnic	violence	between	Hutus	and	Tutsis.		
Community	militias	join	rebel	forces	for	protection	and	to	combat	political	exclusion.			Rebels	shadow-political	structures	provide	population	ability	to	grow	crops	and	trade,	which	is	then	taxed.			Networks	in	refugee	camps.		External	support.		Government	regroupment	camps	limit	rebel	capacity	to	interact	with	Hutu	population.	
Government	no	longer	able	to	control	rural	areas.		Government	forces	Hutus	into	regroupment	camps	to	limit	contact	with	insurgency.		Government	struggles	to	generate	economic	resources	to	pay	military	and	civil	service.		Reportedly	on	brink	of	collapse	in	2000.	
2,	3	&	4	
2001-2003	 Arusha	Accords		Conflict	ends	-	mixed	outcome	
Asymmetric	warfare	(Q3).		Reduction	in	rebel	power	forces	engagement	in	political	process.	
Government	agrees	to	political	reform	in	exchange	for	easing	of	economic	sanctions.	
Fighters	starts	laying	down	weapons	and	refugees	return	to	Burundi	to	take	advantage	of	political	reform.			Rebel	capacity	to	generate	support	significantly	reduced.	
Lifting	of	economic	sanctions	enables	government	to	deliver	socioeconomic	incentives	to	Tutsi	population	to	mobilise	support	into	civil	service	and	military.			No	longer	able	to	use	violence	to	control	Hutus,	relies	on	promise	of	political	reform	instead.	
2	&	3	
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Chapter	seven	
A	‘typical’	rebel	victory:	Cambodia	1968-197552	
	
Introduction	
	The	statistical	model	suggests	there	was	a	72	percent	chance	of	a	Khmer	Rouge	victory	in	Cambodia	in	1975,	making	it	the	best-predicted	government	defeat.	Life	expectancy	had	dropped	by	six	years	to	36	in	the	previous	three	years	and	GDP	per	 capita	 had	 dropped	 35	 percent	 to	 US$704.	 The	 significant	 decline	 in	socioeconomic	conditions	explains	why	the	model	forecasts	a	rebel	victory	with	such	high	probability,	despite	other	variables	being	contraindicated.	The	size	of	the	military,	for	example,	had	actually	increased	by	twenty	people	per	thousand	in	the	population	in	the	years	preceding	1975.	Moreover,	neither	the	rebels	nor	the	government	were	receiving	external	support	at	the	end	of	the	war,	although	the	USA	and	North	Vietnam	both	played	a	significant	role	in	the	final	outcome.	Cambodia,	therefore,	offers	the	opportunity	to	explore	why	governments	losing	the	capacity	to	deliver	socioeconomic	incentives	to	its	population	lose	civil	wars.	The	 historical	 record	 shows	 that,	 as	 predicted,	 the	 population	 increasingly	refused	to	support	the	government,	facilitating	its	final	collapse.	In	contrast,	the	Khmer	Rouge	created	political	structures	that	allowed	it	to	continue	generating	support,	despite	being	the	smaller	force	and	performing	poorly	on	the	battlefield.			Cambodia	is	a	particularly	interesting	case	for	a	number	of	reasons.	Firstly,	the	population	was	extremely	well	segmented	through	most	of	the	conflict,	with	rebel	and	government	sovereignty	clearly	divided	territorially.	The	Khmer	Rouge,	at	least	in	the	second	phase	of	the	conflict,	did	not	have	to	compete	with	established	government	institutions	to	build	relations	with	the	population	in	the	areas	it	was	strongest.	The	clearer	division	of	sovereignty	resulted	from	the	North	Vietnamese	intervention	in	the	conflict	on	the	side	of	the	rebels,	which	was	countered	by	the	
																																																						52	The	Cambodian	war	is	normally	recorded	in	datasets	as	starting	in	1968	as	this	is	when	violence	passed	the	threshold	for	inclusion	in	most	datasets.	However,	most	historians	identify	the	Samlaut	Rebellion	in	1967	as	the	start	of	the	conflict.	Ben	Kiernan	(1982b),	claims	it	took	the	Khmer	Rouge	a	period	of	months	to	organise	the	initial	outbreaks	of	violence	into	an	organised	insurgency.		
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US	supporting	the	government.	The	nature	of	these	interventions	was	decisive	in	the	final	outcome	and	demonstrates	the	importance	of	conflict	actors	exploiting	external	 support	 to	 build	 resilient	 relations	 with	 the	 population.	 The	 Khmer	Rouge	 used	North	 Vietnamese	 support	 to	 build	 resilient	 sovereign	 structures,	while	the	government	assumed	that	external	military	support	alone	would	win	it	the	war.			The	war	can	be	broken	down	into	two	distinct	phases;	1967	to	1970	and	1970	to	1975.	The	government	changed	in	1970,	when	General	Lon	Nol	deposed	Prince	Norodom	Sihanouk.	The	latter	then	pledged	his	support	to	the	rebels.	Despite	this	I	 treat	 ‘the	government’	 as	a	 single	actor	 throughout	 the	conflict.	Lon	Nol	was	prime	minister	from	1966	and	directed	the	government’s	response	to	the	conflict	even	before	1970	(Kiernan,	1982a).	Equally,	even	after	switching	his	support	to	the	Khmer	Rouge,	Sihanouk	played	no	visible	role	in	prosecuting	the	war.	There	were	factions	in	the	Khmer	Rouge,	which	Pol	Pot	had	to	control	at	various	times	in	 the	 conflict.	 However,	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 was	 relatively	 cohesive	 and	 the	internal	dynamics	of	the	group	appear	to	have	played	a	limited	role	in	the	final	outcome	(Kiernan,	1983).	That	is	not	to	say	that	Prince	Sihanouk	did	not	have	an	important	role	in	the	conflict.	His	support	for	the	government	first,	then	the	rebels	did	assist	both	parties	in	generating	support.	Neverthless,	decision-making	over	the	conflict	lay	with	the	government	of	Lon	Nol	and	the	Khmer	Rouge,	headed	by	Pol	Pot.			The	following	chapter	will	start	by	outlining	how	changes	 in	the	period	before	1967	 created	 an	 opportunity	 for	 the	Khmer	Rouge	 to	 build	 support.	 The	 next	section	 will	 examine	 how	 the	 belligerents	 sought	 to	 influence	 population	behaviour	in	the	period	1967	to	1970.	In	1970,	the	war	became	internationalised	as	 North	 Vietnam	 and	 the	 USA	 intervened,	 changing	 the	 capacity	 of	 both	 the	government	and	the	rebels	to	shape	population	behaviour.	The	next	part	of	the	chapter	will	analyse	the	war	from	1970	to	its	conclusion	and	show	how	the	final	outcome	can	be	directly	attributed	to	belligerent	relations	with	the	population	and	 their	 ability	 to	 generate	 support.	 The	 final	 parts	 will	 examine	 battlefield	
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interaction	and	explore	what	 factors	affected	 the	conflict	 strategies	of	 the	 two	belligerents.			
1967	–	the	beginning	of	the	conflict	
	
Norodom	Sihanouk	–	last	of	the	‘god-kings’			Before	 1966,	Norodom	Sihanouk	 retained	power	 by	 balancing	 and	weakening	potential	political	threats	(Kiernan,	2004).	Despite	the	appearance	of	a	popular	vote,	in	all	elections	before	1966,	Sihanouk	handpicked	parliamentary	candidates	to	balance	positions	in	the	Sangkum	(Cambodian	parliament)	between	left-	and	right-wing	forces	(Vickery,	1982).	In	trying	to	balance	these	forces,	however,	a	significant	urban-rural	divide	developed	(Chindawongse,	1991).	The	urban	elite	lived	the	high-life,	sustained	by	huge	levels	of	corruption.	The	standard	of	living	in	the	capital,	Phnom	Penh,	 improved	significantly	 for	many	people	during	the	early	1960s	(Kiernan,	1982b).	Life	in	rural	areas,	in	contrast,	became	significantly	harder.	 Many	 peasants	 relied	 on	 the	 government	 purchasing	 rice.	 In	 1963,	Sihanouk	cut	 ties	with	 the	USA,	believing	 that	North	Vietnam	would	soon	take	over	South	Vietnam	(Heder,	1979).	The	resultant	loss	of	aid	reduced	the	price	the	government	 could	 afford	 to	 pay	 peasants	 for	 this	 rice	 (Chandler,	 2012).	 A	significant	 landless	population	emerged	 in	many	parts	of	 the	Cambodian	 state	(Kiernan,	1982b).			Despite	the	decline	in	living	standards,	Sihanouk	remained	popular	in	rural	areas	and	 commentators	 described	 Cambodia	 as	 the	 oasis	 of	 peace	 in	 Indochina	(Lancaster,	1972).	Khmer	Rouge	leadership	lamented	Sihanouk’s	authority	and	saw	it	as	the	main	obstacle	to	building	revolutionary	momentum	(Kiernan,	2004;	p191).	 Sihanouk	 was	 also	 clever	 at	 undermining	 communist	 rhetoric.	 The	majority	 of	 the	 Cambodian	 populace	 was	 Buddhist	 and	 Sihanouk	 portrayed	parties	claiming	to	represent	them,	such	as	the	Khmer	Rouge,	as	anti-religious	(Vickery,	1982).	Moreover,	observers	remarked	on	the	degree	of	political	apathy	within	the	peasantry,	and	that	they	had	little	understanding	of	national	politics	(Thion,	1983).	While	they	lived	in	poverty	compared	to	their	urban	cousins,	they	
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did	 not	 necessarily	 recognise	 this,	 and	 despite	 the	 falling	 price	 in	 rice,	 most	peasants	 made	 up	 the	 difference	 selling	 rice	 across	 the	 border	 to	 North	Vietnamese	 forces	 fighting	 in	South	Vietnam	(Heder,	1979).	The	Khmer	Rouge	themselves	lamented	this	feature	of	Cambodian	society.	The	official	history	of	the	Khmer	 Rouge	 points	 to	 this	 as	 a	 time	 of	 consolidation	 and	 creating	 internal	cohesion.	 In	 practice,	 this	 translated	 into	 developing	 clandestine	 political	networks	 in	 villages	 across	 rural	 Cambodia	 (Communist	 Party	 of	 Kampuchea,	Eastern	Region	Military	Political	Service,	1973).		
1966	–	the	rise	of	the	right	
	By	1966,	pressure	from	the	right-wing	on	Sihanouk	was	becoming	too	much	to	bear.	 In	 a	 supposed	 bid	 to	 end	 corruption	 and	 rejuvenate	 the	 Cambodian	economy	 after	 the	 loss	 of	 US	 aid,	 Sihanouk	 had	 nationalised	major	 industries,	including	 the	 banking	 sector.	 This	 just	 exacerbated	 corruption	 and	 further	stagnated	the	economy	(Short,	2005).	Amongst	the	urban	elite	and	army	there	were	 increasing	 calls	 for	 Sihanouk’s	 removal	 (Lancaster,	 1972).	 In	 order	 to	undercut	these	ruminations,	Sihanouk	dropped	his	policy	of	fixing	parliamentary	candidates	 in	 1966.	 He	 also	 focused	 state	 media	 on	 undermining	 leftist	candidates.	As	a	consequence	of	this	campaign,	combined	with	the	right-wing’s	greater	capacity	to	exploit	the	electoral	system	to	corruptly	assure	victory,	the	right	 dominated	 the	 new	 parliament,	 winning	 81	 out	 of	 84	 seats	 (Lancaster,	1972).	Sihanouk	retained	a	position	as	nominal	head	of	state	and	the	ability	to	influence	 government	 policy.	 However,	 the	 right-wing	 now	 had	much	 greater	influence	over	governance.	One	could	see	this	as	a	disaster	for	the	Khmer	Rouge;	it	 gave	 its	 arch	 enemy	 much	 greater	 control	 of	 state	 apparatus	 to	 combat	communist	groups	as	well	as	allying	the	army	with	the	government,	as	the	new	prime	minister,	Lon	Nol,	was	a	senior	general	(Osbourne,	2004).	However,	Philip	Short,	in	his	biography	of	Pol	Pot,	shows	how	Pot	identified	this	event	as	a	major	boon.	The	policies	of	the	new	government	gave	the	Khmer	Rouge	a	new	capacity	to	generate	discontent	amongst	 the	peasantry	and	build	support	 (Short,	2005;	p164).			
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The	 new	 government	 forced	 the	 peasantry	 to	 sell	 rice	 to	 the	 government	 at	extremely	 low	prices	 (Heder,	1979).	Members	of	 left-wing	groups	were	either	forced	 out	 of	 Phnom	 Penh	 or	 chose	 to	 leave	 believing	 there	was	 now	 limited	chance	of	effecting	political	change	through	peaceful	means	(Vickery,	1982).	The	Khmer	Rouge	then	began	to	use	the	clandestine	networks	it	had	developed	in	the	countryside,	bolstered	by	the	influx	of	new	intellectuals,	to	generate	propaganda	aimed	 at	 building	 support	 from	 the	 rural	 population.	 The	 rebels’	 point	 of	reference	for	this	propaganda	was	now	Lon	Nol,	rather	than	Sihanouk.	Whereas	the	pre-1966	period	saw	peasants	live	in	significant	hardship,	the	rural	populace	continued	to	believe	that	Sihanouk	had	its	best	interests	at	heart.	Lon	Nol	held	no	such	authority,	meaning	part	of	 the	population	now	perceived	support	 for	 the	rebels	as	offering	a	larger	potential	benefit	(Short,	2005).	The	Khmer	Rouge	used	a	combination	of	incipient	political	networks	it	had	established	in	rural	areas,	and	political	parties	expelled	from	Phnom	Penh	to	shape	population	behaviour	in	the	rebel’s	favour.	In	1967,	small-scale	violence	erupted,	in	what	was	known	as	the	‘Samlaut	rebellion’	(Kiernan,	1982a).	The	government	retained	control	of	a	much	larger	army,	but	the	rebels	now	had	the	ability	to	draw	enough	support	to	sustain	limited	military	activity;	a	state	of	war	and	dual	sovereignty	prevailed.			
1967-1970	–	Limited	violence	
	
The	Sangkum	responds		
	The	 government	 first	 tried	 to	 undermine	 rebel	 ability	 to	 generate	 support	through	the	use	of	violence.	The	government	harshly	repressed	local	outbreaks	of	 violence,	 razing	 villages	 and	 murdering	 anyone	 suspected	 of	 supporting	communist	groups	(Kiernan,	1982a).	Sihanouk	blamed	urban	political	parties	for	the	rising	unrest.	This	led	to	a	ramping	up	of	security	operations	against	left-wing	parties	and	university	groups	in	Phnom	Penh,	with	large	numbers	arrested.	Those	members	that	had	remained	in	the	city	after	the	victory	of	the	right	in	1966	began	to	link	up	with	rebel	leaders	in	the	countryside	(Vickery,	1982).				
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The	new	government’s	political	and	economic	policy	also	further	disenfranchised	segments	of	the	rural	population.	Lon	Nol	tried	to	improve	the	effectiveness	of	local	government	institutions	but	as	a	means	to	aid	in	suppressing	opposition,	not	as	 an	 alternative	 to	 potential	 rebel	 supporters.	 Outposts	 were	 established	 in	isolated	regions	to	enforce	the	rice	collection	policy	and	prevent	peasants	from	trading	with	North	Vietnamese	forces	(Kiernan,	2004).	The	government	replaced	civilian	administrators	with	military	 figures	 in	areas	afflicted	by	violence,	who	then	employed	their	forces	in	destroying	communities	suspected	of	supporting	rebellious	activity	(Kiernan,	2004).			For	Lon	Nol,	the	rural	population	was	of	secondary	concern.	Parliament’s	main	aim	was	 to	 signal	 to	 the	 urban	 population	 that	 it	 was	 addressing	 corruption,	reforming	 the	 economy	 and	 protecting	 the	 urban	 population	 from	 left-wing	violence	 (Tully,	 2010).	 The	 rebels	were	 still	 extremely	weak	 at	 this	 stage	 and	parliament	remained	well	supported	in	urban	areas	throughout	the	initial	phases	of	the	conflict.					
Sihanouk’s	counterinsurgency	
	In	contrast	to	parliament,	Sihanouk	continued	his	attempts	to	balance	Cambodia’s	political	 forces.	He	gave	 the	Sangkum	a	 free	hand	 to	pursue	 its	violence-based	approach	to	undermining	support	for	the	Khmer	Rouge.	However,	he	also	tried	to	motivate	popular	support	in	rural	areas	through	a	combination	of	political	and	economic	incentives	(Henderson	and	Pike,	1971).	He	visited	afflicted	areas	and	provided	 the	 population	 with	 food,	 clothing	 and	 promised	 to	 build	 roads	(Kiernan,	 2004).	 He	 also	 raised	 counter-protests	 across	 the	 country.	 These	stymied	 rebel	 efforts	 to	 build	 support	 in	many	 areas	 as	 it	 signalled	 just	 how	popular	and	powerful	Sihanouk	remained	(Kiernan,	1982c).		
The	Khmer	Rouge	build	a	movement	
	It	 is	 not	 clear	whether	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 even	 initiated	 the	 first	 outbreaks	 of	violence.	 Its	 party	 history	 actually	 identifies	 1968	 as	 the	 start	 of	 its	 campaign	
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(1973).	Ben	Kiernan	argues	 the	Khmer	Rouge	 supported	 rebelling	 community	leaders	 in	 order	 to	 build	 a	more	 organised	movement.	When	 the	 government	responded	 harshly	 to	 local	 violence,	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 would	 incorporate	communities	 into	 the	 movement	 with	 the	 offer	 of	 protection	 from	 future	repression	(1982b).	The	Khmer	Rouge	also	built	relations	with	social	groups	that	had	 a	 history	 of	 resistance	 against	 the	 Cambodian	 government,	 such	 as	 the	population	 in	 the	 mountainous	 north-eastern	 region	 (Deac	 and	 Summers	 Jr,	2000).			The	 Khmer	 Rouge	 began	 to	 evacuate	 population	 centres	 and	 resettle	communities	in	more	easily	defendable	areas.	It	then	organised	the	provision	of	basic	services	to	these	areas	(Short,	2005).	Communities	became	dependent	on	the	Khmer	Rouge	for	their	basic	needs	and	protection	from	government	forces.	Population	displacement	also	isolated	communities	from	government	influence,	exposing	them	to	Khmer	Rouge	political	education	programs;	allowing	the	rebels	to	draw	support	from	the	individuals	most	susceptible	to	indoctrination	and	link	the	 collective	 benefit	 of	 their	 proposed	 political	 reform	 to	 the	 individual	grievances	of	specific	villages	(Osbourne,	2004).	The	main	brunt	of	its	strategy	during	this	period	focused	on	using	its	political	networks	to	identify	communities	that	were	 already	 anti-government	 and	 bringing	 these	 communities	 under	 its	influence	through	a	mix	of	security,	economic	and	political	incentives.	Based	on	the	 success	of	 this	 strategy,	by	1968	 the	Khmer	Rouge	was	 leading	most	anti-government	violence	(Kiernan,	1982a).		The	rebels	did	very	little	to	build	a	movement	in	Phnom	Penh	itself.	Ben	Kiernan	highlights	how,	almost	counter-intuitively,	 the	Khmer	Rouge	tried	to	empower	the	right-wing	in	urban	areas	in	a	bid	to	undermine	Sihanouk.	The	Khmer	Rouge	hoped	 that	by	destabilising	 the	 countryside	 they	 could	 force	 the	 right-wing	 to	remove	Sihanouk	as	a	means	to	take	complete	control	of	 the	counterinsurgent	response	 (Short,	 2005).	 Pol	 Pot	 hoped	 this	 would	 eliminate	 the	 political	 and	economic	incentives	Sihanouk	was	offering	the	population	in	rural	areas,	leaving	violence	as	the	only	means	through	which	the	government	would	seek	to	shape	population	 behaviour	 (Kiernan,	 2004).	 Clearly,	 Pol	 Pot	 felt	 this	 was	 a	 less	
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sustainable	 government	 strategy	 and	 would	 create	 further	 mobilisation	opportunities	for	the	Khmer	Rouge.			
The	Khmer	Rouge	almost	surrender	
	The	 rural	 population	 became	more	 susceptible	 to	 rebel	 propaganda	 between	1967	 and	 1970	 due	 to	 government	 activity	 (Kiernan,	 2004;	 Osbourne,	 2004;	Short,	2005).	Local	community	leaders	assured	that	some	villages	did	support	the	rebels	with	manpower,	provisions	and	shelter	from	government	forces	(Kiernan,	1982a).	Between	1967	and	1970	the	movement	grew	from	only	a	few	hundred	active	fighters	(ibid)	to	around	2,400	(Henderson	and	Pike,	1971).	This	increase	coincided	with	no	significant	battlefield	victories,	suggesting	that	the	population	was	 not	 bandwagoning	 or	 responding	 to	 the	 military	 balance	 of	 power.	Government	forces	numbered	around	35,000	in	the	same	period	(Henderson	and	Pike,	1971).	The	increase	in	size	of	the	Khmer	Rouge	can,	therefore,	be	best	put	down	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 rebels	 to	 generate	 support	 from	 rural	communities.			Pol	Pot,	however,	began	to	recognise	that	Sihanouk	remained	too	popular	for	the	Khmer	Rouge	 to	build	 a	movement	 strong	enough	 to	 force	 the	 government	 to	collapse.	As	a	consequence,	the	communist	central	committee	agreed	to	explore	political	options	for	improving	relations	with	Sihanouk	in	the	hope	he	could	be	persuaded	to	side	with	them	(Kiernan,	2004).			Before	 this	 happened,	 however,	 the	 right-wing	 did	 depose	 Sihanouk	 and	 the	political	context	shifted	rapidly.	Parliament	became	increasingly	angered	at	the	left-wing	rebellion	and	the	blind-eye	Sihanouk	was	turning	to	North	Vietnamese	use	 of	 Cambodian	 territory	 as	 a	 sanctuary	 for	 its	 fight	 in	 South	 Vietnam	(Lancaster,	1972).	It	moved	against	Sihanouk	and	passed	a	vote	of	no-confidence.	Sihanouk	formed	a	government	in-exile	and	threw	his	support	behind	the	Khmer	Rouge	rebellion,	which	publically	promised	to	return	him	to	power.	The	coup	in	1970	significantly	changed	the	mobilisation	capacity	of	both	parties	in	a	number	
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of	ways	and	eventually	allowed	the	rebels	to	transition	to	a	more	conventional	strategy.			
Immediate	impact	of	the	coup	
	
Increased	support	for	both	sides		Both	parties	benefitted	 from	the	coup	 in	absolute	 terms.	Sihanouk	choosing	to	support	the	rebels	brought	fighters	to	the	side	of	the	Khmer	Rouge.	Despite	not	formally	controlling	the	army	a	number	of	commanders	offered	their	soldiers	to	the	 communists	 (Deac	 and	 Summers	 Jr,	 2000).	 Individuals	 from	 the	 rural	population	also	volunteered	in	meaningful	numbers	to	fight	for	the	Khmer	Rouge	out	of	loyalty	to	Sihanouk	(Vannak,	2003).			The	coup	also,	however,	had	a	mobilising	effect	for	the	government.	US	aid	meant	the	 new	 government,	 calling	 itself	 the	 Khmer	 Republic,	 could	 offer	 selective	economic	incentives	to	potential	supporters	and	expand	the	army	to	60,000	men.	This	compared	to	estimates	of	10,000	Khmer	Rouge	rebels	immediately	after	the	coup	 (Girling,	 1972).	 The	 new	 government	was	welcomed	with	 open	 arms	 in	Phnom	 Penh.	 Its	 attempts	 to	 build	 an	 army	 met	 no	 problems	 and	 the	 urban	population	volunteered	 to	 join	 the	army	 in	high	numbers	 (Tully,	2010).	 It	had	grown	weary	of	Sihanouk’s	corruption,	thought	the	coup	would	yield	a	new	dawn	and	was	willing	to	fight	to	protect	these	benefits.			From	 this	 perspective,	 it	 appears	 Pol	 Pot	 miscalculated	 the	 coup’s	 potential	impact.	Ben	Kiernan	feels	ultimately	the	support	of	Sihanouk	played	a	limited	role	in	 boosting	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 (1982c).	 There	 were	 some	 protests	 against	Sihanouk’s	 removal.	However,	 these	were	much	smaller	 in	 scale	 than	 the	pro-Sihanouk	 protests	 organised	 in	 1967-68	 in	 response	 to	 the	 initial	 communist	uprisings	(Kiernan,	1982c).	Huy	Vannak,	in	his	account	of	life	as	a	Khmer	Rouge	soldier,	 argues	 that	 even	 those	who	 claimed	 to	be	 fighting	 for	 Sihanouk,	were	more	motivated	by	protecting	themselves	from	the	repressive	policies	of	the	new	government	 and	 seeking	 a	 way	 out	 of	 the	 rising	 poverty	 brought	 about	 its	
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economic	 policies	 (2003;	 p12).	 Perhaps	 the	most	 significant	 change	 the	 coup	effected	from	a	population	perspective	was	the	transition	from	active	to	passive	support	for	the	government	amongst	the	peasantry.	In	1967,	Sihanouk	organised	significant	counter-protests	against	Khmer	Rouge	activity.	In	contrast	the	Khmer	Republic	 government	 had	 no	 such	 ability,	 despite	 the	 passive	 support	 it	 is	reported	 to	 have	 enjoyed	 (Heder,	 1979).	 The	 government	 was,	 in	 effect,	demobilised	in	rural	areas	without	Sihanouk’s	influence	over	the	region,	giving	the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 greater	 freedom	 of	 movement	 and	 space	 to	 mobilise	 more	potential	support.			
	Figure	18:	Balance	of	power	in	Cambodia	conflict.	Numbers	compiled	from	various	sources	(Kiernan,	1982a;	Henderson	and	Pike,	1971;	Sutsakhan,	1978).		
Cambodia’s	war	goes	international	
	The	new	government	invited	US	and	South	Vietnamese	troops	to	pursue	North	Vietnamese	 soldiers	 taking	 sanctuary	 in	Cambodia.	North	Vietnamese	 soldiers	encroached	further	into	Cambodia	to	avoid	this	targeting	and	ended	up	occupying	nearly	one	quarter	of	Cambodian	 territory	 (Mosyakov,	2004).	The	US	 targeted	North	Vietnamese	and	rebel	positions,	but	the	North	Vietnamese	Army	resisted	
0.25 2.4
10 50
35 35
60 200
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
1967 1970	PRE	COUP 1970	POST	COUP REST	OF	CONFLICT
Balance	of	power	at	different	points	in	the	
conflict
Rebels Government
	
	
	
	
181	
offensives	 by	 Khmer	 Republic	 forces.	 The	 war	 largely	 settled	 into	 a	 military	stalemate	for	three	years	before	these	external	backers	withdrew	the	bulk	of	their	military	support.	Historians	and	policymakers	debate	the	relative	importance	of	this	 intervention	 (Etcheson,	1984).53	However,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 it	 represented	a	three-year	period	of	 stasis	 in	 the	 fight	between	 the	 indigenous	participants.	 It	gave	them	the	chance	to	build	sovereign	relations	with	the	population	with	a	large	weight	of	the	military	burden	borne	by	their	external	supporter.			Immediately	after	the	intervention	commentators	assessed	that	the	Khmer	Rouge	represented	 only	 a	minor	 threat	 to	 the	 government	 (Brown,	 1972;	 Osbourne,	1972).		The	government	had	superior	force	numbers	(Sutsakhan,	1978)	and	more	popular	support	(Heder,	1979).	Yet,	when	the	US	and	North	Vietnam	withdrew	their	support	in	1973,	it	took	just	two	years	for	the	Khmer	Rouge	to	overcome	a	significantly	 larger	 government	 force.	 The	 explanation	 for	 this	 lies	 in	 the	difference	 between	 rebel	 and	 government	 behaviour	 towards	 the	 population	under	 the	 protection	 of	 their	 external	 backer.	 The	 Khmer	 Rouge	 developed	integrated	 political	 structures	 that	 generated	 support	 from	 the	 population.	 In	contrast,	the	Khmer	Republic	oversaw	a	humanitarian	catastrophe,	undermining	its	capacity	to	sustain	its	military	forces.	The	government	collapsed	and	the	rebels	captured	the	state.			
The	rural	population		
	
North	Vietnamese	shadow	governance		The	Khmer	Rouge	benefited	from	the	North	Vietnamese	political	strategy.	In	the	areas	 under	 their	 control	 the	 North	 Vietnamese	 set	 up	 extensive	 shadow	government	structures.	North	Vietnamese	forces	only	required	passive	support	from	the	population,	namely	 freedom	of	movement.	Nevertheless,	 they	offered	the	 population	 political,	 security	 and	 socioeconomic	 incentives	 to	 elicit	 this	
																																																						53	Craig	Etcheson	(1984)	offers	a	useful	rundown	of	the	key	arguments	in	this	debate	between	Henry	Kissinger	and	William	Shawcross.	
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support	(Brown,	1972).	There	were	explicit	instructions	from	Hanoi	to	treat	the	population	well.	They	held	 local	elections,	making	sure	 that	 local	people	stood	and	won.	They	provided	services	to	the	population.	Moreover,	they	protected	the	population	 from	 South	 Vietnamese	 and	 government	 violence	 (Kiernan,	 2004).	The	rational	choice	for	the	population	became	to	stay	in	these	zones	and	afford	its	support	to	the	North	Vietnamese	and	the	Khmer	Rouge.	The	North	Vietnamese	recognised	they	could	not	stay	in	Cambodia	forever,	nor	did	it	serve	them	to	do	so.	The	logical	step	was,	therefore,	to	hand	over	governance	to	their	Cambodian	allies	(Etcheson,	1984).	With	government	forces	powerless	to	reclaim	territory	from	 the	 North	 Vietnamese,	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 was	 free	 to	 build	 sovereign	structures	with	significant	swathes	of	the	population.	
	
The	Khmer	Rouge	reorganises	society	
	The	 Khmer	 Rouge	 developed	 systematic	 control	 over	 the	 population.	 It	completely	 restructured	 society	 in	 rural	 Cambodia	 in	 order	 to	 maximise	 the	support	it	could	generate	from	the	population.	How	much	of	this	effort	was	driven	by	ideology	and	how	much	by	a	pragmatic	approach	to	the	war	is	difficult	to	say.	Regardless,	according	to	Elizabeth	Becker,	the	Khmer	Rouge	put	its	victory	down	to	this	restructuring	of	society,	as	it	allowed	it	to	raise	and	feed	an	army	(1998;	p149).		Under	the	protection	of	North	Vietnamese	troops,	the	Khmer	Rouge	sent	armed	propaganda	teams	into	a	village,	killed	government	officials,	then	set	up	political	indoctrination	programs	and	 rudimentary	governance	 institutions	 (Henderson	and	 Pike,	 1971).	 These	 institutions	 oversaw	 a	 horizontal	 and	 vertical	reorganisation	 of	 society.	 The	 rebels	 split	 people	 into	 groups	 of	 about	 ten	 or	twelve	 families,	 who	 were	 answerable	 to	 district	 chiefs,	 who	 in	 turn	 were	subordinate	 to	 a	 regional	 leader	 (Quinn,	 1976).	 Leaders	were	 selected	 by	 the	Khmer	Rouge	based	on	loyalty;	with	the	pool	of	leaders	at	one	level	making	up	the	potential	candidates	when	a	space	opened	at	 the	next	 level	up.	Candidates	were	generally	appointed	based	on	violent	adherence	 to	 the	Khmer	Rouge.	All	orders	and	political	direction	went	up	and	down	this	chain	(ibid.).		
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The	 rebels	 also	 organised	 the	 population	 into	 functional	 groups.	 As	 well	 as	soldiers,	 there	 were	 associations	 of	 farmers,	 males,	 females	 and	 children	 for	example.	 According	 to	Kenneth	Quinn,	 the	Khmer	Rouge	 did	 this	 to	make	 the	administration	 of	 each	 group	 much	 easier	 to	 manage	 (ibid.).	 Rather	 than	propagandising	the	whole	of	a	polity	with	a	general	message	the	Khmer	Rouge	could	tailor	it	depending	on	the	audience.	Leaders	of	groups	were	appointed	from	within	and	were	accountable	 to	 the	village	chief	 (ibid.).	Once	society	had	been	organised	 in	 this	manner,	 villages	were	 isolated	 from	 each	 other.	 The	 Khmer	Rouge	strictly	forbade	any	travel	(ibid.).		This	reduced	the	ability	of	any	potential	opposition	to	generate	support	across	communities.			Village	leaders	then	selected	the	role	of	the	people	under	their	control,	including	soldiers	for	the	army.	Village	leaders	were	also	responsible	for	the	behaviour	of	the	population	in	responding	to	key	policies.	They	ensured	populations	offered	no	resistance	to	evacuations	or	rice	collection	plans.	If	there	was	any	dissent	the	Khmer	 Rouge	 punished	 not	 only	 the	 perpetrator	 but	 also	 the	 village	 leader	(Vannak,	2003).	This	turned	collective	behaviour	into	a	selective	incentive	for	the	village	leader.	A	dissenting	villager	would	be	responsible	for	the	punishment	of	his	whole	village	and	specifically	the	village	chief,	with	whom	they	likely	had	a	family	tie	(ibid.).	The	Khmer	Rouge	ensured	that	there	would	be	a	high	cost	to	individuals	in	the	population	that	did	not	provide	the	support	it	was	demanding.				It	 also	used	 extensive	political	 education	 sessions	 to	 further	 shape	population	behaviour.	 The	 main	 recipients	 of	 these	 sessions	 were	 the	 young.	 Teenagers	would	be	taken	away	for	two-	to	three-week	indoctrination	sessions.	As	part	of	these	sessions	Khmer	Rouge	leadership	would	identify	who	was	best	suited	for	each	role	 in	society,	ensuring	 the	most	 loyal	 filled	 important	positions	 (Quinn,	1976).	Most	people	would	come	back	from	these	sessions	highly	supportive	of	the	new	 social	 structures	 and	 would	 spy	 on	 their	 families	 to	 identify	 dissent	(Shawcross,	 1979).	 In	 the	 villages,	 political	 education	 was	 given	 as	 much	importance	as	working	the	fields.	People	were	forced	to	work	during	the	day	and	endure	political	education	sessions	during	the	night	(Quinn,	1976).		
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By	developing	this	political	structure	and	using	indoctrination,	the	Khmer	Rouge	monopolised	sovereignty	over	the	population.	Appointing	loyal	leaders,	isolating	villages	and	collectively	punishing	dissent	allowed	the	Khmer	Rouge	to	control	the	information	that	informed	population	behaviour.	It	was	then	able	to	control	the	 delivery	 of	 security,	 socioeconomic	 and	 violence	 based	 incentives	 to	 the	population	as	a	means	of	drawing	the	support	it	needed	to	man,	feed	and	supply	its	military.	Using	the	support	afforded	 it	by	the	North	Vietnamese,	 the	Khmer	Rouge	created	social	structures	that	were	tailor-made	to	support	is	military	goals.	This	contrasts	it	with	most	groups	that	have	to	rely	on	building	support	through	pre-existing	social	networks.			
Violence		There	is	evidence	there	was	genuine	support	for	the	Khmer	Rouge	in	1970.	A	US	Defence	 Intelligence	 Agency	 assessment	 stated	 that	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 was	sympathetic	to	the	needs	of	the	population	(Kiernan,	2004;	p322).	It	picked	up	where	the	North	Vietnamese	had	left	off	in	many	places,	eliminating	corruption	at	the	local	level,	helped	out	with	farming	and	treated	sick	people.	According	to	Philip	 Short	 the	 local	 people	 started	 to	 genuinely	 support	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	(2005).	As	a	result,	the	Khmer	Rouge’s	military	was	made	up	almost	entirely	of	volunteers	in	the	early	1970s	(Vannak,	2003).		As	the	war	dragged	on,	however,	the	Khmer	Rouge	deemed	this	‘soft’	approach	to	the	population	unnecessary	for	defeating	the	government.	Ben	Kiernan	believes	Pol	Pot	calculated	that	the	government	was	inept,	and	would	eventually	collapse	under	the	pressure	of	the	conflict	(2004).	The	Khmer	Rouge	began	to	brutalise	the	population	and	use	more	coercive	power	to	generate	the	support	it	needed.			The	Khmer	Rouge	 violently	 suppressed	 any	 hint	 of	 opposition	 in	 its	 territory.	Even	minimal	dissent	would	mean	a	prison	sentence.	Prisons	were	infested	with	malaria,	so	even	a	short	incarceration	was	effectively	a	death	sentence	(Vannak,	2003).	Anyone	perceived	to	have	affiliation	with	the	government	was	killed.	The	threat	of	collective	punishment	ensured	individuals	did	not	trust	each	other.	As	
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an	additional	measure	to	enforce	their	writ,	the	Khmer	Rouge	always	posted	the	majority	of	their	armed	cadres	away	from	the	frontline	closer	to	the	population	so	any	acts	of	dissent	could	be	punished	(Kiernan,	1982d).	This	demonstrates	that	the	Khmer	Rouge	considered	controlling	the	population	as	important	as	military	confrontation	in	determining	their	strength.			
Socioeconomic	policy	
	Khmer	Rouge	policies	also	reduced	the	autonomy	of	the	rural	population,	making	communities	 reliant	 on	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 for	 basic	 needs.	 The	 Khmer	 Rouge	‘collectivised’	 agricultural	 production.	 While	 this	 was	 a	 central	 part	 of	 its	communist	 doctrine	 (1973),	 it	 ensured	 the	 population	 provided	 all	 of	 its	agricultural	 output	 to	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge.	 Whether	 the	 population	 genuinely	supported	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 or	 not,	 the	 strength	 of	 rebel	 political	 structures	forced	communities	to	provide	vital	material	support	to	the	rebel	group.		Before	the	collectivisation	of	agriculture,	farming	communities	continued	to	trade	with	whoever	would	buy	goods,	including	the	government	(Short,	2005).	Whether	or	not	 collectivisation	 increased	 overall	 agricultural	 production	 is	 impossible	 to	assess.	However,	when	combined	with	the	Khmer	Rouge’s	political	structures,	it	left	communities	with	no	choice	but	to	provide	everything	they	did	produce	to	the	Khmer	Rouge.	In	full	control	of	agricultural	output,	the	Khmer	Rouge	could	then	feed	an	army.	Communities	faced	a	simple	choice,	support	the	Khmer	Rouge,	starve	to	death,	or	risk	fleeing	to	a	government-controlled	zone	(Thion,	1983).	Between	choices	one	and	two	the	decision	is	fairly	obvious	and	was	enough	to	ensure	the	Khmer	Rouge	received	the	support	it	needed.	Many	did	flee,	but	this	just	 undermined	 the	 government	 even	 further,	 as	 detailed	 below.	 Through	collectivisation	the	Khmer	Rouge	essentially	removed	the	ability	of	communities	to	remain	‘passive’	or	provide	resources	to	the	Khmer	Rouge’s	enemies.		The	Khmer	Rouge	ended	up	being	famous	for	their	evacuation	of	Phnom	Penh	at	the	culmination	of	the	war	in	1975.	However,	they	had	been	doing	it	in	smaller	population	 centres	 since	 the	 start	 of	 the	 conflict.	 This	 policy	 also	 significantly	increased	the	Khmer	Rouge’s	political	control	over	the	population	and	limited	the	
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latter’s	ability	to	remain	a	passive	participant	in	the	conflict.	When	it	captured	a	population	centre	they	killed	government	workers	then	evacuated	the	population	to	 communist-held	 areas	 (Kiernan,	 2004).	 The	 rebels	 would	 then	 simply	surrender	 the	 town	 back	 to	 government	 forces,	 demonstrating	 how	 they	considered	populations	to	be	more	important	than	territory.	As	Ben	Kiernan	has	observed,	 this	 relocation	 took	 families	 away	 from	 their	 traditional	 support	networks,	which,	in	turn,	made	the	population	further	reliant	on	the	Khmer	Rouge	(1982b;	p279).	Pol	Pot	himself,	 in	an	interview	with	Yugoslavian	journalists	 in	1978,	described	the	intent	of	the	evacuations	as	limiting	interaction	between	the	population	and	the	government	(Department	of	Press	and	Information.	Ministry	of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 Democratic	 Kampuchea,	 1978).	 Once	 they	 evacuated	 the	population,	the	Khmer	Rouge	organised	it	into	the	societal	structures	described	above	and	forced	it	to	participate	in	collective	farms,	ensuring	they	contributed	to	the	strength	of	the	Khmer	Rouge.	As	these	structures	absorbed	more	people,	the	sovereign	power	of	the	rebels	grew	ever	stronger,	allowing	them	to	create	a	more	resilient	military	force.							
Lon	Nol’s	mysticism	
	The	 Lon	 Nol	 government	 made	 very	 little	 headway	 in	 signalling	 to	 the	 rural	population	that	it	offered	a	viable	alternative	to	the	suppressive	policies	of	the	Khmer	Rouge.	It	did	draw	up	plans	to	generate	support	from	the	rural	population	through	 the	 use	 of	 ethnic	 leaders	 and	 Buddhist	 groups	 (Henderson	 and	 Pike,	1971).	 According	 to	 General	 Sutsakhan	 it	 even	 had	 more	 ambitious	 plans	 of	restructuring	 society	 to	 facilitate	 resistance	 not	 too	 dissimilar	 to	 those	implemented	by	the	Khmer	Rouge	(1978).	However,	these	plans	never	reached	the	 implementation	 stage.	 In	 the	 end,	 according	 to	 Elizabeth	 Becker,	 Lon	 Nol	simply	assumed	that	if	he	claimed	to	be	a	good	Buddhist	that	would	be	enough	to	motivate	 support	 from	 the	 rural	 population	 (1998).	 However,	 without	 the	authority	of	Prince	Sihanouk,	this	appeal	had	no	effect	(Osbourne,	1972).			Military	strategy	in	rural	areas	essentially	drove	the	population	under	the	control	of	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge.	 South	 Vietnamese	 soldiers	 exacted	 atrocities	 on	 the	
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Cambodian	people,	forcing	many	to	seek	protection	from	the	North	Vietnamese	and	the	Khmer	Rouge	(Gordon,	1972).	Many	people	also	fled	to	zones	under	North	Vietnamese	and	Khmer	Rouge	control	to	gain	better	protection	from	US	bombing	runs.	 The	 US	 was	 indiscriminate	 in	 its	 bombing,	 dropping	 more	 bombs	 on	Cambodia	 between	 1970	 and	 1973	 than	 on	 Japan	 during	 World	 War	 II	(Shawcross,	 1979).	 These	 bombing	 runs	 resulted	 in	 huge	 numbers	 of	 civilian	casualties	 and	 effectively	 destroyed	 agricultural	 production	 in	 many	 areas	(Becker,	1998).		In	order	to	avoid	the	bombing	and	the	ground	troop	invasion	from	South	Vietnam	the	North	Vietnamese	moved	west	into	more	of	Cambodia.	The	government	was	too	 weak	 to	 prevent	 this	 and	 it	 exposed	 more	 of	 the	 population	 to	 North	Vietnamese	 and	 Khmer	 Rouge	 shadow	 governance.	 To	 protect	 the	 population	from	 US	 bombing,	 North	 Vietnamese	 and	 Khmer	 Rouge	 soldiers	 would	move	populations	 away	 from	 their	 villages	 into	 forested	 areas	 (Tully,	 2010).	Consequently,	 they	 were	 in	 unfamiliar	 surroundings	 and	 more	 reliant	 on	 the	sovereign	structures	of	the	Khmer	Rouge.	As	North	Vietnamese	areas	of	control	expanded,	 US	 bombing	 increased	 concomitantly	 to	 create	 further	 pressure.	Eventually	the	bombing	destroyed	most	of	the	major	agricultural	areas	and	fertile	land,	 further	 limiting	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 population	 to	 support	 itself	 without	Khmer	Rouge	help	(Deac	and	Summers	Jr,	2000).			Support	 to	 the	 rebels	 became	 a	matter	 of	 life	 and	death	 for	 large	parts	 of	 the	population.	Without	 the	Khmer	Rouge’s	 protection,	 the	 rural	 population	 faced	bombing	 and	 an	 inability	 to	 produce	 ample	 food.	 For	 this	 reason	much	of	 the	population	 had	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge’s	 political	structures	(Kiernan,	2008).			
Khmer	Rouge	fighting	capacity	
	As	a	function	of	its	restructuring	of	society	and	the	resettlement	of	communities	into	collective	farms,	the	Khmer	Rouge	developed	the	capacity	to	build,	supply	and	sustain	an	army,	even	in	the	face	of	enormous	personnel	losses.		
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The	 collective	 farming	 system	 controlled	 where	 food	 went	 once	 it	 had	 been	produced.	Military	cadres	received	minimal	rations	of	food	but	they	did	receive	food,	which	was	in	stark	contrast	to	their	government	equivalents	(Becker,	1998).	Pol	Pot	declared	 feeding	his	army	as	 the	most	 important	part	of	revolutionary	warfare	 (Becker,	 1998).	Without	 the	 forced	 resettlements,	 collectivisation	 and	restructuring	of	society	to	ensure	these	policies	took	place	smoothly	it	is	difficult	to	see	the	Khmer	Rouge	achieving	this.		The	Khmer	Rouge’s	ability	to	give	the	population	no	choice	but	to	support	them	is	also	clear	when	it	comes	to	recruitment	and	the	organisation	of	rebel	forces.	The	 army	was	 built	 from	 the	 bottom	 up;	 village	militias	 were	 formed	 by	 the	newly-selected	village	chiefs.	The	best	fighters	were	then	picked	to	work	at	the	provincial	level	and	the	process	was	repeated	until	front-line	forces	were	filled	(Quinn,	1976).	This	 structure	allowed	 the	Khmer	Rouge	 to	 identify	 those	who	responded	best	to	the	individual	incentives	being	offered	to	fight	and	in	turn	keep	those	with	questionable	loyalty	from	rising	too	far.	Documentary	accounts	of	life	under	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 show	 how	 those	 who	 refused	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 duty	selected	 for	 them	were	 tortured,	 along	 with	 their	 families,	 and	 sent	 for	 hard	labour	 (Vannak,	 2003).	 This	 further	 lessened	 the	 incentive	 for	 individuals	 to	resist	serving	in	the	Khmer	Rouge	forces.			The	Khmer	Rouge	experienced	huge	losses	throughout	the	conflict,	both	at	the	hands	of	US	bombing	and	Khmer	Republic	forces.	In	some	cases,	it	pursued	almost	suicidal	 tactics	 to	make	 a	 political	 point.	 In	 1973,	 it	 launched	 an	 offensive	 on	Phnom	 Penh	 in	 the	 face	 of	 extensive	 US	 bombing,	 despite	 knowing	 that	 US	bombing	was	due	to	finish	a	few	months	later	(Mosyakov,	2004).	Nevertheless,	they	never	experienced	a	loss	of	manpower.	Dead	soldiers	were	always	replaced	quickly.	Elizabeth	Becker,	a	prominent	journalist	who	covered	the	Khmer	Rouge	during	the	conflict,	points	out	that	the	material	and	personnel	losses	the	Khmer	Rouge	suffered	had	virtually	no	impact	on	the	strength	of	the	Khmer	Rouge.	The	Khmer	Rouge	had	developed	an	extremely	resilient	regenerative	capacity,	which	allowed	 them	 to	 recoup	 losses	 quickly	 from	within	 its	 constituent	 population	
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(Becker,	1998).	 Its	power	did	not	come	 from	avoiding	 targeting,	but	 rather	 its	ability	to	continually	replace	those	soldiers	killed.		Despite	the	strength	of	rebel	shadow	governance	structures,	many	in	the	rural	population	 did	 risk	 fleeing	 rebel	 territory.	 The	 population	 of	 Phnom	 Penh	doubled	 to	 one	 million	 (Becker,	 1998).	 If	 the	 government	 could	 channel	 this	support	into	an	effective	armed	force	it	may	well	have	still	been	able	to	absorb	the	costs	of	continuing	the	conflict	given	the	much	larger	population	from	which	it	could	draw	support.			
Urbanites	–	the	Khmer	Republic’s	constituents	
	
The	Khmer	Rouge	and	the	urban	population	
	The	Khmer	Rouge’s	main	focus	throughout	the	conflict	was	building	structures	to	mobilise	its	own	target	population.	It	did	not	expend	effort	trying	to	build	urban	resistance.	 However,	 it	 did	 dedicate	 resources	 to	 demobilising	 government	support.	It	unleashed	a	propaganda	campaign,	tried	to	cut	economic	supply	lines,	swamped	 the	 city	 with	 refugees,	 and	 carried	 out	 sabotage,	 terrorist	 and	assassination	campaigns	 (Sutsakhan,	1978).	 It	 attacked	 rice	 supply	 routes	and	critical	infrastructure.	The	inability	of	the	government	to	bring	food	into	the	city	sparked	riots	against	the	government,	making	it	even	more	difficult	for	the	Khmer	Republic	 to	 sustain	 a	 functioning	 economy	 (Sutsakhan,	 1978).	 Khmer	 Rouge	activity,	 therefore,	 contributed	 to	 the	debacle	outlined	below,	which	 led	 to	 the	government	falling	and	the	Khmer	Rouge	winning	the	war.			The	Khmer	Rouge	also	maintained	a	public	alliance	with	Prince	Sihanouk.	Other	than	the	initial	boost	in	recruitment	its	alliance	with	Sihanouk	gave	the	Khmer	Rouge	there	is	no	evidence	his	support	made	any	material	difference.	Equally,	the	Khmer	Rouge	gave	Sihanouk	no	say	in	the	prosecution	of	the	war.	Instead	they	used	 him	 as	 a	 propaganda	 tool,	 publically	 showing	 him	 with	 Khmer	 Rouge	fighters	(Kiernan,	2004).	Elizabeth	Becker	claims	this	significantly	affected	 the	urban	population’s	calculus	over	the	potential	consequences	of	a	rebel	victory.	
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Many	people	believed	that	Sihanouk	would	return	to	power	and	life	after	a	rebel	victory	would	see	a	return	to	the	status	quo	before	1970		(1998).		
The	Khmer	Republic	–	military	over	politics	
	In	contrast	to	Pol	Pot,	Lon	Nol	did	not	recognise	the	importance	of	engaging	with	the	 population.	 Wilfried	 Deac,	 a	 French	 missionary	 living	 in	 Phnom	 Penh	throughout	 the	 conflict,	 observed	 that	 Lon	Nol	 thought	US	 bombing	would	 be	enough	to	defeat	the	rebels	(Deac	and	Summers	Jr,	2000).			Lon	 Nol	 made	 no	 effort	 to	 improve	 the	 political	 system	 he	 inherited	 from	Sihanouk.	He	had	come	to	power	on	a	wave	of	support	from	the	urban	population	who	 hoped	 Lon	 Nol	 would	 end	 the	 corrupt	 nepotism	 of	 the	 Sihanouk	 era.	However,	he	made	very	few	changes	at	the	top	level	of	government	and	the	urban	population	soon	realised	his	government	represented	a	continuation	of	the	status	quo	(Osbourne,	1972).	In	the	last	two	years	of	the	conflict,	the	government	almost	stopped	 functioning.	 It	 passed	 one	 law	 after	 1973	 and	 this	 was	 authorising	conscription,	which	it	then	failed	to	implement	(Isaacs,	1998).	Many	well-trained	government	 officials	 left	 Cambodia	 or	 were	 side-lined	 by	 the	 regime	 for	representing	a	threat	to	Lon	Nol.	Many	were	aghast	at	Lon	Nol’s	decision-making,	which	was	based	on	 superstition	and	 the	advice	of	monks	 rather	 than	civilian	administrators	and	realities	on	the	ground	(Kamm,	2011).		Lon	 Nol	 quickly	 dispensed	 with	 any	 attempt	 at	 democratic	 governance.	 He	essentially	 ruled	by	presidential	decree	 from	1971	and	elections	held	 in	1972	were	heavily	rigged	(Short,	2005).	Freedom	of	expression	was	written	out	of	the	constitution	 and	 acts	 of	 dissent,	 such	 as	 large-scale	 striking,	were	met	with	 a	security	crackdown	and	widespread	arrests	(Shawcross,	1979).	Lon	Nol	simply	reverted	back	to	the	same	practices	as	Sihanouk;	appointing	military	and	political	figures	 based	 on	 corruption	 and	 nepotism	 (Deac	 and	 Summers	 Jr,	 2000).	Corruption	became	endemic,	particularly	in	the	military,	as	it	was	the	only	route	to	social	advancement.	Military	commanders	would	syphon	off	funds	rather	than	pay	soldiers.	They	also	supported	organised	crime	through	drug	trafficking	and	
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even	selling	arms	provided	by	the	US	to	the	Khmer	Rouge	(Shawcross,	1979).	The	Khmer	Rouge	organised	the	population	in	areas	it	controlled	to	ensure	all	of	its	behaviour	served	the	rebel’s	agenda.	In	contrast,	the	government	failed	to	create	a	broad	alliance	with	various	sections	of	the	population.					
Economic	decline	
	The	Khmer	Republic	also	delivered	very	limited	within-war	economic	incentives	to	 the	 population,	 either	 at	 a	 collective	 or	 selective	 level.	 In	 fact,	 areas	 under	government	 control	 descended	 into	 a	 humanitarian	 catastrophe.	 The	 security	situation	 contributed	 to	 worsening	 socioeconomic	 conditions	 and	 was	exacerbated	 by	 rebel	 activities	 (Poole,	 1972).	 However,	 government	mismanagement	appears	 to	have	been	a	 far	more	 significant	 factor	 (Etcheson,	1984).			On	 coming	 to	 power	 Lon	 Nol	 blamed	 the	 Vietnamese	 for	 the	 problems	 in	Cambodia	in	order	to	justify	the	coup	(Pouvatchy,	1986).	He	sanctioned	violence	against	Vietnamese	 communities	 living	 in	Cambodia,	 some	of	whom	had	been	there	 for	 generations.	 The	 Vietnamese	 provided	 the	 skilled	 labour	within	 the	Cambodian	economy	and	when	 they	 fled	 to	avoid	persecution,	 the	Cambodian	economy	lost	a	large	part	of	its	functionality	(Tully,	2010).	US	bombing	wiped	out	agriculture	 and	 industrial	 production	 that	 could	 be	 accessed	 and	 the	 Khmer	Rouge	monopolised	 the	 remaining	 output	 (Deac	 and	 Summers	 Jr,	 2000).	 The	government	simply	had	no	way	to	feed	its	people	and	the	economy	sank,	as	picked	up	in	the	statistical	model.				As	the	conflict	wore	on	the	population	began	to	stop	working	and	general	strikes	were	common.	The	strikes	were	nearly	always	about	the	lack	of	food	(Shawcross,	1979).	This	situation	was	made	worse	by	the	significant	number	of	refugees	that	arrived	 in	 the	 cities	 after	 fleeing	 US	 bombing	 and	 Khmer	 Rouge	 repression	(Becker,	1998).	What	should	have	been	indicative	of	the	fact	that	the	government	could	still	win	the	conflict,	if	it	was	able	to	draw	support	from	the	refugees,	just	further	 exacerbated	 the	 government’s	 inability	 to	 provide	 for	 its	 people.	 The	
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result	 was	 mass	 starvation	 in	 Phnom	 Penh	 and	 other	 urban	 centres	 and	 the	descent	into	poverty	of	the	whole	population	barring	political	elites.			The	government	became	totally	reliant	on	humanitarian	aid	and	external	support	to	sustain	its	military.	Aid,	however,	rarely	reached	its	intended	targets	and	its	only	real	effect	on	the	conflict	was	that	it	helped	sustain	corruption	(Shawcross,	1979).			
Anaemic	military	force	
	The	 historical	 record	 in	 Cambodia	 shows	 how	 the	 government’s	 inability	 to	sustain	even	a	basic	level	of	economic	activity	led	to	its	defeat.	It	diminished	the	level	of	support	it	was	able	to	generate	from	its	constituent	population.	When	this	is	compared	to	the	manner	in	which	the	Khmer	Rouge	forced	an	originally	passive	population	 to	 provide	 them	 with	 an	 army	 and	 support	 for	 that	 army,	 the	difference	between	the	two	belligerents	becomes	clear.		Quite	simply,	as	Arnold	Isaacs	says	“poverty	diminished	Khmer	Republic	soldiers	will	 to	 fight”	 (Isaacs,	1998;	p249).	The	government	 ceased	 to	pay	 its	 army,	 so	people	stopped	joining	it	and,	in	essence,	stopped	fighting	on	the	government’s	behalf.	After	1973,	with	general	strikes	raging	across	Phnom	Penh,	people	began	to	 refuse	 to	 join	 the	 army	 voluntarily,	 forcing	 the	 government	 to	 implement	conscription	 (Shawcross,	 1979).	 The	 government,	 however,	 was	 not	 strong	enough	 to	 institute	 punishment	 to	 those	who	 resisted	 and	 conscription	 failed	completely.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 conflict	 only	 one	 in	 three	 casualties	were	 being	replaced	(Isaacs,	1998).	Again	this	can	be	placed	in	stark	contrast	to	the	Khmer	Rouge,	who	suffered	far	more	casualties,	but	were	always	able	to	replace	them.		Those	 already	 in	 the	 army	 began	 to	 desert.	 Desertion	 rose	 incrementally	throughout	 the	 conflict	 and	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 conflict	 over	 three	 and	 a	 half	thousand	troops	were	deserting	every	month	(Isaacs,	1998).	The	situation	was	exacerbated	by	the	egregious	corruption.	Military	commanders	would	take	a	slice	of	all	their	soldiers’	wages,	in	many	cases	not	paying	them	at	all.	This	would	force	
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soldiers	 to	 loot	 villages	 in	 the	 countryside	 in	 order	 to	 get	 basic	 subsistence,	alienating	 the	 peasant	 population.	 It	 also	 meant	 soldiers	 had	 to	 take	 drastic	measures	 to	 feed	 themselves	and	 their	 families,	which	degraded	 the	military’s	ability	to	carry	out	significant	operations.	Soldiers	brought	their	families	to	the	frontline	with	them,	knowing	they	would	probably	starve	if	they	left	them	behind.	Other	soldiers	simply	left	their	posts	to	tend	to	their	farms	or	fish	so	they	could	meet	their	families’	basic	food	needs	(Shawcross,	1979).	The	government	could	not	provide	the	within-war	socioeconomic	benefits	the	population	craved,	so	the	population	had	to	attain	these	resources	in	other	ways.			The	 wider	 population	 also	 began	 to	 refuse	 to	 carry	 out	 basic	 functions	 of	government	 in	 protest	 at	 the	 squalor	 of	 Phnom	 Penh	 and	 the	 autocratic	tendencies	of	the	government	(Deac	and	Summers	Jr,	2000).	All	of	this	created	a	feedback	effect	where	 the	government	could	not	provide	 for	 its	people,	 so	 the	people	further	disengaged.	In	turn,	the	government	had	even	less	to	provide	its	people,	further	limiting	its	capacity	to	generate	support.			By	1975,	most	historical	commentators	document	how	the	population	hoped	the	Khmer	 Rouge	would	 win	 and	 bring	 the	 conflict	 to	 an	 end	 (Poole,	 1976).	 The	population	 remained	 passive	 in	 this	 support.	 However,	 the	 contrast	 between	historical	 reports	 of	 fervent	 support	 for	 the	 Khmer	 Republic	 in	 1970	 and	 the	simple	desire	 for	 the	war	 to	 end	 in	 any	way	possible	 in	1975,	 shows	how	 the	sovereign	 power	 of	 the	 government	 changed	 during	 this	 period.	 This	was	 the	mirror	 image	 to	 rural	 areas,	 where	 the	 peasantry	 had	 increasingly	 provided	active	support	to	the	Khmer	Rouge.			Unfortunately,	many	 people	 in	 the	 cities	 did	 not	 know	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 the	Khmer	 Rouge,	 despite	 refugee	 stories,	 and	 believed	 propaganda	 that	 a	 rebel	victory	 would	 see	 Sihanouk	 return	 to	 power	 (Etcheson,	 1984).	 Arnold	 Isaacs	remarked	 that	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 conflict	 the	 only	 people	 still	 fighting	 for	 the	government	were	those	who	had	lived	under	the	Khmer	Rouge	(1998;	p270).	By	maintaining	 Sihanouk	 as	 their	 public	 face,	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 had	 deliberately	motivated	this	behaviour	(Becker,	1998).		
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A	group	of	army	generals	tried	to	recover	the	situation	by	deposing	Lon	Nol	in	April	1975	(Sutsakhan,	1978).	However,	the	US	announced	a	final	end	to	any	aid	after	the	coup	and	many	people	 in	the	army	and	civil	service	stopped	working	altogether.	 The	 new	 government	 originally	 thought	 it	 could	 still	 win	 the	 war	based	 on	 the	 military	 situation,	 but	 it	 found	 it	 had	 no	 capacity	 to	 build	 that	military	in	the	first	place	(Sutsakhan,	1978).	The	government	ceased	to	function,	surrendered,	and	the	Khmer	Rouge	strolled	 into	the	Phnom	Penh,	winning	the	war.			Despite	being	the	end	of	the	conflict,	most	observers	seem	to	agree	that	the	war	itself	was	not	the	key	factor	in	bringing	down	the	Khmer	Republic.	Craig	Etcheson,	for	example,	states	it	is	likely	“it	would	have	ended	the	same	way	for	the	Khmer	Republic	with	 or	without	 the	Khmer	Rouge”	 (1984;	 p129).	 This	 demonstrates	how	the	key	variable	in	determining	any	war	is	the	mobilisation	capacity	of	the	government,	borne	out	through	its	ability	to	shape	population	behaviour.	If	the	government	 loses	 this	 capacity,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 it	 is	 a	 result	 of	 rebel	activity,	it	will	lose	the	war.			
Battlefield	interaction		The	preceding	analysis	shows	how	the	dynamics	and	outcome	of	the	Cambodian	civil	war	were	the	result	of	belligerent	behaviour	towards	the	population.	It	also	reveals	 insights	 into	 how	 rebels	 used	 military	 activity	 to	 boost	 their	 own	mobilisation	capacity	and	undermine	government	sovereign	structures.		Rebel	military	 activity	 in	 1967	 focussed	 on	 capturing	weapons	 and	 providing	activists	with	the	ability	to	defend	themselves	when	tracked	down	by	government	forces	 (Heder,	 1979).	When	 government	 forces	did	 find	 rebel	 outposts,	 rebels	simply	fled	(Etcheson,	1984).	At	no	point	during	this	period	did	they	try	to	inflict	significant	losses	on	government	forces	(Kiernan,	2004).	According	to	nearly	all	accounts	of	the	conflict,	the	government	won	nearly	every	battle	between	1967	and	1970	(eg	Brown,	1972	and	Osbourne,	1972).	Despite	this	the	rebels	did	grow	
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in	 size	 during	 this	 period	 as	 they	 developed	 resilient	 relationships	 with	 the	population.			Even	after	1970,	the	Khmer	Rouge	was	heavily	outnumbered	(see	figure	18).	The	Khmer	Rouge	used	guerrilla	tactics	to	mitigate	its	numerical	disadvantage.	During	conventional	 battles,	 guerrilla	 fighters	 struck	 population	 zones	 behind	government	 lines.	 This	 created	 the	 perception	 that	 Khmer	 Rouge	 forces	were	stronger	than	they	actually	were	and	forced	the	government	to	redirect	troops	to	these	 areas,	 straining	 its	 capacity	 to	 mobilise	 enough	 troops	 to	 secure	 the	population		(Etcheson,	1984).			Government	forces	did	perform	badly	on	the	battlefield,	despite	their	numerical	advantage.	 For	 one	 they	 put	 up	 no	 resistance	 against	 North	 Vietnamese	encroachments	(Quinn,	1976).	Major	offensives	such	as	the	two	Chenla	offensives	early	in	the	war	brought	little	to	no	gains	(Etcheson,	1984).	However,	the	Khmer	Rouge	also	showed	extreme	military	naivety.	They	chose	to	attempt	to	capture	Phnom	Penh	in	1973	under	a	barrage	of	US	bombing,	even	though	they	knew	US	military	support	for	the	Khmer	Republic	would	end	in	a	few	months	(Etcheson,	1984).	All	told	the	Khmer	Rouge	lost	significantly	more	troops	during	the	conflict	than	government	forces	(Becker,	1998).	Some	reports	suggest	the	Khmer	Rouge	could	lose	25	percent	of	its	force	in	one	offensive,	a	figure	that	military	strategists	state	 should	 be	 devastating	 to	 morale	 and	 cause	 widespread	 desertion	(Shawcross,	1979;	p298).	The	Khmer	Rouge	appeared	comfortable	with	this	as	their	mobilisation	 structures	were	 strong	 enough	 to	 continually	 replace	 these	losses.	Overall,	the	battle	lines	changed	very	little	until	the	final	months	of	the	war	and	met	all	the	criteria	for	a	military	stalemate	(Etcheson,	1984).	Under	the	cover	of	 this	 stalemate,	 the	 rebels	 created	 a	 resilient	 political	 structure,	 while	 the	government	imploded.	The	Khmer	Rouge	were	then	able	to	ultimately	take	the	capital	unimpeded.		
	The	 conflict	 in	 Cambodia	 saw	 both	 asymmetric	 and	 conventional	 phases,	transitioning	between	the	two	in	1970.	1970	saw	the	coup	that	deposed	Norodom	Sihanouk,	which	precipitated	the	North	Vietnamese	invasion	and	the	collapse	of	
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government	control	across	large	parts	of	the	country.	The	Khmer	Rouge	used	this	context	 to	 build	 more	 resilient	 sovereign	 structures.	 The	 transition	 from	insurgent	activity	to	conventional	style	warfare	on	the	part	of	the	Khmer	Rouge	was	 clearly	 determined	 by	 its	 mobilisation	 capacity	 and	 ability	 to	 replace	personnel	 and	 resources	 lost	 during	military	 activity.	 Once	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	switched	 to	 a	 more	 conventional	 approach,	 however,	 it	 continued	 to	 use	 its	military	 force	 to	 boost	 its	 own	 sovereign	 structures	 and	 demobilise	 the	government	rather	than	defeat	it	directly.			Its	use	of	 violence	was	always	designed	 for	political	 or	 economic	effect.	As	 an	insurgent	 force	 it	 attacked	 the	most	 unpopular	 government	 outposts	 to	 build	support	amongst	the	populations	most	affected	by	government	efforts	to	collect	rice	(Kiernan,	2004).	Strategically,	it	tried	to	foment	instability	to	induce	a	coup	in	Phnom	Penh.	When	it	transitioned	to	a	conventional	force,	it	attacked	supply	routes	 and	 critical	 infrastructure,	 precisely	 because	 it	 diminished	 the	government’s	ability	to	provide	selective	economic	incentives	to	the	population.	Historical	 accounts	 of	 the	 conflict	 even	 show	 Pol	 Pot	 recognising	 in	 the	 early	1970s	that	the	government	would	inevitably	collapse	if	the	Khmer	Rouge	could	sustain	the	military	stalemate	(Kiernan,	2004).			
Shaping	strategy	
	
External	actors		The	 Khmer	 Rouge’s	 victory	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 examining	 changes	 in	 the	strength	of	government	and	rebel	sovereign	structures.	However,	external	factors	played	a	key	role	in	these	changes.	Without	North	Vietnamese	support	the	Khmer	Rouge	 would	 have	 struggled	 to	 implement	 its	 political	 and	 socioeconomic	policies,	 which	 it	 used	 to	 generate	 active	 support	 from	 the	 population.	Commentators	have	observed	that	the	Khmer	Republic	would	have	struggled	to	survive	even	if	there	had	not	been	a	war	(Etcheson,	1984).	However,	the	North	Vietnamese	 intervention	 almost	 certainly	 accelerated	 this	 process.	 North	Vietnam	assisted	the	Khmer	Rouge	in	overcoming	perhaps	the	biggest	challenge	
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faced	by	many	rebel	groups,	securing	territory	to	build	sovereign	structures.	Most	rebels	have	to	rely	on	pre-existing	social	networks	to	build	support,	which	creates	competing	 loyalties	 for	 many	 in	 the	 population.	 North	 Vietnam	 allowed	 the	Khmer	 Rouge	 to	 break	 down	 these	 pre-existing	 social	 networks	 and	 redesign	society	to	serve	its	military	needs.	Without	these	sovereign	structures	the	rebels	would	have	found	it	much	more	difficult	to	capture	power	in	1975.			For	 the	 government,	 US	 support	may	well	 have	 facilitated	 its	 ultimate	 defeat.	Aside	 from	 the	 effect	 its	 bombing	 had	 on	 the	 rural	 population,	 US	 military	intervention	 created	 a	 classic	 aid	 trap.	 Lon	 Nol	 believed	 US	 military	 support	would	be	sufficient	to	defeat	the	Khmer	Rouge.	As	a	result,	he	lacked	the	incentive	to	develop	effective	institutions	to	mobilise	support	from	the	population	(Deac	and	 Summers	 Jr,	 2000).	 This	 represents	 an	 important	 lesson	 for	 external	governments	 seeking	 to	 support	 allied	 nations;	 support	 has	 to	 be	 credibly	contingent	on	 the	development	of	 indigenous	sovereign	structures	 for	shaping	population	 behaviour.	 If	 an	 external	 actor	 provides	 the	military	 force	 or	 pays	recruits	directly,	this	will	lessen	the	short-term	need	for	indigenous	governments	to	 develop	 mobilisation	 structures	 of	 their	 own,	 forcing	 external	 backers	 to	continue	providing	support	or	see	their	allies	defeated.			
Personalities	and	ideology	
	The	personalities	of	the	key	actors	also	played	a	role	in	the	conflict.	Pol	Pot	had	spent	years	planning	for	this	war	and	was	systematic	in	the	way	he	implemented	plans	 to	reorganise	society	and	build	a	revolutionary	army	(Short,	2005).	This	also	demonstrates	an	important	additional	role	of	ideology.	The	Khmer	Rouge’s	doctrine	provided	a	framework	for	building	sovereign	structures	that	were	used	to	generate	support	 from	the	population.	Lon	Nol,	on	 the	other	hand,	 failed	 to	understand	the	importance	of	building	these	alliances.	This	shows	how	important	strategy	remains	in	creating	the	conditions	for	building	or	undermining	a	conflict	actors’	 ability	 to	 generate	 support	 from	 the	 population.	 Nothing	 is	predetermined.	 The	 outcome	 of	 the	 conflict	 depends	 on	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	belligerents	and	their	ability	to	build	a	broad	alliance	across	the	state.		
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Conclusion	
	Cambodia	was	the	best-predicted	rebel	victory	in	the	statistical	model	precisely	because	 it	witnessed	damaging	socioeconomic	decline.	The	aim	of	 this	chapter	was	 to	 test	 whether	 this	 decline	 lost	 the	 government	 the	 war	 because	 it	undermined	 its	 capacity	 to	 draw	 support	 from	 the	 population.	 This	 is	 exactly	what	 happened,	 lending	 strong	 support	 to	 both	 the	 overall	 theory	 of	 conflict	proposed	in	this	thesis,	and	the	specific	hypothesis	related	to	the	role	of	economic	incentives.	The	government	oversaw	the	development	of	absolute	poverty,	which	led	the	population	to	refuse	to	fight	on	its	behalf.	The	urban	population	decided	it	would	rather	face	the	consequences	of	a	rebel	victory	than	continue	fighting.			In	contrast,	the	Khmer	Rouge	used	a	mix	of	violence,	socioeconomic	and	security	based	incentives	to	shape	population	behaviour.	These	incentives	were	delivered	to	the	population	through	political	structures	that	allowed	the	Khmer	Rouge	to	draw	a	seemingly	inexhaustible	amount	of	the	support	from	the	population.	As	a	result,	 the	Khmer	Rouge	defeated	the	government	militarily,	despite	the	 fact	 it	controlled	a	 smaller	population,	 and	had	a	 smaller	military	 force	with	 inferior	training	 and	 weaponry.	 Table	 21,	 outlines	 the	 key	 phases	 the	 conflict	 went	through.		In	 a	 similar	 vein	 to	Burundi,	 the	 decline	 in	 socioeconomic	 conditions	 came	 as	much	 through	 the	 actions	of	 the	 government	 as	 a	direct	 consequence	of	 rebel	activity.	Declining	socioeconomic	conditions	did	not	create	more	active	support	for	the	rebels,	but	it	did	create	strain	on	the	government	and	induced	its	collapse	and,	 therefore,	 its	 defeat.	 This	 shows	how	 to	use	 the	 framework	developed	 in	chapters	one	to	three	to	understand	civil	conflicts	and	lends	further	credence	to	the	main	message	of	 this	 thesis;	 the	outcome	of	 civil	wars	 is	mainly	 rooted	 in	changes	to	government	mobilisation	capacity.	Rebels	that	win,	do	so	because	the	institutions	that	the	government	uses	to	generate	support	from	the	population	fall	apart.			
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Table	21:	Summary	of	Cambodian	conflict	dynamics	and	key	findings.
Date	 Events	 Conflict	dynamics	
(table	3)	 Key	drivers	of	change	 Rebel	regenerative	capacity	 Government	control	over	the	state	 Sub-hypotheses	
supported	1967-1970	 Onset	 Asymmetric	warfare	(Q3).		Low-level	of	conflict,	no	change.		
Left-wing	suppressed	and	excluded	from	political	process.		
Urban	left-wing	networks	relocate	to	rural	areas.		Rebels	protect	rural	communities	from	government	violence.		Rebels	fail	to	expand	significantly,	consider	political	engagement.		
Government	loses	some	control	in	rural	areas,	but	still	largely	in	control.	 3	&	4	
1970-1973	 Coup	ousts	Prince	Sihanouk		External	interventions	
Conventional	warfare	(Q1).		External	support	enables	both	rebels	and	government	to	develop	conventional	force,	stalemate	ensues.	
Supporters	of	Sihanouk	switch	sides.		External	forces	provide	economic	aid	and	military	protection	for	patrons.	
Rebels	build	extensive	shadow-government	structures,	organising	political	and	economic	activity.			Population	engage	to	secure	protection	from	bombing	and	government	military	activity.		Khmer	Rouge	use	extensive	violence	to	generate	support.		Rebels	create	extremely	resilient	regenerative	capacity.	
Initial	response	to	coup	positive,	government	mobilise	support	into	armed	forces.		Government	incapable	of	challenging	North	Vietnamese	forces	to	reclaim	territory.		Corruption	and	economic	mismanagement	become	rife.		External	support	initially	protects	government	from	effects	of	mismanagement.	
2,	3	&	4	
1973-1975	 Conflict	ends	-	rebel	victory	 -	 Government	collapses	as	cannot	pay	military	or	feed	people.	
Rebel	shadow-government	structures	resilient	enough	to	cope	with	loss	of	external	support.	
Without	external	support	government	is	unable	to	mobilise	resources	from	population	to	cover	the	costs	of	war	and	keeping	state	functioning.	
2	
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Chapter	eight	
An	‘unexplained’	mixed	outcome:	Nagorno-Karabakh		
1992-1994	
	
Introduction	
	The	statistical	model	fails	to	explain	the	conflict	in	Nagorno-Karabakh.	Not	only	does	it	predict	a	mixed	outcome	with	only	a	three	percent	probability,	it	suggests	there	was	a	15	percent	chance	of	an	outright	government	victory.	This	is	all	the	more	interesting	as	the	rebels	made	significant	gains	through	the	course	of	the	conflict	and	achieved	many	of	their	aims.			The	war	 in	Nagorno-Karabakh	involved	the	ethnic-Armenian	population	 in	the	mountainous	 enclave	 fighting	 to	 secede	 from	 Azerbaijan	 and	 join	 Armenia.	Armenians	were	a	small	minority	of	the	overall	population	in	Azerbaijan,	about	two	 percent,	 but	 a	 significant	 majority	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh,	 outnumbering	Azerbaijanis	by	about	three	to	one	at	the	end	of	the	Soviet-era	(Yamskov,	1991).	The	 conflict	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 ended	with	 a	 cessation	 of	 hostilities	 rather	than	a	 final	peace	 settlement	 that	 renormalised	 societal	 and	political	 relations	between	Armenians	and	Azerbaijanis,	as	happened	in	Burundi.	The	rebels	have	retained	de	facto	control	of	the	region	ever	since,	with	Azerbaijan	still	claiming	control	of	the	region.54	Rebel	and	government	forces	still	face	each	other	along	the	line	of	contact	and	there	have	been	periodic	clashes	ever	since.	The	conflict	has,	 therefore,	never	 truly	 finished	and	 is	often	described	as	a	 ‘frozen	conflict’	(CFR,	 2016).	 It	 represents	 a	 different	 type	 of	 mixed	 outcome	 to	 Burundi,	explaining	why	the	model	 fails	to	effectively	predict	 its	outcome.	Nevertheless,	the	 conflict	 is	 an	 extremely	 interesting	 case	 study	 for	 examining	 how	macro-behaviours	 and	 structures	 determine	 the	 incentives	 that	 shape	 population	support.	 Despite	 being	 poorly	 predicted,	 the	 conflict	 lends	 extremely	 strong	
																																																						54	No	international	actor	recognises	Nagorno-Karabakh	as	an	independent	state.	Even	the	Republic	of	Armenia	does	not	recognise	the	Nagorno-Karabakh	government,	despite	the	military	support	it	provides	to	the	rebel	government,	which	allows	the	latter	to	retain	control	of	the	enclave.		
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support	to	the	main	model	of	conflict	proposed	in	this	thesis;	the	rebels	achieved	their	 aims	 by	 undermining	 government	 sovereign	 power	 in	 the	 enclave	 and	creating	 resilient	 mobilisation	 structures	 that	 enabled	 them	 to	 capture	 and	control	the	region.				The	polity	score	in	Azerbaijan	decreased	between	1992	and	1993	from	plus	one	to	 minus-three	 and	 the	 government	 had	 external	 support.	 This	 explains	 the	model’s	prediction	that	there	was	a	moderate	chance	of	a	government	victory	in	1994.	Examining	the	conflict	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	offers	the	chance,	therefore,	to	explore	the	utility	of	these	variables	for	predicting	conflict	outcomes	when	we	know	they	did	not	allow	the	government	to	generate	population	support	in	the	manner	expected.			The	conflict	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	has	a	number	of	other	dynamics	that	makes	it	an	 interesting	 case	 study.	 Firstly,	 it	 reinforces	 the	 crucial	 role	 external	interventions	play	in	creating	opportunities	and	disincentives	for	belligerents	to	build	resilient	mobilisation	structures.	Both	sides	had	external	support,	but	the	rebels	 exploited	 support	 from	 the	 Republic	 of	 Armenia55	 to	 build	 sovereign	structures,	 while	 the	 government’s	 support	 simply	 reflected	 its	 inability	 to	mobilise	its	own	army.			Nagorno-Karabakh’s	 war	 also	 highlights	 the	 role	 ethnic	 identity	 can	 play	 in	determining	 the	 strength	 and	 weakness	 of	 military	 actors.	 Books	 such	 as	
Transcaucasian	 Boundaries	 (Wright	 et	 al.,	 1995)	 demonstrate	 some	 of	 the	mutually	exclusive	narratives	that	feed	into	ethnic	identity	in	Nagorno-Karabakh.	The	 strength	of	 ethnic	 identity	 on	both	 sides	 led	 to	 conflict	 strategies	 focused	around	ethnic	cleansing	and	the	fact	the	rebels	proved	more	successful	at	it	goes	a	 long	way	to	explaining	 the	 final	outcome.	Ultimately,	 removing	a	community	from	a	territory	eliminates	the	capacity	of	conflict	actors	to	draw	support	from	that	 section	 of	 the	 population.	 By	 1994,	 the	 government	 had	 no	 constituent	
																																																						55	For	the	purpose	of	this	study	the	rebels	from	Nagorno-Karabakh	will	be	referred	to	as	Armenians.	When	specifically	referencing	actions	by	the	state	of	Armenia	extra	clarification	will	be	used.	
	
	
	
	
202	
population	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	could	only	recover	its	losses	through	what	amounted	 to	 an	 external	 invasion,	 something	 made	 nearly	 impossible	 by	 the	nature	of	the	terrain.			The	remainder	of	the	chapter	will	compare	the	changing	capacity	of	the	rebels	and	 the	 government	 to	 mobilise	 support	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh,	 from	 the	beginning	of	communal	violence	in	1988,	to	the	escalation	of	the	conflict	in	1992	until	the	ceasefire	that	brought	the	conflict	to	an	end	in	1994.			
Before	1992	
	
Long	memories	
	The	 government	 in	 Baku	 controlled	 the	 Armenian	 population	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	through	coercion	 for	many	years	before	 the	 level	of	military	activity	passed	the	threshold	for	it	to	be	considered	a	civil	war.	Authorities	had	violently	put	 down	 a	 rebellion	 in	 1920,	 expelling	 the	 entire	 Armenian	 population	 from	some	areas	(Kaufman,	1998).			When	the	Soviet	Union	absorbed	Armenia	and	Azerbaijan,	both	claimed	Nagorno-Karabakh.	Josef	Stalin,	then	head	of	nationalities,	awarded	the	area	to	Azerbaijan,	but	granted	Nagorno-Karabakh	significant	autonomy	from	Baku,	with	the	region	officially	 coming	 under	 control	 of	 the	 Soviet	 of	 the	 Mountainous	 Karabakh	Autonomous	Region	(NKAO).	This	autonomy,	however,	meant	little	in	the	Soviet	structure	 (Laitin	 and	 Suny,	 1999).	 Armenians	 claim	 they	 experienced	socioeconomic,	 political	 and	 cultural	 discrimination	 during	 the	 Soviet	 era.	Azerbaijani	 authorities	 were	 accused	 of	 appointing	 leaders	 loyal	 to	 Baku	 in	Nagorno-Karabakh’s	political,	economic	and	law-enforcement	bodies	(Papazian,	2001)	and	rigging	administrative	elections	(Geukjian,	2012).	They	imposed	Azeri	as	 the	 official	 language,	 prevented	 Armenian	 schools	 from	 teaching	 Armenian	history	and	banned	Armenian	textbooks	(Geukjian,	2012;	p108).	They	were	also	
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accused	 of	 closing	 Armenian	 churches,56	 arresting	 Armenian	 clerics	 and	destroying	 Armenian	 cemeteries	 (Papazian,	 2001).	 According	 to	 Ohannes	Geukjian	 (2012;	 p111),	 Azerbaijani	 authorities	 focused	 economic	 projects	 in	Azerbaijani	 towns	 and	 villages	 and	 ignored	 Armenian-dominated	 population	centres.	The	validity	of	 these	 claims	 is	obviously	 in	dispute.	Audrey	Aldstadt’s	analysis	showed	that	there	was	no	clear	socioeconomic	or	cultural	discrimination	of	Armenians	 in	Nagorno-Karabakh	(1994).	That	said,	according	to	Thomas	de	Waal,	 while	 Armenians	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 were	 no	 worse	 off	 than	 their	Azerbaijani	neighbours,	they	were	worse	off	than	the	population	in	Armenia,	and	for	many	this	was	their	point	of	reference	(2013).	Nevertheless,	it	is	clear	from	the	 historical	 analysis	 conducted	 by	 Armenian	 authors	 that	 Azerbaijani	discrimination	 of	 Armenians	 was	 taken	 as	 fact	 by	 the	 Armenian	 population	(Wright	et	al.,	1995).			Perhaps,	most	damaging	of	all	is	the	accusation	that	Azerbaijan	adopted	a	policy	of	 creating	 a	 favourable	 demographic	 shift	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 (Papazian,	2001).	 In	 the	 1920s,	 Armenians	 constituted	 94.4	 percent	 of	 the	 population	 in	Nagorno-Karabakh.	By	1988,	this	had	dropped	to	75	percent	due	to	an	increase	in	Azerbaijani	settlements	and	emigration	by	Armenians	seeking	socioeconomic	opportunities	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 Soviet	Union	 (Yamskov,	 1991).	Armenians	had	seen	a	 similar	demographic	 shift	 in	another	autonomous	 region	of	Azerbaijan,	Nakhchivan.	Stalin	granted	Nakhchivan	to	Azerbaijan	in	the	same	decree	in	which	he	gave	it	Nagorno-Karabakh,	despite	it	having	no	land	border	with	Azerbaijan.57	When	it	was	granted	to	Azerbaijan	in	the	1920s,	Armenians	were	15	percent	of	the	population.	By	1979,	 this	had	 shrunk	 to	1.4	percent	 (Geukjian,	2012).	The	Armenian	population,	therefore,	received	signals	during	the	Soviet	period	from	the	Azerbaijani	authorities,	that	at	the	first	opportunity,	the	government	would	eject	them	from	Nagorno-Karabakh.			
																																																						56	Azerbaijanis	are	Shia	Muslims,	whereas	Armenians	practice	orthodox	Christianity.	This	divide	appears	to	have	only	played	a	very	limited	role	in	the	conflict	and,	as	such,	is	not	treated	in	any	detail.		57	Nakhchivan	is	surrounded	by	Armenia	to	the	north,	Iran	to	the	south	and	has	a	small	border	with	Turkey	in	its	extreme	northwest.	
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Glasnost		
	The	 Armenian	 intelligentsia	 pounced	 on	 President	 Gorbachev’s	 increased	tolerance	of	political	protest	to	petition	for	Nagorno-Karabakh	to	be	made	part	of	the	Armenian	SSR.	Moscow’s	decision	to	allow	protests	to	take	place	emboldened	activists	even	further	and	on	20th	February	1988	the	NKAO	adopted	a	resolution	calling	for	Nagorno-Karabakh	to	be	transferred	to	Armenia.	This	was	supported	by	mass	protests	in	Yerevan,	Armenia’s	capital.	Glasnost	had	significantly	reduced	the	costs	to	individuals	seeking	to	challenge	the	government	(Croissant,	1998).	As	Levon	Chorbajian	puts	it	 ,	when	comparing	the	potential	costs	of	protesting	before	 and	 after	 glasnost;	 “to	 be	 a	 participant	 in	 urban	 demonstrations	 and	general	 strikes,	 one	 had	 to	 be	 a	 person	 who	 was	 willing	 to	 face	 martial	 law,	curfews,	and	perhaps	tear	gas	and	a	water	cannon	not	torture,	death	and	Siberian	exile”	(2001;	p5).	The	costs	for	challenging	the	government	had	been	lowered.		What	followed	remains	a	source	of	contention	and	sources	differ	over	the	exact	order	 of	 events.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 anti-Armenian	 violence	 began	 to	 spread	 in	Azerbaijan	in	response	to	the	protests.	In	an	industrial	town	called	Sumgait,	with	a	population	of	around	223,000	and	an	Armenian	minority	of	15-20,000,	violence	led	to	32	Armenians	being	killed	according	to	Soviet	sources	(Cheterian,	2009).	The	Armenian	population	was	effectively	forced	to	flee	Sumgait.	Around	this	time,	the	main	opposition	 to	Soviet	rule	 in	Azerbaijan,	 the	Azerbaijan	Popular	Front	(APF),	 began	 to	 blockade	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 and	 the	 Armenian	 border.	Eventually	the	Azerbaijani	authorities	(still	within	the	Soviet	Union	at	this	time)	enforced	the	blockade	as	well	(Croissant,	1998).			Fearing	expulsion	 from	Nagorno-Karabakh,	 the	Armenian	population	began	 to	adopt	violence	as	its	principal	means	of	challenging	the	Azerbaijani	authorities.	Armenian	 militias	 formed	 ‘self-defence’	 forces	 based	 around	 a	 variety	 of	relationships,	from	kinship,	to	universities,	collective	farms,	industrial	plants	or	criminal	 networks.	 Azerbaijani	 villages	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 responded	 with	local	strong	men	building	forces	to	challenge	Armenian	militias	(Zurcher,	2007).	Communal	violence	became	a	feature	of	daily	life.	Communities	were	drawn	to	
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these	militias	as	the	only	means	to	protect	themselves.	As	the	violence	escalated	the	remaining	Armenian	population	in	other	areas	of	Azerbaijan	fled	to	Armenia	(Croissant,	1998).		As	Azerbaijan	 still	 formed	part	of	 the	Soviet	Union,	 the	 first	 efforts	 to	end	 the	violence	came	 from	Moscow.	 In	1989,	Moscow	offered	a	political	 compromise,	imposing	 direct-rule	 from	 Moscow	 and	 the	 promise	 of	 socioeconomic	development	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 in	 exchange	 for	 the	 two	 communities	agreeing	 to	 stop	 fighting.	 Interestingly,	 this	 did	 have	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	conflict.	1989	saw	the	 lowest	amount	of	violence	 in	the	whole	of	 the	period	of	1988-1994,	with	only	40	people	being	killed	(Kaufman,	1998;	p32).			The	Soviet	Union	balanced	these	positive	incentives	with	collective	punishments.	First	 it	 arrested	 prominent	 activists,	 who	 had	 organised	 themselves	 as	 the	Karabakh	Committee	(de	Waal,	2013).	In	addition,	despite	the	partial	success	of	its	proposed	political	compromise,	the	Soviets	became	impatient	with	the	rebels	and	 returned	administration	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	 to	Baku	 (Zurcher,	2007).	 It	then	launched	Operation	Ring,	a	joint	operation	with	Azerbaijani	OMON	(a	special	police	unit)	in	1991	in	an	attempt	to	disarm	rebel	militias	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	 The	 Soviets	 targeted	 Armenian	 communities	 accused	 of	 instigating	violence.	Any	towns	that	offered	resistance	were	subjected	to	artillery	barrages	until	 they	submitted.	 In	many	 instances	the	entire	population	was	deported	to	either	 Stepanakert	 (the	 capital	 of	Nagorno-Karabakh)	 or	Armenia-proper.	 The	population	was	then	replaced	by	ethnic	Azerbaijanis,	many	of	whom	had	been	expelled	from	Armenia	in	the	previous	three	years	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	Observers	describe	the	operation	as	a	form	of	collective	punishment	designed	to	undermine	popular	support	for	the	rebels	(Helsinki	Watch,	1993;	Human	Rights	Watch,	1992;	Melander,	2001).	While	scholars	are	not	in	universal	agreement,58	Erik	Melander	claims	the	operation,	combined	with	the	effects	of	the	economic	blockade,	undermined	support	 for	 the	rebels.	Some	Armenian	political	 leaders	
																																																						58	Ohannes	Geukjian,	for	example,	claims	the	operation	hardened	the	population’s	resolve	and	strengthened	the	rebels	(2012).	The	longer-term	impact	this	had	is	discussed	below.	
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considered	accepting	autonomy	in	Azerbaijan	as	part	of	a	political	settlement	to	end	the	violence	(2001).			Ultimately,	 the	 Soviets	 called	 off	 the	 operation.	 The	 army	 was	 sent	 back	 to	Moscow	 in	 response	 to	 the	 coup	 to	 remove	 President	 Gorbachev,	 which	 also	signalled	the	final	days	of	the	Soviet	Union.	Shortly	afterwards	both	Armenia	and	Azerbaijan	declared	 independence,	 as	did	Nagorno-Karabakh.	The	break-up	of	the	Soviet	military	also	meant	the	two	belligerents	suddenly	had	access	to	more	weaponry,	both	 in	 terms	of	quantity	of	arms	and	 its	 lethality	 (de	Waal,	2013).	Increased	weaponry	and	the	development	of	independent	sovereign	structures	meant	violence	escalated	and	took	an	increasingly	organised	form,	transitioning	the	enclave	to	a	state	of	war.	Violence,	however,	was	still	mainly	communal	 in	nature,	with	 local	militias	making	up	the	majority	of	armed	personnel	on	both	sides.	The	 rebels	had	a	burgeoning	political	 structure,	while	 the	authorities	 in	Baku	now	had	control	over	 the	counterinsurgent	response.	Nagorno-Karabakh	found	 itself	 in	a	straightforward	state-building	competition.	The	war	would	be	won	by	the	nascent	political	structure	able	to	build	effective	sovereign	structures	across	the	territory	and	organise	their	militias	and	communities	into	a	cohesive	military	force.			
The	rebels	and	the	population		The	 rebel’s	 strategic	 aim	was	 to	 liberate	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 from	 Azerbaijani	control.	 The	 enduring	 perception	 of	 discrimination	 and	 more	 recent	 violence	undertaken	 by	 the	 Baku	 authorities	 and	 Azerbaijani	 communities	 meant	 the	whole	Armenian	population	supported	these	aims	(de	Waal,	2013).	The	strength	of	 Armenian	 identity	 almost	 certainly	 lessened	 the	 collective	 mobilisation	problem	 by	 creating	 a	 shared	 perception	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 a	 rebel	 victory.	However,	 the	promise	of	unification	with	Armenia	 is	a	collective	and	post-war	benefit,	 which	 made	 it	 difficult	 for	 the	 rebels	 to	 mobilise	 support	 using	 this	incentive	alone.	It	had	existed	for	over	seventy	years	and	had	not	been	enough	to	base	a	movement	around.	For	the	rebels	to	build	an	effective	force	they	would	have	to	offer	Armenian	communities	more	immediate	benefits.	In	the	event,	the	
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rebels	 delivered	 a	 range	 of	 incentives	 and	 converted	 the	 clear	 sentimental	support	 they	enjoyed	 into	active	behavioural	 support,	 allowing	 them	to	create	effective	political	and	military	institutions.			
	
A	de	facto	government		The	rebels	created	local	governance	structures	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	when	the	pre-existing	 ones	 were	 dissolved	 by	 the	 Soviets	 in	 1989.	 One	 of	 the	 main	challenges	 faced	 by	 rebel	 groups	 is	 building	 sovereign	 structures	 that	 can	compete	with	pre-existing	government	institutions.	The	Azerbaijani	government	was	inadvertently	demobilised	by	the	Soviets,	creating	a	significant	opportunity	for	the	rebels	to	develop	mobilisation	structures	of	their	own.			It	formed	local	councils	that	then	elected	a	national	council,	which	became	the	de	
facto	 government	 of	 Armenian-controlled	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 (Zurcher,	 2007).	According	 to	 Levon	 Abrahamian	 this	 was	 particularly	 effective	 as	 Karabakh	society	 remained	 feudally	 structured,	 which	 the	 councils	 could	 be	 organised	around.	It	was,	therefore,	possible	for	rebel	authorities	to	communicate	with	the	population	 through	 societal	 structures	 that	 were	 understood	 and	 respected	(2001).				While	the	economic	blockade	created	hardship	in	rebel-held	regions,	the	rebels	alleviated	this	suffering	through	the	course	of	the	conflict.	Suzanne	Goldenberg	states	that	by	the	end	of	1993,	life	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	had	returned	to	a	degree	of	normality	(1994).	The	rebels	achieved	this	through	five	main	efforts.		
Governance	structures		In	many	 conflict	 zones,	 nefarious	 actors	 exploit	 the	 law	 and	 order	 vacuum	 to	establish	a	 shadow	economy.	According	 to	Human	Rights	Watch,	 the	 rebels	 in	Nagorno-Karabakh	 controlled	 the	 ‘war	 economy’	 and	 kept	 it	 focused	 on	supporting	their	war	aims	(1994).	Rebel	governance	structures	were	hierarchical	and	 organised	 enough	 to	 prevent	 independent	 warlords	 from	 exploiting	 the	
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population.	Human	Rights	Watch	reports	show	that	they	ran	a	“highly	centralised	state”	 (1994;	 p27).	 They	 controlled	 the	 gas	 market,	 ensuring	 it	 was	 evenly	distributed	and	affordable	 for	 the	population.	This	was	 in	contrast	 to	even	the	Republic	of	Armenia,	where	the	high	price	of	gas,	due	to	a	rapacious	black	market,	caused	significant	socioeconomic	problems	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	They	also	managed	to	keep	basic	services	running,	such	as	hospitals,	and	ensured	most	children	could	attend	school	(Cox	and	Eibner,	1993).		
External	support	
	There	is	little	doubt	that	external	support	for	the	rebels	was	a	key	factor.	Support	from	Armenia-proper	allowed	the	rebels	to	shape	population	behaviour	in	two	main	ways.	Firstly,	it	gave	them	a	military	force	capable	of	capturing	territory	in	the	 first	 place.	 By	 1994,	 there	 were	 10,000	 people	 in	 the	 Nagorno-Karabakh	Army,	but	20,000	Republic	of	Armenia	troops	fighting	on	the	rebel	side	(Zurcher,	2007;	p175).	Nagorno-Karabakh	is	highly	mountainous	and	access	in	and	out	of	the	region	is	extremely	difficult.	Militarily	this	gives	the	defenders	a	significant	advantage.		Chorbajian,	et	al.	claim	attackers	would	need	a	ten-to-one	numerical	advantage	 in	 order	 to	 conquer	 the	 region	 (1994;	 p41).	 The	 military	 support	provided	 by	 the	 Republic	 of	 Armenia	 helped	 the	 rebels	 capture	 this	 territory,	creating	a	security	blanket,	which	allowed	the	rebels	to	build	effective	sovereign	structures.			The	Republic	of	Armenia	also	provided	significant	economic	aid,	which	the	rebels	distributed	 between	 military	 spending	 and	 the	 provision	 of	 supplies	 to	 the	population	(Lynch,	2002).			
Military	activity	
	The	rebels	also	geared	military	activity	around	establishing	a	functioning	state.	Their	 first	 goal	 was	 to	 open	 supply	 lines	 to	 Armenia.	 Initially	 the	 rebels	 in	Nagorno-Karabakh	 found	 themselves	 surrounded	 by	 Azerbaijan,	 but	 they	managed	to	capture	the	town	of	Khojaly	in	early	1992,	giving	them	an	air	bridge	
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to	Armenia	and	partially	alleviating	the	blockade	on	the	region	(Croissant,	1998).	That	 same	month,	 the	 rebels	 captured	 the	 Lachin	 corridor,	 an	 area	 outside	 of	Nagorno-Karabakh,	which	gave	them	a	land	connection	with	Armenia,	essentially	breaking	 the	blockade	 (Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	They	continued	 to	widen	this	corridor	throughout	the	conflict,	enabling	them	to	fully	exploit	their	external	support.			The	 rebels	also	 focused	resources	on	capturing	 towns	 that	had	socioeconomic	value.	For	example,	the	capture	of	Mardakert	in	1993	secured	access	to	the	main	reservoir	and	hydroelectric	power	station	in	Nagorno-Karabakh.	Human	Rights	Watch	claims	this	gave	the	rebels	the	capacity	to	provide	basic	services	to	rebel-held	areas	(1994).	According	to	International	Crisis	Group	reports,	they	chose	to	create	settlements	in	places	such	as	the	Lachin	corridor,	which	is	key	to	supplying	the	enclave.	In	contrast,	they	left	areas	without	political	or	economic	value	empty	after	ejecting	the	Azerbaijani	population	(2005).		In	the	summer	of	1993,	Armenian	forces	captured	significant	amounts	of	territory	outside	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	claiming	it	made	them	better	able	to	defend	their	constituent	population.	These	offensives	included	expanding	the	territory	around	the	Lachin	corridor,	most	notably	the	town	of	Kelbajar,	which	further	facilitated	economic	and	military	support	from	Armenia	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	This	demonstrates	how	military	activity	is	a	crucial	element	of	civil	war.	However,	it	needs	to	be	examined	to	see	what	effect	it	has	on	a	belligerent’s	capacity	to	shape	population	behaviour.	In	Nagorno-Karabakh,	capturing	specific	territory	was	key	to	 enabling	 the	 rebels	 to	 generate	 support	 by	 facilitating	 political	 and	socioeconomic	activity	and	stabilising	life	inside	rebel-controlled	areas.				
Providing	security		The	rebels	also	demonstrated	their	ability	to	protect	Armenian	civilians.	As	Mary	Kaldor	shows,	 the	Armenian	population	bore	 the	brunt	of	Azerbaijani	military	activity	(2007).	Azerbaijani	forces	used	villages	and	towns	populated	by	ethnic	Azerbaijanis	 to	 launch	 attacks	 on	 neighbouring	 Armenian	 communities.	 The	
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rebels	 clearly	 saw	 this	 as	 a	 genuine	 strategic	 threat.	 For	 one,	 they	 ensured	Armenian	 populations	 did	 not	 flee	 despite	 pressure	 from	 Azerbaijani	 forces.	Rebel	political	authorities	forbade	civilians	from	fleeing	conflict	areas.	According	to	 Vicken	 Cheterian	 this	 was	 because	 they	 recognised	 that	 once	 an	 area	 was	depopulated	 it	 would	 be	 much	 more	 difficult	 to	 motivate	 forces	 to	 defend	 it	(2009;	 p131).	 Rebels	 also	 focused	military	 activity	 on	 Azerbaijani	 towns	 that	were	being	used	to	launch	attacks	against	Armenian	communities.	They	would	then	depopulate	these	areas,	ensuring	the	attacks	ceased.			
Expelling	opposition	
	While	 the	 rebels	 offered	 the	 Armenian	 population	 a	 range	 of	 political,	socioeconomic	and	security	based	incentives,	they	mainly	used	violence	to	shape	the	 behaviour	 of	 ethnic	 Azerbaijanis.	 Human	 Rights	Watch	 accused	 Armenian	forces	of	deliberately	targeting	Azerbaijani	villages	with	no	military	justification.	It	also	accused	rebels	of	imposing	economic	blockades	on	Azerbaijani	villages,	in	a	 similar	 manner	 to	 those	 imposed	 by	 Azerbaijani	 forces	 on	 Armenian	communities	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1992).		Ultimately,	 the	 rebels	 expelled	 the	 whole	 Azerbaijani	 population	 of	 Nagorno-Karabakh.	OSCE	reports	from	the	time	claim	that	the	destruction	of	Azerbaijani	towns	was	planned	in	Stepanakert	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	In	Khojaly,	they	killed	 a	 large	 number	 of	 civilians,	 which	 according	 to	 Vicken	 Cheterian	 was	explicitly	designed	to	send	a	message	to	other	Azerbaijanis	on	the	consequences	of	not	fleeing	(2009).	According	to	a	Human	Rights	Watch	report,	after	Khojaly	when	they	sieged	a	town	they	would	leave	a	passage	out	of	the	area	for	civilians,	incentivising	 the	population	to	 leave	rather	 than	stay	and	resist	 (1994).	Those	towns	with	no	strategic	value	were	then	destroyed	in	order	to	make	it	difficult	for	the	population	to	countenance	returning	(de	Waal,	2013).			Rebels	 expelled	 Azerbaijani	 communities	 in	 lieu	 of	 being	 able	 to	 shape	 their	behaviour	through	other	means.	In	1994,	a	rebel	commander	described	the	logic	driving	 the	 expulsion	 of	Azerbaijanis	 to	Human	Rights	Watch;	 “(we)	 deported	
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civilians	because	 (we)	did	not	have	enough	 forces	 to	occupy	 land	and	pacify	a	hostile	 civilian	 population.”	 (Human	 Rights	Watch,	 1994;	 p60).	 By	 the	 end	 of	1992,	rebel	forces	had	expelled	nearly	the	entire	Azerbaijani	population	(Helsinki	Watch,	1993).	
	
Political	power	creates	military	power	
	As	 a	 result	 of	 their	 governance	 activities,	 rebel	 leaders	 developed	 enormous	authoritative	power	over	the	population	(Zurcher,	2007).	They	channelled	this	support	into	the	creation	of	an	effective	military	force.	The	parliament	of	the	self-declared	state	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	managed	to	subordinate	all	of	the	Armenian	militias	into	a	single	force,	known	as	the	Popular	Liberation	of	Artsukh59	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1992).	It	organised	local	businesses	to	support	the	conflict	effort,	providing	 essential	 supplies	 to	 soldiers	 on	 the	 front	 line	 (de	 Waal,	 2013).	Similarly,	 Saideman	 and	 Ayres	 show	 how	 expelling	 Azerbaijani	 communities	meant	 they	 did	 not	 have	 to	 drain	 resources	 pacifying	 a	 rebellious	 population	(2008).	As	a	consequence,	all	the	resources	that	rebel	leaders	generated	from	the	population	 and	 the	 Republic	 of	 Armenia	were	 invested	 in	 creating	 a	 resilient	armed	force	with	a	strong	regenerative	capacity.	Few	resources	were	needed	to	demobilise	government	support	in	the	region	from	1993	onwards.		Perhaps	the	most	impressive	feature	of	rebel	ability	to	mobilise	support	was	their	conscription	drives.	Rebel	authorities	adopted	a	policy	of	conscription	for	all	men	between	the	age	of	eighteen	and	forty-five.	They	had	no	problem	enforcing	it	and	mobilised	 almost	 the	 entire	 able-bodied	 male	 population	 (Zurcher,	 2007).	Whenever	Azerbaijani	forces	made	gains,	the	rebels	generated	increased	support	from	 the	 population.	 In	 February	 1994,	 after	 Azerbaijan	 launched	 a	 series	 of	successful	counterattacks,	the	rebels	raised	the	conscription	age	to	50	and	with	these	extra	forces	recaptured	lost	land60	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).			
																																																						59	The	Armenian	name	for	Nagorno-Karabakh	60	The	Republic	of	Armenia	also	often	provided	extra	support	in	response	to	any	gains	by	Azerbaijani	forces	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).		
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The	 rebels	 solved	 the	 collective	mobilisation	 problem	 through	 the	 creation	 of	hierarchical	 governance	 structures	 that	 fed	 into	 a	 unified	 war	 effort.	 These	structures	 were	 based	 on	 rebel	 ability	 to	 provide	 effective	 governance,	 a	functioning	 economy,	 basic	 public	 services	 and	 security	 to	 the	 Armenian	population.	While	the	Armenian	population	all	agreed	with	the	war	aims	of	the	rebels,	it	took	building	credible	political	structures	to	provide	within-war	benefits	for	this	to	be	converted	into	an	effective	military	force.		
The	government	of	Azerbaijan	and	the	population	
	
Reinforcing	perceptions	
	Armenian	perceptions	of	the	Azerbaijani	government	were	ingrained	before	the	war	 started.	 Government	 behaviour	 throughout	 the	 conflict,	 however,	 only	solidified	these	beliefs.			Many	Armenian	authors	point	to	violence	in	Sumgait	in	1988	and	Baku	in	1990,	as	 demonstrating	 that	 Armenians	were	 not	 safe	 living	 under	 Azerbaijani	 rule	(Saideman	 and	 Ayres,	 2008).	 Azerbaijan’s	 strategy	 inside	 Nagorno-Karabakh	further	reinforced	this	perception.	NGO	reports	from	the	beginning	of	the	conflict	show	that	Baku	had	almost	no	effective	control	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	from	early	in	the	conflict	(Amnesty	International,	1994;	Helsinki	Watch,	1993;	Human	Rights	Watch,	1992	and	1994).	This	left	them	with	only	threats	of	force	and	the	economic	blockade	 as	 possible	 means	 to	 shape	 population	 behaviour	 (Halbach,	 2013).	Michael	Croissant	argues	that	Azerbaijan’s	strategy	for	defeating	the	Armenian	rebels	was	to	try	to	break	the	will	of	the	Armenian	population	and	increase	the	costs	they	would	face	if	they	supported	rebel	authorities	(1998;	p78).	At	no	stage,	did	 they	 offer	 the	 Armenian	 population	 direct	 benefits	 if	 they	 supported	 the	government	instead.			Operation	Ring	operated	on	a	logic	of	collective	punishment	and	the	government	continued	 indiscriminately	 targeting	 civilian	 communities	 throughout	 the	conflict.	Human	Rights	Watch	accused	the	Azerbaijani	government	of	using	its	air	
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force	solely	to	demoralise	Armenian	civilians,	targeting	towns	and	villages	that	had	no	military	value	(1994).	In	the	early	stages	of	the	conflict,	when	Azerbaijani	militias	 still	 controlled	 large	 numbers	 of	 towns	 and	 villages	 they	 would	indiscriminately	launch	artillery	barrages	against	Armenian	population	centres,	including	Stepanakert	(Maresca,	1996).			As	 well	 as	 using	 violence	 to	 affect	 population	 behaviour,	 Azerbaijani	 forces	blockaded	 the	 region	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 undermine	 rebel	 capacity	 to	 generate	support.	In	the	early	years	of	the	conflict	this	blockade	did	have	an	effect.	Human	Rights	Watch	reported	in	1992	that	Stepanakert	was	effectively	at	a	standstill.			
Emptying	Nagorno-Karabakh	
	Vicken	Cheterian	argues	the	government	learnt	from	Sumgait	and	tried	to	use	this	strategy	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 to	 create	 larger	 swathes	 of	 territory	 it	 could	control	 (2009;	 p151).	 In	 Sumgait,	 Azerbaijani	 pressure	 incited	 hundreds	 of	thousands	of	Armenians	to	leave	other	parts	of	Azerbaijan	after	the	troubles	had	begun	 in	 1988.	 In	 1990,	 as	 the	 conflict	 began	 to	 grow,	 it	 emptied	 numerous	villages	in	northern	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	during	Operation	Ring	10,000	people	were	deported	(Cheterian,	2009).	This	was	the	centrepiece	of	the	government’s	strategy	 to	 defeat	 rebel	 forces.	 It	 tried	 to	 eliminate	 rebel	 capacity	 to	 generate	support	 and	 regenerate	 military	 losses	 by	 removing	 the	 population	 from	rebellious	areas.		Ultimately,	 however,	 the	 strategy	was	 doomed	 to	 fail.	 The	 pre-existing	 ethnic	balance	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	the	ability	of	the	population	in	the	region	to	organise	themselves	into	defensive	militias	made	it	impossible	for	the	Azerbaijani	authorities	to	completely	purge	the	region	(Cheterian,	2009).		
Political	dysfunction		In	contrast	to	rebel	ability	to	convert	community-based	militias	into	a	functioning	army,	 the	government’s	 campaign	was	undermined	by	 its	 inability	 to	build	 an	
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effective	force	in	Nagorno-Karabakh.	Despite	sharing	the	government’s	desire	to	retain	control	over	the	region,	Azerbaijani	communities	across	the	whole	country	did	not	provide	the	government	behavioural	support.			Many	 authors	 document	 how	 each	 Azerbaijani	 village	 had	 its	 own	 militia	commanded	by	a	local	strong	man	with	no	central	authority	coordinating	activity	(Aldstadt,	 1997;	 de	Waal,	 2013;	 Human	 Rights	Watch,	 1992	 and	 1994).	 	 The	problem	 this	 created	 for	 Azerbaijan	 was	 that	 foot	 soldiers’	 loyalty	 was	 then	directed	towards	the	strong	man,	and	his	personal	goals,	rather	than	the	broader	war	effort.	 For	 example,	Colonel	 Suret	Husseinov,	 grew	 in	power	 through	 “his	ability	 to	 keep	 his	men	well-fed	 and	 shod”	 (Goldenberg,	 1994;	 p124).	He	 also	secured	 acclaim	 from	 the	 Azerbaijani	 population	 after	 some	 early	 military	victories.	Consequently,	despite	failing	to	score	any	further	military	success	and	with	no	officially	appointed	position,	in	1993,	he	was	effectively	commanding	the	northern	front	of	Azerbaijani	forces	(Aldstadt,	1997).			The	first	president	of	Azerbaijan,	Ayaz	Mutalibov,	rather	than	organising	these	militias	into	one	fighting	force,	attempted	to	disband	them.	He	feared	they	were	more	likely	to	be	used	against	him	than	against	Armenian	rebels	(Kaldor,	2007).	This	weakened	the	Azerbaijani	government’s	fighting	capacity	in	the	early	period	of	the	conflict	as	Azerbaijan	lacked	a	functioning	military	(ibid.).	NGO	reports	at	the	 time	 show	 that	 there	 was	 a	 limited	 command	 and	 control	 relationship	between	the	Azerbaijan	central	command	and	the	militias	fighting	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	 (Human	 Rights	Watch,	 1992).	 In	 June	 1992,	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 APF,	Albufaz	Elchibey,	succeeded	Mutalibov	as	president.	Elchibey	also	failed	to	unite	the	 various	 fighting	 forces	 operating	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 (Aldstadt,	 1997;	p136).		
	The	impact	of	this	inability	to	create	a	unified	military	force	was	most	apparent	in	the	fall	of	Keljabar	in	1993,	which	secured	the	rebels	land	access	to	the	Republic	of	 Armenia.	 Upon	 coming	 under	 attack,	 Husseinov	 simply	 retreated	 from	 the	town	 and	 left	 it	 to	 rebel	 forces	 (Goldenberg,	 1994).	 Given	 their	 loyalty	 to	Husseinov,	his	men	followed	him.	The	Human	Rights	Watch	Report,	Seven	Years	
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of	 Conflict	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 (1994),	 shows	 this	was	 standard	 practice	 for	Azerbaijani	 forces	 throughout	 the	 conflict	 and	 the	 militias	 rarely	 stood	 and	fought;	 surrendering	 Azerbaijani	 civilians	 to	 face	 the	 full	 force	 of	 Armenian	advances.		
	After	 the	 fall	 of	 Keljabar,	 Elchibey	 tried	 to	 remove	 Husseinov	 from	 his	commanding	 role.	 Husseinov	 took	 his	men	 and	marched	 on	 Baku	 demanding	Elchibey’s	resignation.	Eventually,	Elchibey	fled	and	Heydar	Aliyev	became	the	new	president,	with	Husseinov	as	his	prime	minister.			While	 not	 by	 design,	 Azerbaijan	 ended	 up	 organising	 the	 population	 inside	Nagorno-Karabakh	through	relations	with	militia	leaders	and	local	strong	men.	These	people	were	well	supported	by	the	population.	However,	if	the	strong	man	switches	 allegiance,	 as	 Husseinov	 effectively	 did,	 then	 his	 fighters	 and	 the	population	go	with	him.	Ultimately,	 commentators	 agree	 that	during	 the	 early	stages	of	the	conflict	in	Nagorno-Karabakh,	Azerbaijani	political	elites’	primary	focus	was	fighting	amongst	themselves	for	power	in	Baku,	rather	than	fighting	Armenian	rebels	(Aldstadt,	1997;	de	Waal,	2013).	The	government	failed	to	assert	any	 sovereignty	 over	 Nagorno-Karabakh,	 allowing	 rebels	 a	 free	 hand	 to	 take	control	of	Nagorno-Karabakh.			Heydar	 Aliyev	 was	 the	 first	 figure	 powerful	 enough	 to	 somewhat	 unify	 the	fighting	 forces	 towards	a	 single	goal	 (Helsinki	Watch,	1993).	Even	 then	Aliyev	could	not	get	the	population	to	actively	support	the	armed	conflict.		Many	people	continued	 to	 avoid	 attempts	 to	 implement	 the	 draft	 (Laitin	 and	 Suny,	 1999).	“Press	gang	raids	were	a	common	occurrence,	with	youths	being	pulled	off	buses	and	stopped	 in	public	places	 for	 induction”	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994;	p83).	Aliyev	was	so	concerned	that	Azerbaijani	units	would	continue	to	desert	in	the	face	of	Armenian	action	he	would	deploy	two	units	in	parallel;	the	first	would	fight	Armenian	forces,	while	the	second	unit	would	stand	behind	the	first,	with	orders	to	shoot	deserting	soldiers	(Chorbajian	et	al.,	1994).			
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Insecurity	
	Despite	the	dysfunction	in	the	capital,	at	the	start	of	the	conflict	there	remained	an	Azerbaijani	population	inside	Nagorno-Karabakh	that	the	government	could	have	 used	 to	 build	 support.	 Azerbaijanis	 still	 accounted	 for	 25	 percent	 of	 the	region’s	 population.	 However,	 government	 signals	 through	 the	 course	 of	 the	conflict	were	that	they	were	not	interested	in	supporting	their	needs.	For	starters,	the	Azerbaijani	government’s	lack	of	control	forced	the	Azerbaijani	population	to	seek	protection	from	militias	(Geukjian,	2012).	Once	the	tide	of	the	conflict	turned	against	 the	 Azerbaijanis,	 the	 only	 signal	 the	 population	 received	was	 that	 the	government	would	not	protect	 it	 from	rebel	 forces.	When	 the	government	did	offer	 to	evacuate	civilians,	soldiers	 forced	themselves	onto	helicopters	and	 left	civilians	behind	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	Thomas	de	Waal	documents	two	visible	 impacts	 this	 perception	 had	 on	 the	 Azerbaijani	 population	 behaviour;	civilians	 would	 flee	 cities	 being	 attacked	 (2013;	 loc3521)	 and	 then	 refuse	 to	return	 to	 areas	 that	 government	 forces	 liberated	 (loc4377).	 This	 is	 in	 stark	contrast	to	rebel	ability	to	protect	its	constituent	population	and	motivate	it	to	stay	in	the	region.	The	government	could	no	longer	generate	manpower,	supplies	and	finances,	while	the	rebels	had	steady	access	to	all	different	types	of	support.			
How	to	lose	a	civil	war	
	Everything	 the	 government	 did	 between	 1992	 and	 1994,	 as	 well	 the	 years	immediately	preceding	1992,	made	it	harder	for	it	to	generate	support	and	easier	for	the	rebels.			Commentators	noted	that	Azerbaijan’s	strategy	of	 targeting	Armenian	civilians	and	trying	to	make	conditions	in	the	territory	unbearable	had	the	opposite	effect	to	that	intended.	Ohannes	Geukjian	argues	Operation	Ring	forced	the	population	under	 the	protection	of	 rebel	militias	 (2012).	 Similarly,	Caroline	Cox	and	 John	Eibner	argue	the	population	responded	to	the	rising	number	of	civilian	casualties	at	the	hands	of	Azerbaijani	forces	by	being	more	motivated	to	support	Armenian	rebels.	 It	 even	motivated	 the	 Armenian	 population	 to	 support	 rebel	 efforts	 to	
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empty	 Azerbaijani	 villages	 and	 the	 targeting	 of	 Azerbaijani	 civilians	 (Cox	 and	Eibner,	1993).	Dov	Lynch,	writes	that	the	economic	blockade	played	into	the	rebel	leaders’	narrative	that	the	Azerbaijani	government	was	intent	on	destroying	the	Armenian	population	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	(2002;	p844).	This,	in	turn,	justified	operations	outside	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	to	alleviate	the	economic	blockade	and	provide	a	security	buffer	to	protect	Armenian	civilians.			The	government’s	failure	to	protect	Azerbaijani	civilians	meant	it	was	completely	demobilised	 inside	 the	main	 battlefield.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 1992,	 rebel	 forces	 had	expelled	 nearly	 the	 whole	 Azerbaijani	 population	 from	 the	 region	 (Helsinki	Watch,	1993).	Vicken	Cheterian	shows	how	this	further	limited	the	motivation	of	Azerbaijani	 fighters	 (2009).	 Most	 importantly,	 the	 mountainous	 nature	 of	Nagorno-Karabakh	 made	 control	 over	 territory	 paramount.	 Once	 Nagorno-Karabakh	was	completely	under	Armenian	control	it	was	extremely	difficult	for	the	Azerbaijanis	to	penetrate	it	and	degrade	support	for	the	rebels.			In	essence,	the	rebels	were	better	at	ethnic	cleansing	than	the	government,	and	this	is	what	allowed	them	to	create	favourable	conditions	on	the	ground.	After	the	rebels	 ethnically	 cleansed	 the	 region,	 as	 far	 as	 the	 Armenian	 population	 in	Nagorno-Karabakh	was	concerned,	the	Azerbaijani	government	became	largely	irrelevant;	it	had	been	demobilised.		The	 political	 chaos	 in	 Baku	 and	 its	 inability	 to	 bring	 Azerbaijani	militias	 also	contributed	to	 the	weakness	of	government	military	 forces.	Rebel	 forces	made	significant	gains	every	time	political	infighting	shifted	political	elites’	focus	from	the	war	 in	Nagorno-Karabakh	to	power	 in	Baku	(Goldenberg,	1994).	President	Aliyev,	 stated	 in	 a	 speech	 on	his	 defence	 reforms	 in	November	1993,	 that	 the	inability	 of	 previous	 governments	 to	 motivate	 soldiers	 to	 fight	 was	 the	Azerbaijani	government’s	key	weakness	in	the	Nagorno-Karabakh	conflict.			 “It	 must	 be	 noted	 that	 our	 defeats	 are	 due,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 to	weakness	and	the	Azerbaijani	Army	units'	lack	of	fighting	and	skill...It	is	 no	 secret	 that	 our	 soldiers	 and	 fighters	 in	 Jebrayil	 Raion	 and	 in	
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Horadiz	 and	 elsewhere	 abandoned	 the	 civilians	 and	 fled	 the	 battle	zones	without	putting	up	any	 fight....It	would	have	been	possible	 to	create	an	army	over	two	or	three	years	and	defend	Azerbaijan.	But	this	opportunity	 was	 lost,	 and	 Azerbaijan's	 defense	 (sic)	 has	 suffered	rather	 than	 improved.	 Various	 groups	 and	 battalions	 fought	independently	of	each	other.	They	served	various	forces	and	goals	and	lacked	 an	 overall	 military	 strategy.”	 (Human	 Rights	 Watch,	 1994;	pp82–83).			
The	ceasefire	
	The	beginning	of	1994	 saw	 fresh	Azerbaijani	 advances,	making	headway	back	into	 Nagorno-Karabakh.	 However,	 once	 again	 the	 rebels	 mobilised	 increased	support	 and	 recaptured	 all	 the	 territory	 they	had	 lost,	 in	what	was	by	 far	 the	bloodiest	period	of	the	conflict.	Aliyev	agreed	to	a	Russian-mediated	ceasefire.	As	figure	19	shows,	combined	forces	from	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	the	Republic	of	Armenia	now	controlled	nearly	20	percent	of	Azerbaijani	territory,	nine	percent	if	Nagorno-Karabakh	is	discounted	(de	Waal,	2013).			
	Figure	19:	Areas	of	Armenian	rebel	control	at	the	end	of	the	conflict.			
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The	rebels	made	these	gains	as	they	mobilised	their	own	constituent	population	and	demobilised	that	of	 the	government.	They	created	political	structures	 that	converted	 popular	 sentiment	 into	 behavioural	 support.	 They	 expelled	 the	Azerbaijani	 population,	 removing	 the	 government’s	 capacity	 to	 generate	resistance	inside	Nagorno-Karabakh.	At	the	same	time,	the	government	failed	to	cohere	 local	 support	 into	 organised	military	 activity,	with	 local	 powerbrokers	instead	using	their	influence	on	the	ground	to	boost	their	own	political	power.			However,	the	rebels	failed	to	force	the	government	to	formally	recognise	these	gains	and,	at	the	time	of	writing,	Azerbaijan	still	refuses	to	recognise	Nagorno-Karabakh.	Given	their	relative	strength,	why	did	the	rebels	agree	to	a	ceasefire	without	having	achieved	this	recognition?			The	ending	of	the	conflict	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	has	been	held	up	as	an	example	of	a	mutually	hurting	military	stalemate	inducing	the	parties	to	sign	a	ceasefire	(Halbach,	2013;	Mooradian	and	Druckman,	1999).	Indeed,	the	dataset	used	in	the	statistical	 model	 shows	 a	 significant	 rise	 in	 battlefield	 deaths	 in	 the	 year	preceding	the	ceasefire.	This	does	not	capture	the	months	before	the	ceasefire	in	1994,	which	according	to	reports	also	saw	significant	war	deaths	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	However,	the	model	showed	no	correlation	between	an	increase	in	battlefield	 deaths	 and	 the	 end	 of	 civil	 wars.	 The	 idea	 of	 a	 military	 hurting	stalemate	inducing	a	ceasefire	either	makes	Nagorno-Karabakh	an	anomaly	or	it	is	not	a	complete	explanation.						
The	government		For	the	government,	the	argument	that	its	military	losses	induced	it	into	signing	the	ceasefire	holds	some	weight.	Most	of	 the	military	 losses	 in	1993	and	1994	were	Azerbaijani	forces.	Moreover,	the	inability	of	the	government	to	make	any	lasting	 headway	 in	 capturing	 back	 land	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 revealed	 the	potential	 costs	associated	with	 reasserting	 control	over	 the	 region.	Mooradian	and	Druckman	conducted	interviews	with	Azerbaijani	politicians,	who	they	quote	as	saying	they	needed	to	avoid	further	bloodshed	(1999).	The	government	was	
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clearly	‘hurting’	and	had	realised	the	war	could	not	be	won	militarily	now	that	the	rebels	held	 the	 territorial	 advantage.	However,	Mooradian	and	Druckman	also	argue	that	previous	mediations	had	been	doomed	to	fail	because	both	actors	had	divided	militaries	 and	weak	 political	 leaders	 (p726).	 Before	 the	 ceasefire	was	signed	in	1994	this	also	changed	in	Azerbaijan.	Losses	in	the	conflict	had	already	led	 to	 the	 fall	 of	 two	 Azerbaijani	 presidents	 in	 1992	 and	 1993.	 The	 ascent	 of	Heydar	 Aliyev	 brought	 a	 stronger	 leader	 to	 power.	 According	 to	 Carol	Migdalovitz,	 Aliyev	 recognised	 that	 further	 losses	would	 threaten	 his	 political	power.	However,	in	the	early	months	of	his	reign	he	had	the	capacity	to	disband	the	militias	that	could	threaten	him	(2001).	In	other	words,	Aliyev	was	able	to	impose	an	unpopular	settlement	on	his	constituents	when	it	became	clear	the	war	could	not	be	won.	The	previous	two	presidents	faced	similar	costs	for	continuing	the	conflict,	but	any	signs	of	weakness	would	have	certainly	led	to	their	demise.	Aliyev’s	ability	to	prevent	opposition	to	a	settlement,	in	other	words	to	control	the	behaviour	of	his	constituent	population,	was	as	key	to	his	ability	to	sign	the	ceasefire	as	the	heavily	unfavourable	military	situation.		
	
The	rebels	
	From	the	rebel	perspective,	 the	hurting	stalemate	explains	even	less	about	the	decision	to	agree	to	a	cessation	of	hostilities.	For	one,	the	rebels	had	achieved	as	much	as	they	could	militarily.	In	contrast	to	the	other	three	wars	looked	at	in	this	study,	where	the	conflict	was	about	control	over	the	state,	the	rebels	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	only	wanted	to	secure	the	secession	of	their	region.		When	the	ceasefire	was	signed,	the	rebels	could	sell	it	as	a	victory.	A	direct	comparison	can	be	made	to	1991,	when	simply	beginning	an	initiative	to	start	negotiations	resulted	in	the	murder	of	its	most	active	rebel	supporter,	Valery	Grigoryan	(Melander,	2001).		A	deal	 in	1991	would	have	made	more	sense	in	terms	of	the	rebels	 ‘hurting’	and	being	forced	into	concessions.	At	this	time	rebel	authorities	were	“reconsidering	the	feasibility	of	their	struggle”	given	“the	massive	damage	being	inflicted	on	the	Armenian	population”	by	Operation	Ring	(Melander,	2001;	p69).	The	population	and	the	 leadership,	however,	were	divided	on	the	 issue,	and	the	more	militant	faction	won	out.	
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In	contrast,	 in	1994,	 the	 rebels	were	 in	 the	ascendency.	 In	 the	Mooradian	and	Druckman	 article	 they	 refer	 to	 an	 interview	with	 a	 senior	 Nagorno-Karabakh	official	who	 states	 “that	 freedom	 (was)	worth	 the	 severe	 price	 that	was	paid”	(1999;	p723).	This	 seems	 to	 suggest	 the	Armenians	 thought	 they	had	 secured	their	freedom	and	the	ceasefire	was	not	a	significant	concession.	By	April	1994,	they	had	overturned	nearly	all	of	the	territorial	losses	they	had	suffered	in	late	1993	and	the	humanitarian	 impact	of	 the	war	had	 largely	been	brought	under	control.	 The	 population	 and	 the	 fledgling	de	 facto	 state	were	 no	 longer	 under	threat	and	the	rebels	had	monopolised	sovereignty	in	Nagorno-Karabakh.	From	this	perspective	the	rebels	had	little	left	to	fight	for	militarily,	so	if	the	government	was	willing	to	agree	to	the	ceasefire	there	was	little	for	rebel	authorities	to	lose.	The	rebels	remaining	goals	would	be	international	recognition	and	the	lifting	of	the	economic	blockade.			As	 suggested	 in	 the	 theory	 section	 of	 this	 thesis,	 it	 appears	 the	 government	calculated	its	decision	to	negotiate	in	a	manner	that	better	fits	traditional	models	of	 civil	war;	 balancing	 the	 probability	 of	 victory	 against	 the	 potential	 costs	 of	winning.	In	contrast,	the	rebels	only	based	their	decision	on	whether	to	negotiate	on	their	perceptions	around	the	prospect	of	winning,	only	potentially	mooting	a	ceasefire	in	1991	when	Operation	Ring	was	increasingly	threatening	their	ability	to	generate	support.		Ultimately	 it	was	able	to	get	the	government	to	sign	the	ceasefire	and	create	a	sense	of	permanence	precisely	because	it	had	dragged	government	forces	into	a	hurting	‘military	stalemate’.	As	in	the	other	two	wars	covered	so	far,	this	supports	the	notion	that	a	military	stalemate	that	then	exerts	socioeconomic	and	political	pressure	 on	 the	 government,	 threatening	 the	 government’s	 wider	 ability	 to	function,	is	an	effective	modus	operandi	for	rebel	groups.	Two	governments	fell	in	Baku	because	they	failed	to	quell	the	rebellion.	The	fact	that	two	governments	fell	 and	were	 replaced	by	 actors	 in	Baku	 suggests	 territorially-focused	 groups	may	face	an	extra	difficulty	when	compared	to	rebels	attempting	to	capture	the	whole	state.	In	a	war	to	capture	the	state,	if	the	rebels	can	induce	a	government	to	collapse	then	they	can	fill	that	void	themselves.	In	conflicts	where	rebel	aims	
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are	more	limited	territorially,	the	government	is	liable	to	reconstitute	itself	and	keep	battling	the	rebels,	as	happened	in	Nagorno-Karabakh.			
Military	factors	
	The	 rebels	 used	 their	 military	 to	 open	 up	 supply	 routes,	 protect	 the	 civilian	population	and	eject	Azerbaijani	communities.	The	government	tried	to	use	its	military	 to	 rid	 the	 region	 of	 Armenian	 communities,	 but	was	 not	 as	 effective.	Analysing	 the	 impact	 of	 military	 interaction	 through	 this	 lens	 yields	 more	interesting	insights	than	looking	at	in	a	more	conventional	manner.			For	example,	the	balance	of	power	always	favoured	the	government	as	outlined	in	 figure	 20,	 suggesting	 by	 itself	 it	 reveals	 little	 about	 the	 likely	 course	 of	 the	conflict.					
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	Figure	20:	Balance	of	power	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	conflict	in	1992	and	199461	(Zurcher,	2007)	
	Territory	was	the	key	military	aspect	of	the	conflict.	Nagorno-Karabakh	is	highly	mountainous	and	access	in	and	out	of	the	region	is	extremely	difficult.	Militarily	this	 gives	 defenders	 a	 significant	 advantage.	 	 Chorbajian	 et	 al.	 claim	 attackers	would	 need	 a	 ten-to-one	 numerical	 advantage	 in	 order	 to	 conquer	 the	 region	(1994;	 p41).	 By	 1994,	 the	 rebels	 controlled	 the	 region,	 which	 gave	 them	 a	significant	military	 advantage,	 given	 the	 relatively	 balanced	military	 numbers.	However,	 just	 looking	at	the	situation	in	1994	does	not	tell	the	whole	story.	In	1992,	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	conflict,	 it	was	 the	government	 that	 should	have	benefitted	from	the	hostile	terrain.	The	border	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	falls	entirely	inside	Azerbaijan,	with	no	contiguous	border	with	Armenia.	Christoph	Zurcher	documents	 how	 this	 essentially	 isolated	 the	 Armenian	 population	 from	 any	
																																																						61	Rebel	numbers	include	both	local	forces	and	those	supplied	by	the	Republic	of	Armenia.	13,000	of	the	21,000	rebel	troops	in	1992	were	volunteers	from	the	Republic	of	Armenia.	In	1994,	Republic	of	Armenia	support	was	more	organised,	with	20,000	Republic	of	Armenia	troops	augmenting	the	10,000	strong	Nagorno-Karabakh	Army.		
21
30
22
45
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
1992 1994
Balance	of	power	in	1992	and	1994
Rebels Government
	
	
	
	
224	
outside	support	(2007).	It	was	very	easy	for	Azerbaijan	to	impose	the	economic	blockade	 on	 the	 region,	 undermining	 the	 rebels’	 access	 to	 both	 economic	 and	military	 support	 from	 the	 Republic	 of	 Armenia.	 As	 such,	 while	 the	 territorial	situation	hugely	favoured	the	rebels	in	1994,	in	1992	it	made	it	much	easier	for	the	government	to	isolate	the	rebels.	Territory,	therefore,	played	a	key	role	in	the	conflict,	but	only	when	one	 looks	at	how	it	affected	 the	ability	 to	 the	rebels	 to	generate	support	from	the	population	at	various	points	in	the	conflict.			
Battlefield	outcomes		According	 to	 Mary	 Kaldor,	 military	 forces	 rarely	 ever	 confronted	 each	 other	directly,	 with	 the	 principle	 military	 aim	 being	 to	 blockade	 a	 town	 until	 it	surrendered.	The	invading	forces	would	then	expel	the	population	and	destroy	the	 town	 (2007).	 Commentators	 unanimously	 agree	 that	 there	 was	 limited	military	logic	to	most	of	the	military	interaction,	and	military	forces	were	used	to	affect	 the	behaviour	of	populations	(eg	Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	The	main	logic	 of	 rebel	 and	 government	military	 interaction	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	way	 it	affected	their	ability	to	mobilise	support	from	the	population,	as	documented	in	more	detail	above.			Rebel	 leaders	 clearly	did	not	 choose	 to	 fight	based	on	a	belief	 that	 they	had	a	stronger	army	that	could	defeat	Azerbaijani	forces	directly	in	1992.	According	to	John	 Maresca,	 the	 head	 of	 the	 OSCE	 mediating	 mission,	 the	 Minsk	 Group,	Azerbaijani	assaults	on	Stepanakert	at	the	end	of	1991	could	have	theoretically	created	a	‘ripe’	moment	for	peace.	He	states	it	was	known	by	all	parties	that	the	Azerbaijanis	were	stronger	militarily	in	1992;	there	were	daily	military	assaults	on	Stepanakert	and	the	rebels	still	did	not	have	a	supply	line	to	Armenia		(1996;	p478).	Moreover,	at	this	time,	none	of	the	deficiencies	of	the	Azerbaijani	military	had	presented	themselves.	In	his	view	the	rebels	should	have	calculated	that	their	odds	of	victory	were	minimal	and	should	have	been	seeking	a	potential	peace	deal.	 However,	while	 some	 rebel	 leaders	 considered	 a	 peace	 offer,	most	were	committed	 to	 pursuing	 the	 conflict	 to	 its	 conclusion	 (1996;	 p480).	 It	 is	 clear,	therefore,	 that	 something	 other	 than	 hard	 military	 facts	 informed	 the	 rebel	
	
	
	
	
225	
leaders’	 perception	 of	 their	 strength	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 their	 ability	 to	ultimately	force	the	Azerbaijani	government	into	concessions	by	taking	up	arms.	Most	obviously,	it	was	their	perception	of	their	ability	to	mobilise	support	that	made	them	believe	the	war	would	be	won.		
	
Factors	affecting	strategy	
	
External	events	
	External	support	played	an	important	role	as	in	most	wars,	however,	it	was	not	the	quantity,	but	the	quality	of	support	that	made	the	difference.	The	Republic	of	Armenia’s	support	gave	the	rebels	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	the	ability	to	generate	internal	 support	 in	 a	 way	 they	 could	 have	 never	 achieved	 by	 themselves.	 In	contrast,	the	majority	of	the	meaningful	support	the	government	received	from	Turkey,	Russia	and	mercenaries	from	Afghanistan	and	the	former	Soviet	Union,	was	military	 in	nature	(de	Waal,	2013).	There	 is	no	evidence	that	 this	support	caused	the	government	to	become	complacent	about	its	ability	to	win	the	conflict,	as	the	Cambodian	government	had	done.	That	they	needed	these	forces,	however,	demonstrates	Baku’s	inability	to	build	its	own	force	in	the	region.	Before	1992,	Azerbaijan	 relied	 on	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 to	 control	 the	 population	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh.	Once	 the	Soviet	Union	 fell,	Azerbaijan	could	no	 longer	maintain	 the	same	threat	of	violence	 to	control	 the	Armenian	population	(Cheterian,	2009).	Essentially,	the	Republic	of	Armenia	replaced	the	Soviet	Union	as	the	guarantors	of	security	 in	Nagorno-Karabakh,	allowing	rebels	 to	build	sovereign	structures	and	demobilise	the	government	in	the	region.		
History	
	The	 conflict	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 also	 shows	 how	 history	 can	 play	 a	 role	 in	shaping	population	behaviour.	The	 legacy	of	 ethnic	 relations	between	 the	 two	communities,	 and	 the	 Armenian	 narrative	 of	 persecution,	 shaped	 how	 both	
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communities	perceived	events	as	they	were	unfolding.62	Armenian	communities	believed	 the	 costs	 of	 not	 supporting	 the	 rebel	 authorities	 would	 be	 their	expulsion	from	the	region	(Cheterian,	2009).	This	made	it	easier	for	the	rebels	to	generate	support	 from	the	population.	Moreover,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	government	had	 always	 succeeded	 in	 suppressing	 dissent	 in	 the	 region	 by	 punishing	Armenians	 violently	 and	 removing	 rebellious	 populations	 meant	 this	 was	 its	default	strategy.	However,	the	fall	of	the	Soviet	Union	removed	the	extra	military	muscle	 the	 Azerbaijani	 authorities	 could	 rely	 on	 to	 execute	 this	 strategy	 and	allowed	 the	Republic	 of	Armenia	 to	 support	 its	 ethnic	brethren.	The	 legacy	of	history	 and	 ethnic	 identity,	 therefore,	 cannot	 be	 discounted	 in	 shaping	 the	strategy	belligerents	use	to	influence	population	behaviour.		
	
Internal	events		The	final	 interesting	factor	that	comes	out	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	is	how	events	that	were	only	tangentially	related	to	the	conflict	affected	the	outcome.	The	level	of	 democracy	 did	 decline	 in	 Baku,	 but	 not	 as	 a	 result	 of	 increased	 repression	against	the	Armenian	population	in	Nagorno-Karabakh.	In	Burundi,	the	change	in	polity	score	and	status	of	the	Hutus	reflected	a	change	in	their	relationship	with	the	government.	The	change	for	the	better	helped	to	demobilise	support	for	the	Hutu	 rebels	 and	 forced	 them	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 new	 political	 realities.	 In	Azerbaijan,	the	changing	polity	score	reflected	Haydar	Aliyev	cementing	control	in	Baku	at	the	expense	of	his	political	rivals.	This	change	had	no	impact	on	the	government’s	relationship	with	the	Armenian	population	in	Nagorno-Karabakh,	which	by	then	was	shielded	from	government	influence.			The	ascent	of	Aliyev	to	power	did,	however,	impact	the	government’s	strategy	for	dealing	with	the	war.	His	increased	power	enabled	him	to	refocus	efforts	away	from	a	purely	military	strategy	and	double	down	on	the	economic	and	political	
																																																						62	Many	Armenian	authors	show	how	the	population	compared	Azerbaijani	attempts	to	deport	Armenians	from	Nagorno-Karabakh	to	the	death	of	1.5	million	Armenians	in	1915	as	they	were	expelled	from	Turkey.	An	event	that	is	often	referred	to	as	the	‘Armenian	genocide’	(Cheterian,	2008).			
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strategy	 that	 the	 government	has	 continued	 to	 employ	 since	1994	 (Laitin	 and	Suny,	 1999).	 No	 previous	 leader	 could	 have	 achieved	 this	 without	 losing	 his	position.	 Political	 dynamics	 not	 explicitly	 linked	 to	 the	 conflict	 in	 a	 state,	therefore,	also	clearly	play	a	role	in	the	strategies	conflict	actors	can	employ.		
Conclusion	
	
Why	is	this	a	deviant	case?		That	 Aliyev	 was	 able	 to	 agree	 to	 the	 cessation	 of	 hostilities	 because	 he	 had	secured	greater	political	control	in	Baku	is	also	one	of	three	explanations	as	to	why	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 is	 a	 deviant	 case	 in	 the	 statistical	 model.	 The	 model	suggested	 a	 decrease	 in	 democracy	may	 proxy	 for	 the	 government	 punishing	segments	of	the	population	for	supporting	rebel	groups.	However,	the	decrease	in	democracy	in	Azerbaijan	actually	reflected	the	government’s	relationship	with	its	own	constituent	population.	The	same	can	be	said	for	the	increasing	size	of	the	Azerbaijani	 military.	 By	 the	 time	 these	 changes	 took	 effect	 the	 rebels	 had	captured	 the	 region	 and	 created	 an	 impenetrable	 fortress,	 meaning	 the	population	inside	Nagorno-Karabakh	was	largely	unaffected.		Most	rebel	groups	are	too	weak	to	achieve	this.	This	feature	of	the	conflict	probably	represents	an	anomaly	rather	than	something	we	can	use	to	update	the	statistical	model.			The	 first	 two	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis	 implied	 that	 the	 likely	 dynamics	 and	outcomes	 of	 wars	 can	 be	 predicted	 principally	 through	 the	 examination	 of	relations	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 population.	 The	 rebels	 basically	eliminated	 this	 relationship	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 by	 ejecting	 Azerbaijani	communities,	something	not	captured	in	the	statistical	model.	The	importance	of	conflict	actor’s	efforts	to	shift	demographics	in	areas	under	their	control	cannot	be	understated	and	is	an	element	of	many	civil	wars,	including	those	in	Syria	and	Iraq.	These	demographic	shifts	clearly	play	a	role	in	determining	the	outcome	of	conflicts	and	the	strength	of	both	governments	and	rebels,	but	were	not	captured	in	 the	 statistical	 model.	 A	 complete	model	 of	 civil	 will	 need	 to	 find	 a	 way	 to	
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incorporate	 demographic	 shifts	 if	 it	 is	 to	 prove	 capable	 of	 comprehensively	predicting	a	range	of	civil	wars.					The	conflict	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	is	also	poorly	predicted	because	it	represents	a	different	type	of	conflict	compared	to	that	which	the	model	was	testing	against.	Firstly,	it	was	more	irregular	in	nature	at	the	beginning	of	conflict,	which	meant	it	was	less	about	demobilising	the	government	and	more	a	straight	competition	to	mobilise	support	in	a	political	vacuum.	The	war	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	is	also	a	different	 type	 of	 mixed	 outcome	 to	 Burundi,	 where	 the	 government	 made	democratic	concessions	that	undermined	the	rebels’	support	base.	 Instead,	 the	conflict	ended	in	a	stalemate,	and	to	some	extent	remains	unresolved.	One	would,	therefore,	 expect	different	dynamics	 to	have	 led	 to	 the	 ceasefire.	Many	people	view	the	war	as	still	on-going,	with	the	current	ceasefire	representing	a	break	in	hostilities	rather	than	the	end	of	the	conflict	(CFR,	2016).	It	is	not	unreasonable	to	 presume	 any	 model	 would	 have	 difficulty	 demonstrating	 commonalities	between	 wars	 that	 ended	 so	 differently	 as	 those	 in	 Burundi	 and	 Nagorno-Karabakh.	One	solution	would	be	to	code	frozen	conflicts	as	a	different	type	of	ending.	My	 dataset	 includes	 three	 conflicts	 that	 are	 traditionally	 described	 as	frozen;	Abkhazia	in	Georgia,	Transinistra	in	Moldova,	and	Nagorno-Karabakh.63	Recoding	them	as	a	different	type	of	outcome	does	not	work,	as	there	are	too	few	of	them	to	conduct	statistical	analysis.	However,	removing	them	from	the	dataset	improves	the	overall	fit	of	the	model	and	the	effects	of	all	the	variables	of	interest	are	magnified.	Moreover,	the	rebels	having	sanctuary	and	access	to	rough	terrain	both	now	correlate	with	a	rebel	victory,	as	many	people	have	predicted	it	should	(Galula,	1964).	Rebels	are	also	much	less	likely	to	win	territorial	conflicts	in	this	new	model	 (table	22).	That	 the	government	can	reconstitute	 itself	 to	continue	fighting	despite	 collapsing,	 just	 as	 the	 government	 in	Baku	did,	may	offer	 one	explanation	as	to	why	this	is	the	case.	Rebels	aiming	to	secede	territory	have	to	
																																																						63	Abkhazia	is	coded	as	a	mixed	outcome,	while	Transinistra	has	been	deemed	a	rebel	victory.	Abkhazia	is	actually	extremely	well	predicted,	given	Georgia	experienced	a	huge	drop	in	GDP	and	reduced	its	military	size	in	the	year	before	the	war	ended.	Without	examining	the	conflict	in	more	detail	it	is	impossible	to	say	whether	the	behaviour	of	these	variables	caused	the	conflict	to	become	‘frozen’	in	the	same	way	we	would	expect	these	conditions	to	bring	about	a	more	standard	type	of	mixed	outcome.		
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push	 the	conflict	 through	all	of	 its	phases	and	capture,	protect	and	govern	 the	territory	under	dispute.	They	do	not	benefit	from	the	shortcut	to	victory	enjoyed	by	most	rebel	groups.			Frozen	conflicts	can,	therefore,	be	described	as	a	different	type	of	ending	to	other	mixed	 outcomes	 and	 should	 be	 treated	 as	 such	 when	 examining	 civil	 wars	comparatively.	 Removing	 these	 wars	 from	 the	 statistical	 model	 improves	 its	utility.	While	this	makes	sense	intuitively,	using	the	model	to	guide	the	selection	of	case	studies	has	demonstrated	this	empirically.												
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Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	Number	of	obs				 826	Wald	chi2(45)	 -	Prob	>	chi2	 -	Table	22:	Model	ten	-	Full	model	with	‘frozen	conflicts’	removed.	
	
Support	for	hypotheses			Despite	 being	 a	 deviant	 case,	 the	 conflict	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 offers	 strong	support	for	the	theories	developed	in	this	thesis.	Nagorno-Karabakh	reinforces	the	 finding	 from	 Cambodia	 that	 popular	 support	 is	 only	 important	when	 it	 is	
	 Model	10		 Government	victory	 Rebel	victory	 Mixed	outcome	Change	in	democracy	 -0.282***	(0.0765)	 -0.0636	(0.0599)	 0.199***	(0.0677)	Change	in	ethnic	relations		 -0.121	(0.763)	 -1.570	(1.014)	 1.129***	(0.356)	Change	in	life	expectancy		 0.0552	(0.190)	 -0.823***	(0.191)	 0.370	(0.254)	Change	in	GDP		 0.599	(1.249)	 -2.916***	(1.112)	 -2.582	(1.615)	Change	in	battle	deaths	 -3.28e-05**	(1.47e-05)	 -4.13e-05	(3.08e-05)	 -4.96e-05	(3.48e-05)	Change	in	government	military	 0.0103	(0.0104)	 -0.0185*	(0.0102)	 -0.0239***	(0.00601)	Rebels	have	external	sanctuary	 0.0620	(0.712)	 26.64***	(6.303)	 1.473*	(0.843)	Rough	terrain		 -0.403	(0.284)	 0.420*	(0.254)	 0.333	(0.284)	Rebels	use	terrorism	against	population	 0.791	(0.662)	 1.165	(0.895)	 -1.795	(1.230)	Territorial	aims	 1.119	(0.774)	 -2.940***	(1.026)	 0.751	(0.709)	External	support	for	government	 1.977**	(0.969)	 -1.123	(1.296)	 1.234	(0.801)	External	support	for	rebels	 0.216	(1.219)	 1.101**	(0.439)	 0.359	(0.779)	Time		 0.123	(0.123)	 1.200**	(0.514)	 -0.312*	(0.167)	Time	squared		 -0.00365	(0.00616)	 -0.0613**	(0.0280)	 0.0361***	(0.0122)	Time	cubed		 7.87e-05	(9.50e-05)	 0.00106**	(0.000488)	 -0.000981***	(0.000291)	Constant	 -5.685***	(1.360)	 -38.21***	(8.279)	 -6.727***	(1.348)	
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translated	into	active	participation.	Armenian	and	Azerbaijani	communities	both	strongly	supported	the	aims	of	the	rebels	and	government	respectively.	Only	the	rebels	converted	this	into	active	support	in	the	form	of	finance	and	manpower	for	its	 military	 force.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 government	 saw	 its	 constituent	 population	respond	to	the	fear	of	rebel	violence	and	political	opportunities	to	challenge	the	government	 in	 Baku.	 The	 Azerbaijani	 population	 chose	 to	 leave	 the	 region,	eliminating	government	capacity	to	seriously	threaten	rebel	control	of	Nagorno-Karabakh.			Table	23	summarises	the	conflict	and	key	findings,	which	show	strong	support	for	all	 the	hypotheses.	The	general	 theories	of	conflict	developed	 in	 this	 thesis	proves	itself	an	extremely	framework	for	explaining	the	dynamics	and	outcome	of	the	conflict	in	Nagorno-Karabakh.	The	rebels	monopolised	sovereignty	in	the	region,	and	demobilised	the	government	by	expelling	its	constituent	population.	The	 rebels	 could	 not	 have	 achieved	 this,	 however,	 without	 support	 from	 the	Republic	of	Armenia,	once	again	affirming	the	importance	of	external	support.				Nagorno-Karabakh	also	highlights	another	element	of	conflict	outside	the	scope	of	the	thesis’s	main	hypotheses.	Without	a	constituent	population	it	is	very	hard	for	conflict	actors	to	generate	the	support	they	need	to	carry	out	military	activity.	Both	the	rebels	and	the	government	attempted	to	weaken	the	other	by	ejecting	its	constituent	population	from	Nagorno-Karabakh.	One	of	the	main	reasons	the	rebels	 in	 Nagorno-Karabkh	 achieved	 their	 conflict	 aims	 is	 that	 they	 won	 this	battle.	Belligerents	in	Cambodia	and	Burundi	also	attempted	similar	demographic	shifts	 in	 order	 to	 strengthen	 their	 sovereign	 power	 or	 weaken	 that	 of	 their	opponent,	suggesting	this	is	a	common	tactic	in	civil	wars.	Observers	of	civil	wars	need	 to	 examine	 ethnic	 cleansing,	 including	 genocide,	 in	 this	 context	 when	exploring	conflicts.	While	it	represents	a	humanitarian	crisis,	it	also	significantly	affects	the	strategic	context	by	altering	a	conflict	actor’s	mobilisation	capacity	in	a	 specific	 area,	 explaining	 why	 these	 types	 of	 activities	 appear	 so	 ubiquitous	across	civil	wars	throughout	history.			
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	 Table	23:	Summary	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	conflict	dynamics	and	key	findings.	
Date	 Events	 Conflict	dynamics	
(table	3)	 Key	drivers	of	change	 Rebel	regenerative	capacity	 Government	control	over	the	state	 Sub-hypotheses	
supported	1992	 Onset	 Irregular	warfare	(Q4).		Government	and	rebels	attempt	to	unify	militias	into	coherent	fighting	force.	
Dissolution	of	Soviet	Union	left	communities	free	to	confront	each	other.		
Rebels	bring	communities	together,	protecting	them	from	violence.		Significant	external	support	from	Republic	of	Armenia.	
Government	unable	to	control	community-based	militias	and	cannot	protect	population	from	rebel	efforts	to	expel	them	from	Nagorno-Karabakh.		Attempts	to	control	Armenian	population	through	violence.	
3	&	4	
1993	-1994	 Conflict	ends	-	‘frozen	conflict’	(mixed	outcome)	
Conventional	(Q1).		Rebels	capture	territory	and	ceasefire	agreed.	
Rebels	expel	ethnic	Azerbaijani	communities.	 Rebels	build	shadow-governance	structures	that	protected	population	and	facilitate	economic	activity,	converting	sentimental	support	into	substantive	resources.			
Government	has	no	influence	left	inside	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	cannot	win	conventional	war	with	rebel	forces	given	the	latter’s	external	support	and	territorial	advantage.		
2,	3	&	4	
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Chapter	nine	
An	‘unexplained’	rebel	victory:	Zimbabwe	1965-1979	
	
Introduction		The	conflict	in	Zimbabwe64	represents	an	extremely	interesting	case	study	in	the	context	 of	 this	 broader	 piece	 of	 work.	 An	 African65	 nationalist	 insurgency	defeated	a	much	stronger	government	army	run	by	the	white	settler	community.	The	main	challenge	is	that	in	many	ways	it	fits	the	theoretical	model	of	conflict	proposed	in	this	thesis	almost	perfectly.	The	insurgents	won	by	undermining	the	government’s	ability	to	distribute	benefits	to	its	constituent	population;	yet,	it	is	a	deviant	case	in	the	statistical	model	in	chapter	five.			The	model	suggests	the	rebels	had	under	a	one	percent	chance	of	victory	in	1979,	while	there	was	four	percent	chance	of	a	government	victory	and	a	five	percent	chance	 of	 a	 mixed	 outcome.	 According	 to	 the	 model	 there	 was	 a	 90	 percent	probability	of	the	war	continuing	into	1980.	Most	of	the	key	variables	perform	contrary	 to	what	 the	 statistical	model	 suggested	we	would	expect	 to	 see	 for	a	rebel	 victory;	 life	 expectancy	 had	 risen	 by	 one	 year,	 no	 external	 power	 was	intervening	 on	 the	 rebel’s	 behalf,	 the	 government	 was	 receiving	 outside	assistance,	 battlefield	 deaths	 had	 actually	 increased	 significantly	 and	 the	government	had	increased	the	size	of	its	military	in	the	years	preceding	its	defeat.	Only	GDP	had	decreased	significantly,	dropping	US$91	to	US$313	per	capita	in	the	three	years	before	the	end	of	the	war,	representing	a	decrease	of	23	percent.	The	model	of	conflict	proposed	in	chapter	two	suggested	that	the	key	element	of	
																																																						64	Rhodesia	became	Zimbabwe	after	the	Lancaster	House	agreement	that	brought	the	war	to	an	end.	During	1979	it	was	also	known	as	Zimbabwe-Rhodesia	as	part	of	the	Internal	Settlement,	an	attempt	by	the	white	regime	to	end	the	war	by	dealing	with	moderate	nationalists.		This	chapter	will	use	Zimbabwe	to	describe	the	country	itself,	but	will	use	the	term	Rhodesia	when	referencing	government	activity	or	institutions	as	that	was	how	it	self-identified.	I	will	use	Zimbabwe	when	talking	about	the	rebels	for	the	same	reason.		65	While	the	Zimbabwean	insurgents	were	not	the	only	African	nationalist	movement,	and	the	population	did	not	represent	the	whole	of	Africa,	for	the	sake	of	brevity	the	term	African	will	refer	specifically	to	autochthonous	population	of	Zimbabwe	as	it	is	often	referred	to	in	this	way	in	historical	accounts	of	the	conflict.	The	terms	settler,	white	and	European	community	will	be	used	to	refer	to	the	constituent	population	of	the	Rhodesian	government.		
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civil	war	is	rebel	ability	to	demobilise	the	government.	On	this	basis,	we	reasoned	that	a	drop	in	GDP	should	indicate	a	government	struggling	to	generate	support	from	its	constituent	population,	making	a	rebel	victory	more	likely.	The	statistical	model	suggested	this	was	true,	but	the	substantive	effect	was	small.	In	contrast,	the	wars	Burundi	and	Cambodia	showed	the	general	economy	was	a	key	factor	in	determining	the	course	of	these	wars.	As	all	other	variables	are	contraindicated,	Zimbabwe,	 therefore,	 offers	 the	 opportunity	 to	 examine	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	discrepancy.			The	conflict	in	Zimbabwe	is	also	instructive	as	it	allows	us	to	examine	how	rebels	can	 win	 when	 facing	 a	 technically	 superior	 military	 force.	 While	 being	outnumbered,	 both	 the	 Cambodian	 and	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 rebels	 faced	dysfunctional	 government	 forces.	 The	 Rhodesian	 government’s	counterinsurgency	tactics,	in	contrast,	have	been	lauded	over	(J.R.T.	Wood,	1997).	Yet	the	government	was	defeated	and	the	rebels	grew	in	strength	throughout	the	war.	Zimbabwe,	therefore,	serves	as	a	reminder	that	success	on	the	battlefield	is	not	determined	by	who	wins	in	the	conventional	military	sense.			
The	insurgency		The	insurgency	had	two	main	factions;	the	Zimbabwean	African	National	Union	(ZANU)	with	its	military	wing,	the	Zimbabwean	African	National	Liberation	Army	(ZANLA);	and	the	Zimbabwe	African	People’s	Union	(ZAPU),	with	a	military	wing	known	as	the	Zimbabwe	People’s	Revolutionary	Army	(ZIPRA).	ZANU	and	ZAPU	often	fought	each	other,	particularly	after	the	ceasefire	was	signed.	The	reasons	for	these	splits	were	numerous	and	have	been	discussed	elsewhere	(Henriques,	1977).	Broadly	speaking,	however,	 they	occupied	similar	positions	 throughout	the	conflict.	They	both	began	recruiting	for	guerrilla	activities	around	1963	and	they	 both	 largely	 respected	 the	 Lancaster	 House	 agreement	 that	 brought	 the	conflict	to	an	end	(Cilliers,	1986).	Consequently,	the	majority	of	this	chapter	will	
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refer	to	these	factions	as	a	single	actor.66	ZANU	and	ZAPU	did,	however,	pursue	diverse	strategies	for	building	a	military	force	and	had	different	external	backers;	China	and	the	Soviet	Union	respectively.	This	disparity	will	be	briefly	covered	in	the	section	examining	how	the	belligerents	selected	their	strategies.		
	
Key	dates		The	conflict	can	be	divided	into	four	main	parts,	1965-1968,	1968-1972,	1972-1976	and	1976-1979.			In	1965,	the	ruling	party	of	Rhodesia,	the	Rhodesian	Front,	made	its	Unilateral	Declaration	of	Independence	(UDI)	from	Great	Britain.	Great	Britain	refused	to	recognise	it	and	imposed	economic	sanctions,	which	were	later	endorsed	by	the	United	Nations.	Small	insurgent	units	then	began	to	infiltrate	into	Zimbabwe	from	bases	 in	 Zambia,	 although,	 in	 general,	 government	 forces	 easily	 detected	 and	destroyed	 them	 (de	 Boer,	 2011).	 After	 persisting	 with	 this	 for	 two	 years,	insurgent	forces	engaged	in	almost	no	military	activity	between	1968	and	1972.67		
																																																						66	This	is	not	to	downplay	the	importance	of	insurgent	cohesion	in	determining	the	outcome	of	the	conflict	in	Zimbabwe	as	well	as	other	conflicts.	While	I	would	argue	it	is	less	important	than	government	unity,	comparative	studies	have	shown	it	to	make	a	difference	(Findlay	and	Rudloff,	2010).	However,	the	conflict	in	Zimbabwe	was	fifteen	years	long,	with	many	interesting	features,	and	given	the	space	constraints	I	am	under	it	is	not	an	element	of	the	conflict	I	can	analyse	in	more	detail	and	situate	within	the	context	of	the	broader	theory	of	conflict	proposed	in	this	thesis.				
67	The	importance	of	this	period	for	the	final	outcome	also	highlights	the	utility	of	the	dataset	used	for	this	study.	The	RAND	experts	that	documented	the	insurgency	in	Zimbabwe	identify	it	as	starting	in	1965	and	continuing	to	1979.	In	contrast,	the	UCDP	dataset	of	armed	conflict	has	it	briefly	erupting	between	1966	and	1968,	before	recommencing	in	1973	(Gleditsch	et	al.,	2002).	This	is	because	certain	violent	thresholds	have	to	be	met	before	an	observation	is	recorded	in	the	UCDP	dataset,	whereas	the	RAND	dataset	uses	subjective	observation	to	mark	the	beginning	and	end	of	insurgent	activity.	This	thesis	argues	that	civil	war	should	not	be	measured	solely	in	terms	of	amounts	of	violence,	as	the	war	is	about	building	resilient	structures	that	shape	population	behaviour.	ZANU	actively	pursued	insurgency	in	the	period	1968-1973	through	means	other	than	violence	and	this	played	a	significant	role	in	its	ultimate	victory.	Consequently,	no	analysis	of	civil	war	that	includes	Zimbabwe,	be	it	a	large-N	study	or	a	single	case	study,	would	be	complete	without	incorporating	this	period.	This	is	not	to	say	that	classifying	a	state	as	experiencing	civil	war	according	to	levels	of	violence,	as	is	the	standard	practice	in	most	datasets,	is	not	the	most	objective	measure	available.	I	do	think,	however,	it	is	dangerous	to	see	wars	as	being	discrete	events	when	there	is	a	lull	in	violence	between	two	time	periods.	As	this	conflict	demonstrates,	just	because	there	is	no	violence	does	not	mean	that	belligerents	are	not	attempting	to	build	movements	and	degrade	the	mobilisation	capacities	of	their	opponents.	The	same	variables	that	affect	their	capacity	to	do	this	during	the	war	remain	important	during	periods	of	more	limited	violent	activity.	Whenever	there	is	inactivity	between	two	periods	of	violence,	as	was	the	case	in	Zimbabwe,	effort	should	be	made	to	treat	that	war	in	its	totality.	
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Then,	in	1972,	a	group	of	ZANU	insurgents	attacked	the	Altena	farm,	marking	the	start	of	the	next	stage	of	the	conflict.	Violence	increased	significantly	as	compared	to	1965-1968.	However,	government	 forces	still	held	the	upper	hand	and	kept	insurgent	 activity	 to	 a	 minimum,	 preventing	 it	 from	 growing	 beyond	 a	 few	hundred	guerrillas.	At	the	end	of	1974,	South	Africa	launched	its	policy	of	Détente	to	 improve	 relations	with	 its	 southern	 African	 neighbours.	 Part	 of	 this	 policy	involved	putting	pressure	on	Ian	Smith,	the	prime	minister	of	Rhodesia,	to	agree	to	a	ceasefire,	 free	 insurgent	 leaders	 from	prison	and	seek	a	political	 solution.	Smith	 reluctantly	 agreed,	 believing	 that	 the	 insurgents	 were	 close	 to	 defeat	(Matthews,	1990).			Despite	a	drop	in	military	activity,	there	was	no	real	prospect	of	a	political	deal	being	reached	and	violence	began	to	pick	up	again	in	1976.	By	December	1979,	the	government	had	declared	martial	law	across	90	percent	of	the	country.	The	government	entered	negotiations	with	the	rebel	leaders;	Robert	Mugabe	of	ZANU	and	Joseph	Nkomo	of	ZAPU.	At	Lancaster	House,	it	agreed	to	a	ceasefire,	elections	in	February	1980,	a	limit	to	the	power	of	white	politicians	to	veto	legislation	and	an	end	to	white	control	over	the	security	forces.	In	return,	the	nationalists	agreed	to	 delay	 land	 reform	 and	 guarantee	 some	 civil	 service	 pensions	 and	 property	rights.	 The	 amount	 of	 political	 change	 the	 deal	 represented	means	 the	war	 is	classified	as	a	rebel	victory,	a	victory	that	took	15	years	of	war.	The	remainder	of	the	 chapter	 will	 analyse	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 belligerents	 to	 shape	 population	behaviour	and	how	it	changed	through	these	various	phases	of	the	conflict.			
Background	and	causes	
	Before	the	war,	the	Rhodesian	government68	had	different	relationships	with	the	African	 and	 settler	 population.	 The	 government	 systematically	 discriminated	
																																																						68	Rhodesia	was	still	formally	part	of	the	United	Kingdom.	The	colony	was	granted	self-rule	in	1922,	giving	it	the	right	to	elect	its	own	parliament	and	prime	minister.	Britain	officially	retained	veto	power	over	the	government’s	relations	with	the	native	population	and	its	foreign	policy,	but	it	failed	to	ever	exercise	this	veto.	The	government	of	Rhodesia,	therefore,	is	considered	the	counterinsurgent	at	all	times	in	this	conflict,	unlike	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	where	the	original	response	to	rebel	activity	was	led	by	the	colonial	power.		
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against	Africans	to	condition	behaviour	that	advanced	the	interests	of	the	settler	community.	The	most	visible	area	 it	discriminated	against	Africans	was	 in	 the	distribution	of	land.	The	government’s	allocation	of	land	and	relocation	policies	left	Africans	unable	to	produce	enough	to	support	their	families.	This	created	a	source	 of	 cheap	 labour	 for	 white	 farmers	 and	 businesses	 as	 Africans	 sought	alternative	employment	(Lan,	1985).				There	 was	 a	 huge	 disparity	 in	 the	 economic	 status	 of	 the	 African	 and	 white	populations.	White	settlers	occupied	the	most	high-skilled	and	high-paid	jobs	and	denied	Africans	access	 to	education	and	healthcare	(Kriger,	1991).	Meanwhile,	Africans,	despite	providing	90	percent	of	wage	labour,	in	1962,	the	average	wage	for	African	workers	was	R$110	compared	to	R$1,186	for	a	European	(ibid.;	p56).			The	Rhodesian	government	precluded	reform	by	controlling	access	 to	political	power.	 The	 electoral	 franchise	 was	 based	 on	 a	 combination	 of	 education,	property	ownership	and	salary.	This	ensured	all	whites	could	vote,	but	very	few	Africans	could	(Mlambo,	1972).	By	retaining	legislative	control,	the	regime	could	pass	 laws	 ensuring	 the	 African	 community	 remained	 poor	 and	 uneducated.	Consequently,	it	could	never	gain	the	vote	and	threaten	the	legislative	control	of	the	settler	community.			There	was	some	African	resistance	before	1965,	but	it	never	seriously	challenged	the	 government	 (Ranger,	 1985).	 The	 government	 used	 the	 Law	 and	 Order	(Maintenance)	Act	of	1960	 to	put	over	10,000	people	 in	prison	 for	nationalist	activity	(Henriques,	1977;	p498).	The	government	did	explore	repealing	some	of	the	 most	 repressive	 land	 and	 political	 policies,	 but	 simply	 doing	 this	 lead	 to	successive	 administrations	 falling	 (Martin	 and	 Johnson,	 1981).	 In	 1962,	 the	Rhodesian	 Front	 came	 to	 power	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 Ian	 Smith.	 Smith	explicitly	 stated	 that	 he	 intended	 to	 further	 entrench	 the	 political	 and	socioeconomic	 structures	 that	 privileged	whites	 and	 subordinated	 the	African	population	 (Martin	and	 Johnson,	1981;	p58).	 	This	 immediately	 led	ZANU	and	ZAPU	 to	 begin	 recruiting	 and	 training	 guerrillas	 (Cilliers,	 1986).	 However,	
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Mugabe	himself	stated	insurgent	strategy	at	this	point	was	still	to	force	Britain	to	intervene,	rather	than	try	to	bring	the	government	down	directly	(1983).			After	Britain	failed	to	intervene	when	the	Rhodesian	Front	declared	UDI.	Many	nationalists	were	now	convinced	that	an	armed	struggle	was	the	only	means	to	effect	political	change	(Mugabe,	1983).	Small	insurgent	units	began	to	infiltrate	into	 Zimbabwe	 (de	 Boer,	 2011).	 Even	 though	 they	 were	 easily	 detected	 and	destroyed	by	government	 forces,	a	state	of	 ‘dual	sovereignty’	emerged	and	the	war	began.		
	Despite	transitioning	into	a	state	of	war,	the	military	context	still	heavily	favoured	the	government.	The	rebels	had	no	meaningful	networks	inside	Zimbabwe	itself.	The	 core	 of	 the	 insurgency	was	made	up	of	 a	 small	 group	of	 exiles	 in	 Zambia	(Chung	 and	 Kaarsholm,	 2006).	 The	 government	 still	 had	 a	 huge	 advantage	 in	terms	of	force	numbers	and	was	able	to	project	its	power	across	almost	the	whole	country	(Cilliers,	1986).	The	strength	of	government	forces	meant	it	was	highly	unlikely	 the	 insurgency	 would	 ever	 defeat	 the	 government	 directly	 on	 the	battlefield.	For	the	rebels	to	win	they	would	have	to	build	a	support	base	inside	the	country	and	undermine	the	government’s	control	over	the	state.			
	
The	African	population	
	
Insurgents	and	the	African	population	between	1965	and	1968	
	Between	1965	and	1968,	the	insurgents	believed	that	African	grievances	against	the	government	were	so	ingrained	that	the	population	would	simply	rise	up	and	overthrow	the	settler	regime	(Martin	and	Johnson,	1981).	It,	therefore,	made	little	effort	to	build	reciprocal	relations	with	civilians.	In	general,	they	would	establish	bases	 in	 unpopulated	 areas	 (Hoffman	 et	 al.,	 1991)	 and	 move	 groups	 of	 one	hundred	or	so	at	a	time	into	these	regions	(Cilliers,	1986).	This	made	it	easy	for	the	 government	 to	 identify	 insurgent	 positions	 and	 eliminate	 them	 (de	 Boer,	2011).			
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The	insurgency	failed	to	build	relations	with	the	population	and	found	it	difficult	to	recruit	fighters.	The	promise	of	addressing	African	grievances	was	a	collective	post-war	incentive,	which	meant	it	was	unlikely	to	generate	the	level	of	popular	participation	 rebels	 needed	 to	 challenge	 the	 government,	 especially	 when	 set	against	the	risk	of	punishment	for	supporting	the	insurgency.	During	this	period	rebel	numbers	did	not	grow	significantly.	By	1968,	168	insurgents	had	been	killed	for	the	loss	of	only	twelve	members	of	government	security	forces	and	the	rebels	had	failed	to	establish	a	permanent	presence	inside	Zimbabwe	(de	Boer,	2011;	p36).			
A	switch	in	strategy	
	Between	1968	and	1972	the	 insurgency	engaged	 in	almost	no	military	activity	(Cilliers,	1986).	Instead,	insurgents	spent	time	developing	networks	of	support	that	created	reciprocal	relations	with	the	population	(Kirk,	1975;	Moorcroft	and	McLaughlin,	2008).			
	Primarily,	this	engagement	was	limited	to	the	northeast	of	Zimbabwe,	but	as	the	conflict	 expanded	 from	 the	 mid-seventies	 onwards	 the	 rebels	 replicated	 this	strategy	across	the	country.	Norma	Kriger,	in	Zimbabwe’s	Guerrilla	War	(1991),	outlines	 how	 this	 worked.	 In	 each	 village	 the	 rebels	 would	 establish	 local	committees	whose	 sole	 purpose	was	 to	 “meet	 (insurgent)	 logistical	 needs	 for	resources	 –	 food,	 money,	 clothing,	 and	 intelligence	 about	 regime	 forces	 and	informers”	 (p116).	Sometimes	posts	on	 these	committees	were	democratically	elected,	 sometimes	 the	 rebels	 would	 ensure	 sympathetic	 villagers	 were	appointed	(p162).			Youths,	or	mujibas,	acted	as	couriers	for	guerrillas	and	provided	intelligence	to	the	 insurgents,	 both	 on	 government	 activity	 and	 the	 broader	 population	(Alexander	 et	 al.,	 2000).	 The	 rebels	 used	mujibas	 to	 give	 advance	warning	 to	villages	of	 insurgent	visits	 and	what	 they	needed	 in	 terms	of	 supplies	 (Kriger,	1991;	p119).	Young	people	also	transported	arms	between	rebel	camps,	as	the	government	 was	 less	 likely	 to	 challenge	 youths,	 especially	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	
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conflict	(Martin	and	Johnson,	1981;	p79).	Martin	and	Johnson	estimate	that	at	the	end	of	the	conflict	there	were	50,000	mujibas	working	for	the	insurgency	(ibid.),	demonstrating	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 rebel’s	 support	 networks	 throughout	 rural	Zimbabwe.		While	never	really	penetrating	urban	areas,	insurgents	obtained	support	from	the	cities	 by	 developing	 ties	 with	 businessmen.	 Bus	 companies	 would	 smuggle	recruits	out	of	urban	areas	to	training	camps	in	bordering	countries.	Missionaries	and	 storekeepers	 provided	 food,	 clothing	 and	 medicine	 (Caute,	 1983).	Unemployed	people	were	paid	to	 inform	on	government	activities	(Martin	and	Johnson,	1981)	and	females	supported	ZANU	by	working	as	nurses	and	teachers	in	camps	in	Mozambique	(Chung	and	Kaarsholm,	2006).			These	support	networks	demonstrate	how	the	rebels	structured	their	solutions	to	the	collective	mobilisation	problem.	Unlike	the	Khmer	Rouge,	who	broke	down	society	and	rebuilt	it	from	the	bottom	up,	the	Zimbabwean	insurgents	generally	worked	 with	 pre-existing	 social	 structures.	 Only	 where	 current	 societal	structures	did	not	meet	their	needs,	did	they	create	new	sections	within	society	to	 meet	 a	 specific	 purpose;	 the	 creation	 of	 mujibas	 being	 the	 most	 obvious	example.			
Public	outreach	
	To	 generate	 meaningful	 support,	 the	 insurgency	 still	 needed	 to	 incentivise	popular	participation	in	these	structures.	ZANU,	in	particular,	pursued	a	number	of	techniques	to	establish	reciprocal	relations	with	the	population.		The	 insurgents	 began	 by	 identifying	 influential	 figures	 in	 villages	 before	 they	established	a	more	visible	presence.	In	practice	this	meant	spirit	mediums,	tribal	chiefs	or	headmen,	Christian	clergy,	businessmen,	teachers,	powerful	tribes	and	politically	mobilised	communities	(McLaughlin,	1996;	Preston,	2004a).	Much	has	been	made	of	ZANU’s	relationship	with	spirit	mediums,	which	retained	significant	influence	over	the	wider	population	(Lan,	1985).	In	many	cases	traditional	chiefs	
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had	lost	most	of	their	influence	over	local	populations	as	they	had	become	closely	associated	with	the	regime.	Those	tribal	chiefs	that	had	resisted	the	government	were	 given	 positions	 at	 the	 head	 of	 committees,	 restoring	 their	 power	 and	ensuring	their	support	(Ranger,	1985).	These	influential	individuals	would	then	convince	 the	 wider	 population	 to	 participate	 in	 insurgent	 committees	 and	organise	political	meetings,	or	pungwes,	which	gave	the	insurgents	a	platform	to	appeal	for	support.			The	insurgent	tactic	of	engaging	with	local	figures,	providing	them	with	political	and	social	power,	contributed	greatly	to	rebel	strength,	allowing	the	insurgency	to	mobilise	support	through	local	social	networks.			
Political	meetings	
	Once	 they	 established	 access	 to	 a	 community,	 the	 insurgents	 attempted	 to	politicise	 the	population	 so	 it	 saw	more	benefit	 to	providing	 support.	Political	meetings,	or	pungwes,	were	often	the	first	exposure	the	population	had	with	the	insurgency.	Upon	entering	an	area	the	rebels	would	call	a	meeting	for	the	whole	community,	attendance	at	which	was	compulsory	(Lan,	1985).	Meetings	would	then	 be	 held	 almost	 every	 night	 by	 a	 political	 commissar	 (Moorcroft	 and	McLaughlin,	 2008).	 The	 meetings	 addressed	 local	 grievances	 such	 as	 land	allocation,	 education,	 poverty,	 unemployment	 or	 repressive	 government	behaviour	 (Chung	 and	 Kaarsholm,	 2006).	 This	 was	 another	 advantage	 of	engaging	 local	notables	 first,	 in	 that	 the	 rebels	 could	 identify	 these	grievances	before	their	first	direct	meeting	with	the	population.	The	population,	therefore,	understood	 the	 political	 incentives	 the	 rebels	 were	 promising	 as	 tangible	socioeconomic	benefits	rather	than	vague	political	constructs.			
Exploiting	social	dynamics	
	Another	way	 the	 rebels	motivated	active	 support	was	by	exploiting	 social	 and	local	political	dynamics.	Norma	Kriger	even	states	most	of	those	involved	in	the	support	 structures	 that	 sustained	 the	 insurgency	 were	 motivated	 by	 the	
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immediate	social	and	political	power	they	felt	supporting	rebels	would	give	them,	rather	than	a	desire	to	see	the	government	defeated	(1991;	p8).			She	lists	a	number	of	social	cleavages	that	the	insurgency	exploited.	She	claims	that	many	poor	Africans	saw	association	with	the	insurgency	not	only	as	financial	opportunity,	 but	 also	 an	 chance	 to	 improve	 their	 personal	 standing	 (p187).	People	 also	 used	 the	 insurgency	 to	 settle	 socio-political	 scores.	Weaker	 tribes	would	support	the	rebels,	knowing	they	could	exploit	the	power	that	controlling	village	committees	would	give	them	over	stronger	tribes,	 in	terms	of	accessing	land	 and	 resources	 (p199).	 Communities	 would	 invite	 insurgents	 into	 their	villages	to	rid	them	of	unpopular	headmen,	regardless	of	whether	they	had	a	real	connection	to	the	government	(p199).	Young	people	saw	the	insurgency	as	a	way	to	increase	their	influence	within	traditional	family	and	tribal	structures.	Young	people	were	subordinated	to	elders	in	African	society	and	their	role	as	the	eyes	and	 ears	 of	 insurgency	 in	 local	 villages	 gave	 them	 power	 to	 challenge	 this	traditional	authority	(p150).			As	predicted,	the	rebels	used	social	cleavages	not	just	at	the	national	level	but	also	at	the	local	level	to	incentivise	segments	of	the	population	to	provide	support.			
Coercion	
	How	 much	 coercion	 the	 insurgency	 used	 to	 force	 the	 population	 to	 provide	support	is	a	source	of	contention	amongst	some	commentators.	However,	given	its	prevalence	in	many	accounts	of	the	conflict	it	seems	almost	certain	that	the	insurgency	supplemented	its	positive	incentives	with	the	threat	of	force	to	ensure	the	population	participated	in	insurgent	support	structures	(Kriger,	1991).	The	insurgency	 forced	 the	population	 to	attend	pungwes	and	executed	people	 they	accused	of	working	for	the	government	(Caute,	1983).	They	would	also	threaten	to	put	companies	out	of	business	that	refused	to	work	with	them	(Alexander	et	al.,	2000).		
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Refugee	camps	
	The	insurgency	never	held	absolute	authority	over	territory	during	the	conflict	and	never,	therefore,	created	state-like	sovereign	structures.	The	rebels	did	not,	for	example,	provide	rudimentary	healthcare	or	education	for	the	population	in	the	manner	of	the	Khmer	Rouge	(Chung	and	Kaarsholm,	2006).	The	only	place	they	provided	services	to	the	population	was	in	refugee	camps,	mainly	in	Zambia	and	Mozambique.	These	camps	were	normally	near	military	bases	and	were	run	by	the	insurgents.	Many	people	chose	to	travel	to	these	refugee	camps	to	avoid	government	 repression	 but	 also	 as	 it	 presented	 an	 opportunity	 to	 get	 an	education	(Chung	and	Kaarsholm,	2006).	The	insurgency	then	used	these	refugee	camps	as	a	source	of	recruits	and	more	general	support.			I	will	not	attempt	to	assess	which	of	these	various	strands	of	rebel	activity	was	most	 important.	 Scholars	 have	 argued	 this	 for	 over	 thirty	 years.	 Most	 of	 this	disagreement	can	probably	be	put	down	to	the	different	locations	in	which	they	conducted	 their	 primary	 research,	 with	 each	 community	 almost	 certainly	experiencing	 the	war	differently.	Commentators	appear	 to	unanimously	agree,	however,	that	active	support	was	provided	to	the	insurgency	inside	Zimbabwe.	In	reality,	 the	 rural	 population	 almost	 certainly	 responded	 to	 a	 combination	 of	education,	coercion,	social	advancement	opportunities	and	influence	from	local	leaders.				
Undermining	governance	
	As	 well	 as	 trying	 to	 build	 its	 own	 relations	 with	 the	 population,	 the	 rebels	attempted	to	weaken	the	Rhodesian	government’s	influence.		According	 to	 Moorcroft	 and	 McLaughlin	 (2008),	 insurgent	 military	 strategy	explicitly	revolved	around	putting	pressure	on	local	government	institutions.	It	carried	out	acts	of	sabotage	against	offices	for	District	Commissioners	of	African	areas	 to	pressure	 them	to	shut	down	(Kirk,	1975).	 It	was	selective	 in	where	 it	chose	to	target.	J.K.	Cilliers	claims	it	is	no	coincidence	that	the	northeast	was	the	
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centre	for	the	insurgency	in	the	early	years	of	the	conflict,	as	it	had	been	neglected	for	years	and	had	a	very	limited	regime	presence	(1986).			The	rebels	also	targeted	African	civilians	associated	with	the	regime.	Before	the	conflict,	 the	government	appointed	 loyal	 chiefs	 to	govern	African	areas.	Chiefs	were	a	key	source	of	intelligence	for	the	government	during	the	late	sixties.	To	counter	this	threat,	the	insurgency	threatened	chiefs	unless	they	broke	relations	with	the	government,	killing	many	that	refused	to	comply.	The	result	was	that	African	civilians	refused	to	work	in	local	government	councils,	which	then	ceased	to	function	in	many	areas	(Kriger,	1991).			The	 rebels	 considered	 teachers	 as	 collaborators	 (Kriger,	 1991)	 and	 tried	 to	prevent	African	labourers	working	on	white	farms	(Mtisi	et	al.,	2009).	Quite	apart	from	the	obvious	effects	this	had	on	the	white	economy,	it	also	removed	economic	relations	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 African	 population;	 reducing	 the	former’s	ability	to	either	financially	sanction	or	reward	the	African	population	as	a	 means	 to	 shape	 its	 behaviour.	 Rebels	 even	 targeted	 African	 populations	relocated	into	Protected	Villages,	which	the	government	used	to	try	and	prevent	insurgent	contact	with	the	population	(Cilliers,	1986).			
Insurgent	foot	soldiers		Once	the	rebels	had	recruited	people	to	their	cause	it	worked	hard	to	ensure	they	remained	 loyal.	 As	 many	 people	 participate	 in	 rebellions	 to	 pursue	 selective	within-war	benefits,	insurgents	need	to	create	a	cohesive	force	if	they	are	to	keep	all	their	forces	focused	on	defeating	the	government.			Insurgents	 used	 their	 training	 camps	 to	 ensure	 new	 recruits	 understood	 the	grievances	of	local	communities	and	how	they	were	linked	to	the	activities	of	the	government	 (Moorcroft	 and	 McLaughlin,	 2008).	 Political	 training	 had	 equal	billing	to	teaching	guerrilla	tactics,	which	itself	focused	on	how	to	mobilise	the	population	as	much	as	how	 to	directly	engage	government	 forces	 (Martin	and	Johnson,	1981).		
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Insurgent	 leaders	tried	to	keep	activity	focused	on	national	and	strategic	goals	rather	 than	 on	 settling	 individual	 scores.	 Insurgents	 had	 to	 follow	 a	 code	 of	conduct,	which	was	drawn	up	in	conjunction	with	spirit	mediums	to	ensure	the	overall	 impact	 on	 the	 population	 of	 insurgent	 activity	 was	 minimised.	 They	banned	 activities	 such	 as	 sex	 with	 locals,	 drinking	 alcohol	 and	 shooting	 wild	animals	 (Chung	 and	Kaarsholm,	 2006).	 They	 also	 deployed	 troops	 away	 from	their	homes,	so	that	they	would	not	get	caught	up	in	local	disputes	(Ranger,	1985).	This	did	not	preclude	insurgent	transgressions	against	the	population,	but	it	may	have	limited	them	and	prevented	insurgent	bad	behaviour	becoming	a	strategic	threat.			On	the	 flip	side,	 insurgent	 leaders	 let	recruits	settle	personal	scores	as	 long	as	these	would	be	well	received	by	the	population	and	fit	within	the	context	of	the	broader	conflict.	Sabotage	and	attacks	on	white	farms	almost	exclusively	focused	on	those	that	had	a	reputation	for	treating	workers	particularly	badly.	The	same	logic	drove	attacks	against	local	African	politicians,	civil	servants	and	tribal	chiefs	(Astrow,	1984).	 It	 is	 likely	 this	engendered	more	 loyalty	 from	fighters	keen	 to	demonstrate	to	the	population	the	immediate	benefits	of	insurgent	activity.		
	
The	African	population	and	the	government	
	Kenneth	Good	argues	that	even	before	1972,	government	control	over	the	African	population	was	structurally	weak.	He	predicted	that	it	would	not	take	much	for	the	 government	 to	 lose	 control	 (1974;	 p10).	 As	 the	 insurgency	 took	 hold,	 the	government	increasingly	resorted	to	violence	as	its	main	means	of	shaping	the	African	population’s	behaviour	(Henriques,	1977).	
	
Punishing	cooperation	
	Commentators	 have	 accused	 the	 Rhodesian	 security	 forces	 of	 adopting	 an	‘enemy-centric’	counterinsurgency	policy	(Cilliers,	1986).	The	government	was	obsessed	 with	 kill-rates	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 success	 (ibid.).	 Nevertheless,	 the	Rhodesian	 government	 also	 recognised	 the	 importance	 of	 controlling	 the	
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population	 to	 prevent	 the	 insurgency	 from	 growing.	 Rather	 than	 improving	socioeconomic	and	governance	conditions	in	African	areas	it	chose	to	take	a	more	punitive	approach,	attempting	to	raise	the	costs	to	the	population	of	supporting	the	rebels.			The	 government	 imposed	 the	 death	 penalty	 on	 any	 individual	 suspected	 of	cooperating	with	 the	 rebels	 (Hoffman	 et	 al.,	 1991).	Wounded	 or	 surrendering	insurgents	were	often	shot	on	sight	(de	Boer,	2011).	Even	denying	knowledge	of	rebel	 activity	 became	 a	 criminal	 offence	 (ibid.).	 The	 government	 did	 not	differentiate	 between	 African	 peasants	 that	 had	 been	 forced	 to	 comply	 with	insurgent	 activity	 and	 those	 that	 had	 cooperated	 voluntarily,	 with	 judges	explicitly	stating	that	coercion	was	no	excuse	for	cooperation	(Kirk,	1975).	When	government	 security	 forces	 discovered	 pungwes	 they	 would	 target	 all	 the	attendees,	often	killing	far	more	civilians	than	insurgents	(Caute,	1983).	Whole	villages	 would	 be	 burnt	 down	 if	 the	 government	 suspected	 an	 insurgent	 cell	operated	 there	 (Godwin	 and	Hancock,	 1993).	By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 conflict	 7,790	African	civilians	had	been	killed	compared	to	10,450	rebels.69	The	government	also	 often	 categorised	 many	 victims	 of	 security	 force	 activities	 as	 insurgents	without	due	investigation	and,	according	to	David	Caute,	during	many	periods	of	the	war	it	killed	far	more	civilians	than	insurgents	(1983;	p102).			When	the	government	suspected	communities	of	supporting	insurgents,	District	Commissioners	 imposed	 collective	 fines	 on	 villages	 (Ranger,	 1985).	 The	government	 passed	 the	 Emergency	 Powers	Regulation	 in	 1973,	which	 further	extended	the	power	of	 local	officials	 to	confiscate	cattle,	 land	and	money	 from	communities	they	suspected	of	supporting	insurgents	(CIIR,	1976).			The	 government	 would	 shut	 down	 schools,	 hospitals,	 churches	 and	 African	businesses	 in	 areas	 where	 insurgents	 were	 active;	 explicitly	 stating	 this	 was	
																																																						69	This	number	includes	African	civilians	killed	by	insurgents,	so	is	not	a	true	reflection	of	the	insurgent	to	civilian	casualty-rate	caused	by	government	military	activity.	It	is,	however,	the	only	data	I	can	find	that	compares	civilian	casualties	to	those	killed	during	direct	interaction	between	the	belligerents.		
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punishment	 for	 supporting	 insurgents	 (Good,	 1974).	 The	 government	deliberately	 restricted	 supplies	 to	 African	 rural	 communities	 and	 burnt	 crops	(Hove,	2012).	The	aim	of	this	was	to	ensure	that	the	villagers	only	had	enough	supplies	to	provide	food	for	themselves,	and	had	no	surplus	to	give	to	insurgents	(Astrow,	 1984).	 It	 limited	 villagers	 to	 cooking	once	 a	 day	 and	killed	peasants’	cattle.	In	Sengwe,	it	killed	as	much	as	80	percent	of	the	locals’	cattle	stock	without	compensation	(Hove,	2012).	Government	strategy	was	not	designed	to	generate	support	from	the	African	population,	it	was	aimed	at	undermining	the	capacity	of	the	population	to	provide	meaningful	support	to	the	rebels.			
Protected	villages	
	The	 most	 systematic	 way	 the	 government	 attempted	 to	 prevent	 the	 African	population	from	cooperating	with	the	insurgency	was	moving	them	to	so-called	Protected	 Villages.	 By	 depopulating	 areas	 where	 insurgents	 were	 active	 the	government	hoped	it	could	isolate	them	and	make	them	easier	targets	(Cilliers,	1986).			The	government	marched	communities	to	Protected	Villages	at	gunpoint,	often	miles	from	their	home	locations	(Caute,	1983).	It	then	destroyed	the	villages	left	behind	to	ensure	the	population	could	not	return	and	insurgents	could	not	use	the	village	infrastructure	(CIIR,	1976).	Many	Africans	were	impoverished	by	the	whole	 experience,	 as	 they	 had	 to	 leave	 their	 equipment	 and	 livestock	 behind.	They	were	also	 too	 far	 from	their	 land	to	 farm	it	effectively	(Hove,	2012).	The	government	provided	no	services	to	Protected	Villages	and	they	lacked	adequate	sanitation	 (Cilliers,	 1986).	 In	 1977,	 there	 were	 over	 200	 Protected	 Villages	containing	580,000	Africans	(Astrow,	1984;	p64).			
Passing	on	the	effects	of	the	war	to	the	African	population	
	Until	1974,	the	government	was	able	to	almost	exclusively	pass	on	the	economic	costs	of	the	conflict	onto	the	African	population	(Preston,	2004a).	Between	1965	and	1971	the	average	wage	for	Europeans	rose	from	R$2,576	to	R$3,387.	In	the	
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same	period	the	African	average	wage	rose	from	R$246	to	R$315,	representing	a	difference	of	R$2,330	at	the	start	of	the	conflict	and	R$3,072	in	1971	(Good,	1974;	p17).	 Rent	 and	 energy	 costs	 rose	 by	 around	 70	 percent	 for	 Africans.	 50,000	Africans	were	leaving	school	each	year	and	the	government	provided	no	jobs	for	them	 (Preston,	 2004a;	 p70).	 The	 amount	 of	 Africans	 in	 employment	 declined	from	one	million	to	800,000	between	1975	and	1979	(Astrow,	1984;	p65).	This	coincided	with	 an	African	population	 explosion;	 the	population	 rose	 from	 five	million	Africans	in	1970	to	7.5	million	in	1980.	African	tribal	lands	only	produced	60	percent	 of	 the	maize	needed	 for	 basic	 subsistence	 (ibid.).	 As	 the	Protected	Villages	also	made	it	impossible	for	people	to	visit	clinics	or	feed	cattle	properly,	malnutrition	 became	 rife	 in	 rural	 African	 areas	 (Mushonga,	 2005).	 The	combination	 of	 Protected	 Villages	 and	 economic	 decline	 in	 African	 areas	 was	clearly	designed	to	prevent	rebels	from	converting	sentimental	support	from	the	population	into	behaviours	that	provided	tangible	resources.		
Did	violence	work?	
	At	first	this	strategy	appeared	to	be	working.	In	1974,	the	government	assessed	there	were	 only	 a	 few	 dozen	 insurgents	 operating	 inside	 the	 country	 (Kriger,	1991).			After	agreeing	to	the	South	African	proposed	ceasefire	in	1974,	the	government	withdrew	 from	many	 areas	 of	 the	 country,	while	 the	 insurgency	 continued	 to	build	sovereign	structures.	J.K.	Cilliers	argues	that	the	withdrawal	of	government	forces	eliminated	 the	only	 type	of	 interaction	 the	 regime	had	with	 the	African	population,	namely	coercion.	This	left	the	population	open	to	rebel	efforts	to	build	sovereign	 structures	 (1986;	 p24).	 Hostilities	 resumed	 in	 1975,	 but	 the	 rebels	were	 now	 too	 strong	 for	 violence	 alone	 to	 undermine	 its	 ability	 to	 generate	support.	The	 insurgency	then	grew	exponentially	 from	1976	onwards	(Cilliers,	1986).	 The	 limited	 focus	 of	 the	 government	 on	 simply	 killing	 insurgents	 and	punishing	 communities	 that	 supported	 the	 insurgency,	 rather	 than	 improving	governance	and	socioeconomic	opportunities	for	Africans,	worked	up	until	1975	because	the	government	only	had	to	deploy	it	in	small	areas	at	a	time.	From	1976	
	
	
	
	
249	
it	did	not	have	the	resources	to	coerce	the	population	in	all	areas	the	rebels	were	active.			Moorcroft	and	McLaughlin	put	it	succinctly	when	they	argue	that	compared	to	the	rebels,	 who	 lived	 amongst	 local	 communities,	 the	 only	 contact	 between	 the	government	 and	 the	 population	 as	 the	 war	 dragged	 on	 was	 “passing	 patrols,	punitive	 actions	 or	 escorting	 administrative	 officials”	 (2008;	 loc1996).	 As	Matthew	 Preston	 (2004a)	 shows,	 growing	 African	 grievances	 around	socioeconomic	 inequalities,	 weak	 governance	 and	 government	 repression	created	significant	mobilisation	opportunities	for	the	insurgency.	This	increased	the	capacity	of	rebels	to	build	relations	with	the	population	at	the	expense	of	the	government	 and	 highlights	 the	 cyclical	 and	 exponential	 nature	 of	 insurgent	growth	if	government	actions	prove	counter-productive.			
Peace	talks	and	the	Internal	Settlement	as	a	counterinsurgency	tool	
	By	1978,	the	government	found	itself	in	a	position	where	it	decided	offering	the	African	population	the	opportunity	to	join	the	political	process	was	the	only	way	to	end	the	war.	While	it	had	made	some	ruminations	towards	political	reform	in	1971	and	1974,	commentators	are	agreed	 it	did	not	offer	any	serious	political	concessions	until	1978	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993).			
The	Internal	Settlement	
	According	to	Sue	Onslow	(2006),	once	the	war	escalated	again	in	1976,	Ian	Smith	quickly	realised	the	government	could	not	defeat	the	insurgents	militarily.	Smith	entered	 into	 negotiations	 with	 Abel	 Muzerowa	 and	 Ndabaningi	 Sithole,	 two	nationalist	leaders	that	had	been	marginalised	as	the	war	had	gone	on.	At	the	end	of	 1978	 they	 agreed	 upon	 the	 Internal	 Settlement.	 Elections	 on	 a	 universal	franchise	 took	place	 in	April	1979	with	a	64	percent	 turnout	 (Mitchell,	1992).	Muzerowa	was	victorious	and	became	the	new	prime	minister.	However,	white	politicians	 retained	 veto	 power	 over	 constitutional	 changes	 as	 well	 as	 firm	control	over	the	security	forces	and,	therefore,	military	operations.	If	the	war	had	
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ended	 there,	 it	 would	 probably	 be	 classified	 as	 a	 ‘mixed	 outcome’	 similar	 to	Burundi.		The	 Internal	 Settlement	 failed	 to	 end	 the	war	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons.	 Some	commentators	point	to	the	fact	that	it	involved	nationalist	leaders	with	no	real	power.	Muzerowa	and	Sithole	saw	the	Internal	Settlement	as	a	chance	to	build	a	powerbase,	rather	than	because	there	was	bottom-up	pressure	on	them	from	the	population	to	find	a	resolution	to	the	conflict	(Matthews,	1990).	This,	however,	should	not	have	doomed	the	Internal	Settlement	to	failure.	Burundi	showed	that	a	 well-implemented	 political	 settlement	 can	 undermine	 the	 capacity	 of	 rebel	groups	to	mobilise	support	and	sustain	military	activity	even	if	the	rebels	are	not	involved	in	drawing	it	up.				More	 damaging	 was	 the	 fact	 that,	 despite	 now	 having	 an	 African	 face,	 the	government	did	not	implement	promised	political	reforms.	It	still	saw	punishing	the	population	as	a	viable	means	to	weaken	the	insurgency.	As	such,	there	was	no	land	reform,	the	government	managed	to	block	changes	to	the	security	forces	and	continued	opening	new	Protected	Villages	(Caute,	1983;	Matthews,	1990).	Where	it	 did	 shut	 Protected	 Villages,	 the	 government	 provided	 no	 compensation	(Cilliers,	1986).			The	Rhodesian	Front	still	believed	the	Internal	Settlement	would	be	enough	to	defeat	the	insurgency	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993)	and	there	is	some	evidence	that	it	was	working.	Robert	Mugabe	claimed	it	was	harder	to	motivate	fighters	in	the	initial	aftermath	of	the	settlement	(Cilliers,	1986;	p209).	Ultimately,	however,	the	 international	 community	 rejected	 the	 election	 results	 and	 refused	 to	 lift	economic	 sanctions.	As	 a	 result,	 very	 few	 insurgents	 laid	down	 their	weapons	(Cilliers,	1986).		The	Internal	Settlement	was	probably	the	only	major	effort	the	government	made	to	undermine	 support	 for	 the	 insurgency	 through	positive	political	 incentives.	However,	 the	 government	 needed	 it	 to	 work	 too	 quickly.	 Growing	 economic	pressure,	 underscored	 by	 the	 international	 community’s	 decision	 not	 to	 lift	sanctions,	 meant	 the	 government	 needed	 to	 achieve	 rapid	 progress	 in	
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undercutting	 active	 and	 popular	 support	 for	 the	 insurgency.	 In	 Burundi,	 the	Arusha	 Accords	 were	 negotiated	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 international	community	 and,	 therefore,	 resulted	 in	 an	 easing	 of	 international	 sanctions.	Moreover,	Burundi’s	government	did	implement	reform	and	closed	its	version	of	Protected	Villages.	Hutus	embraced	the	political	process,	forcing	the	insurgents	to	engage	with	it	if	they	wanted	to	maintain	the	ability	to	generate	support	from	the	 population.	 However,	 this	 did	 not	 happen	 overnight.	 It	 took	 two	 years	between	the	signing	of	the	Arusha	Accords	and	the	CNDD-FDD’s	decision	to	lay	down	its	weapons.	This	highlights	how	changes	at	the	macro-level	take	time	to	filter	down	and	affect	rebel	ability	to	mobilise	support	from	the	population.	The	Rhodesian	 government	 simply	 did	 not	 have	 two	 years	 given	 the	 economic	pressure	it	was	under	and	by	December	1979	the	government	was	negotiating	directly	with	ZANU	and	ZAPU	to	create	a	new	political	deal	to	end	the	war.		
The	settler	community	
	
The	government	and	the	white	population	
	As	the	government	did	not	want	to	reach	out	to	the	African	population	and	allow	it	 to	 access	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 state,	 it	 had	 to	 rely	 on	 getting	 the	most	 of	 its	relationship	with	the	white	population.			
Economic	opportunities		Immigrants	 had	 been	 attracted	 to	 Rhodesia	 with	 promises	 of	 economic	opportunities	and	an	idyllic	lifestyle.	Even	before	the	war,	large	numbers	left	the	country	each	year,	but	this	was	outweighed	by	new	immigrants	(Marston,	1986).	The	country	relied	on	immigrants	to	man	the	armed	forces,	but	in	order	to	sustain	immigration	the	government	needed	to	keep	the	economy	growing.		
	The	Rhodesian	 government’s	 ability	 to	 facilitate	 economic	 activity	 in	 order	 to	generate	support	from	the	white	population	would	play	a	key	role	in	the	conflict.	Examining	insurgent	military	strategy	highlights	its	importance.	Robert	Mugabe	
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stated	 that	 undermining	 the	 regime	 economically	was	 the	 key	 element	 of	 the	conflict,	as	this	would	weaken	the	foundations	of	the	regime	(1983).	The	main	target	 of	 insurgent	 guerrilla	 activity	 was	 not	 government	 security	 forces,	 but	farms,	bridges,	railway	lines	and	roads	(Martin	and	Johnson,	1981).	According	to	Martin	 and	 Johnson,	 rebels	 attempted	 to	 stop	 the	 government	 using	 rural	production	 and	 its	 infrastructure	 to	 sustain	 the	 economy	 (1981).	 At	 first	 the	government	managed	to	keep	the	economy	growing	and	the	direct	effect	of	the	conflict	on	most	settlers	was	minimal.	No	white	civilians	died	between	1967	and	1972	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993).	The	regime	also	managed	to	circumvent	the	economic	damage	caused	by	sanctions	due	to	its	good	relations	with	South	Africa	and	Portugal,	which	still	controlled	Mozambique	until	1974.			Over	 time,	 however,	 rebel	 strategy	 began	 to	 have	 an	 impact	 by	 forcing	 the	government	 to	 divert	 military	 resources	 to	 protecting	 infrastructure	 (Cilliers,	1986).	In	1976,	the	government	had	to	increase	the	defence	budget	by	40	percent	as	well	raise	other	funds	to	start	continually	repairing	infrastructure	damaged	by	insurgent	activity.	To	raise	this	money	the	government	cut	personal	allowances	for	travel,	and	increased	sales	taxes	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993).	The	economy	began	to	contract	significantly,	shrinking	by	7.4	percent	in	1976.	Overall,	there	was	a	24	percent	decline	in	real	income	for	Europeans	between	1975	and	1979	(Martin	and	Johnson,	1981;	p294).70			White	farmers	bore	the	brunt	of	the	insurgency.	The	government	did	not	have	the	resources	 to	 protect	 all	 white	 farmlands	 (Cilliers,	 1986).	 There	 were	 1,053	insurgent	 incidents	against	white	 farmsteads	between	1976	and	1978	and	 the	insurgents	killed	116	white	farmers	in	1978,	and	a	further	80	in	the	final	year	of	the	conflict	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993;	p290).	Despite	government	subsidies,	over	half	of	white	farms	had	been	abandoned	completely	or	were	not	functioning	properly	 by	 1979.	 Money	 raised	 from	 the	 agricultural	 economy	 dried	 up	
																																																						70	The	state	of	the	global	economy	contributed	to	this	as	well.	Most	commentators	agree,	however,	that	the	costs	of	the	war	either	directly	caused	Rhodesia’s	economic	woes	(Preston,	2004a)	or	undermined	its	capacity	to	protect	its	population	from	the	global	slump	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993)	
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completely	 (ibid.).	 Farmers	 had	 also	 organised	 into	 local	 militias	 to	 confront	insurgent	 forces,	 and	 their	 decision	 to	 quit	 an	 area	 often	 eliminated	 local	government	 presence	 (ibid.).	 A	 perception	 of	 insecurity	 began	 to	 pervade	 the	white	population	as	90	percent	of	the	country	came	under	martial	law	by	the	time	of	the	Lancaster	House	agreement	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993).	
	
Conscription	
	As	the	war	escalated,	the	government	extended	those	eligible	for	conscription	and	the	expected	length	of	service.	Conscription	was	eventually	extended	to	include	all	men	 up	 to	 the	 age	 of	 50	 (Godwin	 and	Hancock,	 1993;	 p184).	 Godwin	 and	Hancock	 claim	 this	 was	 extremely	 unpopular	 and	 many	 people	 attempted	 to	avoid	the	draft	(1993).	In	1979,	only	415	out	of	1500	new	white	call-ups	reported	for	duty	(Moorcroft	and	McLaughlin,	2008;	loc3205).			The	extent	of	conscription	also	affected	the	economy.	The	government	refused	to	let	 companies	 hire	African	manpower	 to	 replace	white	workers,	which	meant	production	ground	to	a	halt	(Brownell,	2010).		Companies	often	had	as	much	as	60	 percent	 of	 their	 work	 force	 on	 continuous	 call-ups	 (Godwin	 and	 Hancock,	1993).	Ultimately	the	government	had	to	balance	the	need	to	keep	the	economy	functioning	with	 its	 requirement	 to	 draw	 on	manpower	 to	 secure	 areas	 from	insurgent	influence	(Preston,	2004a).	This	shows	how	important	less	active	types	of	support	are	to	governments	if	they	want	to	keep	the	state	functioning	and	avoid	defeat.			
	
Migration	
	As	 the	war	 intensified,	 emigration	started	 to	outstrip	 immigration	 for	 the	 first	time.	 Between	 1967	 and	 1969	 net	 immigration	 into	 Zimbabwe	 was	 13,000	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993;	p17).	However,	after	1972	the	levels	of	immigration	dropped	 significantly	 and	 in	 September	 1973	 there	 was	 a	 net	 loss	 of	 118	migrants;	 the	 first	 negative	 figure	 during	 the	 conflict	 (p137).	 When	 the	 war	
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escalated	 further	 in	 1976,	 the	 monthly	 net	 departure	 figure	 was	 around	 771	(p163).	 According	 to	 Josiah	 Brownell,	 emigration	 increased	 every	 time	 the	government	appealed	for	extra	support	from	the	population	by	expanding	those	eligible	for	conscription	(Brownell,	2010).	By	the	end	of	1978,	net	emigration	had	reached	around	1400	whites	a	month	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993;	p236).	This	meant	that	Rhodesia	was	losing	around	one	percent	of	its	white	population	every	two	months.			Increasing	 emigration	weakened	 the	 economy.	 The	 construction	 industry	 lost	nearly	 one	 quarter	 of	 its	 workforce	 in	 1976	 (Caute,	 1983;	 p89).	When	 white	farmers	emigrated	the	area	was	generally	surrendered	to	the	insurgents	(ibid.).	The	government	recognised	the	severe	threat	emigration	posed	but	all	attempts	to	boost	immigration	and	make	emigration	harder	failed	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993).	From	this	perspective	it	is	easy	to	see	that	the	relationship	between	the	government	 and	 the	 white	 population	 was	 being	 broken	 by	 the	 conflict.	 The	insurgents	 did	 not	 replace	 this	 relationship	with	 one	 of	 their	 own,	 but	 as	 the	European	population	was	transitory	in	nature,	it	always	had	the	option	to	simply	leave	and	withdraw	its	support	for	the	government.	When	the	government	could	no	 longer	 offer	 the	 benefits	 of	 living	 in	 Rhodesia	 that	 the	 white	 population	expected,	 that	 is	 exactly	 what	 it	 started	 doing.	 Ian	 Smith	 recognised	 that	 if	emigration	continued	at	the	same	pace,	the	economy	was	going	to	collapse	and	there	would	be	no	army	to	fight	the	insurgency	(Brownell,	2010).			
Political	power	leads	to	military	control	
	The	rebels	increased	ability	to	generate	support	from	its	constituent	population	and	 the	 equivalent	 decline	 in	 government	 ability	 to	 shape	 settler	 behaviour	explains	the	increase	in	rebel	strength	and	the	eventual	defeat	of	the	government.			
	
The	rebels	mobilise	
	ZANLA	had	as	little	as	a	dozen	recruits	in	1965	and	still	only	had	a	few	hundred	in	1972,	with	most	 in	 external	 bases.	Before	1968	most	 of	 these	 came	 from	a	
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forced	recruitment	policy.	By	1974,	ZANLA	had	3,00071	recruits	that	were	almost	all	volunteers	(Chung	and	Kaarsholm,	2006;	p82).	At	the	end	of	1976,	there	were	5,000	insurgents	operating	inside	Rhodesia,	with	many	more	in	external	camps	(Cilliers,	1986;	p83).	When	the	war	finally	came	to	an	end,	best	estimates	suggest	there	 were	 around	 74,000	 insurgents,	 with	 around	 15,000	 operating	 inside	Rhodesia	and	other	in	reserve	or	training	(p239).		The	increase	in	rebel	numbers	operating	inside	Zimbabwe	is	illustrated	in	figure	21.			
	Figure	21:	Number	of	Zimbabwean	insurgents	(thousands)	in	country	in	latter	stages	of	conflict	(Preston,	2004b).	This	contrasts	with	around	60,000	government	forces	of	various	types.			Matthew	Preston	argues	that	four	main	factors	contributed	to	the	rise	in	guerrilla	strength	 through	 the	 conflict;	 “attachment	 to	 the	guerrilla	 cause,	 the	declining	rural	economy,	disruption	by	 the	war	of	 rural	 services	and	Rhodesian	policies	themselves”	(2004;	p70).	It	is	clear	government	policies	further	disenfranchised	the	rural	African	population	and	pushed	them	into	the	hands	of	the	insurgency	in	three	 ways:	 driving	 them	 to	 leave	 the	 country	 and	 live	 in	 insurgent	 refugee	camps;	creating	individual	 incentives	for	people	to	actively	 join	the	insurgency	
																																																						71	Many	of	these	recruits	lived	in	external	bases	during	this	period,	hence	disparities	between	different	sources	on	the	strength	of	rebel	forces.		
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given	the	lack	of	alternative	income	opportunities;	and,	most	importantly,	leaving	a	 space	 for	 the	 insurgency	 to	 build	 structures	 to	manage	 its	 relationship	with	population.	 These	 factors	 combined	 account	 for	 the	 growth	 in	 the	 insurgency	throughout	 the	 1970s.	 While	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 continued	 to	 favour	 the	government,	it	is	clear	that	the	rebels	were	increasingly	able	to	mobilise	support	as	the	war	grew	to	a	close,	exactly	as	we	would	expect	if	the	model	of	war	as	a	mobilisation	competition	is	a	useful	framework	for	studying	civil	wars.		
	
Demobilising	the	government	
	The	growth	of	the	insurgency	directly	affected	the	government’s	capacity	to	raise	its	own	security	forces.	From	1977	onwards,	the	economy	was	declining	at	such	a	 rate	 that	 the	 government	 knew	 that	 sustaining	 its	 military	 was	 becoming	impossible.	Continuing	to	fight	the	insurgents	meant	the	chances	of	the	economy	recovering	 were	 virtually	 nil,	 leading	 to	 even	 greater	 emigration	 (Preston,	2004a).	 Smith	 recognised	 that	 if	 emigration	 continued	 at	 its	 current	 pace	 the	white	 regime	 would	 collapse	 completely	 (Brownell,	 2010).	 Moreover,	 the	government	 also	 realised	 it	was	 too	 late	 even	 if	 it	 could	 resolve	 its	 economic	difficulties;	it	had	lost	too	much	control	in	rural	areas.	Matthew	Preston	argues	that	even	if	the	international	community	had	lifted	sanctions	in	1977	it	would	not	have	 made	 any	 difference.	 No	 amount	 of	 money	 could	 have	 now	 raised	 the	manpower	 necessary	 to	 pacify	 the	 whole	 country	 given	 insurgent	 strength	(2004).	The	government	could	not	remonopolise	sovereignty	over	its	territory,	as	required	to	defeat	the	rebels,	and	its	final	collapse	was	a	matter	of	time.	The	government	 was,	 in	 effect,	 being	 demobilised	 and	 this	 forced	 it	 to	 accept	unfavourable	peace	terms,	as	predicted	by	the	theories	proposed	in	this	thesis.				By	 the	 end	 of	 1979	 the	 government	 believed	 its	 last	 chance	 for	 Europeans	 to	continue	 living	 in	 Zimbabwe	 at	 all	 was	 to	 surrender	 and	 assist	 in	 organising	elections	(Matthews,	1990).		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
257	
Lancaster	House	and	the	limits	of	asymmetric	warfare	
	While	the	war	is	coded	as	a	rebel	victory,	there	was	still	a	political	settlement.	The	Rhodesian	 Front	 government	 was	 willing	 to	 surrender	 political	 power	 and	control	over	the	security	forces	in	exchange	for	guarantees	over	property	rights	and	pensions	 for	civil	servants.	The	rapid	rate	 the	 insurgency	had	grown	after	1976	and	level	of	control	it	now	exerted	suggested	it	did	not	even	need	to	make	minor	 concessions.	 However,	 commentators,	 and	 even	 insurgents	 themselves,	argue	that	while	the	rebels	had	managed	to	undermine	the	government	they	had	yet	to	develop	effective	governance	structures.			David	Caute	describes	 the	 insurgency	as	only	having	“negative	control”	(1983;	p332).	The	rebels	never	actually	governed	themselves,	 they	 just	did	enough	 in	areas	to	demobilise	government	presence.	In	1979,	this	problem	was	becoming	critical.	Mugabe	himself	recognised	that	the	insurgency	did	not	have	a	viable	plan	to	develop	more	holistic	governance	structures	 (1983).	These	structures	were	necessary	to	facilitate	the	population	providing	the	extra	support	the	insurgents	needed	to	transition	the	conflict	into	a	more	conventional	phase.	The	insurgents	started	 to	 need	 more	 from	 the	 population	 than	 it	 could	 provide.	 This	 led	 to	insurgents	employing	more	violence	against	the	African	population	to	extract	the	resources	 it	 needed,	which	 in	 turn	 began	 to	 undermine	 its	 support	 (Maxwell,	1999).	Moreover,	while	the	rebels	had	freedom	of	movement	across	90	percent	of	the	country,	‘liberated’	territory	only	contained	only	around	ten	percent	of	the	seven-million	 population	 (Preston,	 2004a).	 Mozambique	 and	 Zambia	 did	 put	pressure	on	ZANU	and	ZAPU	to	agree	to	the	Lancaster	House	agreement,	but	it	is	also	clear	that	the	agreement	offered	ZANU	a	way	to	take	power	without	solving	the	problem	of	extending	its	sovereign	structures	across	Zimbabwe	(Matthews,	1990).			This	is	in	contrast	to	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	Cambodia	where	external	support	had	 allowed	 the	 rebels	 to	 develop	 rudimentary	 government	 structures,	which	they	used	to	assert	complete	control	over	the	population.	Having	this	structure	behind	it	also	enabled	the	Khmer	Rouge	to	immediately	impose	authority	over	
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the	 population	 once	 it	 demobilised	 the	 government.	While	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	know	with	any	certainty,	 it	 is	possible	that	 if	 the	Rhodesian	Front	government	had	collapsed	completely,	ZANU	may	not	have	been	able	to	assert	control	over	the	whole	polity.	That	 the	 government	 supported	 the	 transition	might	 explain	why	it	succeeded,	at	least	in	the	short	term.			ZANU’s	decision	to	make	these	concessions	adds	another	element	to	the	factors	affecting	rebel	groups’	decisions	to	engage	in	political	settlements.	In	the	theory	section	of	 this	 thesis,	we	suggested	 that	rebels	 judge	 the	progress	of	a	conflict	solely	by	their	likelihood	of	success.	The	conflict	in	Zimbabwe	showed	that	rebels	also	engage	in	political	processes	based	on	their	ability	to	govern	post-conflict.	This	 may	 open	 up	 new	 opportunities	 for	 identifying	 ‘ripe’	 moments	 for	intervention	in	civil	wars.					
The	battlefield		The	favourable	balance	of	power	led	the	government	to	be	overconfident	that	it	could	 easily	 overcome	 the	 insurgency	 (Moorcroft	 and	McLaughlin,	 2008).	 The	government	believed	 it	 only	had	 to	defeat	 the	 insurgents	militarily	 to	 end	 the	conflict,	 leading	 it	 to	obsess	over	 ‘kill-rates’	and	tactical	 innovations.	Academic	observers	 also	 came	 to	 the	 same	 conclusion	 (Wilson,	 1973).	 Kenneth	 Good’s	prediction	 in	1974,	however,	 shows	 that	 it	 is	possible	 to	predict	 the	 course	of	conflict	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 government’s	 relations	 with	 the	population.			The	 clearest	 evidence	 that	 the	 military	 context	 fails	 to	 explain	 the	 conflict’s	dynamics	and	outcome,	 comes	 from	 the	mouths	of	 the	 rebels.	Mugabe	himself	states	they	could	not	win	the	war	quickly,	because	it	was	not	about	direct	military	confrontation	 (1983).	 Jeremy	 Brickhill	 argues	 that	 ZAPU	 fighters	 knew	 that	guerrilla	 activity	 was	 designed	 to	 create	 the	 conditions	 for	 defeating	 the	government,	not	a	way	of	defeating	the	government	by	itself	(1995).	Instead	the	rebel’s	aim	was	to	weaken	government	ability	to	control	the	African	population,	creating	the	opportunity	for	rebels	to	mobilise	support	(ibid.).	Robert	Matthews	
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claims	 this	 perception	 explains	 rebel	 leaders’	 refusal	 to	 negotiate	 even	 when	government	forces	heavily	outnumbered	them	in	1975	(1990).	They	believed	the	relations	 they	 had	 established	with	 the	 population	were	 resilient	 enough	 that	they	could	continue	to	function	regardless.	The	key	for	the	rebels	was	whether	they	could	continue	to	undermine	government	authority	in	the	long	term.	Even	as	 early	 as	 1968,	Mugabe’s	 writings	 show	 he	 felt	 confident	 this	 was	 the	 case	(1983).			
	Battlefield	outcomes	between	the	rebels	and	government	forces	is	also	insightful.	According	 to	Moorcroft	 and	McLaughlin,	 “(t)he	 armed	 forces	of	Rhodesia	won	virtually	every	battle”	(2008;	loc808).	Casualty	numbers	throughout	the	conflict	support	 this	 notion.	 Between	 1973	 and	 1978,	 the	 government	 killed	 6,024	insurgents	and	injured	or	captured	over	40,000	more.	In	the	same	period,	only	686	government	security	forces	lost	their	lives	and	a	further	3,585	were	injured	(Cilliers,	 1986;	 p242).	 Perhaps,	most	 tellingly	 the	 ratio	 of	 casualties	 stayed	 at	about	ten	to	one	throughout	the	whole	conflict	(ibid.).	The	rebels	never	gained	the	ascendency	when	the	two	forces	engaged	directly.	Changing	efficacy	on	the	battlefield	cannot	account	for	the	changing	fortunes	in	the	war	more	generally.		In	 reality,	 however,	 the	 insurgents	 never	 sought	 to	 heavily	 engage	 militarily.	Rebel	 resources	 were	 focused	 on	 sabotaging	 government	 economic	infrastructure,	 targeting	 civilian	 collaborators	 and	 hit	 and	 run	 tactics	 on	government	convoys.	When	faced	with	government	security	forces,	rebels	would	simply	flee	(de	Boer,	2011).			The	dominance	of	regime	forces	on	the	battlefield	has	led	to	observers,	both	at	the	 time	 and	 since,	 lauding	 over	Rhodesian	 tactics	 (Bailey,	 2010).	 J.R.T.	Wood	quotes	 a	 retired	 British	 and	 NATO	 General,	 Walter	 Walker,	 as	 stating	 that	Rhodesian	forces	were	the	best	 in	the	world	at	counterinsurgency	warfare	(no	date;	p2).	It	seems	strange	that	this	is	based	on	a	campaign	that	suffered	complete	strategic	failure.				
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It	was	quite	possibly	 the	government’s	obsession	with	achieving	 its	version	of	tactical	success	that	led	to	its	downfall.	Government	tactics	directly	contributed	to	the	spread	of	the	insurgency,	by	further	aggrieving	African	communities	and	forcing	 them	 into	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 insurgency.	 Many	 civilians	 were	 killed	 in	operations	 and	 livelihoods	were	 destroyed	 (Caute,	 1983).	 So	while	 Rhodesian	forces	may	be	famed	for	killing	insurgents,	the	manner	in	which	they	went	about	it	 contributed	 to	 creating	 far	more	 insurgents	 than	 they	killed	 (Moorcroft	 and	McLaughlin,	2008).			When	one	puts	Rhodesian	tactics	into	this	context	it	is	clear	they	were	tactically	as	well	 as	 strategically	 counter-productive.	 This	 serves	 as	 a	warning	 to	 those	looking	to	use	Rhodesian	counterinsurgency	tactics	as	an	example	to	follow.	The	effect	a	belligerent’s	tactics	have	on	a	conflict	actor’s	regenerative	capacity	should	determine	 whether	 they	 are	 considered	 tactically	 successful.	 This	 also	 links	tactics	to	strategy	in	a	much	clearer	fashion	than	the	current	disjointed	approach	of	Western	militaries,	which	often	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	an	operation	was	tactically	 successful,	 but	 a	 strategic	 failure	 (Constable,	 2009).	 Rebel	 tactical	activity	 in	Zimbabwe	increased	 its	ability	to	mobilise	support	and	demobilised	the	 government,	making	 it	 a	 tactical	 success.	Government	 activity,	 in	 contrast,	made	it	easier	for	the	rebels	to	mobilise	support;	as	such,	it	represents	a	tactical	failure.			
Selecting	a	strategy	
	
The	Rhodesian	state		
	Ultimately	the	basis	for	the	relationship	between	the	government	and	the	settler	community	 made	 it	 impossible	 for	 the	 government	 to	 pursue	 any	 kind	 of	engagement	with	 the	African	population.	The	 regime	was	built	on	 segregation	and,	according	to	Roger	Marston	(1986),	this	is	what	attracted	many	immigrants.	Simply	 talking	 with	 nationalist	 leaders	 undermined	 white	 morale,	 increasing	draft-dodging	and	emigration	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993).	The	idea	of	further	political	integration	was	unacceptable	(Mlambo,	1972).		
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The	government	was,	therefore,	 limited	in	the	political	and	economic	reform	it	could	offer	the	African	population.	Even	after	it	agreed	to	the	Internal	Settlement	it	 could	 not	 institute	 equality	 in	 the	 security	 forces	 for	 fear	 of	 losing	 its	 own	constituency.	 The	 Rhodesian	 Front	 ended	 up	 pushing	Muzerowa	 to	 sack	 ANC	politicians	that	pushed	too	hard	for	security	force	reform	(Chung	and	Kaarsholm,	2006).			Many	 settlers	 felt	 Africans	 were	 too	 uncultured	 to	 respond	 to	 political	 and	socioeconomic	opportunities	(Cilliers,	1986).	The	government,	therefore,	refused	to	 exploit	 the	 potential	 of	 African	 recruits	 willing	 to	 join	 the	 security	 forces	(Stapleton,	 2011).	 Many	 Africans	 did	 fight	 for	 the	 Rhodesian	 government	throughout	 the	conflict	 in	 the	Royal	African	Rifles.72	However,	 the	government	never	 truly	 implemented	 any	 plan	 to	 expand	 its	 African	 military	 force	 as	 an	alternative	 for	 the	African	population	 to	 supporting	 the	 insurgency.	Nor	did	 it	contemplate	 plans	 to	 employ	 African	 labour	 in	 many	 industries	 to	 boost	 the	economy,	despite	many	Africans	seeking	employment	 in	Salisbury	 (Chung	and	Kaarsholm,	2006).			The	conflict	in	Zimbabwe	shows	how	history	and	ideology	can	limit	the	options	a	government	uses	 for	 shaping	population	behaviour.	We	can	 contrast	 this	with	Cambodia,	 where	 rebel	 ideology	 laid	 the	 framework	 for	 the	 reorganisation	 of	society	in	a	manner	that	significantly	strengthened	the	rebels.	A	strong	ideology	is,	therefore,	neither	a	positive	nor	a	negative	thing	by	itself,	but	can	be	extremely	important	in	determining	the	efficacy	of	a	belligerent’s	conflict	strategy.		
	
	
																																																						72	Space	constraints	have	precluded	a	more	detailed	examination	of	the	Royal	African	Rifles,	which	numbered	in	the	thousands	(Stapleton,	2011).	Moreover,	many	of	these	people	then	voted	for	ZANU-PF	in	the	1980	elections	(Preston,	2004a),	demonstrating	how	selective	within-war	incentives	shape	behaviour	more	sharply	than	post-war	preferences.	They	are	an	extremely	interesting	feature	of	the	conflict	and,	alongside	the	Fay	Chung’s	observation	about	many	African	labourers	seeking	employment	in	Salisbury	when	job	opportunities	disappeared	in	the	city,	shows	the	outcome	was	not	inevitable.	The	government	could	have	defeated	the	insurgency	if	it	had	been	willing	to	explore	ways	to	offer	meaningful	within-war	incentives	to	the	African	population.		
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External	dynamics	
	Once	 again,	 external	 factors	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 determining	 belligerent	behaviour.	 The	 government	 was	 pressured	 into	 the	 1974	 ceasefire	 by	 South	Africa.	This	 also	 coincided	with	Mozambique’s	 independence,	which	expanded	the	amount	of	camps	the	rebels	could	establish	outside	of	 the	country	and	the	areas	 of	 Zimbabwe	 that	 the	 rebels	 could	 enter	 directly,	 as	 shown	 in	 figure	22	(Astrow,	1984).	These	factors	proved	crucial	in	allowing	the	rebels	to	expand	to	the	point	that	the	Rhodesian	government	could	no	longer	shield	its	constituent	population	from	the	effects	of	the	war	or	control	the	rebel’s	constituents	through	violence	alone.			
	Figure	22:	Insurgent	infiltration	routes	into	Zimbabwe	(Friedman,	2006).		Additionally,	 both	main	 rebel	 groups	 received	 crucial	 support	 from	a	 range	of	regional	and	international	backers	in	the	form	of	external	sanctuary,	funding	and	weaponry	(Cilliers,	1986).	However,	the	difference	in	the	support	given	to	ZANU	
Infiltration	routes	
from	beginning	
of	conflict 
Additional	
infiltration	routes	
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and	ZAPU	is	revealing.	ZAPU	received	support	from	the	Soviet	Union,	which	tried	to	give	ZAPU	the	means	to	build	a	conventional	force	(Brickhill,	1995).	China,	on	the	other	hand,	advised	ZANU	to	build	political	networks	amongst	the	population	(Chung	 and	 Kaarsholm,	 2006).	 The	 differing	 success	 of	 these	 strategies	 is	illuminating.			At	the	beginning	of	the	conflict	the	majority	of	active	fighters	were	affiliated	with	ZAPU	(Chung	and	Kaarsholm,	2006).	After	1968,	ZANU	came	to	the	fore	and	Fay	Chung	 claims	 this	 led	 to	 recruits	 defecting	 from	 ZAPU	 to	 ZANU	 (ibid;	 p83).	Nevertheless,	 there	 remained	 only	 a	 few	 hundred	 recruits	 between	 the	 two	groups	in	the	early	seventies.	Both	groups	then	exploited	government	activity	to	create	more	recruits.	However,	ZANU	hoovered	up	many	more	of	these	potential	recruits	than	ZAPU.	By	April	1979,	ZAPU	had	22,900	members	inside	Zimbabwe	and	in	training	camps	outside	Zimbabwe,	while	ZANU	had	51,000	(Cilliers,	1986;	p239)73.	 J.K.	 Cilliers	 also	points	 out	 that	 ZANU	had	 tens	 of	 thousands	 of	 other	people	actively	working	for	it,	while	no	similar	structures	existed	for	ZAPU	(ibid.).	All	 of	 this	 was	 most	 clearly	 highlighted	 in	 the	 election	 results	 in	 1980,	 with	Mugabe’s	 ZANU-PF	 getting	 63	 percent	 of	 the	 vote	 and	 Joseph	 Nkomo’s	 ZAPU	getting	21	percent.	In	the	end,	another	civil	war	was	to	follow	during	the	1980s,	in	which	ZANU	finally	defeated	ZAPU	completely.					Other	factors	also	clearly	contributed	to	the	disparity	in	the	performance	of	these	two	groups.	For	example,	ZANU	was	tied	much	more	to	the	Shona	people,	which	constitute	about	82	percent	of	the	African	population.	Much	of	ZAPU’s	support	came,	 in	 contrast,	 from	 the	 much	 smaller	 Nbedele	 population	 (CIA,	 2016).	However,	 the	 fact	 that	ZAPU	was	 larger	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	conflict	 shows	other	dynamics	must	also	explain	the	success	of	ZANU.	The	differing	advice	the	two	groups	received	from	external	patrons	on	building	sovereign	structures	that	
																																																						73	Many	of	these	fighters	were	outside	Zimbabwe	and	still	in	training,	explaining	the	discrepancy	between	the	numbers	here	and	in	figure	21.	The	fact	that	the	insurgents	kept	such	a	large	proportion	of	their	fighters	in	reserve	also	shows	how	rebels	select	a	force	size	to	best	exploit	weakness	in	government	control.	In	Zimbabwe,	even	though	they	had	this	large	reserve	force,	it	was	still	no	match	for	Rhodesian	forces	on	the	battlefield.	As	such,	to	have	projected	as	much	force	as	possible	and	engage	the	government	conventionally	would	have	led	to	unsustainable	losses	for	the	insurgents	for	limited	gains.		
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reached	 into	 the	population	offers	 a	plausible	 explanation.	Chinese	 support	 to	ZANU	serves	as	a	reminder	for	nations	seeking	to	influence	the	direction	of	civil	wars;	 the	 most	 decisive	 way	 to	 affect	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 civil	 war	 is	 to	 assist	belligerents	in	building	resilient	mobilisation	structures.				
Conclusions	
	
Why	is	it	deviant?		The	 conflict	 in	Rhodesia	 fits	 the	 theoretical	model	 of	 conflict	 proposed	 in	 this	thesis	almost	perfectly.	The	government	lost	its	capacity	to	generate	support	from	the	white	settler	community,	forcing	it	to	surrender.	Moreover,	the	government’s	inability	to	mobilise	support	from	white	communities	can	be	directly	traced	to	a	decline	 in	 its	 ability	 to	 provide	 within-war	 socioeconomic	 incentives	 to	 its	constituent	population.	The	statistical	model,	however,	showed	GDP	to	have	only	a	very	 limited,	 albeit	 statistically	 significant,	 effect	on	 the	 likelihood	of	 a	 rebel	victory.	A	23	percent	drop	between	year	eleven	and	fourteen	of	a	conflict,	as	in	Zimbabwe,	only	increases	the	odds	of	a	rebel	victory	by	two	percent.		Are	changes	in	GDP,	therefore,	an	effective	predictor	of	conflict	outcomes?	All	else	being	equal	 the	statistical	model	suggests	not.	But	13	out	of	14	rebel	victories	show	declines	in	GDP,	compared	to	12	out	of	18	mixed	outcomes	and	three	out	of	18	outright	government	victories.	Moreover,	a	drop	in	GDP	has	a	clear	interactive	effect	with	the	other	socioeconomic	variable	used	in	the	model.	If	life	expectancy	is	also	declining	by	five	years,	the	23	percent	GDP	drop	now	has	four	times	the	effect.			The	case	studies	suggest	it	is	the	secondary	effects	of	declining	GDP	that	are	key	to	explaining	the	outcome	of	the	conflict,	not	the	loss	of	GDP	itself.	For	example,	in	Cambodia	the	decline	in	GDP	led	to	a	humanitarian	catastrophe,	causing	the	population	 to	withdraw	 its	 support	 for	 the	 government.	 This	 catastrophe	was	captured	in	the	model	and,	therefore,	Cambodia	was	well	predicted.	In	Zimbabwe,	the	drop	in	GDP	led	to	the	emigration	of	white	communities,	who	made	up	the	
	
	
	
	
265	
core	of	 the	government’s	 fighting	 forces,	but	 this	was	not	accounted	 for	 in	 the	model.	Moreover,	economic	growth	had	been	slowing	significantly	for	a	number	of	years	before	the	end	of	the	conflict.	Up	until	the	late	1970s	the	government	was	able	to	pass	on	the	effects	of	this	onto	the	African	population.	While	this	may	have	boosted	the	mobilisation	capacity	of	the	rebels,	it	did	not	make	it	more	difficult	for	the	government	to	draw	support	from	its	constituent	population	until	later	in	the	conflict.			Taken	all	 together,	 this	 suggests	a	decline	 in	GDP	has	 to	 specifically	 affect	 the	ability	 of	 the	 government	 to	 generate	 support	 from	 its	 own	 constituent	population	if	it	is	to	lead	to	a	rebel	victory.	A	comprehensive	statistical	model	of	civil	war	would	have	to	capture	the	wide	range	of	ways	this	could	happen.	This	almost	certainly	explains	why	GDP	is	a	key	measure	of	a	war’s	progress,	but	its	substantive	effect	 is	small	 in	the	statistical	model.	Observers	of	single	conflicts	need	to	look	at	which	segments	of	the	population	are	most	likely	to	be	affected	by	any	decline	 in	GDP.	Only	 if	 economic	decline	 leads	 to	a	government	 losing	 the	ability	to	generate	support	specifically	from	its	own	constituent	population	can	we	confidently	assess	that	a	rebel	victory	may	be	imminent.	This	may	take	some	time	from	the	moment	the	government	starts	to	struggle	economically,	as	it	will	likely	cut	spending	in	other	areas	first,	before	reducing	the	benefits	it	distributes	to	its	constituent	population.	In	this	way,	a	drop	in	GDP	becomes	a	necessary,	but	not	sufficient	condition	for	a	rebel	victory.		
Hypotheses	
	Despite	not	 fitting	 the	 statistical	model,	 the	 conflict	 in	Zimbabwe	 lends	 strong	support	for	the	theory	of	conflict	proposed	in	this	thesis.	The	rebels	won	because	they	built	integrated	networks	with	the	population,	from	which	they	generated	various	 types	of	support,	 from	finances,	 to	 food,	 to	manpower.	The	population	participated	 in	 these	 structures	due	 to	 the	 selective	within-war	 incentives	 the	rebels	offered,	which	were	political,	socioeconomic	and	coercive	in	nature.	The	rebels	 also	 undermined	 the	 government’s	 ability	 to	 generate	 support	 from	 its	target	 population.	 This	 limited	 the	 economic	 benefits	 the	 white	 population	
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accrued	from	supporting	the	Rhodesian	Front	government.	The	population	began	to	leave	and	the	government	recognised	it	was	on	the	brink	of	collapse	and	sought	favourable	surrender	terms.			Each	 of	 the	 turning	 points	 in	 the	 conflict	 can	 be	 explained	with	 recourse	 to	 a	change	in	the	incentives	the	belligerents	used	to	shape	population	behaviour	as	table	24	demonstrates.	Eventually,	the	rebels	were	able	to	exert	huge	economic	pressure	on	the	government,	which	undermined	the	latter’s	capacity	to	deliver	economic	 and	 security	 benefits	 to	 its	 constituent	 population.	 The	 government	was	pushed	to	the	brink	of	collapse	and	forced	to	surrender.	The	government	was	put	into	this	position	even	before	the	rebels	had	pushed	the	conflict	through	the	phases	of	conflict	laid	out	in	chapter	two,	meaning	the	rebels	did	not	need	to	build	a	conventional	army	to	capture	the	state,	exactly	as	predicted	in	the	theoretical	model.
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Table	24:		Summary	of	Zimbabwe	conflict	dynamics	and	key	findings
Date	 Events	 Conflict	dynamics	
(table	three)	 Key	drivers	of	change	 Rebel	regenerative	capacity	 Government	control	over	the	state	 Sub-hypotheses	
supported	1965-1968	 Onset	 Asymmetric	warfare	(Q3).		Rebels	begin	recruiting	and	carrying	out	limited	activity.	
Unilateral	Declaration	of	Independence	(UDI)	makes	rebels	realise	Britain	will	not	intervene	to	support	them.	
Rebel	capacity	to	build	support	extremely	limited	-	relying	on	grievances	against	settler	regime	with	limited	effect.		
Government	has	capacity	to	provide	incentives	to	settler	population	and	suppress	African	communities.		
2,	3	&	4	
1968-1972	 -	 Asymmetric	warfare	(Q3).		Rebels	focus	on	building	networks.		
Failure	to	build	support	forces	rebels	to	change	strategy.		 Rebels	begin	to	build	networks	in	northeast	of	country.			 Government	still	in	control	of	state.	 3	&	4	
1972-1976	 Detente	 Asymmetric	warfare	(Q3).		Rebels	use	networks	to	carry	out	insurgent-style	violence.	
Rebel	networks	begin	to	generate	support.	 Rebel	networks	provide	them	with	manpower,	finances	and	supplies.	Still	limited	in	capacity	to	operate	across	country	
Government	uses	Protected	Villages	to	control	African	population	in	areas	affected	by	insurgency.		
2	&	3	
1976-1979	 Conflict	ends	-	rebel	victory	
Asymmetric	warfare	(Q3).		Rebels	escalate	insurgent	warfare.	
Ceasefire	in	1975	allows	rebels	to	spread	influence	across	country	and	create	overwhelming	economic	pressure	on	the	regime.	
Rebel	networks	now	extend	across	country,	enabling	activity	in	more	and	more	places.	 Pressure	of	conflict	undermines	economy	and	ability	to	attract	migrants,	eliminating	government	capacity	to	build	armed	forces	and	forcing	it	to	surrender.		
2	&	4	
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Conclusion	
	This	 thesis	 started	 by	 posing	 two	 questions:	 Why	 do	 conflict	 actors	 expend	resources	 on	 shaping	 population	 behaviour	 rather	 than	 directly	 confronting	opposition	forces?	And,	why	are	small	rebel	groups	able	to	compete	with	much	stronger	government	forces	and,	in	some	cases,	defeat	them?			To	 answer	 these	 questions,	 I	 proposed	 we	 should	 describe	 civil	 war	 as	 a	mobilisation	competition,	but	one	with	asymmetric	qualities.	Governments	and	rebels	 attempt	 to	 mobilise	 resources	 from	 the	 population	 and	 degrade	 the	capacity	of	their	opponents	to	do	the	same.	Relative	power,	therefore,	is	defined	by	 belligerents’	 alliances	 with	 the	 population,	 explaining	 why	 they	 dedicate	resources	 to	 shaping	 population	 behaviour.	 However,	 governments	 normally	start	 the	 conflict	with	 the	 institutions	 it	uses	 to	mobilise	 support	 intact,	while	rebels	 have	 to	 build	 them	during	 the	war.	Governments	 also	 have	 to	mobilise	more	resources	than	rebels	as	they	have	to	carry	out	activities	tangential	to	the	conflict	 itself	 in	order	 to	 retain	 control	over	 the	 state.	These	 two	points	mean	rebels	can	concentrate	on	demobilising	the	government	and	still	win	the	war	even	if	they	do	not	conquer	the	whole	polity,	explaining	why	weak	insurgencies	can	defeat	strong	governments.			This	framework	suggests	we	should	be	able	to	predict	the	dynamics	and	outcome	of	 a	 conflict	 by	 examining	 the	 government’s	 ability	 to	 absorb	 the	 costs	 of	 the	conflict	and	continue	delivering	the	incentives	across	the	population	that	keep	it	in	power.	When	the	institutions	that	the	government	uses	to	mobilise	resources	from	 the	 population	 are	 in	 decline,	 the	 rebels	 are	 likely	 to	 emerge	 victorious.	When	 the	 government	 is	 able	 to	 re-establish	 its	 institutional	 reach	 across	 the	whole	polity,	 then	 it	will	defeat	 insurgent	challengers.	This	 thesis	represents	a	first	attempt	to	articulate	this	process	and	the	empirical	sections	showed	strong	support	for	using	this	framework	to	understand	the	dynamics	and	outcomes	of	civil	wars.			
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Demobilising	the	government		The	 cases	 studies	 demonstrated	 how	 rebels	 demobilise	 governments	 across	 a	variety	of	 contexts	 and	 that	 this	was	 the	key	variable	 in	determining	 the	 final	outcomes	 of	 conflicts.	 Zimbabwean	 insurgents	 put	 the	 government	 under	economic	strain,	which	led	white	settlers,	who	had	previously	provided	most	of	the	 active	 support	 to	 the	 government,	 to	 begin	 leaving	 Zimbabwe.	 The	government	of	the	Khmer	Republic	could	not	sustain	even	the	basic	functions	of	a	state,	and	eventually	collapsed	completely.	The	Khmer	Rouge	then	captured	the	capital.	 The	 rebels	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 completely	 ejected	 the	 government’s	constituency	from	the	region,	eliminating	government	capacity	to	build	any	type	of	 force	 to	 challenge	 rebel	 control.	 The	 conflict	 in	 Burundi	 undermined	 the	government’s	capacity	to	generate	the	resources	necessary	to	keep	the	organs	of	the	state	functioning,	forcing	it	to	engage	in	political	reform	to	end	the	conflict.			
Rebel	mobilisation		The	cases	also	showed	how	rebels	build	their	own	sovereign	structures	to	create	pressure	 on	 governments.	 Every	 rebel	 group	 featured	 in	 the	 case	 studies	developed	 institutions	 that	 shaped	 population	 behaviour	 and	 drew	 resources	from	 communities.	 The	 Zimbabwean	 rebels	 probably	 created	 the	 least	comprehensive	 shadow	 governance,	 in	 that	 they	 did	 not	 provide	 services,	facilitate	 economic	 activity	 or	 establish	 internal	 security	 forces.	 Nevertheless,	ZANU	and	ZAPU	achieved	more	through	their	mobilisation	structures	 than	the	CNDD-FDD	and	the	Nagorno-Karabakh	rebels,	in	terms	of	the	ultimate	outcome	of	 the	war.	The	strength	and	nature	of	 rebel	mobilisation	networks,	 therefore,	was	not	as	decisive	as	government	capacity	to	absorb	the	costs	of	the	conflict	for	determining	whether	rebel	groups	win	outright,	exactly	as	predicted	when	the	two	caveats	are	added	to	the	logic	of	war	as	a	mobilisation	competition.			Based	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 their	 mobilisation	 structures,	 insurgents	 employ	 a	military	strategy	that	allows	them	to	continually	replace	losses	on	the	battlefield.	This	 allows	 them	 to	 strain	 the	 government’s	 capacity	 to	 raise	 the	 resources	
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necessary	to	hold	onto	power.	Relatively	weaker	groups,	such	as	the	insurgents	in	Zimbabwe	and	Burundi,	use	guerrilla-style	warfare.	The	strain	this	created	in	these	 conflicts	 had	 a	 much	 slower	 effect	 on	 the	 government	 than	 the	 more	conventional-style	 operations	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 employed	 after	 1970.	Nevertheless,	 the	 Zimbabwean	 rebels	 won	 the	 war	 in	 the	 same	 way;	 by	undermining	the	very	basis	of	government	control	over	the	state.		Rebel	 groups	 that	 build	 stronger	 armies	 may	 be	 able	 to	 demobilise	 the	government	 more	 quickly.	 They	 can	 capture	 economically	 and	 politically	important	targets,	boosting	their	own	mobilisation	capacity	and	weakening	the	government	in	large	steps.	The	Nagorno-Karabakh	rebels	captured	territory	that	opened	 up	 supply	 routes	 to	 the	Republic	 of	 Armenia,	 better	 enabling	 them	 to	draw	 support	 from	 their	 external	 patron	 and	 facilitate	 internal	 state-building	activity.	The	Zimbabwean	rebels,	 in	contrast,	chipped	away	at	minor	economic	and	 political	 targets,	 such	 as	 local	 government	 institutions,	 roads,	 agricultural	production	and	 infrastructure,	undermining	 the	capacity	of	 the	government	 to	facilitate	 the	 life	 the	white	 settler	 community	demanded.	These	 types	of	 rebel	groups	must	place	more	emphasis	on	demobilising	the	government’s	economic	and	political	institutions	compared	to	relatively	stronger	rebel	groups.	Stronger	rebels	 can	 capture	 territory	 directly	 and	 create	 much	 more	 comprehensive	mobilisation	 structures,	 as	 the	 rebels	 managed	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 and	Cambodia.	 These	 structures	 can	 be	 used	 to	 create	 so	 much	 strain	 on	 the	government	that	it	collapses	completely,	as	in	Cambodia,	or	they	can	be	used	to	build	 a	 more	 conventional	 force	 that	 can	 capture	 and	 hold	 territory,	 as	 in	Nagorno-Karabakh.	 Asymmetric	 and	 conventional	 conflicts,	 therefore,	 are	 not	fundamentally	different.	They	represent	parts	of	a	single	process	that	the	rebels	are	trying	to	force	the	conflict	through.			The	empirical	work	in	this	thesis	showed	how	both	strong	and	weak	rebel	groups	win.	 The	 challenge	 for	 rebel	 groups	 is	 to	 understand	 the	 resilience	 of	 their	support-base,	 the	 foundation	 of	 government	 control,	 and	 select	 a	 strategy	accordingly.	 If	 they	 succeed,	 rebels	 can	 win	 without	 ever	 having	 to	 push	 the	
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conflict	 through	all	 the	phases	 identified	 in	 the	 ideal-type,	 as	demonstrated	 in	Zimbabwe.			
Demobilising	rebels		Governments,	 if	 they	 are	 to	 fend	 off	 the	 challenges	 of	 organised	 rebel	 forces,	cannot	 blast	 them	 off	 the	 battlefield,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 Rhodesian	government.	 Governments	 win	 when	 they	 demobilise	 rebels	 through	undercutting	their	capacity	to	generate	popular	support.	Whether	a	rebel	group	is	 1,000	 or	 100,000	 strong	 is	 less	 relevant	 than	 its	 ability	 to	 replace	 those	personnel.	It	is	this	regenerative	capacity	that	determines	its	freedom	to	act	and	drain	government	resources	in	the	longer	term.	In	Burundi,	the	government	used	political	reform	to	undercut	the	CNDD-FDD’s	ability	to	mobilise	support,	forcing	the	 insurgency	 to	 embrace	 the	 newly	 formed	 democratic	 structures	 it	 had	previously	rejected.		
Conflict	as	an	iterative	process		Framing	 civil	 war	 as	 an	 asymmetric	 mobilisation	 competition	 turns	 it	 into	 a	continuous	process	of	alliance	building	and	breaking	between	conflict	actors	and	the	 population,	 exactly	 as	 described	 by	 Stathis	 Kalyvas	 (2006).	 Belligerent	behaviour	 during	 the	 conflict	 itself	 determines	 changes	 in	 their	 mobilisation	capacities	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 demobilise	 their	 opponent.	 Academics	 and	government	 analysts	 need	 to	 look	 at	 how	 events	 in	 the	 conflict	 affect	 the	mobilisation	 capacities	 of	 the	 belligerents.	 This	 would	 allow	 them	 to	 better	predict	the	dynamics	of	ongoing	and	future	wars	and	speak	about	civil	war	in	the	same	terms;	a	battle	to	generate	support	from	the	population.			
Counterinsurgency	doctrine			This	 thesis	also	represented	a	 first	attempt	 to	comparatively	 test	 the	 tenets	of	current	 counterinsurgency	 doctrine;	 development,	 governance	 and	 security.	These	 three	 areas	 do	 correspond	 to	 many	 of	 the	 facets	 that	 determined	 the	
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strength	 of	 belligerents	 in	 the	 case	 studies.	 However,	 the	 way	 development,	governance	 and	 security	 shaped	 population	 behaviour	 differed	 to	 how	 it	 is	currently	described	in	doctrine	(JCS,	2013).			
Development	
	Both	 the	 statistical	 analysis	 and	 case	 studies	 reinforced	 the	 importance	 of	socioeconomic	incentives.	The	model	showed	strong	support	for	the	idea	that	a	government	 losing	 the	capacity	 to	 facilitate	socioeconomic	activity	and	deliver	basic	 services	 is	more	 likely	 to	 lose	 a	 civil	war.	 The	 quantitative	 analysis	 also	found	some	support	 for	the	 idea	that	governments	benefit	 from	improving	the	economy.			Governments	 in	 Burundi,	 Cambodia	 and	 Zimbabwe	 lost	 control	 because	 they	could	 not	 generate	 the	 economic	 incentives	 to	 motivate	 participation	 in	 the	military	and	civil	service.	The	government	in	Burundi	took	steps	to	redress	this,	implementing	 political	 reform	 in	 exchange	 for	 external	 economic	 aid.	 The	Rhodesian	and	Cambodian	governments	could	not	find	a	way	to	overcome	this	problem	 and	 surrendered	 power.	 The	 evidence	 from	 the	 case	 studies	 and	 the	statistical	 model	 is	 that	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 government’s	 ability	 to	 facilitate	socioeconomic	activity	is	the	most	effective	predictor	that	a	government	is	going	to	be	defeated.		The	declining	economy	in	Zimbabwe	and	Cambodia	led	to	an	inability	to	generate	support	from	the	government’s	constituent	population.	However,	it	happened	in	two	 contrasting	 fashions.	 In	 Cambodia,	 it	 induced	 a	 humanitarian	 catastrophe	that	 caused	 the	population	 to	disengage.	 In	 Zimbabwe,	 it	 led	 the	white	 settler	community	to	emigrate	in	order	to	avoid	conscription.	The	cases	also	showed	that	governments	 can	 lessen	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 drop	 in	GDP	by	 drawing	 support	 from	external	 sources,	 as	 in	 Burundi,	 or	 by	 passing	 negative	 effects	 onto	 non-constituent	communities,	as	the	Rhodesian	government	managed	for	a	number	of	years.			
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These	two	features	of	the	case	studies	explain	why	GDP	appeared	to	have	a	small	substantive	effect	on	civil	war	outcomes	in	the	statistical	model.	A	drop	in	GDP	is	significant	 for	 a	 government,	 but	 it	 only	 leads	 to	 it	 losing	 the	 war	 when	 it	translates	 into	 an	 inability	 to	 specifically	 build	 support	 from	 its	 constituent	population.	Analysts	looking	at	specific	wars	need	to	examine	how	a	decline	in	overall	 economic	 output	 affects	 a	 government’s	 relationship	 with	 its	 own	constituent	 population	 if	 they	 want	 to	 understand	 how	 the	 war	 is	 likely	 to	proceed.			The	case	studies	showed	that	rebel	ability	to	facilitate	socioeconomic	activity	can	also	 play	 a	 role	 in	 determining	 the	 strength	 of	 rebel	 groups.	 Rebel	 groups	 in	Cambodia,	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	Burundi	all	built	effective	shadow	economies	that	 enabled	 them	 to	 generate	 support.	 The	 structures	 these	 rebels	 created	showed	 the	 importance	 of	 socioeconomic	 activity	 beyond	 just	 incentivising	popular	 support.	 Economic	 activity	 generates	 resources,	 such	 as	 finances	 and	food,	which	belligerents	then	use	to	build	and	sustain	armed	forces.	How	conflict	actors	 maximise	 the	 support	 they	 generate	 from	 the	 population,	 in	 terms	 of	tangible	 resources,	 is	 often	 overlooked.	When	 a	 conflict	 actor	 fails	 to	 sustain	socioeconomic	activity	 it	 is	normally	only	analysed	 in	 terms	of	whether	 it	will	induce	popular	opposition	(Lund,	2015).	This	thesis	shows	that	this	misses	out	a	key	variable	for	understanding	the	dynamics	and	outcomes	of	civil	wars.	Analysts	need	to	examine	the	resources	belligerents	are	generating	from	the	population.	The	ability	of	an	actor	to	do	this	determines	its	‘popular	support’,	not	whether	the	population	identify	with	its	goals.			
Governance	
	The	 statistical	model	 implied	 that	 political	 incentives	 are	 key	 to	 the	 ability	 of	governments	to	generate	support.	The	government	in	Burundi	showed	itself	to	be	adhering	to	the	new	political	order	it	had	promised.	This	motivated	refugees	to	return	to	the	country	rather	than	support	the	CNDD-FDD.	It	also	led	to	fighters	laying	down	their	weapons	on	the	basis	they	had	achieved	their	aims.			
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Equally,	 rebels	generated	support	by	creating	effective	political	 structures	and	undermining	 government	 institutions.	 The	 conflict	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh,	however,	showed	that	it	was	not	the	post-war	vision	of	governance	that	mattered,	but	 creating	 credible	 structures	 that	 conditioned	population	behaviour	during	the	war.	It	was	the	rebels’	ability	to	exploit	a	changing	context	and	build	effective	sovereign	structures	 that	enabled	 them	to	generate	 the	behavioural	 support	 it	needed	to	build	an	army.	These	political	structures	delivered	the	socioeconomic	and	security	benefits	that	shaped	population	behaviour.	The	rebels	in	Cambodia	and	Burundi	used	shadow	governance	to	improve	agricultural	production	so	the	population	could	eat	and	trade.	Once	 these	structures	started	 functioning	 they	generated	resources	that	the	rebels	used	to	sustain	military	activity.	All	the	rebel	groups	 covered	 in	 this	 thesis	 used	 the	 structures	 they	 created	 to	 organise	recruitment	 and	 generate	 finances,	 food	 and	 other	 types	 of	 supplies.	Without	these	structures	there	would	have	been	no	war.			The	flipside	of	this	is	that	when	governance	breaks	down	a	belligerent	loses	the	capacity	to	shape	behaviour.	Government	institutions	were	degraded	across	large	parts	of	the	state	in	Burundi,	Azerbaijan,	Zimbabwe	and	Cambodia.	As	a	result,	the	governments	surrendered	their	ability	to	shape	population	behaviour	in	these	areas.			Governance	structures	are,	by	definition,	the	means	through	which	belligerents	draw	support	back	out	from	the	population	in	the	form	of	manpower,	finances	and	supplies.	If	rebels	undermine	government	institutions,	then	the	government	can	 no	 longer	 generate	 and	 distribute	 the	 resources	 that	 keep	 it	 in	 power.	Building	and	destroying	sovereign	structures	for	generating	support,	therefore,	becomes	a	key	element	of	any	conflict	and	is	why	counterinsurgency	theorists,	such	as	Bard	O’Neill,	describe	civil	wars	as	political,	rather	than	military	in	nature	(1990).			
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Security	
	Providing	security	to	the	population	has	primacy	in	current	counterinsurgency	doctrine	(JCS,	2013).	In	the	case	studies,	 insecurity	drove	local	communities	to	support	militias	 in	 Burundi,	 Cambodia	 and	Nagorno-Karabakh.	 Insecurity	 also	pushed	many	white	settlers	to	leave	Zimbabwe,	undermining	the	economy	and	the	 government’s	 ability	 to	 mobilise	 a	 force	 to	 confront	 the	 insurgency.	Populations	 clearly	 seek	 to	 avoid	 insecurity	 and	 will	 withdraw	 support	 from	actors	 that	 cannot	 bring	 stability,	 just	 as	 the	 white	 settler	 community	 did	 in	Zimbabwe	or	the	Azerbaijani	population	did	in	Nagorno-Karabakh.	The	security	cover	 that	 the	 North	 Vietnamese	 and	 Armenian	 armies	 provided	 the	 Khmer	Rouge	and	Nagorno-Karabakh	rebels	respectively	also	proved	crucial	in	enabling	the	rebels	to	build	shadow	governance	structures	that	mobilised	resources	from	the	population.			The	evidence	from	the	case	studies	and	the	statistical	model	showed,	however,	that	governments	and	rebels	have	to	do	more	than	provide	security	to	generate	the	support	they	need	to	win	wars.	Insecurity	is	far	more	important	than	security.	In	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	Zimbabwe	populations	fled	insecure	areas,	essentially	demobilising	the	government	completely	in	these	parts	of	the	state.	Security	is,	therefore,	 important	 in	 that	 it	 facilitates	 the	 economic	 and	 socio-political	behaviour	that	generates	resources	for	the	government.	If	governments	are	too	weak	to	stimulate	this	type	of	activity	regardless,	then	the	provision	of	security	may	well	be	moot.	Only	resilient	political,	social	and	economic	structures	shape	population	 behaviour	 on	 a	 large	 enough	 scale	 to	 significantly	 weaken	 rebel	groups,	as	evidenced	in	Burundi,	where	security	followed	political	reform.			
Other	variables	
	
Violence	
	The	introduction	showed	the	extent	of	the	current	literature	on	how	belligerents	use	 violence	 to	 shape	 population	 behaviour.	 The	 case	 studies	 reiterated	 the	
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central	role	of	population-focused	violence	in	shaping	conflict	outcomes.	We	also	uncovered	 an	 additional	 reason	 as	 to	 why	 violence	 may	 fail	 to	 stymie	 rebel	groups.		The	governments	in	Burundi	and	Zimbabwe	contributed	to	their	own	economic	problems	by	coercing	the	population	into	stopping	agricultural	activity	in	many	areas	for	fear	that	the	output	was	being	used	to	support	rebel	groups.	Violence	can	induce	a	population	to	provide	passive	support,	but	cannot	generate	the	level	of	 resources	 of	 a	 mutually	 beneficial	 relationship.	 Violence	 works,	 therefore,	when	governments	can	afford	to	pacify	the	rebel’s	constituent	population	over	the	 long	 term.	 It	 cannot	 create	 effective,	 resource-generating	 sovereign-structures,	be	they	informal	rebel	networks	or	government	institutions.	While	I	hope	the	use	of	violence	against	civilian	populations	is	not	an	area	from	which	Western	 governments	 are	 seeking	 to	 take	 lessons,	 the	need	 to	make	 relations	with	 the	 population	 mutually	 productive	 remains	 pertinent.	 A	 similar	 logic	explains	why	simply	providing	local	security	is	not	enough	to	defeat	insurgencies.	
	
Shaping	strategies		Population	 support,	 when	 framed	 as	 a	 behavioural	 contribution	 rather	 than	sentiment,	 is	 the	key	element	of	 any	war.	Other	 factors,	 however,	 dictate	how	much	 support	 belligerents	 need	 to	 raise	 internally,	 whether	 they	 can	 rely	 on	passive	support	alone	as	well	as	how	conflict	actors	choose	to	generate	support.	These	variables	are	often	crucial	in	determining	the	war’s	outcome	and	the	ability	of	 belligerents	 to	 build	 resilient	 mobilisation	 structures	 that	 sustain	 military	activity.	I	do	not	intend	to	revisit	every	outside	factor	raised	through	this	thesis.	Two	 factors,	 however,	 are	worth	 recounting	given	how	often	 they	 come	up	 in	policy	debates.			External	support	had	a	positive	effect	for	most	belligerents,	both	in	the	statistical	model	 and	 across	 the	 case	 studies.	 This	 challenges	 the	 current	 notion	 that	external	forces	cannot	defeat	local	rebellions	(Jones,	2008).	External	support	in	the	 statistical	 model	 explicitly	meant	 ‘boots	 on	 the	 ground’	 and	 the	 rebels	 in	
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Cambodia	 and	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 could	 not	 have	 won	 without	 direct	intervention	from	North	Vietnamese	and	Republic	of	Armenia	forces	respectively.			External	support,	up	to	and	including	‘boots	on	the	ground’,	does,	therefore,	work.	However,	 it	has	 to	be	used	by	a	conflict	actor	 to	build	credible	 institutions	 for	asserting	 sovereign	 control	 across	 the	 state.	 The	Khmer	Republic	 government	received	 as	 much	 support	 as	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge,	 yet	 it	 only	 employed	 this	assistance	militarily,	and	once	it	was	withdrawn	the	government	quickly	fell.	If	external	actors	cannot	find	a	way	of	ensuring	support	is	used	effectively,	it	creates	an	 aid	 trap	with	 governments	 believing	 their	 patron	will	 keep	 them	 in	 power	indefinitely.	Both	Afghanistan	and	Iraq	followed	this	pattern	and	they	continue	to	struggle	 to	 overcome	 the	 rebel	 forces	 that	Western	militaries	 and	 indigenous	populations	paid	such	a	significant	human	and	financial	cost	to	contain.	External	patrons	need	 to	 find	a	credible	means	of	ensuring	 the	security	assistance	 they	provide	is	used	to	create	effective	sovereign	structures.	Failure	to	do	this	is	what	leads	to	external	forces	getting	sucked	into	conflicts	they	cannot	win	against	small	bands	of	guerrilla	forces.	Based	on	the	logic	of	asymmetric	conflict,	as	originally	proposed	 by	 Ivan	 Arreguıń-Toft	 (2005),	 there	 will	 always	 be	 a	 strategy	 that	allows	 rebels	 to	 induce	 a	 military	 stalemate.	 What	 happens	 politically	 and	economically	behind	this	stalemate	determines	the	outcome	of	the	conflict	even	when	it	involves	the	most	advanced	militaries	in	the	world.			This	 thesis	 has	 also	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 ideology	 in	 shaping	belligerent	 behaviour.	 Much	 has	 been	 made	 of	 ISIL’s	 ideological	 appeal	 as	 a	recruitment	tool	(G.	Wood,	2015).	This,	however,	misses	a	key	role	of	ideology.	Ideology,	particularly	in	the	case	of	the	Khmer	Rouge,	helped	the	rebels	to	win	because	it	provided	a	ready-made	framework	for	building	a	shadow-state.	Rebels	that	have	a	clear	vision	 for	 the	post-war	state,	 such	as	 ISIL,	may	well	be	more	powerful,	but	not	just	because	their	vision	is	appealing.	Their	power	comes	from	their	mobilisation	structures,	which	are,	whether	by	design	or	not,	grounded	in	a	broader	 ideology.	 This	 makes	 them	 more	 effective	 than	 less-ideologically	motivated	rebel	groups.			
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The	role	of	ideology	can,	however,	swing	both	ways.	The	government’s	support	in	Zimbabwe	rested	strongly	on	the	belief	that	whites	were	superior	to	African	communities.	 The	 regime	 could	 not	 countenance	 opening	 up	 electoral	participation	 to	 Africans,	 nor	 could	 it	 expand	 the	 army	 to	 include	 them.	 An	ideology	 can	 provide	 a	 framework	 for	 drawing	 broad	 support	 from	 the	population,	but	it	can	also	constrain	a	belligerent’s	capacity	to	build	relationships	across	different	communities.	Conflict	observers	need	to	understand	whether	a	belligerent’s	 ideology	provides	a	 framework	for	broadening	or	constraining	 its	capacity	to	generate	support	beyond	its	hard-core	group	of	supporters.	Treating	ideology	 in	 this	 way	 provides	 a	 better	 framework	 for	 assessing	 its	 long-term	importance	 in	 particular	 conflicts	 compared	 to	 current	 debates,	 which	 solely	focus	 on	 whether	 an	 ideology	 really	 is	 appealing	 to	 a	 mass	 audience	 (Dagli,	2015).74			
Recommendations		
	A	 number	 of	 recommendations	 fall	 out	 of	 this	 thesis,	 both	 for	 academics	 and	practitioners.			
Academia	
	The	first	implication	of	this	thesis	is	how	academia	should	be	using	comparative	data	on	rebel	numbers	and	the	balance	of	power.	Stronger	rebel	groups	inevitably	create	greater	pressure	on	governments	than	smaller	ones.	By	the	time	a	rebel	group	has	grown	in	size,	however,	it	is	often	too	late	for	the	policy	community	to	take	appropriate	action.	Rebel	groups	explicitly	use	civil	war	to	grow	in	power	and	demobilise	the	government.	Decision-makers	need	help	understanding	when	rebel	 groups	 are	 likely	 to	 grow	 in	 size	 and	 when	 governments	 are	 likely	 to	struggle	 to	 cope	with	 them.	 Rebel	 numbers	 and	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 should	become	dependent	variables	for	academic	study.		
																																																						74	The	referenced	article	explicitly	responds	to	the	Graeme	Wood	article	cited	in	the	previous	paragraph.	This	sort	of	debate	is	common	in	magazines	such	as	The	Atlantic,	which	often	then	feeds	into	policy	discussions.		
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Both	comparative	and	single-conflict	analysis	should	be	examining	government	capacity	to	absorb	the	costs	of	the	conflict	and	rebel	capacity	to	inflict	those	costs,	both	in	the	short	and	long	term.	This	study	represents	a	first	step,	but	there	are	many	ways	it	can	be	improved.	I	have	chosen,	for	a	number	of	reasons,	to	focus	on	the	first	part	of	this	equation;	government	capacity	to	absorb	the	costs	of	the	conflict.	However,	we	also	need	 to	 collect	 comparable	data	on	 rebel	 sovereign	structures.	 Comparable	data	 on	 rebel	 funding,	 shadow	economies,	 governance	structures	 and	 rudimentary	 services	would	offer	 enormous	 insights	 into	what	types	of	rebel	groups	represent	the	most	significant	challenge	to	governments.	We	 would	 then	 be	 in	 a	 better	 position	 to	 directly	 compare	 the	 resilience	 of	government	 and	 rebel	 mobilisation	 capacities	 and	 generate	 a	 more	 powerful	model	of	civil	war	outcomes.			I	have	also	focused	on	a	very	narrow	element	of	government	relations	with	the	population,	namely	formal	political	and	economic	institutions.	As	William	Reno	(2007)	and	Lee	Seymour	(2014)	show,	many	states	are	held	together	by	looser	networks	 of	 informal	 patronage-based	 alliances.	 Partly	 through	 its	 own	mismanagement,	 this	 was	 the	 situation	 the	 coalition	 found	 itself	 in	 both	Afghanistan	 and	 Iraq.	 The	 policy	 and	military	 communities	 need	 studies	 that	explore	what	works	in	these	types	of	situations.	As	Mark	Duffield	points	out,	the	ability	of	local	actors	to	exploit	Western	interventions	for	their	own	ends	has,	in	many	cases,	just	further	entrenched	the	social,	political	and	economic	drivers	of	these	 wars	 (2005).	 The	 broader	 framework	 developed	 in	 this	 thesis	 offers	 a	sensible	template	for	exploring	this	phenomenon.			
Policymakers	
	Analysts	 in	 governments	 around	 the	world	 need	 to	 look	 at	 the	 resilience	 and	adaptability	of	the	mobilisation	structures	governments	and	rebels	are	using	to	generate	support.	We	need	to	understand	what	phase	the	war	is	in	–	irregular,	asymmetric	 or	 conventional	 –	 and	 assess	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 belligerents	 to	transition	 the	 conflict	 through	 these	 phases	 by	 increasing	 their	 regenerative	capacity	and	degrading	that	of	their	opponent.	Looking	at	conflicts	through	this	
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lens	will	allow	us	to	get	ahead	of	the	game	and	properly	inform	decision-makers	on	 how	 wars	 are	 likely	 to	 proceed.	 The	 overall	 resilience	 of	 a	 government’s	control	over	its	state	will	be	the	key	to	its	ability	to	survive	a	civil	war,	not	just	the	size	of	its	army.			At	 any	given	point	 in	 time	a	 rebel	 group’s	power	 to	 regenerate	will	 be	at	100	percent,	 because	 it	 will	 choose	 its	 level	 of	 activity	 to	 reflect	 its	 regenerative	capacity.75	We	need	to	understand	what	determines	its	regenerative	capacity	and	focus	activity	accordingly.	Targeting	a	group’s	regenerative	capacity	will	have	far	more	impact	than	‘direct’	targeting,	as	a	rebel	group	will	base	its	activity	around	a	 perceived	 ability	 to	 absorb	 these	 losses.	 Cambodian	 and	 Zimbabwe	 rebels	suffered	enormous	casualties	but	no	loss	in	operational	capacity.			The	need	to	focus	on	a	rebel	group’s	regenerative	capacity	applies	just	as	much	to	kinetic	targeting,	as	it	does	political	and	development	activities.	Undermining	its	 regenerative	 capacity	 will	 force	 a	 rebel	 group	 to	 adapt	 its	 behaviour	 and	reduce	its	level	of	activity,	much	more	than	the	killing	of	insurgents,	thus	creating	less	 strain	 on	 the	 government.	 Rebel	 groups	 will	 adapt	 to	 pressure	 on	 their	mobilisation	capacities	and	policymakers	and	military	strategists	will	need	to	be	flexible	in	response.	Effective	intervention	strategies	that	weaken	an	insurgency’s	mobilisation	capacity,	however,	will	gradually	eliminate	rebel	capacity	to	operate.			That	said,	there	is	no	quick	fix	for	defeating	rebel	groups.	They	can	only	be	slowly	degraded	 as	 improving	political	 and	 socioeconomic	 conditions	 eliminate	 rebel	capacity	to	regenerate.	We	must	recognise	that	overseas	interventions	are	likely	to	require	a	long-term	commitment	of	economic,	political	and	military	resources	if	 they	 are	 to	 have	 any	 chance	 of	 success.	 If	 this	 cannot	 be	 assured,	 then	interventions	will	fail	to	create	a	lasting	solution.	If	host-nation	governments	do	not	use	external	military	support	to	develop	effective	political	and	socioeconomic	
																																																						75	Rebels	can,	of	course,	miscalculate	their	regenerative	capacity.	However,	I	would	suggest	this	is	a	dangerous	assumption	to	make.		
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institutions,	 then	 no	 amount	 of	 military	 commitment	 will	 be	 enough,	 as	demonstrated	by	the	limited	effect	of	the	enormous	US	commitment	in	Cambodia.			We	 need	 to	 better	 define	 what	 constitutes	 a	 tactical	 effect	 in	 civil	 war	 by	examining	wars	where	governments	survived,	not	Zimbabwe.	Counterinsurgency	differentiates	between	direct	and	 indirect	 targeting	 (JCS,	2013).	This	 creates	a	false	dichotomy	in	that	it	implies	direct	targeting	to	be	affecting	the	root	of	the	problem.	However,	as	Zimbabwe	shows,	it	is	direct	targeting	that	is	tangential	to	the	main	battleground	of	the	conflict.	Former	ISAF	Commander	in	Afghanistan,	General	 Stanley	McChrystal,	 uses	 the	 term	 “insurgent	math”	 to	 describe	 rebel	efforts	 to	 induce	 government	 retaliation;	 “for	 every	 innocent	 local	 the	incumbent’s	 forces	kill,	 they	 create	 ten	new	 insurgents”	 (Dreyfuss,	 2013).	The	same	logic	should	be	applied	to	all	government	activity.	If	it	does	not	undermine	rebel	capacity	to	generate	support,	then	it	has	no	utility,	regardless	of	how	many	insurgents	have	been	taken	off	the	battlefield.	It	is	tempting	to	assess	that	people	will	be	deterred	from	joining	rebel	groups	if	they	face	significant	casualties	or	that	rebels	 cannot	 replace	 experienced	 commanders.	 While	 this	 may	 be	 true	 in	isolated	cases,	the	figures	from	Afghanistan,	Cambodia	and	Zimbabwe,	show	this	is	 not	 the	 norm.	 We	 must	 assume	 killed	 insurgents	 were	 on	 the	 battlefield	because	they	could	be	replaced;	this	applies	to	those	in	leadership	positions	just	as	much	as	foot	soldiers.	Undermining	a	rebel	group’s	regenerative	capacity	is	the	only	 way	 to	 ‘directly’	 target	 and	 weaken	 it,	 as	 the	 government	 in	 Burundi	managed.			Practitioners	 also	 need	 to	 steer	 away	 from	understanding	 popular	 support	 as	largely	dependent	on	legitimacy.	Stathis	Kalyvas	presented	the	idea	that	support	needs	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 behaviour,	 not	 an	 opinion	 (2006).	 This	 thesis	strongly	reinforces	that	notion	and	takes	it	further	by	urging	analysts	to	view	it	as	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 strength	 of	 a	 group.	 When	 examining	 sovereign	structures,	be	they	clandestine	networks	or	formal	institutions,	we	need	to	focus	on	their	effectiveness	at	creating	the	desired	behavioural	effect,	not	just	whether	they	accord	with	cultural	norms.			
	
	
	
	
282	
Final	words	
	Regardless	of	whether	an	analyst	is	from	academia	or	the	policy	community,	this	thesis	demonstrates	the	utility	of	viewing	civil	war	as	an	asymmetric	mobilisation	competition.	The	explanation	for	the	beginning,	middle	and	end	of	civil	wars,	past,	present	 and	 future,	will	 be	 found	 in	 changes	 to	 the	mobilisation	 capacities	 of	conflict	 actors.	 Civil	 war	 is	 about	 controlling	 the	 state,	 which	means	 building	resilient	sovereign	alliances	across	the	population	in	order	to	create	a	resilient	regeneration	capacity.	Governments	need	to	assert	sovereignty	across	the	whole	state,	while	rebels	seek	to	undermine	their	solution	for	achieving	this,	inducing	the	government	to	collapse.	Regenerative	capacity	is	determined	by	the	ability	of	a	conflict	to	generate	popular	support;	understood	as	a	behaviour	not	sentiment.	This	 is	how	popular	support	determines	 the	outcome	of	conflicts	and	explains	how	small	rebel	groups	are	able	to	frustrate	the	most	powerful	military	forces	in	the	world.					 	
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